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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates whether humans possess the capacity to resist ideology via two 
dimensions: empirical analysis and philosophical discourse. For the empirical analysis, 
academic ideology-specialists and their publications (articles related to ideological analysis 
or critique (IAC)) are selected as research subjects. Through analysing ideology-specialists’ 
IAC works, this thesis attempts to examine their immunity against (their own or social) 
ideology and humans’ limitation of undertaking (ideological) critique. Inspired by the 
Frankfurt School’s argument of standardisation in cultural creations, this thesis has analysed 
33 IAC articles to determine whether these IAC works are composed in the same way and 
lead to an academic industry (as with the culture industry critiqued by Adorno and 
Horkheimer). Based on the commonalities between the 33 IAC articles, it has been found 
that standard writing procedures (SWPs) when writing IAC articles do indeed exist. 
Accordingly, through an empirical analysis, this thesis argues that ideology critics are 
incapable of exempting from either their own or from the social ideology in which they are 
embedded. Humans’ capacity to undertake a neutrally and objectively ideological critique is 
limited. 
 In the philosophical discourse, Adorno’s works are selected since many of his ideas 
seem to guide a way out of ideology’s dungeon; yet, Adorno only succeeds in a theoretical 
dimension. His discourses have conveyed certain significations that represent his personal 
ideology resulting from his life experience. His defeat reveals the limitation of undertaking 
(ideological) critique: criticising one subject, even through an ideological angle, involves an 
ideology itself. Finally, in order to solve this dilemma of fatalism, this thesis suggests the 
concept of humbleness and the action of self-critique. The former asks readers to realise 
humans’ limitation of undertaking a neutral and objective (ideological) critique, so that 
humans have to minimise their egocentricity. The latter indicates a possible way to escape 
from ideology. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Motivation, Research Question, and Debate 
Discourse and semiotic analyses were adopted in my MA dissertation to illustrate American 
hegemony in Hollywood superhero films. Yet, the more I criticised the films, the more I 
found myself involved and identifying with the American hegemony. Although I have often 
watched the scene in which Superman saves an airplane, I still feel excited and nervous 
whenever I watch it. Such reaction has confused me. If people, like me, consider themselves 
critics, how might they acknowledge the ideology that they are arguing? If so-called critics 
cannot avoid the influences from their own or the social total ideology, how could they 
obtain authority to claim the validity of their critique? 
 Of course, Sahin (1980) was correct in saying that researchers do not have to despise a 
subject in order to analyse the hidden hegemony. However, in my opinion, since researchers 
have learned or developed various theories and are considered people who can lead others to 
see social injustice or unbalanced power relationships, for example, they should respond 
differently from the public, to be responsible for the arguments resulting from their critique 
and analysis, and to be the vanguard of the critical response.  
 What is it that makes analysts or critics, like me, on the one hand, think they have 
understood/discovered/criticised the ideology of their research, yet, simultaneously surrender 
to their research subjects on the other? Are analysts/critics really capable of delineating the 
ideology of their research? Or, is the unacceptable fact that the ideology they describe always 
and already influenced/determined by another more obscure, unidentifiable, insensible but 
powerful ideology embedded in their consciousness, abounding in the social condition in 
which they live? Accordingly, my prime question is: 
 Are analysts or critics capable of exempting from the influences of their own and 
social ideology, even if they are experts in ideology studies?  
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 If so, then another question is: By what given authority, can one state that one’s 
analysis/critique is valid, without any personal opinions? In fact, any humans’ discussions 
(even those not related to ideology) are all the products of ideology, without exception, 
because every discussion is based on ones’ personal ideology to examine/argue against 
another’s ideology which, eventually, will fall into an endless loop of ‘critique of critique of 
critique…’. Research on ideology will always face the curse of circular reasoning. Criticising 
one subject involves an ideology itself (McLellan, 1995; Larrain, 1994; Thompson, 1990; 
Žižek, 1989). Just as people cannot use the word labour to describe Marx’s notion of labour, 
criticizing a system of human consciousness, by using another system of human 
consciousness, is similar to Escher’s drawings: the ‘paradox… of two hands drawing each 
other’ (Žižek, 1989, p. 47). In short, if one claims that he/she is able to criticise/analyse one 
ideology neutrally and objectively, the question is: how can they avoid involving their own 
ideology to do so?  
 On the contrary, if the answer is not, then what is the meaning/purpose of 
critique/analysis (of ideology)? Alternatively, why do people continue to criticise/analyse if 
all discussions, ab ovo, are the products of discussants’ own ideology? If humans’ conscious 
actions always refer to certain guiding ideology, the reason for humans’ existence becomes 
even harder to understand. 
 Whether critics/analysts are capable of neutrally and objectively undertaking their 
analysis/critique which is exempt from the influences of their own and social ideology, or 
whether the results of their analyses are the conscious products determined by their own or 
social ideology? These questions, which attempt to examine humans’ limitation during their 
analysis, will be answered through this thesis. 
 
1.2 Framing the Subject 
Based on above discussion, three subjects revealing the kernel of this thesis are: humans, 
(ideological) critique/analysis, and ideology. To investigate these three subjects’ 
inter-relationships, this thesis focuses on academics’ conscious activities, examining 
academic publications which specifically refer to the type of ideological critique/analysis. 
This is to observe how they present their works as well as seeing if they are able to impart 
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their critique/analysis neutrally and objectively, without involving personal opinions. Further 
explanation is provided below.  
 1) Humans: In this study, I specifically refer to ideology-specialists. By these I mean 
scholars who are familiar with ideology-related theories. Ideological-specialists have been 
promoted to a higher position as the few people who are able to carry the role of 
real-intellectuals. They are, or might be, the most capable people who can escape from the 
intervention of ideology. 
 2) Critique/analysis: Critique and analysis are actions resulting from humans’ conscious 
activities. This thesis focuses on academics’ publications (e.g., journals, books, or chapters) 
which claim to be written from the angle of ideological analysis or critique (IAC). The 
reason for selecting the ‘ideological’ angle is: what other angle of critique/analysis is capable 
of avoiding the interference of ideology if those which adopt the ‘ideological’ angle cannot. 
 The two points above establish this thesis’ task: to investigate how academics 
compose/present their works of critique/analysis especially when they claim to undertake 
their analysis/critique through the perspective of ideology. In so doing, this thesis seeks to 
answer the research question: Are analysts or critics capable of escaping from the influences 
of social and indeed their own ideology, even if they are experts in ideology studies? In other 
words, it is also a work to determine the limitation of ideological critique. 
 Another subject of this thesis is 3) ideology. In this thesis, ideology refers to a strength 
which influences how analysts undertake their conscious works. It not only means the 
academics’ own ideology, which directs how they present their works, but also means the 
social total ideology which invisibly determines/influences the making of their personal 
ideology.  
 People’s recognition of ideology’s power has changed through time. A famous 
description originally from Marx is that “they do not know it, but they do it” (Marx & 
Dragstedt, 1976, p. 36, also see Žižek, 1989, p.29). To some elucidators, this indicated 
Marx’s concept of false consciousness. Sloterdijk (cited in Žižek, 1989) reinterpreted the 
capacity of ideology as “they know very well what they are doing, but still, they are doing it” 
(p. 29). Sloterdijk was right about the capability of ideology; yet, the significance/reference 
of his sentence seems too general and imprecise.  
Introduction 
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 First, the ‘they’ should be classified carefully while reading this sentence. Who might 
be the ‘they’ able to recognize ideology is a critical question with which this thesis begins its 
research in Chapter 2. Moreover, was Sloterdijk too optimistic in his statement, ‘they know 
very well what they are doing’? Do they really know very well? Whether Sloterdijk’s 
statement is true or false, or as this thesis asks—are they (e.g., analysts or critics) capable of 
exempting from the influences of their own and social ideology—is another question to be 
answered at the end of this study. 
 
1.3 Thesis Outline 
Chapter 2: Accordingly, this thesis, in Chapter 2, starts with explaining the first subject, the 
human subject, finding out who are ‘they’. A brief history of intellectuals is reviewed to 
determine the common characteristics intellectuals in history shared together with the 
responsibilities they shouldered that have helped humans’ spiritual and physical development. 
After, this thesis investigates the second subject, critique. A history of critique is examined to 
illustrate the nature, purposes, and functions of critique which have helped to improve 
humans’ rationality through time.  
 After the investigation of human (intellectuals) and critique with consideration of 
scholars’ gradual awareness of the capacity of ideology in contemporary academia, this 
thesis argues that the ‘they’ should only refer to those people1
                                                     
1 This does not mean to support elitism. The fact is that ideology is not an open subject, about which 
all persons are able to talk. Many scholars have shared the same perspective, such as Bourdieu 
(Bourdieu & Eagleton, 1994) who commented that “you [mankind] have a conscious agent who is the 
scholar, the learned person, and the others who don’t have access to consciousness” (p. 267). Another 
example is from Larrain (1994). He provided a clear explanation to answer why the masses are 
unaware of the operation of ideology. He explained that in psychotherapy, patients realize their 
problems and are willing to accept suggestions from psychiatrists—in short, patients know. Yet, in 
social analysis, the oppressed class are unaware of their social condition. It is hard for them to believe 
that their inner consciousness is composed of something that the ‘Critical Theorist’ has called 
‘ideology’. That is to say, the masses are not aware of so-called ideological things. 
 (including academic scholars, 
students, literary critics) who are aware of the capacity of ideology, who have learned the 
basic theories or understood the characteristic of ideology, and who adopt the angle of 
ideology to analyse/criticise in their original research fields. Namely, ‘they’ refers to the 
ideological critics/analysts. This thesis argues that in contemporary society, they (ideological 
critics) are the few humans who might be able to shoulder the role of intellectuals to discover 
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the social problem (via their critique/analysis) especially in the epoch of ideology. Their 
works of critique/analysis ‘might’ be able to lead people to discover ideology. Based on the 
discussion in Chapter 2, it will be demonstrated that it is possible to escape from the cage of 
ideology through ideological-specialists’ critique/analysis. 
 Yet, while the current dominant idea of capitalism, which intrudes into academic 
creation, is brought into consideration, what has been suggested in Chapter 2 is questionable. 
Macherey (1978) argued that a writer is merely a producer who composes words into an 
article, which is no different from assembling a vehicle. In addition, Eagleton (1976) 
proposed, “Literature […] is also an industry. Books are not just structures of meaning, they 
are also commodities produced by publishers and sold on the market at a profit” (p. 59, 
emphasise original). The two scholars share a notion that the process of creating literature is 
no different from producing commercial goods. It is especially Eagleton’s words which 
indicate a similar manufacturing logic with commodities’ production: things are massively 
fabricated in a production line which goes through a model of compulsion (invisible 
controls), commodification, and standardisation (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1997). This logic 
explains exactly the concept of culture industry offered by the Frankfurt School. 
 Chapter 3: Accordingly, in Chapter 3, this thesis will first introduce some Frankfurt 
School thinkers’ concepts, such as dialectic of enlightenment, instrumental rationality, and 
identity and totality. These concepts may seem not relevant to the main stream of this thesis; 
but they are the foundational and background concepts to many theoretical discussion of this 
thesis. The second half of Chapter 3 will discuss whether scholars’ publications contribute to 
an ‘academic industry’, which reveals the same phenomena as the culture industry displays, 
including phenomena of compulsion, commodification, and standardisation in academic 
works. Based on the Frankfurt School’s notions, this thesis specifically places the spotlight 
on the phenomenon of standardisation in the academic industry (while for the other two 
phenomena discussions could readily be found, e.g., Radder, 2010). It argues that if the 
phenomenon of standardisation indeed intrudes into academic creations, then scholars are 
able to produce any academic works just by following certain writing rules, even articles 
related to ideological critique/analysis. Hence, based on the discourse in Chapter 3 that the 
ideological critics/analysts’ academic works indeed are generated on the production line of 
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academic industry, this thesis argues that escaping the cage of ideology is impossible 
(opposite to the argument in Chapter 2). 
 The statement made in Chapter 3, about the phenomenon of standardisation in 
academic works, is unlikely to be accepted/admitted by academics since most scholars 
believe their academic works are the outcome of their free will, which is unique. How could 
commonalities exist between their works and others? How could it be possible to have a 
standard writing discipline to follow when writing articles? This thesis argues that there, 
especially in social science, indeed exist standard writing procedures in academic 
publications, even for articles which claim to adopt the angle of ideology to analyse/criticise 
the research subjects. Thus, determining the ‘standard writing procedures’, hidden in articles 
related to ideological analysis/critique, is the mission of the subsequent empirical analysis 
chapters (5 to 8). 
 Chapter 4: Therefore, Chapter 4 will explain the research method specific to the 
empirical analysis of this thesis. Contents include how the research data were collected and 
analysed as well as how this thesis presents the research results. 
 As mentioned above, Chapters 5 to 8 offer the empirical analysis of this study, the 
purpose of which is to discover the commonalities between diverse articles related to 
ideological analysis/critique (IAC), that is, to find evidence of what this thesis calls the 
standardized procedures for writing academic IAC articles. This thesis has induced six 
standard writing procedures (SWPs). On the one hand, if standard writing procedures exist, it 
means that there is a rule guiding analysts to write their IAC articles. It further implies that in 
spite of every effort that the IAC analysts have made to break through the cage of ideology, 
eventually they are still prisoners of ideology (their own or the social total). On the other 
hand, those induced commonalities (or SWPs) between diverse IAC articles have another 
role: to establish a methodology of ideological analysis or critique. That is to say, by 
following this method, analysts could easily analyse or criticise their research subjects 
ideologically. These six standard procedures for writing IAC articles are briefly introduced 
as follows. 
 Chapter 5 introduces the first of the six procedures, Identifying Essential Elements, 
which is a procedure to understand the nature of ideology. This thesis argues that ideology is 
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a word about relations which contains three elements: Class2
 If Procedure 1 (identifying essential elements) is to study the nature of one researched 
phenomenon (i.e., the researched ideology), then the following five procedures could be seen 
as ways to practically investigate how and why such a phenomenon conveys a certain 
ideology or can be considered as an ideology. These are procedures to comprehend the 
making of ideology. 
, power, and reality. These three 
elements form the initial motivation of analysts and, most importantly, their presumed 
standpoints which have affected the conclusion of their analysis. The interactive relation of 
these three elements also responds to many topics while discussing ideology, such as 
concepts of false consciousness, class consciousness, dominant ideology, characteristics of 
ideology (e.g., negative or neutral), formation of ideology (e.g., visible or invisible). 
 Chapter 6: Procedure 2 illustrated in Chapter 6 is to Apply Theoretical Foundations. 
Understanding the theoretical foundations adopted by IAC analysts in their articles will help 
to comprehend the ideology of the researched phenomenon that they have tried to 
present/construct, or convince us to believe. This thesis has categorized theories that IAC 
analysts frequently apply into five categories (or analytical pathways). They are: analytical 
pathways of Marx, Althusser, and Gramscian as well as a historical description pathway and 
a semiotic pathway. The application of theoretical foundations could influence the structure, 
writing trend, argument, or even the conclusion of an IAC article.  
 Chapter 7 deals with two procedures including 3 Connoting Certain Meanings and 4 
Illustrating. These two procedures focus on examining how ‘IAC articles’ (i.e., the texts) are 
presented through which certain (ideological) connotations are indicated. Procedure 3 
introduces Barthes’s notion of mythology to solve the shortcoming which people usually 
violate: that is, randomly or arbitrarily labelling one phenomenon as an ideology without 
providing reasonable argumentation. Barthes’s notion helps to explain why the meaning of 
one sign transforms to another meaning, or how a phenomenon implies/carries a certain 
ideology. This is an important foundation to comprehend the making of ideology, and 
provides analysis/critique related to ideology with a theoretical basis instead of hollow 
arguments.  
                                                     
2 The term Class has been redefined/ reinterpreted by this thesis and will be explained in Chapter 5. 
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 If Procedure 3 is a theory-based perspective to examine how ideology 
functions/operates, then procedure 4 explains ideology’s practical applications. Procedure 4, 
Illustrating, explains the techniques (i.e., illustrating techniques) that IAC analysts 
frequently use in which their writings display the same function as the concept of myth 
suggests. By applying these illustrating techniques, ordinary signs start their journey to carry 
connotations. These illustrating techniques include finding similarities, using references, 
transferring, using inarguable values, special writing skills, and explaining which are all 
terminologies created by this thesis. 
 Chapter 8: While Procedures 3 and 4 (Chapter 7) focus on the texts, the remaining 
procedures, 5 Selecting Expression Styles and 6 Revealing Personal Viewpoints, are 
introduced in Chapter 8, turning the angle to investigate how IAC analysts’ ‘consciousness’ 
intrudes into their works. Procedure 5, selecting expression styles, indicates the diverse 
degrees in which IAC analysts involve themselves (e.g., attitudes, positions, judgements, 
preferences, etc.) within their writings. These diverse degrees of engagement result in their 
different expressive styles, which could be categorised as: the purely descriptive style, the 
interpretative style, and defensive/corrective style. These diverse styles correspondingly 
affect the extent to which the validity of an IAC article is recognised and accepted by the 
readers.  
 If Procedure 5 is a holistic view to see how IAC analysts’ expressive styles influence 
the making of an IAC article, then Procedure 6, also presented in Chapter 8, focuses on IAC 
analysts’ practical writing techniques to determine how they intentionally/accidentally 
expose their stance (e.g., pessimistically or optimistically). These writing techniques which 
reveal their personal viewpoints include their title selection, asking questions, personal 
background, and their assertive declaration. These created terminologies will be explained in 
Procedure 6.  
 In the empirical chapters (5-8), this thesis has concluded the commonalities between 
diverse IAC articles to testify that there indeed exists standard procedures for writing IAC 
articles. If such statement is acceptable, then it is reasonable to prove again that no one is 
able to escape from the influence of ideology, even the ideology-specialists. 
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 Chapter 9: Results from the empirical analysis show that ideology-specialists are 
unable to break through the cage of ideology. For this reason, in Chapter 9, this thesis returns 
to review related literatures, specifically focusing on Adorno’s philosophy, to ascertain 
whether early scholars had provided escape routes from the dungeon of ideology. Selecting 
Adorno is not only to draw a correspondence with the literature discussed in Chapter 3 from 
which this thesis’ argument (e.g., SWP in IAC articles) was inspired; it is also because 
Adorno’s concepts, such as the preponderance of the object, the pursuit of 
non-identify-thinking, immanent critique, constellation, etc., seem to guide a way out of the 
cage of ideology. Yet, this thesis argues that Adorno only theoretically established the brave 
new world where people might find ways out of ideology’s intervention. In fact, Adorno’s 
discourses, to a great degree, were inevitably influenced by his personal judgement (see 
discussion in Chapter 9).  
 Chapter 10: Both the empirical analysis (Chapters 5-8) and the philosophical 
discussion (Ch. 9) show that humans, to a great degree, are inevitably limited to their own 
ideology while undertaking the analysis and critique. In short, humans’ consciousnesses per 
se has influenced the arguments of one conscious critique/analysis. Faced with such an 
inevitable limitation, in Chapter 10, Conclusion and Suggestion, this thesis suggests that 
human beings have to humble themselves to minimize their self-considered-righteous as 
much as possible. This is to prevent humans from adopting their own ideology to judge 
others’ ideology, which turns out to fall into the endless loop of ideology-critique of 
ideology-critique. Moreover, the only work of critique that humans are able to undertake is 
limited to the regime of ‘self-critique’. This argument is undoubtedly a moral perspective, 
yet, it is what this thesis considers the way out of ideology. Arguments will be provided in 
the main discussion.   
 In summary, the content and argument of each chapter are set out as Table 1-1.  
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Table 1-1: Thesis Outline 
Chapter 2: Framing the Subjects —Intellectuals and Ideological Critique 
Contents 1. Concepts of intellectuals. 2. Concepts of (ideological) critique. 3. The role of ideological critics in the contemporary society 
Argument Ideological critics/analysts are the few people who can lead others to escape from the cage of ideology. 
Chapter 3: Theoretical Inspiration —From the Notion of the Frankfurt School to Standardisation of 
Academic Publications 
Contents 1. The Frankfurt School thinkers’ theories. 2. Academic industry and standardisation in academic publications 
Argument None is able to escape from the influences of ideology because of the phenomenon of standardisation in academic publications 
Chapter 4: Methodology for the Empirical Analysis Chapters 
Chapter 5-8: Standard Writing Procedures of Ideological Analysis/Critique —A Theoretical Review 
and Empirical Analysis 
Contents 
1. Ideology-related literature. 2. Empirical analysis results (6 SWPs findings). 3. 
Suggestions for writing IAC articles (methodology). 
Six standard procedures for writing IAC articles (SWPs): identifying essential 
elements, applying theoretical foundations, connoting certain meanings, illustrating, 
selecting expression styles, and revealing personal viewpoints. 
Argument 
Due to the standardized phenomenon in academic publications, there is a guiding rule 
for writing articles related to ideological analysis/critique. Accordingly, no one is able 
to escape from the influence of ideology. 
Chapter 9: Way Out: Rethinking the Possibility of (a Critique of) Ideological Critique —On 
Notions of Adorno 
Contents 1. Adorno’s philosophies. 2. Limitation of Adorno’s perspectives. 
Argument 
Adorno only theoretically established the brave new world out of ideology’s 
intervention. No one is capable of escaping from the influences of ideology, even 
philosophers.  
Chapter 10: Conclusion and Suggestion 
Content 1. Conclusion of chapters. 2. Suggestion: Out of fatalism and determinism. 
Argument The importance of humbleness and self-critique. 
 
1.4 Clarification and Redefinition of Terminologies 
Before advancing to the main chapters, a few specific usages of terminologies in this thesis 
should be classified or redefined. 
 A. Differences between critique/analysis of ideology (of X) and ideological 
critique/analysis (of X): This thesis will first distinguish their differences, and then explain 
why they are considered identical in the rest of this thesis. 
 ‘Critique/analysis of ideology (of X)’ usually considers their research subjects to carry 
a (false/bad) ideology, so that it should be analysed (and then criticised). Yet, analysts/critics 
of this type are inevitably influenced by their own perspectives (e.g., considering that this 
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ideology of X is…) before they start their analysis/critique. In other words, although analysts 
will try to be neutral (or consider themselves capable of being neutral), the arguments they 
are able to present are always already embedded in their innermost consciousness, that is, 
their own ideology. 
 Take ideology of natural science for example. In Galilei’s era, scientists criticised the 
church as, for example, corrupt and closed units while the church tarnished scientists as 
pagans. Both held their own ‘truth’ to criticise others’ ‘belief’. In fact, both truth and belief 
are all ideologies. One side’s ideology decided ‘why the other’s ideology is wrong’, and, not 
always but usually, whoever controls the power controls the rights of definition.  
 Hence, since rightness is defined by the power-have, it means that any 
‘critique/analysis of ideology (of X)’ is consequentially the conscious product of certain 
people at a particular time. As time goes, one ideology (i.e., C) which is considered to be 
‘right’ might be deemed to be ‘wrong’ by another ideology (e.g. D) in other time; yet, this 
new ideology D might be argued to be wrong again by ideology E in the future. That is to say, 
if the ‘critique/analysis of ideology’ is based on humans’ consciousness (i.e., their ideology), 
the analysis/critique will never end, in which case the action of analysis/critique falls into the 
loop—ideology critique of ideology critique of ideology critique…. 
 On the contrary, analysts who carry the ‘ideological critique/analysis (of X)’ do not 
know (or attempt to claim) ‘what ideology it is’ before they start their analysing or criticising. 
They will not claim ‘research subject X carries a (false/bad) ideology’ in advance before 
starting their research; instead, they will explain what factors (e.g., power, organised interests) 
influence the birth of one phenomenon within X which might carry certain ideology, or they 
will illustrate how a simple sign carries a certain connotation in X.  
 Accordingly, three characteristics of the angle of ideological critique/analysis (of X) 
could be found. First, research related to ‘ideological analysis/critique’ requires a long 
process of argumentation in which its arguments are built on analysable and visible elements. 
In this sense, the second characteristic reveals: the ideology that the analysts/critics finally 
report to their readers is nothing to do with right or wrong in nature. The second 
characteristic also brings out the third: although power is still the critical factor for analyses 
in social science, it is no longer the main factor in the angle of ‘ideological analysis/critique’. 
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The latter places the spotlight on how and why X reveals a certain ideology where power is 
one factor but not the sole one. For example, some sentences might carry certain ideology 
without its authors’ purpose written; that is why we call it ‘ideology’. 
 According to the discussion above, the angle of ‘ideological critique/analysis’ would be 
much suitable if seen as a methodology. ‘Ideological critique/analysis’ as a methodology 
contains many analytical methods, including semiotics, context, discourse analysis and those 
methods which can help determine ideological operations and their further influences within 
the research cases. This methodology focuses more on how ideology works in X or how X 
reveals a certain ideology rather than directly claiming that X contains/is an (bad/wrong, 
true/false) ideology. Considering ‘ideological critique/analysis’ as a methodology is also the 
mission which this thesis expects to contribute via the empirical analysis chapters. 
 Yet, despite distinguishing the differences between these two terms being possible, 
most predecessors who applied these terms, to a great degree, did not make a clear 
distinction as this thesis’ collected IAC articles have shown. The main reason might be 
because the term ideology per se is an abstract concept, especially when ideology’s 
characteristic is misunderstood, analysts’ position of seeing the concept, ideology, will vary 
(this is detailed/explained in Chapter 5). Accordingly, the damage of mixing up these two 
terms is that the concept ideology will continue to stay at an obscure status where it becomes 
more like a cosmetic vocabulary. By applying the word, ideology, within either articles’ titles 
or sentences of context, analysts are able to specialize and strengthen their argument (even 
though the article might have little discussion regarding the concept of ideology). As a result, 
to them, what angle of the characteristic of ideology that one analyst possesses, whether they 
consider ideology as a researched target or regard ideology as an analytical angle, is no 
longer a necessary question to be asked before a study of ideology. 
 Although the differences between the two terms are distinguishable, this thesis is forced 
to regard these as the same concept. For, first, aforementioned confusion still exists in 
ideology-related research. Second, it is also due to the lack of IAC articles which meet the 
requirement that this thesis needs in its empirical analysis (to be further explained in 
methodology chapter).  
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 Thus, this thesis presumes that both critique/analysis of ideology (of X) and ideological 
critique/analysis (of X), broadly speaking, are sorts of ideology-studies which focus on a 
certain research object/phenomenon/occurrence (of X). Accordingly, later writing in this 
thesis will adopt the term ideological critique/analysis to refer to both terms, but it will be 
presented as critique/analysis of ideology occasionally depending on the needs of context or 
identification.  
 B. Relationship between Analysis and Critique: The presentation of 
critique/analysis (critique slash analysis) as used above, honestly speaking, is annoying, 
which not only made the description redundant but also confused the meanings of sentences. 
To most people, critique and analysis are two different concepts. Yet, for this thesis, there is 
no difference between these two concepts, especially with respect to research related to 
ideology. 
 To the public cognition, the word analysis makes readers feel more neutral and 
objective while the word critique usually makes readers deem that critics think they 
understand the research subjects better than others might. To the public, critics are those 
people who consider themselves located at a higher knowledge level arguing with everything 
for the sake of argument. Thus, the only difference is from the feeling that the two words 
(i.e., analysis and critique) bring to the readers, but not from the nature of each word. 
Accordingly, the usage of the word analysis in the article title of ideology-related research 
will create a relatively neutral and objective expression to its readers compared to the same 
article title adopting the word critique. For example, compare the title ‘An ideological 
Analysis of Teenage Culture in the U.K.’ with ‘An Ideological Critique of…’. The latter will 
not be seen as a neutral presentation but rather as aggressive, especially if such a title is 
written by foreigners and read by U.K. citizens. 
 Not only the public’s cognition but also in other research fields, such as natural science, 
can the concepts analysis and critique be clearly distinguished. Yet, this thesis argues that 
once a research topic is engaged in ideology, there will be no difference between the 
characteristic/function of analysis and critique—in short, to analyse is to criticise and vice 
versa. 
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 From the epistemology angle, critique needs to be carried out through analysis. Even 
though most analysts try to express their objectivity by adopting a comparatively neutral 
phrase (i.e., by claiming that this is an ideological ‘analysis’ instead of ‘critique’), it is still 
inevitable that they will unintentionally reveal their disagreements, arguments, personal 
interests, and attitudes during the process of their ‘analysis.’ This is because the enemy 
which all analysts encounter while writing articles related to ideological analysis (or critique) 
is ideology. Actions of analysis in the ideology realm always represent their authors’ 
ideology judging another ideology. Namely, the action of analysis is done via an invisible 
process which has always engaged with personal opinion representing an action of critique. 
 On the other hand, critique can only be achieved via analysing. While analysts attempt 
to criticise one thing, for example, a social problem, they have to prove that such problem 
indeed exists in society. Analysts cannot randomly or arbitrarily label one phenomenon as a 
social problem without providing reasonable argumentation. Thus, the action of critique is 
done via a visible process which is composed of reasonable argumentation resulting from 
thorough analysis.  
 In short, when the purpose or dimension of research studies engages with 
ideology-related subjects, the terms analysis and critique become each other’s alter ego. 
Accordingly, later writing in this thesis will adopt the word critique to signify meanings of 
critique as well as analysis. This is for two reasons: to reduce redundant phrases and, most 
importantly, to proclaim the position of this thesis—analysis indeed is critique in neutral and 
objective clothing.  
 To conclude, based on the classification and redefinition of ideology-related 
terminologies illustrated above, as well as trying to avoid confusion when words such as 
ideological, critique, analysis, articles, authors, and analysts come together, an explanation 
regarding the specific usage of terminologies in this thesis is provided below. 
First, ‘ideological analysis or critique’ is a combination of ideological analysis and 
ideological critique which is the main research subject in this thesis so that, wherever it is 
used in this thesis, it should be seen as an individual phrase. This term is usually abbreviated 
as capitalized IAC. Accordingly, an equation could be drawn as: 
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Ideological analysis or critique 
 
= ideological analysis/critique  
= ideological critique  
= analysis or critique of ideology  
= analysis/critique of ideology  
= critique of ideology  
 Second, 33 articles focusing on ideological analysis or critique have been collected as 
this thesis’ research data. These 33 articles are presented as ‘article(s) of IAC’ or ‘IAC 
article(s)’. 
 Similarly, third, people who wrote those collected 33 IAC articles are presented in this 
thesis as ‘analyst(s) of IAC’ or ‘IAC analyst(s)’. The word analysts in the thesis mostly refer 
to the writers of these 33 IAC articles. 
 Finally, SWPs stands for ‘standard writing procedures’ which is a guiding discipline 
that this thesis presumes and wishes to discover. Such a discipline conveys standard 
procedures for writing articles related ideological analysis or critique. 
Other terminologies, which relate more to the usages specifically in empirical analysis 
chapters, will be introduced in Chapter 4: Methodology. 
 
1.5 Definition of Ideology in this Thesis 
The discussion of ideology-theories will be systematically illustrated in later chapters. This 
short section is to explain my own perspective regarding the term, ideology, which also 
illustrates what influenced me or the position I adopted to undertake the empirical analysis. I 
argue, people have to realise the two parts of ideology before they enter into the discussion 
of ideology. Humans might well know the 1) ‘analyzable’ or ‘visible’ part of ideology; but 
they will never detect any piece of the 2) ‘invisible’ or ‘ontological’ part of ideology; that is 
why we call the latter ideology.  
 What analysts can analyse, speak about, and understand is always the visible, 
analyzable part of ideology of one subject, such as my research findings in later chapters. On 
the other hand, what influenced me to generate my argument is something that belongs to 
the invisible or ontological part of ideology that I will never determine by myself because I 
am already living in that ideology. My invisible part of ideology could be analysed by other 
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analysts just as I can analyse the ideology of my research data (others’ ideology). Based on 
the above explanation, ideological analysis/critique is possible via A’s analysis/critique on 
B’s ideology.  
 Accordingly, my definition of ideology in the visible, analyzable realm is: Ideology is a 
set of beliefs which reflects or influences humans’ conscious activities (which also turns 
back to contribute to the matrix of such a set of beliefs to reflect or influence future humans’ 
conscious activities). By defining its capacity as ‘reflect’ and ‘influence’, first, the positive 
and neutral as well as the negative and critical characteristics of ideology are considered; 
second, the circular and accumulative feature of ideology is also taken into account3
 It seems possible, reasonable, and acceptable to criticise/analyse one’s ideology based 
our own opinions (i.e., ideology) in the visible, analyzable realm of ideology. Yet, it is still 
arguable because, as previously questioned: by what given authority, can we state that our 
analysis/critique is valid without our personal judgment? Thus, for this thesis, a proper 
ideological analysis/critique should be the one in which its analysts must avoid involving 
personal opinion/judgement in their discussion as far as possible. This is why the neutrality 
and objectivity are set as one of the angles to examine whether the IAC analysts are capable 
of escaping from the influence of (their own) ideology. This thesis argues, an ideological 
analysis/critique is valid only when the analysis is undertaken neutrally and objectively.  
. Hence, 
ideological analysis/critique is possible in the visible, analyzable realm. To analyse or to 
criticise one ideology is to investigate how a set of beliefs reflects or influences humans’ 
conscious activities.  
                                                     
3 I.e., X ideology reflects/influences human activity, becoming Y ideology to reflect/influence 
another human activity, which generates Z ideology to reflect/influence another human activity… 
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Chapter 2   
 
Framing the Subject and the Object 
—Intellectuals and the Ideological Critiques 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Human subjects and the critiques they propose are two crucial topics central to this thesis. 
The former are the executors while the latter are what they do. When the angle of ideology4
 In section 2.2, this thesis investigates the concepts of intellectuals through an angle of 
historical evolution, which tries to identify the basic characteristic of intellectuals and their 
roles in society. The aim of this section is to establish foundational concepts for later 
discussion in section 2.4: to assure why ideological critics are the few humans who can 
shoulder the role of intellectuals to discover the social problem especially in the epoch of 
ideology. In section 2.3, this thesis frames the other subject—critique. Section 2.3 starts with 
classifying that professed critique is not opposition for the sake of opposition, which reflects 
a contemporary misrecognition toward the meaning of critique. The discussion illustrates the 
philosophical evolution (from specialism via idealism to material critique) to see how critics 
justify and undertake the works of critique and that of ideological critique. Also in this 
section, the difference between (general) critique and ideological critique is discussed.  
 
is taken into consideration the main research question of this thesis becomes: could human 
beings be immune to the influence of ideology, even if they specialize in analysing and 
criticising ideology? The aims of this chapter are to consider intellectuals (2.2), critique (2.3), 
their interrelationship (2.4), and most importantly, their relationship with ideology (2.3 & 
2.4). 
                                                     
4 All ideology-related notions will be illustrated in Chapters 5 to 8 accompanying with the empirical 
analysis. The position of this thesis regarding ideology is briefly provided here. According to 
Abercrombie (2006), there are three types of dimension which consider the concept of ideology as, 
first, specific kinds of beliefs, e.g., communism, capitalism, socialism, etc.; second, as a distorted or 
false belief; and third, as a set of beliefs which has nothing to do with true or false. The position of 
this thesis massively adopts the dimension of the third type, especially in cooperation with the notion 
of power relation. Regarding the first and second types, both of them will be interpreted in related 
chapters showing what position they play in the standard writing procedure of ideological critique. 
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Finally, in section 2.4, this thesis first expounds how humans undertake their 
critique, and then continues to discuss to what extent critics can be seen as intellectuals 
especially when the influence of personal ideology is taken into consideration. Based on 
all the discussions above, this study distinguishes ideological critics from general critics. 
By further explaining the differences in functions and characters between the two, it has 
concluded that academics, who are familiar with ideology-related theories, are few in 
terms of ‘real’ intellectuals in contemporary society.  
 
2.2. History of Intellectuals 
This section will start by depicting the general characteristics considered for intellectuals 
through historical development in western academic circles, from ancient times via 
seventeenth century France and eighteenth century Russia to present day. In so doing, a basic 
definition of intellectuals is provided. It says: the basic characteristics of intellectuals are to 
propagate new ideas and to criticise the wrongness of society. Sometimes, characteristics 
such as being well-educated and other specific personal attributes (e.g., courageousness, 
feeling obligated, radicalism, and being a revolutionary or even being famous) are reasons to 
be considered as intellectuals too. 
Intellectuals in Early History 
First, ancient times sages could be seen as intellectuals. They included speakers, poets, and 
teachers, essentially people who engaged in enlightening the public’s thinking. Yet, they 
were described negatively by Socrates as people who were burned by knowledge, helping to 
create tyranny through their ideas (Lilla, 2001). Although there was no such word as 
intellectual to refer to the above people at that time, people who possessed the skills of 
propagating ideas were considered capable of illuminating the masses.  
Jesters in the royal, medieval courts, as described in Shakespeare’s King Lear, revealed 
one of the intellectuals’ functions—critique. Most jesters were of lowly class with mental or 
physical problems (Otto, 2001). Due to their disability, their funny imitation of nobilities’ 
speech and behaviours all became entertainment. Yet, since ‘what really happened in the 
court’ was usually the story material for jesters, their innocent imitation invisibly mocked the 
noblemen. Although what the jesters did was innocent simulation, displaying what they had 
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seen in the palace shares the same role/function of intellectuals, that is, to tell the 
truth—which could be considered as an early mode of critique 
According to Coser (1965), it was not until the seventeenth century that people in 
Europe, including clerics, diviners, and clerks of courts, started to consider themselves as 
leaders who proclaimed that they could guide society. Although the term intellectual had not 
been coined at this time, it was the first time that the group-consciousness of intellectual-like 
emerged. In this epoch, they possessed the role of propagators to lead the public and 
maintain social order. 
In the eighteenth century, the decreasing power of theocracy bred sceptics, deists, and 
atheists, who were confident people prompting and leading the public in criticising ordered 
disciplines, especially the religious variety (Johnson, 1988). Different to early history, 
intellectual-like people in this epoch empowered themselves and this extended to having a 
critical perspective observing society. Different from jesters, whose role of being seen as 
critics resulted from their innocent mimicry of royal life, intellectual-like people in this 
epoch directly commented on society’s problems from their critical perspective (Johnson, 
1988).  
Overall, the shift of intellectuals’ characteristics in a diachronic perspective began from 
1) propagating new ideas to the public to 2) mocking (criticising) royal life. Later, the 
characteristic of intellectuals returned to 3) the function of propagation focusing more on 
maintaining the vested social order, and, eventually, arrived at the characteristic with which 
modern people are much more familiar, that is, 4) critically criticising society. Namely, the 
simplest definition of intellectual could be drawn as those people who possess functions of 
propagation and critique.  
Intelligentsia in Russia 
The development of the Russian concept of intellectuals5
                                                     
5 Although, in Russia, the term Intelligentsia was used instead of intellectual, for the convenience of 
discussion, this thesis will use the term intellectual to describe the general meaning of such a specific 
group of people. Intelligentsia will be used only when its particular historical meaning is being 
discussed.  
 could be distinguished by three 
stages: before the 1890s (especially from 1838), the 1890s-1917, and after 1917 (Berlin, 
1979).  
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 During the “Remarkable Decade”, 1838 to 1948 6 , the vanguard intellectuals, 
specifically new university graduates, tried to introduce diverse knowledge from other 
nations. This knowledge impact led group members to carry out social critique, especially 
criticising citizens’ views and values of life, which, to a great extent, is considered to have 
caused the Russian 1917 revolution (Acton, 1997; Berlin, 1979; Confino, 1972). Although 
these vanguard intellectuals7
In the 1860s, the word intelligentsia was created, referring to the stratum of educated 
critics (Acton, 1997). Nevertheless, just as Napoléon stigmatized Tracy and his fellows as 
metaphysicians, Nicholas II of Russia once likened the roles of these educated Russians to 
syphilis (Acton, 1997). These two emperors both had sensed a threat from the knowledgeable 
people, whose critical power might impact their legitimacy, so that they demonized and 
stigmatized the intelligentsia. This is the birth of the second stage, the 1890s-1917. What 
should be noted is the identification of a people who were ‘educated’ was no longer the 
essential requirement of being part of the intelligentsia during the 1890s-1917. According to 
Pipes (1974), Jacoby (2000), and Bobbio (1993 in Bellamy, 1997), even those people who 
were in working or peasant classes were considered as intelligentsia provided they kept their 
distance from Nicholas II’s regime, held a definitely opposite position, and possessed a 
radical and revolutionary attitude against this old political and economic system.  
 were criticised in respect of confusing life values with their 
learned literature and ideas, what they did was to introduce a new dimension of seeing or 
valuing things. 
The characteristic of Russian intellectuals changed again after the Soviets took power 
(Acton, 1997). Membership of the intelligentsia, which originally referred to the radical and 
revolutionary stratum, had been extended to encompass a broader category “including all 
non-manual strata of the working population” (p. 150). Intelligentsia no longer held an 
“establishment” attitude (p. 150) or argued against the new government as the revolution had 
done. Instead, they turned their shellfire to life-based subjects, such as environmental or 
                                                     
6 Berlin (1979) quoted the title “A Remarkable Decade” from Pavel Annenkov, a Russian critic 
whom Karl Marx admired, to describe the beginnings of Russian intellectual history in a general point 
of view. Yet, to himself, the time that Russian students went abroad to pursue new knowledge could 
be traced back to Peter the Great. 
7 Due to the severe publication censorship, vanguard members of intellectual circles could not 
directly criticize the contemporary political condition. For this reason, they conveyed their critical 
ideas within their art or literary critique (Berlin, 1979). 
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religious issues (Acton, 1997). They returned to the original characteristics of intellectuals, 
propagation and critique (on life8
Despite the Russian concept of intellectuals having changed through time, attitudes of 
being radical and revolutionary to overthrow an outdated system are what they contributed 
to the understanding of intellectuals’ roles.  
). 
Intellectuals in France and Contemporary Society 
The self-consciousness of being intellectuals in France referred to l’Affaire Dreyfus9
In France, the courage of practically entering into public debate to stand up for beliefs 
of ‘what is right’ is a key characteristic of intellectuals, that is, taking Jennings’ (1997) words, 
beliefs of “Truth, Justice, Reason and Universality” (p. 70). These French intellectuals 
believed that it was an obligation to be a “purveyor” and to shoulder social responsibility 
(Berlin, 1979, p. 39).  
 in 1895 
(Derfler, 2002) in which a group of people led by Émile Zola, who wrote J'accuse, jointly 
signed a letter to accuse the government’s abuse of power and requiring a fair application of 
justice. They were diverse, socially prominent people (actors, writers, scientists), and 
eventually denominated by journalist Georges Clemenceau as intellectuals. 
The contribution that French intellectuals made to enrich the concept of intellectuals is: 
the requirement of being intellectuals is that they have to deem themselves as ‘saviours’ with 
strong courage and obligation devoted to a better society, which shoulders a sense of 
commitment: If not me, then who? This French belief was inherited and directed the later 
movements such as anti-fascism, anti-colonialism, and the Algerian War wherein 
self-intellectualized persons such as students and academic scholars played a great part in the 
history of French intellectuals (Jennings, 1997). 
In contemporary society, what intellectuals are is massively based on media 
representation. According to Jennings and Kemp-Welch (1997), the function of the 
                                                     
8 In fact, to a great extent, this change should have considered the political conditions under Soviet 
governance. 
9 The fountainhead of this affair can be traced back to 1517, when Martin Luther criticized the Holy 
See that opened the religious tumult in Europe. In 1888, the economy of France was deeply influenced 
due to the excavation of the Suez Canal, which unveiled the malady of collusion between Jewish 
middlemen. Being the scapegoat of the epoch, the French artillery officer Alfred Dreyfus, who was 
Jewish, was convicted of treason and of collaborating with the enemy, Germany (Derfler, 2002). 
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intellectual, with a traditional definition (i.e., propagation and critique), was replaced by 
famous television celebrities after the 1960s, a period in which the media started to grow. 
The impact was that real-intellectuals (based on previously discussed characteristics) had to 
discard their beliefs, ideals, and ambitions to obtain the right of voice, which is controlled by 
media owners or journalists, and were forced to yield to commercial interests. As a result, 
media celebrities are much more ‘believed’ than the above-described intellectuals. They are 
significant to the public and they have a great impact on the public’s consciousness (Boon & 
Lomore, 2001; Marshall, 1997).  
Undoubtedly, some genres of celebrities, such as political commentators, are able to 
criticise society and possess the basic function of intellectuals—propagation and critique10. 
However, since some celebrities are a media creation (a field wherein true voice has to yield 
to diverse power) and since they are composed of diverse people (who achieve fame for 
various reasons11
 
), from an academic perspective it is difficult to consider them so-called 
intellectuals (even though the public are willing to think so). It is reasonable to claim that 
being famous can make people ‘intellectuals’ in the age of media communication. 
 
                                                     
10 What we have to notice is that this thesis here only explains that celebrities possess such capacities; 
this thesis does not argue or criticize the rightness/wrongness of these capacities. For example, 
whether the ideas that they propagate benefit society; whether their judgements about society are fair 
and objective, or whether their judgements are just used to convey their subjective opinion, which 
might be believed due to their fame. These arguments will be left to section 2.4 Academic Intellectuals 
and Ideological Critique, because such arguments have already entered into the regime of ideology. 
11 According to Rojek (2001), three forms of generating celebrities are ascribed, achieved, and 
attributed (p. 17). The first, ascribed, is unchangeable: Being famous is based on blood relationship. 
One is born famous. A royal family is an example. On the contrary, the second and third forms are 
acquired through competition or attributed by mass media. Rojek proposed two terminologies: 
celetoid and celeactor (p. 24), to subdivide the celebrity phenomena, especially referring to the one 
attributed to mass media. Celetoids have a short-lived appearance usually resulting from one-hit 
wonders. They come and go quickly. People who become famous (and disappear) swiftly due to their 
appearance on TV show, for example, Britain’s Got Talent is a good example. In terms of Celeactors, 
it is a subcategory of Celetoids which mainly refers to fictional characters. They have no real self and 
the public face is entirely imaginary. Lara Croft created by video game and later film Tomb Raider 
and Mr. Bean are classic examples.  In spite of how celebrities are ascribed, achieved, or attributed 
as a member of the royal family, or professor, politician, sport-stars with specific achievements, or 
short-lived Britain’s Got Talent stars, or made up characters, the point is: the ways of becoming 
famous are various and, most importantly, it is undeniable that, to a great degree, they possess 
capacities to influence the society. Even though they might not consider themselves as intellectuals, to 
the public, what they say, how they act, and even their philosophies all function as disciplines of 
intellectuals.  
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Summary and Discussion 
Based on historical investigation, the western intellectuals’ characteristic is found to contain: 
propagation, critique (through mocking), radical and revolutionary critique, possessing 
courage and obligation, and being famous, which are listed in Table 2-1. These 
characteristics represent the role of intellectuals in particular times. Yet when the influence of 
(personal) ideology is considered, traits that make them admirable in their time make them 
problematic from the angle of ideology. This argument will be discussed throughout this 
chapter. 
 
Table 2-1: Characteristics of Intellectuals in Human History 
Time 
Characteristics of 
Intellectuals 
Representatives/ Specific Features 
Ancient 
Times 
Propagation 
Speakers, poets, and teachers / who were able to enlighten the 
public’s thinking. 
Medieval 
times 
Critique (through 
mocking) 
Royal court jesters / through adopting royal court life as stories and 
performing also displayed what this world really was like. 
17th  
Century 
Propagation 
Clerics, diviners, and clerks of courts / 1. who started to shape 
intellectual-like group-consciousness; 2. function was to maintain 
social order. 
18th 
Century 
Critique 
Sceptics, deists, and atheists / 1. who resulted from decreasing 
power of theocracy; and 2. focused on criticising ordered 
disciplines, especially religion. 
18th Cen. 
in Russia 
Propagation 
Before 1890s: Overseas, educated students. / Russia intelligentsia 
especially referred to stratum of educated critics who propagated 
new knowledge to society.  
Radical and 
Revolutionary 
Critique 
1890s-1917: Intelligentsia were no longer limited to educated 
stratum. People in working or peasant classes were considered 
intelligentsia only if they held a radical and revolutionary attitude to 
argue for the old political and economic system. 
Propagation, 
Critique 
After 1917: All non manual strata were intelligentsia / who turned 
the angle to focus (criticise) on a single subject such as 
environmental and religious issues except politics.  
19th Cen. 
in France 
Courage, 
Obligation 
The brave people / The term intellectual specifically referred to 
l’Affaire Dreyfus. 
Modern 
Society 
Famous 
Television celebrities. / Definition of intellectuals returns to 
vagueness. 
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2.3. History of Critique and Ideological Critique 
The concept of intellectuals was introduced in the previous section. This section will frame 
the second subject of this thesis—(ideological) critique—by examining its definition and 
developing history. Finally a comparison between (general) critique and ideological critique 
will be offered.  
What is Critique? 
The broad meaning of criticism in earlier times was limited to literature and art examination 
(Jay, 1996). It focused on textual criticism, in which connoisseurs were usually equal to 
critics. For example, the Homeric Hymns were examined by astronomers (e.g., the solar 
eclipse when Odysseus returned home) and geographers (e.g., discovery of Mycenae and 
evacuation of the site of Troy) to prove the authenticity of the texts in history (Hernadi, 
1981). The capacity for criticism, at this stage, was limited to specific groups, meaning that 
only people who had recognized knowledge of the subject were deemed able to undertake 
criticism. These professed critics were considered to understand the intention and the 
purpose of compositions better than the original authors (Cazamian, 1929), as Brownell 
(1914) explained the “judge of the tiller is not the carpenter but the helmsman” (p. 13).  
 Another trend, different from the above, is known as ‘critique’, which is the kernel of 
this thesis. Critique, in a broad meaning, means to indicate the troublesome matters, focusing 
on particular phenomena in human society such as cultural, political, and economic issues. 
Nevertheless, application and recognition of critique today, whether (general) critique or 
ideological critique, seems to face confusion regarding the purposes of undertaking it. Hence, 
instead of directly claiming a definition of critique, this research suggests that classifying the 
misunderstandings critique has been facing is a better way to understand critique’s essence. 
 First, critique is not to oppose one thing for the sake of opposition. Possessing critical 
thinking is important especially to educated people. But, the problem is that—by adopting 
the logic of Dialect of Enlightenment—this ‘we all need critical thinking to unveil the myth 
surrounding us’ has become another new myth which veils human thinking again12
                                                     
12 This ‘we all need critical thinking’ also echoes Marcuse’s (1991) idea of ‘Instrumental Rationality’. 
That ‘if I want to be rational, I must possess a critical thinking’ has become an instrumental rationality 
which creates a new myth that ‘because I think critically (due to I oppose things), I am rational so I 
must be right’. This new myth not only is based on self-granted rationality but also distinguishes us 
. As a 
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result, most people, even educated persons, suppose that critique means to take an opposite 
position to comment, argue, and object to all issues; in so doing, they are distinguished from 
the irrational others.  
 Nevertheless, Kant claimed that human rationality is limited so that critique cannot be 
exaggerated (in Russell, 1946). Critique is not reasonless judgements or accusations, nor to 
proffer unlimited complaints or disagree with others. It is not to oppose one thing for the 
sake of opposition. Once oppositions and objections are misrepresented as equalling the 
characteristics of critique, the real discourse sphere will gradually disappear. Whilst this 
sphere is occupied by irrational arguments and disagreements, so-called critique will become 
a scapegoat, eventually losing its power to balance unrighteousness. 
 The reason for explaining ‘what critique is not’ is because the definition of it is so 
simple: looking for the truth. Without such understanding of what critique is not, this simple 
definition can be easily appropriated, and people will self-righteously think that all their 
actions (i.e., always taking an opposite position to comment, judge, and object to all issues) 
stand alongside the truth.  
 Hence, to criticise is to look for truth. Heidegger (1997) claimed that truth results from 
the discovering and revealing processes. Critics discover abnormal phenomena, then reveal 
or question these phenomena instead of judging and proclaiming their wrongness. What 
these critics have done could be seen as critique. For example, economists may perceive a 
negative market trend after a government policy decision so that they provide a warning to 
prevent future economic problems. Or socialists note the gap between urban and rural 
communities and ask their government for a balanced countrywide development. Thus, 
people who query and argue, in conjunction with offering warnings or suggestions, could be 
seen as undertaking critique.  
 However, the above examples can only be seen as a ‘general’ critique because once the 
influence of (subjects’) ideology is considered, whether the critics truly discover the ‘truth’ is 
arguable. Thus, the following section will, through historical and philosophical investigation, 
examine the characteristic of critique to answer why ideological critique emerges in 
contemporary society. 
                                                                                                                                                      
from other irrationals. The concept of instrumental rationality will be introduced in next chapter. 
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Evolvement of Critique—From Scepticism to Modern Critique 
From the philosophical perspective, according to Popper (1996), early critique could be 
tracked back to the “sceptical school” (p. 192), which began, from Xenophanes’ search for 
truth. Xenophanes, considered as one of the earliest critics in human history, believed that 
being suspicious of everything is a way to approach the objective truth (Popper, 1996), 
claiming that “there is nowhere anything but guessing” (in Russell, 1946, p. 40). His 
scepticism was expressed through his attitude toward God. Xenophanes was a student of 
Homer, but he disagreed with and criticised Homer’s perspective, which personalized God as 
mortal (Popper, 1996). Xenophanes argued, for example, if oxen had ability, like humans, to 
draw gods, then an image of a god who looks like them (oxen) would be painted. (This 
argument has implied the influence of ideology.) Consequently, by looking for the 
relationship between objective truth and humans’ fallibility, Xenophanes founded the 
philosophical branch of the sceptical school (Popper, 1996). Popper (1996) explained that 
although such a sceptical way of thinking is usually negatively misunderstood, the 
significance of being sceptical is “to look out, to inquire, to reflect, [and] to search” (p. 192) 
which is the way to seek the truth. 
Popper (1996) claimed that philosophers who followed this sceptical tradition, 
(including Socrates, Erasmus, Locke, Hume) emphasised the “human ignorance13” (p. 192). 
Socrates stated that he knew nothing which influenced his students to remain as sceptics of 
their days (in Russell, 1946); Plato’s writing style14 often did not arrive at a clear conclusion 
implying an attitude of scepticism. Although scepticism was no longer the dominant thought 
train after the third century15
It is not until Hume’s work, which also influenced Kant’s series of writings on critique, 
that the evolution of critical thinking transformed from scepticism to critique (Russell, 1946). 
From a general perspective, scepticism and critique share the same position—negativity; 
 (Popper, 1996), the spirit of scepticism can be seen as one of 
critique’s foundations.  
                                                     
13 As Popper (1996) said “What all the members of this sceptical tradition have in common ...and 
what I also share with this tradition is that we stress our human ignorance.” (p. 192) 
14 Modern scholars, such as Nietzsche, Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse, also considered ‘writing 
style’ as a way of pursuing the truth. But, differently, instead of leaving conclusion aside as Plato did, 
they usually made their arguments and works as short fragments, or, as aphorism. Please refer to 
Chapter 9. For more discussion of their writing style, please refer to Rose (1978) and Jay (1996). 
15 In the third century, thought of scepticism was argued as only capable of inciting people against 
their nation or religion, but incapable of leading to practical solutions (Russell, 1946). 
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however, there is a slight difference between the two. The concept of negativity in scepticism 
is close to the meaning of ‘opposition’ in modern usage. By contrast, the meaning of 
negativity in critique possesses a similar meaning as Kantians’ ‘affirmation’ (Žižek, 1993). 
Kant’s three major critiques tried to explain the possibilities of humanity through rejecting 
the notion of a godsend morality; he tried to determine how humans establish the codes of 
conduct (i.e., morality). To Kant, critique entails not opposing everything; instead, it is an 
affirmative establishing process, namely, through the process of critique, to establish a 
possibility (Kant, 2009; Russell, 1946; Žižek, 1993).  
According to Jay (1996), modern critique started from Hegel. One of Hegel’s crucial 
concepts of critique is to consider society as a totality, such that every social phenomenon 
could only be analysed by examining the whole social context (Horkheimer, 1972). The 
purpose of critique is to destroy the matrix of totality, given that it is in a limited condition. 
This closed totality implies an internal injury of human society, covered by a specific social 
consciousness, which might cause extreme disorder if not dealt with seamlessly (Wu, 2008). 
Based on the dimension of totality, Hegel (in Jay, 1996; Žižek, 1993) connected 
philosophical cerebration to social and political phenomena, such that the angle of critique 
starts to evaluate the construction of things, especially to indicate problems hidden in social 
and political phenomena.  
Marx agreed with Hegel’s logic of critique, i.e., dialects, including the important notion 
of totality, except for one aspect: the way of doing critique. To Hegel, the development of 
human history results from thinking; to Marx, it stems from human daily political and 
economic material-practices. This difference has distinguished Marx’s material dialectics 
from Hegel’s ideal dialectics as well as ideological critique from general critique, which will 
be discussed in the next section.  
Evolvement of Critique—Epoch of Ideological Critique 
A better understanding of the term ideological critique should return to the time when the 
power of ideology was noticed while undertaking critique. Marx’s critique on capitalist 
society could be seen as the early human masterpiece which took ideology and its influences 
into consideration.  
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According to Marx (1971), human productive force determines the relation of 
production which reflects the economic formation of that time. Directly upon this economic 
base-structure is another corresponding political super-structure; forms of the latter represent 
a consequential determined relationship which is varying, together with the development of 
the relation of production. The point is that this political super-structure, which goes through 
ideological forms including legal, political, religious, artistic, or philosophic ones, will 
eventually, and inevitably, influence human consciousness.  
Ideology is capable of pouring particular value and meaning into culture which is an act 
that rationalizes the special relation of power in society. Some groups control these power 
relations while others do not, which could be described as a dominant and subordinate 
relationship. Ideology, on the surface, claims to stand for the truth for it seems so natural and 
optimum. In fact, ideology helps to maintain rationality for the vested dominants which 
answers why dominant groups are able to consolidate and enlarge their advantages over 
subordinate groups in this relationship of power competition.  
Accordingly, since ideology has such a great impact, criticizing these diverse ideologies 
becomes a possible method to understand how human (false-) consciousness is moulded by 
relations of power controlled by certain dominant groups. Ultimately, such critique is hoped 
to deconstruct this unbalanced power relationship (Oakley, 1983). In short, ideological 
critique is a dimension to analyse how a certain ideology involves the making of human 
consciousness.  
Nevertheless, such a simple definition has significant implications for the meaning of 
critique. Marx’s contribution to critique is that, by detecting the relationship between base 
and superstructure, he not only bridged the analytical angle of critique to the ideological 
realm, but also implied one important point: any demonstration of critique must possess a 
material basis which establishes its difference from Hegel’s idealism. 
All critiques, in a broad meaning, are ideological critiques as they are all based on 
personal ideology against another ideology. This view might help to understand why Marx 
disagreed with Hegel’s idealism. To Marx, Hegel’s critique regarding social phenomena was 
based on an obscure mental/spiritual dimension, which is unable to achieve the action of 
critique, only helping to maintain the vested social reality (Parekh, 1982). According to 
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Parekh (1982, p.1), Marx generally called Hegel and the Young Hegelians (another term, the 
Holy Family) ideologists; for they did nothing but create idealism. To Marx, the reason why 
the Holy Family created idealism is that they wanted to seek the internal logic of things, but 
failed. This is because, in spite of how the Holy Family considered things, essentially they 
had already been influenced by their own educational background and living environment16
With Hegelian-created idealism when they thought they were looking for things ‘as 
such’, they had created and defined what so-called rightness, goodness, morality, and justice 
really are, eventually, self-believing that they were standing next to the truth. 
 
(Parekh, 1982). Marx argued that there is nothing which could be called ‘things as such’; 
instead, the concept of ‘things as such’ is an “empty phase” (in Parekh, p. 4). With this empty 
characteristic of the things as such, philosophers like the Holy Family can define the things 
as willingly as they wanted. As a result, what they had defined was nothing to do with things 
‘as such’; what they had established was, as per Parekh’s (1982) explanation, “a general 
theory of property, but not a theory of property in general” (p. 4).  
To escape from this problem, Marx appropriated Hegel’s notion of dialectic and 
confirmed his own method for analysing society, that is, the materialist dialectics, which 
were demonstrated when Marx began his critique of political economy. In his study, he did 
not directly claim that ideology has great power on human consciousness. Instead, he first 
acknowledged that the order of materiality of social development is prior to human ideal 
subjectivity, which could find testimony from his historical economic studies. In so doing, he, 
eventually, found how relations of production determined a certain social formation and the 
corresponding ideology17
Accordingly, since Marx considered ideology as a crucial element which influences 
human consciousness, and explained its emergence through his strict demonstration of 
identifying the material relationship within research subjects, it could be said that he turned 
. All told, instead of providing direct and ideal statements, Marx’s 
critiques require strict demonstrations with a material basis. 
                                                     
16 Of course, Marx himself did not escape the same problem. His critique on Hegel was also based on 
his own educational background and living environment. Yet, such a way of argument (a critique on a 
critique of a critique...) will never end. That is why this thesis suggests considering Marx’s ideas as a 
method, please refer to discussion in Chapter 5. 
17 That echoes to Marx’s and Engels (1970) famous claim that “The ideas of the ruling class are in 
every epoch the ruling ideas […] is at the same time its ruling intellectual force” (p. 64).  
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the dimension of critique from daily matters to humans’ thoughts, i.e., critique of ideology or 
ideological critique. Works of critique applied through an ideology-dimension are based on a 
demonstration: the phenomenon of social inequality results from an unbalanced dominant 
relationship where the dominant groups possess more interests (e.g., economic or political 
power) to develop certain ideologies to maintain and strengthen their advantages18
However, what kind of critique could be seen as critique of ideology (ideological 
critique) is still ambiguous. Based on Marx’s foundation, this thesis attempts to establish a 
methodology for ideological critique. Commonalities among academic articles related to 
ideology-critique will be delineated (in Chapters 5 to 8) to see how such ideology-dimension 
critique is undertaken to examine/criticise social phenomenon. In so doing, this thesis seeks 
to establish a methodology for ideological critique and if such a methodology might be 
delineated, it will help answer the research question of this thesis: whether humans are able 
to escape from the influence of their own ideology or social total ideology, or to find out 
humans’ limitation while undertaking the works of ideological critique. 
. In short, 
after Marx, investigating humans’ ideology and its influences became an angle of critique to 
seek the truth.  
The Difference between General Critique and Ideological Critique 
The previous section explained Marx’s contributions to works of critique where concept of 
ideological critique and general/ideal critique is distinguished. He took the angle of critique 
away from idealism to emphasize the importance of critique based on material dialect 
perspectives. 
 Regardless of the type of critique, all predecessors’ efforts are the same: looking for the 
truth and establishing a better world. Yet, there are still several diverse characteristics 
between general and ideological critiques. This study will go further to illustrate their 
differences (which will also help to realize the speciality of ideological critiques). These 
                                                     
18 This demonstration is closer to the angle of ‘critique of ideology’ where ideology is negatively seen, 
or say, discussion of ideology is related more to power operation. Yet, according to the distinction of 
‘critique of ideology’ and ‘ideological critique’ explained in section 1.4, Chapter 1, angle of 
‘ideological critique’ is situated much on a neutral position where the dimension of ideology is seen as 
a method to examine subjects. However, before the findings in the empirical analysis chapters are 
explained , this thesis here has to (is forced to) consider these two terms as containing the same 
meanings for reading convenience. 
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differences include their epistemology, whether they recognize the power relation, and the 
angle from which they define the truth. 
First, by quoting Aron’s (1957) classification of three levels of critique, their 
epistemological difference is revealed. Aron’s first level focuses on technical critique which 
takes a position against the rulers. The purpose of such critique is to correct the mistakes of 
systems and to improve human society. For example, people highlight the unreasonable laws 
to improve legislation. The second level is the critique on morality, endeavouring to detect 
what humans have been doing wrong; for instance, those which impinge on humanity such 
as colonialism, slavery, and alienation in a capitalist society. The third is the critique of 
ideology. It takes the viewpoint of a possible future society to criticise modern ones to unveil 
pernicious social regulations (e.g., capitalism), which are influenced by invisible power and 
controlled by specific groups. 
What this thesis has been calling the general critique echoes Aron’s first level which 
focuses on visible facts, or trends, to claim what is wrong. In terms of Aron’s second level, 
moral critique, this can also be considered as ideological critique (based on a broad 
definition). It is a critique which criticises the ideology that one society gestates. Such a 
moral critique is close to an ideal critique. Finally, Aron’s third level corresponds to the 
ideological critique that this thesis suggests. It is a non-idealism critique, and one that 
requires a material demonstration. That is, a critique which investigates what sort of power 
relations are controlled by specific groups that give birth to a certain ideology which then 
influences human consciousness.  
The second difference between general and ideological critiques reflects on the extent 
to which the angle of power relation is investigated. General critique focuses on visible facts, 
or trends, to claim what is wrong. Critics who undertake general critique possess specialized 
knowledge in their particular areas to determine whether issues follow the regulations 
together with warning the public of potential risks if mistakes are detected. All results of 
general critiques are based on critics’ professional specialty. They detect and criticise what is 
wrong to protect society.  
Conversely, ideological critique concentrates on the innermost, invisible, and 
qualitative segments of the research subjects to unveil how one specific idea functions 
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purposely or innocently and examines why social orders become the way they are now, 
which might help the dominant groups maintain their advantages. Thus, ideological critique 
focuses on exploring whether particular ideas (which represent certain groups’ ideology) are 
influenced by visible or invisible power or other factors leading to a specific way of thinking 
that influences social development. 
Take studies in the communication field as an example. General critique would 
examine how harmful policies influence society (e.g., determine how media policy relaxes 
restrictions on foreign films which might lead to a decline in the production of local films). 
Differently, ideological critique will show how foreign films influence local culture and lead 
to problems of national identity.  
Third, although the final difference seems simple, it explores the greatest distinction 
between general and ideological critiques, namely, how they detect the problem of the 
research object and how they approach the truth.  
Regarding how they detect a problem, for general critique, there will always be a 
certain answer (right versus wrong) to a question; such critique usually directly claims what 
is wrong so that it can be corrected. Such judgements are beyond approach because their data, 
findings, statistics (which no doubt are based on critics’ ideologies) direct them to make such 
a judgement. Namely, general critique detects a wrongness or risk and provides a warning or 
suggests a solution. Different from general critique, ideological critique will never declare 
the wrongness of one research phenomenon; if it has to do so, it only identifies what is 
inappropriate within this phenomenon. Actually, the real mission of ideological critique is to 
discover a phenomenon, which, on the surface, seems right but, in fact, conceals something 
which is inappropriate which also helps to create a consensus of apparent ‘rightness’ for the 
public. Thus, ideological critique is to ferret out the wolf in sheep's clothing.  
Regarding the ways of seeking the truth, for general critique, truth is the opposite of 
wrongness. When general critics state what is wrong based on the visible facts or data 
findings, simultaneously, they also imply what is right. Once humans solve the wrongness, 
they reach the so-called truth. Differently, ideological critique will never claim what truth or 
rightness is (Foucault, 1991; Hernadi, 1981); in fact, it is incapable of doing so (otherwise, it 
will fall into endless ideological critique on the previous critiques). Ideological critique is to 
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probe seemingly inappropriate phenomena resulting from certain social common sense to 
explore how its “truth of regime” (Foucault’s term) or rightness-construction was established 
(Hernadi, 1981).  
Although the following paragraph is a digressive discussion in this section, it is central 
to this thesis. Any claim of reaching/discovering the truth is always arguable because no one 
can ignore that a claim regarding the so-called ‘truth’ has resulted from discussants’ 
ideologies, which shares a similar question to this thesis: are humans capable of escaping 
from ideology. As mentioned in section 2.3, Heidegger (1997) claimed that truth results from 
the discovering and revealing processes; yet, he also argued that such processes do not mean 
to uncover the relationship between a concept and the discussed object per se.  
Accordingly, truth is not generated from the relationship between subjects and objects, 
because such truth only shows subjects’ certain ideology. Annoyingly, this does not mean 
that truth comes from the relationship between subjects and subjects either, given that if the 
so-called truth could be intersubjectively found, it would inevitably become a dominant 
ideology. To escape from ideology (resulting from subjects’ personally interpreting objects) 
and dominant ideology (stemming from intersubjective agreement), critiques, which take the 
angle of ideology, seem to be a way to reach the truth. Yet, is not ideological critique 
undertaken based on critics’ own ideology? The troublesome loop emerges, which is what 
this thesis tries to resolve through the following chapters.  
Although this thesis examines humans’ capacity to escape ideology, it is also the 
examination of whether humans are able to reach the truth. It seeks to answer whether all 
truth claims are ideological? If not, how might ideology be removed to reach the truth? If so, 
is ideology the best humans can do and can we never accept the truth people claim? If so, 
might some ideologies be better than others? This question will be answered gradually 
through discussion of each chapter. 
Summary 
This section started by arguing that critique is not to oppose one thing for the sake of 
opposition. This is for a simple reason: the definition of critique is to seek out the truth. To 
understand the emergence of ideological critique, this thesis investigates the historical 
evolution of critique. The path begins with Xenophanes (i.e., sceptical school) via Socrates, 
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Hume, Kant (i.e., interrogative attitude) and Hegel (i.e., idealism critique), and finally arrives 
at Marx (i.e., material-based critique). Marx’s critique of political economy bridged works of 
critique to the realm of ideology where ideal critique was discarded. 
After reviewing the philosophical history of critique, this section discussed the 
differences between general and ideological critique. The former is usually to indicate what 
is wrong based on visible facts or data of findings. Providing problems are resolved, humans 
might reach the truth. The latter concentrates on the innermost, invisible, and qualitative 
segments of research subjects to unveil what on the surface seems right but indeed conveys 
something inappropriate which helps certain groups to create a dominant ideology. Yet, 
whether ideological critique is able to reach the truth, for this thesis, is still arguable. 
 
2.4. Academic Intellectuals and Ideological Critique 
The previous two sections have illustrated the meanings/characteristics of intellectuals and of 
critiques. This section will first discuss the relationship between intellectuals and critique to 
answer why intellectuals could shoulder the work of critique. Yet, when the angle of 
ideology is measured (which indicates that all critiques are the products of discussants’ 
ideologies) together with the new recognition of intellectuals in modern society (e.g., being 
famous), then whether intellectuals are still capable of carrying critique becomes debatable. 
Who else can shoulder the mission of critique? This thesis suggests that academic critics, 
especially those who focus on phenomena or the theory of ideology, are the few people who 
are able to shoulder the role of real intellectuals. They are potentially the most capable 
people who might escape from the intervention of ideology. 
From Jesters to Modern (General) Critics 
The relationship between critics and their critiques has similarities in the evolution of court 
jesters and their functions. The ancient times fools, who could be seen as the precursors of 
jesters, were mainly the mentally or physically impaired. They imitated nobilities’ speech 
and actions, which unintentionally revealed ‘what really happened at court’. Due to their 
disabilities, they were much tolerated, known as ‘licensed fools’ and exempt from 
punishment even if they offended the nobility. 
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The function of the jesters (fools) can be explained by its parallel role, the clowns. 
While the fools (jesters) improvised to entertain nobilities, clowns performed their 
entertainment following a script—i.e., the clowns were trained. Clowns usually wear heavy 
make-up with a big smile concealing the actors’ real facial expressions. This make-up creates 
a role of the ‘Other’ with this outside mask, not the real face of the actors, entertaining (and 
simultaneously criticising) audiences.  
The function of the clowns being the Others (or outsiders) is also demonstrated by the 
game of cards (Gaarder, 1996). In poker, for example, the joker (crowns) card is unnumbered, 
implying its subversive role in this ordered game. In Tarot, the Fool is the first card of the 
system, usually assigned to zero or even unnumbered. It is listed before the Sun card or the 
World card. To a great degree, the Fool may be considered more important in modern human 
consciousness, implying the fools’ (clowns’) unconventional role out of the world. In short, 
clowns are well-trained, made-up entertainers, outsiders who subvert the vested order.  
Jesters could be considered as the combination of licensed fools and well-trained 
outsider clowns. The first point is, had there been no such fools’ ‘licenses’ exempting from 
punishments, these jesters would definitely have been risking their lives for their innocent 
imitation. Second, if there had been no such clowns’ well-trained characteristics standing 
outside the ordered society, jesters’ performance would never have been so funny yet so real 
to the general public. Under the guise of entertainment, they tell the truth. 
 Modern critics, inadvertently, share many characteristics with jesters, being exempted 
from what they have argued and well-trained outsiders. First, modern critics, of course, do 
not have to entertain the public. That they are exempted from punishment thanks to nobility’s 
acquiescence to the fools’ deficiencies is no longer the case, rather it might be human rights, 
freedom of speech, or simple respect from the public to intelligent people in modern society. 
Second, training is required for the ability to critique, which brings to mind the training of 
clowns for the ability to entertain. A real critic, as argued in section 2.3, will never oppose 
one thing for the sake of opposition. Their criticising of society should be based on 
rationality which is learned and trained (this point will be further discussed later). Most 
modern critics, it is argued19
                                                     
19 Some scholars suggested that critics should engage within the society to undertake critiques, such 
, endeavored to take a position outside a system, such as 
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concepts of Mannheim’s (1936) ‘free-floating intellectuals’, Said’s (1994) ‘outsider, 
amateur’, and Benda’s (2006) ‘universal intellectuals’. In short, exempting from what they 
have argued and being well-trained outsiders are two common characteristics for modern 
critics. 
When General Critics Encounter Ideology 
The following question can be considered. Do modern critics count as intellectuals? The 
answer is complex. In terms of the definition of intellectuals—people who propagate new 
ideas and criticise what is wrong, sometimes feeling obligated to do it, and, occasionally, 
doing it with a brave, radical, and revolutionary sense of calling—modern critics are 
intellectuals. In terms of their fiery-spirited intention, to improve society, they are 
intellectuals.  
 However, living in a ‘relaxed’ advanced society (compared to times of trouble in 
human history or countries currently suffering diverse challenges), hailing modern critics as 
intellectuals could render the meaning of intellectuals valueless. In fact, the question of 
‘what are intellectuals?’ has been asked regularly, and much literature has already offered 
various arguments. Some focused on distinguishing types of intellectuals and suggested their 
ideal model of intellectuals20 while others criticised and investigated why/how intellectuals 
lost their power and function21
When the angle of ideology is considered, the requirement of becoming real 
intellectuals is of a superior grade. This is because even those elements such as courage, 
. All show that the meaning of real intellectuals is important 
for the development of society. 
                                                                                                                                                      
as Gramsci’s (1971) concept of ‘organic intellectuals’. This thesis has listed a figure, attached as 
Appendix 2, to show above scholars’ preference regarding the roles of intellectuals. Although it is not 
the subject of this thesis, it is still worth mentioning. 
20 For example, Gramsci (1971) distinguished intellectuals as traditional v.s. organic; Foucault (1991) 
did as specific v.s. universal; Bauman’s (1989) classification was legislators v.s. interpreters; and 
Mannheim (1936) defined as particular v.s. free-floating. Said (1994) suggested that the ideal 
intellectual should be an unengaged outsider while Benda (1955; 2006) argued that it should be 
non-praxis universal ones. 
21 For example, Lilla (2001) explained the famous sarcasm “Back from Syracuse” (p. 194) which 
refers to Martin Heidegger's returning to university after war. Moreover, Foucault’s argument that 
there are professionals everywhere, but intellectuals have disappeared. Benda (1955; 2006) and 
Hazareesingh (1994) pointed out the phenomenon of losing intellectuals. These are all example to 
explain why intellectuals lose their function and roles in contemporary society. As for other 
systematically relevant arguments, please refer to Jacoby (2000), Johnson (1988), Benda (2006), 
Posner (2002), and Furedi (2004).  
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feeling obligation, radicalism, and revolution (which people used to admire and consider as 
ways to reach real intellectuals) are a high risk, and could ultimately be the holy pretexts 
which, on the surface, are noble spirits to be appreciated; but in fact, these elements become 
gangways to rationalize so-called intellectuals’ actions to reach their own purpose, which no 
doubt is the reflection of their ideologies.  
Take the Russian revolution as an example. To Russian intelligentsia’s opinions, 
Nicholas II’s regime of an old style political and economic system was bad and wrong; 
nevertheless, to what extent, was such a critique based on their own value, position, and 
opinion, that is, ideologies? If later Russian history, under communist Soviet governance, is 
also considered, would such a revolution have been as welcome as those intelligentsias had 
previously desired? (Of course, this is my own judgement.) Take the 1960s French debates 
on the Algerian War as another example. In that period, two groups of so-called intellectuals, 
with opposing opinions, claimed their rightness of perspective regarding whether to support 
the war or to conscientiously object. The actions, spirits, and attitudes of both groups could 
be considered as intellectual because both indeed wanted to make France better. This is a 
competition for ideological hegemony and it is impossible to judge which side is correct and 
who shoulders the role of intellectuals.  
Based on these examples, it shows that when critics’ own ideologies are concerned, the 
question of ‘what are intellectuals?’ becomes complicated and cannot simply rely on their 
possessing brave, courageous, radical, or revolutionary attitudes to propagate a new idea or 
criticise the so-called wrongness of society.  
As a result, this thesis argues that, in the age of ideology, especially for a ‘relaxed’ 
advanced society, the meaning of intellectuals should be redefined or, say, the roles of 
intellectuals should be re-distinguished. This thesis suggests classifying intellectuals’ roles as 
the ‘general’ (i.e., all the features of modern critics discussed above) and ‘ideological’ 
intellectuals. The definition of ideological intellectuals and why nowadays they are limited to 
academia together with the problem academic intellectuals of ideological critique have faced 
will be discussed later. Before that, a definition for general intellectuals (modern critics) is 
provided here as conclusion to this section 
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General intellectuals are usually well trained within a specific knowledge field; they 
propagate new ideas and criticise social deviating phenomena. Most of the time, they could 
be exempted from what they have criticised. Their critiques often focus on visible data or 
facts; as a result, to them, the truth is the opposite side of wrongness. Pointing out and 
solving these faulty phenomena are the methods to reach the truth. 
Academic Intellectuals of Ideological Critique 
A definition of intellectuals (modern critics) who work on general critique has been provided 
above; a definition of intellectuals who work on ideological critique, however, is difficult to 
set out. When the executor of critiques (i.e., humans) and their so-called free will (or their 
ideology) are taken into consideration simultaneously, who is able to shoulder the role of 
intellectuals to undertake ideological critique requires thorough inspection. A failed 
inspection might lead to a failed ideological critique, causing an endless loop of personal 
consciousness criticising another consciousness, thereby contributing to nothing but creating 
another ideal-critique.  
 However, there is no evidence to determine who is capable or incapable of undertaking 
ideological critique, since any judgement is all ideological estimation. As a result, this thesis 
can only explain who may be best placed to conduct ideological critique. It argues that works 
of ideological critique, to a great degree, are limited to academic circles, especially those 
academic critics who focus on dealing with phenomena or theories of ideology, i.e., the 
academic ideology theorists. Reasons are provided as follows. 
First, the ability of undertaking ideological critique is limited to specific academics if the 
following question is taken seriously: Do critics fully understand the nature/characteristic of 
ideology? Have they explained how and why one ideology emerges while conducting 
ideological critique? 
All people with specialization in certain areas are capable of doing critiques to point 
out the wrongness and to offer suggestions. This is what general critics do. General critics 
are sometimes involved in a discussion of ideology too. However, unlike their highlighting 
social problems which at least are based on visible data or evidence, they usually link one 
social problem directly to ideology without explaining why and how such an ideology relates 
to this social problem. This is merely an idealism-style critique on one ideology, but not a 
real ideological critique.  
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Differently, critics of ideological critiques are required to explain why (and under what 
conditions) this ideology is created, and with what sorts of operation of power that this 
ideology is linked to such a social problem. That is to say, only when general critics possess 
abilities to explain how and why such ideology emerges, do they become ideological critics. 
To possess such abilities, critics must be familiar with theories of ideologies (regardless of 
the diverse theoretical dimensions they hold) and the relative discussion (e.g., ideas of 
consciousness, power, hegemony, etc.). Only by thoroughly understanding to what the nature 
of ideology refers, are people able to talk about ideology.  
Second, since not every one learns/understands the basic discussion/theory of ideology 
before they talk about/apply the term of ideology, and since works of ideological critique are 
usually obscure and often conflict with people’s ‘normal’ thinking, ideological critics’ 
arguments are not easily accepted/supported; their arguments can only circulate and be 
understood, even agreed, within academia.  
Different from the general critics who focus on the visible faults, ideological critics 
attempt to discover invisible social phenomena which seem so right on the surface, yet, in 
fact are inappropriate. Ideological critics’ argumentations often overly refer to human 
consciousness, which is beyond the general public's comprehension. If ideological critics’ 
words are easily accepted, then such words only reveal the public’s common thoughts 
instead of the humans’ inner part of concealed ‘ideology’. As a result, while fools are 
laughed at for their clumsy demeanours, ideological critics are also deemed to be unrealistic 
because their critiques on invisible human consciousness per se, to the public, are highly 
absurd.  
Inadvertently, ideological critics are also seen as over-nervous and taking everything 
too seriously (e.g., always linking terms like power, hegemony, ideology to every 
phenomenon) so that their arguments are usually regarded as a foolish perspective. 
Eventually, ideological critics re-shoulder the role of entertainer, echoed in Shakespeare's 
(2008) description of the jester as “wise enough to play the fool” (p. 87). Accordingly, 
academia becomes the only channel where such unusual social observation can 
communicate. 
Finally, people who work on ideological critique possess a special inner feeling of 
personal responsibility toward society; this feeling usually accompanies an indignant and 
helpless sense.  
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Ennis (1987) suggested that works of critique include three essentials: skills, abilities, 
and dispositions. While the terms skills and abilities correspond to the previous discussion of 
why ideological critique is limited to academics, disposition can be seen as the foundation of 
any style of critique. Dispositions means whether general or ideological critics, there must be 
a sense of calling leading them to shoulder social responsibilities. Yet, there are slight 
differences between them. While general critics see the wrongness of one certain social 
phenomenon, they warn, criticise, and suggest solutions; by so doing, they (think they) 
accomplish their social responsibilities.  
Differently, what ideological critics have observed is not the wrongness on the surface; 
instead, it is inappropriateness in rightness’ clothing. Although they try to discover these 
ideological phenomena, the problem is that since these phenomena are seen as so right and 
normal to the public, no one will consider these phenomena as serious problems as these 
critics do. Consequently, their critiques are usually treated with contempt; they are 
re-criticised by the public as scholars in ivory towers who sense trouble in the air because, to 
the public, there is nothing to worry about. As a result, the calling of social responsibility 
seems impossible to accomplish which eventually reflects on ideological critics’ indignant 
and helpless feelings. For inappropriateness is in rightness’ clothing, they are indignant; for 
the public’s ignorance (even if it is bliss), they feel helpless. Some critics retreat through 
frustration; others endure which becomes the crucial reason making them the real 
intellectuals. This is the characteristic of the intellectual to which this thesis refers and which 
might be well explained by Adorno’s words.  
Adorno (1990) argued that although the world is awful and identity-thinking22
armored against every tangible, imaginatively unimaginative assertion of 
transcendence…. And yet philosophy cannot abdicate if stupidity is not to triumph 
in realized unreason. Aux sots je préfère les fous. (p. 404) 
 is 
terrible, it does not mean that real intellectuals have to surrender. “For it is a feature of truth 
that it will last, along with its temporal core” (p. 371). Even though they are seen as idiots in 
this reification world, real intellectuals still have to fight,  
 
                                                     
22 Concept of identity-thinking will be introduced in Chapter 3. 
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Adorno’s words help to distinguish the decisive difference between ideological and general 
critics. The former are intellectuals who possess a special inner feeling of personal 
responsibility toward society; they keep criticising ideological phenomena, fighting the 
unjust in just clothing. Although the public do not need them, see them, or believe them, and 
no one is there to understand. To create a better world and for truth to triumph, they prefer to 
be sots instead of fous.  
 
2.5. Conclusion 
This chapter started by illustrating the historical evolution of two subjects of this 
thesis—intellectuals and the critiques they offer. In terms of the definition of intellectuals, 
propagating new ideas and criticising the wrongness of society are usually considered as 
intellectuals’ basic characteristics. Sometimes, characteristics such as being educated and 
other specific personal attitudes (e.g., bravery, feeling obligated, being radical, revolutionary 
or just famous) are also reasons for being considered intellectuals.  
 In terms of critique, the definition is simple, to seek the truth. This thesis investigates 
the historical evolution of critique to understand the emergence of ideological critique. The 
path begins with Xenophanes (sceptical school) via Socrates, Hume, Kant (interrogative 
attitude) and Hegel (idealism critique), finally reaching Marx (material-based critique). 
Marx’s critique on political economy bridged works of critique to the realm of ideology 
where ideal critique was discarded. 
After reviewing the philosophical history of critique, this chapter discussed the 
differences between general and ideological critique. The former is usually to point out what 
is wrong with the research subjects based on the visible facts or data of findings. As long as 
problems are resolved, humans might reach the truth. Differently, ideological critique 
concentrates on the innermost, invisible, and qualitative segments of research subjects to 
unveil what, on the surface, seems right but indeed conveys something inappropriate which 
helps certain groups to create a common dominant ideology. 
The final section of this chapter focused on the relationship between intellectuals and 
their work of critiques and explained the situation when ideology is considered. This thesis 
argues that in the epoch of ideology, ideological critics are limited to academia and they are 
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the few humans who might be able to shoulder the role of intellectuals especially in 
contemporary society. Three factors are explained. First, the ability to analyse and criticise 
ideology is limited to specific academics, especially to those familiar with ideology-related 
notions. As a result, second, ideological critiques are usually obscure and critics’ arguments 
are perceived as strange, and not readily accepted by the public. The third factor, making 
academic ideological critics intellectuals, is that ideological critiques require a special inner 
feeling of personal responsibility towards society. Ideological critics unveil the inappropriate 
when clothed as rightness. Yet, their arguments are uneasily accepted by the public and often 
ridiculed as unrealistic; while some critics cave, others have more tenacity and this makes 
them the intellectuals. 
 The argument of this chapter concludes that academic ideological critics are the few 
people who can be seen as real intellectuals in contemporary society. Based on this, it seems 
that ideological critics are able to lead the public to escape from the influence of ideology. 
However, questions remain. While this thesis highlighted the limitation of general (modern) 
critics when they encounter ideology, the same shortcoming applies to ideological critics 
who also have to overcome their own or social ideology, such as the influence of capitalism. 
Accordingly, whether capitalism influences academic publications and how/if ideological 
critics’ own ideologies influence their works are the missions in the following chapters. Only 
after these questions are considered, might the answer to whether humans can escape from 
an ideology dungeon be provided. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Theoretical Inspiration: Standardisation 
—From Culture Industry to Academic Industry 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, this thesis framed two subjects, intellectual and critique, focusing on 
their characteristic and definitional evolution through historical and philosophical 
perspectives respectively. Meanwhile, how the strength of ideology influences the way of 
recognizing these two terms is also considered throughout the discussion. Based on these 
investigations, ideological critics are distinguished from general ones.  
 This thesis also argues that ideological critics are limited to academia particularly those 
who specialize in ideology-related studies. Ideology-specialists are the few people who are 
able to discover inappropriateness when disguised as rightness in contemporary society. 
Nevertheless, such expectation remains doubtful. Although Chapter 2 endowed ideological 
critics with the function of real intellectuals, they still have to tackle being influenced by 
their inner or social total ideologies. In fact, ideological critics’ works are still conscious 
products of their own ideology, despite those works being meant to criticise ideology. 
Humans are unable to run from ideology’s dungeon.  
 Yet, such claim cannot be suggested simply based on my ‘idealism’ argument because 
it is my personal ideology against those ideological critics’ ideology, which is similar to their 
works being based on their ideology to fight against the ideology of their research subjects. 
Arguments like that will inevitably fall into the endless loop of idealism critique. Thus, to 
provide validated argumentations, which testify above statement, this thesis turns to examine 
ideological critics’ works (e.g., articles, papers, books) to see if they and their works might 
be immune from the influences of ideology.  
According to Adorno (1973), “identity is the primal form of ideology” (p. 148). Based 
on his notion, finding the ‘commonalities’ between diverse IAC works is one reasonable way 
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to examine ideological critics’ immunity against ideology. Exploring the commonalities, or 
what Adorno despised the most—identity-thinking, between diverse IAC articles has a 
theoretical foundation inspired by the Frankfurt School’s critiques on the ‘culture industry’, 
which discovered the phenomenon of making artistic products in a model of compulsion 
(invisible controls), commodification, and standardisation.  
Hence, this chapter will briefly introduce some critical concepts of the Frankfurt School. 
Although considerable detail is needed to explain their notions which may seem irrelevant to 
this work’s train of thought at this stage, their ideas indeed are the foundational concepts that 
not only help to understand notions of the culture industry, but also help to delineate this 
thesis’ argument of ‘academic industry’ in the following discussion. Academic industry is 
nothing new; in fact, it has been discussed23
Essentially, this chapter is an introspection of Chapter 2, re-thinking the ideological 
critics’ capacity to escape the influence of ideology. Concepts of the Frankfurt School will be 
introduced first, to be followed by an explanation of the birth of academic industry, which 
led to the phenomenon of standardisation in academic publications. If ideological critics’ 
IAC articles were found to be standardised, following standard writing procedures, it will 
prove that no one is capable of escaping the power of ideology (i.e., mission of Chapters 
5-8).  
. Yet, re-stating it here is to specifically highlight 
the standardisation in academic publications (resulting from commonalities), or what this 
thesis calls the phenomenon of Standard Writing Procedures (SWPs) in IAC articles, which 
is the main presumption that this thesis will consider in Chapters 5-8. 
 
3.2 The Frankfurt School 
Its History and Critique on Ideology-Life Complex 
People are much more familiar with the Frankfurt School and Max Horkheimer than with the 
School’s birthplace, the Institute for Social Research, and Carl Grunberg, the first director of 
                                                     
23 For example, Macherey (1978) argued that a writer is merely a producer who composes words into 
an article, which is no different from assembling a vehicle. In addition, Eagleton (1976) proposed, 
“Literature […] is also an industry. Books are not just structures of meaning, they are also 
commodities produced by publishers and sold on the market at a profit” (p. 59, emphasise original). 
The two scholars share a notion that the process of creating literature is no different from producing 
commercial goods.  
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this Institute. Originally, the objective of the Institute was to research and strengthen 
Marxism; such an objective was followed by many of its previous leaders until Horkheimer 
(Jay, 1996). Under Horkheimer’s directorship, the Institute did not simply focus on economic 
dimensions, others such as cultural and psychological dimensions were also considered as 
analytical angles to understand society24
 Eventually, they came to be known as the Frankfurt School. Although members of the 
Frankfurt School possess diverse backgrounds, their arguments shared the same 
considerations: attempting to determine what had gone wrong within society and to debate 
what was ordinarily not discussed (Horkheimer, 1972). Their thoughts on analysing and 
criticising society have been described succinctly as ‘Critical Theory
 (Jay, 1984). The reasons that these dimensions, 
beyond economics, were emphasised were also related to the specialist background of the 
Institute (Rose, 1978; Held, 1980; Jay, 1996). For example, Marcuse and Fromm possessed 
backgrounds in psychoanalysis while Adorno focused on musical and aesthetic perspectives.  
25
 
’. Critical theory is 
more like a collective noun or a concept. The purpose of its existence is to position itself to 
tell the truth (Jay, 1996), which, to a great degree, shares the same characteristic as 
ideological critique. 
                                                     
24 That whether Horkheimer was a Marxist has been questioned a lot. It is said that there was no 
opportunity for Horkheimer to be appointed as professor in the department of philosophy at that time; 
therefore, if he could become the director of the Institute for Social Research, he could be promoted as 
professor (because the director is a vacancy for professor level). Since the goal of such an institute is 
Marxism-oriented, it seems that adopting a position close to Marxism would help him obtain the 
position. This interesting suspicion might also provide an answer to the question of why the Frankfurt 
School is criticized extensively for abandoning the economic angle (Wiggershaus, 1994). 
25 Critical Theory is different from other theories. Other theories focus on specific notions or offer a 
complete system of discourse. Although Critical Theory or, say, the Frankfurt School theorists, to a 
great degree, inherited from Marx’s ideas, it still showed a certain diversity, especially to orthodox 
Marxism which hinges on the viewpoint of class consciousness (Jay, 1996). As discussed above, 
Critical Theory is composed of diverse research angles such as culture, society, psychoanalysis, music, 
and aesthetic. In his article “Traditional and Critical Theory”, Horkheimer (1972) had explained the 
difference between these two terminologies. Traditional theory (i.e., other theories mentioned above) 
excessively praises objectivity to avoid prejudice and conflicts of interests. It wishes to depart from 
value judgement via intelligent determination in order to pursue an agreeable theory without any 
contradictions. With traditional theory, the research objects are positioned outside theories. On the 
contrary, Critical Theory subsumes the study objects into the analysed structure, such that it claims 
itself as an indispensable link to change the world. The purpose of Critical Theory is not to reach 
absolute knowledge. This is because even though Critical Theory helps to change reality, it varies 
itself simultaneously during the whole process. In other words, traditional theory tries to place itself 
outside of the research object in order to provide the abstract concept with a concrete system; however, 
in Critical Theory, the concrete system is represented as various ideologies which serve certain 
interest groups. If traditional theory supports the “existing reality” (p. 217), then Critical Theory lifts 
this veil which, to a great degree, shares the same function as ideological critique. 
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One of the Frankfurt School’s central argumentative points is that ideology and daily 
life are indeed and unquestionably integrated in the age of capitalist society. Simply put, an 
ideology-life complex has been created. Encountering this phenomenon, several Institute 
theorists have provided their perspectives. Horkheimer and Adorno (2002) in their book 
Dialectic of Enlightenment explained that the pursuit of rationality (which, in fact, is the 
representation of certain ideologies) has led human beings to make progress ever since the 
age of enlightenment. These rational disciplines were originally established only to eliminate 
barbaric and illiterate human manners; however, they replaced the very social guiding logics, 
which they used to criticise most, becoming themselves a new myth. Inside this myth, the 
ideology, which promotes the sublime of rationality, was involved with human life becoming 
the only discipline.  
Moreover, Marcuse (1991) provided this new myth a terminology, that is, Instrumental 
Rationality. To him, advanced society per se indeed possesses the characteristics of ideology 
which help to reproduce dominant thought. This thought is that rationality is important. With 
the assistance of ideology, such thought is repeatingly reproduced where so-called scientific 
knowledge and technology (i.e., instrumental rationality) are blindly pursued and identified. 
Eventually, a world that lives with one-dimensional man is created. The impact of such a 
one-dimensional society could find further theoretical explanation in Adorno’s (1990) notion 
of identity where he discussed how this ideology-life complex led to human irrationality on 
the scale of the Holocaust.  
If the phenomenon of the ideology-life complex is the starting point of the Frankfurt 
School—i.e., the presentation of society now is opposite to its reality— then what this 
School continues to do is to begin their critiques (see section 3.3) and look for solutions (see 
Chapter 9). As mentioned above, it is better to understand some critical concepts of the 
Frankfurt School to ascertain how they diagnose society before investigating how they 
criticise it as well as guiding ways out of it. Concepts that the following section will review 
include notions of Dialectic of Enlightenment, Instrumental Rationality, and 
Identity(-thinking) and Totality. 
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Concept: Dialectic of Enlightenment 
To the Frankfurt School26
 Yet, Horkheimer and Adorno (2002) in their book, The Dialectic of Enlightenment, 
questioned “why humanity, instead of entering a truly human state, is sinking into a new kind 
of barbarism” (2002, p. xiv). They answered that although the world has become more 
civilized since the age of enlightenment, a blind fetish of enlightenment-correct has become 
another new dominant myth and ideology with a better disguised appearance. The 
enlightenment rejected myth, but ultimately it became a new myth itself. This myth was 
borne out of human belief in rationality, science, technology, and knowledge where they 
were forced to abandon individuality of thinking. The characteristics of their thoughts can 
only be shown through material formation becoming a new form of thinking, which is based 
on an instrumental and technological rationality.  
, the purpose of enlightenment is to release humans from fears of 
barbarism via the guidance of rationality. Enlightenment thus claims to establish knowledge 
based on neutral mathematical disciplines and objective logic to eliminate illusion and myth. 
In other words, the idea of enlightenment upholds the logical form and highly praises the 
mathematical disciplines. This is to eradicate the sensitive characteristics of everything, 
simplifying everything into countable quantities. In so doing, all things in the world, even 
human feelings, could be equally calculated and exchanged (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002). 
 What should be clarified is that it is not the instruments, technologies, and knowledge 
per se which the Frankfurt School criticised, but rather the thinking logic, or the ideology, 
that upholds rationality, (blindly) believing in the correctness of instruments, technologies, 
and knowledge. 
In short, the Frankfurt School argues that while the spirit of enlightenment shepherds 
humans from being savage to being civil, humanity itself has retreated back to the barbarian 
stage due to the new myths it has created. The difference is that the reasons that have 
provoked this relapse into barbarism are no longer factors such as the economy, but rather 
                                                     
26 What must be explained here is that, to a certain extent, this thesis has simply and irresponsibly 
generalized thoughts of the Frankfurt School’s theorists into an angle of totality, and collectively 
presented this as “the Frankfurt School.” (Ironically, seeing all incidents, even though they are close, 
as a totality is to a certain extent agreed with by Lukacs, but rejected by Adorno). The reasons for 
presenting it this way are not only that this is not a thesis on the Frankfurt School, but also that the 
thoughts of the Frankfurt School’s members are mutually demonstrated and complementary to each 
other. Frankly speaking, there is a certain difficulty in distinguishing their individual thoughts across 
such a limited number of pages. 
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rationality. With the sword of rationality, enlightenment was able to criticise old ideologies; 
this rational sword, however, has become another form of violence that itself should be 
argued against.  
Drawing on Horkheimer & Adorno (2002), if the humans’ enlightenment initially 
involved the pursuit of rationality to escape from barbarism, then what the Frankfurt School 
wishes is to ask us to undertake the second enlightenment, that is, to criticise the irrationality 
of rationality derived from the first enlightenment.  
The reason why the first enlightenment was veiled in itself or why rational reason 
became violent reason could be explained by Marcuse’s and Adorno’s other ideas, which is 
the task of the following discussion. To Marcuse (1991), the first enlightenment has 
encouraged people to follow the discipline of scientific technology (i.e., instrumental 
rationality), which becomes the only way for the public to prove their rationality. To Adorno 
(1990), the impact that the first enlightenment, or the instrumental rationality, has created is 
that human beings have begun to pursue identity to create a dreamed totality. 
Concept: Instrumental Rationality 
How scientific technology, as a formation of ideology, influences society could be traced 
back to Marx’s (1971) relative discourses where he demonstrated how productive forces and 
the relations of production together determine the social formation of an age27
The same men who establish their social relations in conformity with their material 
productivity, produce also principles, ideas, and categories, in conformity with their 
social relations. (p. 119) 
. Marx’s 
demonstrative logic is: scientific technology is part of the productive forces—the diverse 
labour instruments (and its users) determine the expression of the productive forces (and its 
corresponding relations of production, i.e., the means of production), which will determine 
the whole formation of social development (and its corresponding relationships of 
dominance). Essentially, this reflects an ideology of a time. As Marx (1955) said, 
                                                     
27 The productive forces refer to what type(s) of labourers are in demand and the instruments they 
adopt to create products. Although it is human beings as labourers who create their own instruments, it 
is the certain social economic conditions at the time which determine what sort of labourers these 
humans become and what type of instruments they are able to (invent and) use. Handiwork in the 
feudal manor, the steam engine machine in an industrial capital society, and Internet business in the 
era of information all show that the means of production, to a certain degree, reflect the corresponding 
formation of society. 
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If Marx pointed out the veiled relationship between the productive forces (especially the 
corresponding instruments) and one ideology of a time, then arguments claimed by the 
Frankfurt School are to demonstrate how scientific technology, which was nourished in the 
era of enlightenment, became the dominant ideology of their time (and, of course, our 
present-day), or, has become the only standard to achieve rationality. Although members of 
the Frankfurt School, e.g., Horkheimer and Adorno, more or less, entered into the discussion 
on how scientific technology influences human consciousness, Marcuse should be 
considered as the one who actually offered a complete analysis and critique on the influence 
of scientific technology.  
Marcuse’s (1991) foci were mainly on the relationship between the political content of 
scientific/technological rationality and the characteristic of ideologies. His findings were that 
scientific technologies per se are a new kind of ideology. To Marcuse, mechanization (i.e., 
the result of scientific technology development) has redefined the meaning of labour28
However, using an iPhone 4, as Steve Jobs did, does not mean that the class difference 
between him and us is removed. As Marcuse (1991) argued, 
 
because technological progress promotes the productive forces that also have improved 
human lives, including those of the bourgeoisie and proletariat. In other words, the 
improvement of instruments has brought about a better working environment, which in turn 
has changed the proletariat’s attitude regarding their labouring, and eventually makes them 
feel that the gap between the two classes has been reduced. 
this assimilation indicates not the disappearance of classes, but the extent to which 
the needs and satisfactions that serve the preservation of the Establishment are 
shared by the underlying population. (p. 8) 
In fact, to Marcuse (1991), exploitation does still exist because the very truth of exploitation 
is now veiled by the development of scientific technology (e.g., the operation of instruments 
becomes more convenient). To him, “The slaves of developed industrial civilization are 
sublimated slaves, but they are slaves” (p. 32). The definition of slaves does not refer to the 
difficulty of performing labour but to workers’ conditions of playing disposable yet 
instrumental roles.  
                                                     
28 For concept of labour, please refer to Chapter 5. 
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Marcuse (1991) stated that technology eliminated the original form, which serves a 
single purpose and created a new general form, which can serve several major purposes. The 
scientific technologies quantify the abstract natural world, transforming it into one with 
countable materials offering humans an efficient, reasonable, and comprehensive sensibility 
to reach objectivity. The scientific technologies meet not only the material but also the 
spiritual needs of humans, creating an illusion where humans neglect the false and deceitful 
characteristic of scientific technology and forget the real freedom. The worship of and 
reliance on scientific technology becomes a key part of humans’ living discipline, and further 
creeps into their daily life. Marcuse described these phenomena as the pursuit of 
“technological rationality” (i.e., instrumental reason29
The characteristics of technological rationality are composed of logical, mathematical, 
and instrumental formations, including both the application of visible scientific instruments 
and invisible derivative/constructed knowledge. Under the guidance of technological 
rationality, humans stand on quantified data and formalised, standardised procedures to 
evaluate things in the world; in so doing, they think that they are able to objectively and 
neutrally establish a principle for all things. Thus, such positive thinking of technological 
rationality, to the public, is the principles guiding humans’ social practices.  
). 
However, to Marcuse (1991), the technological rationality per se possesses the 
characteristic of ideology, which is the leading logic of social control. Since technological 
rationality possesses the characteristic of ideology, the application of visible technologies 
and invisible derivative knowledge could never be neutral. On the contrary, it is 
unidirectional and interest-oriented, and it is destined to construct a systematic and cultural 
totality by eliminating other differences of things. It transpires that the application of 
scientific technology, whether through visible instruments or invisible knowledge, is a 
method to maintain a certain ideology. This phenomenon is what Marcuse described as the 
rationality of irrationality, or an alienated rationality. 
 
                                                     
29 Although Marcuse’s terminology of instrumental rationality was inherited from Weber’s notion of 
rationality (including value-rational and instrumental-rational action), Marcuse often adopted 
technological rationality instead of Weber’s term instrumental-rational action or instrumental reason 
as termed by his other colleagues, such as Horkheimer and Adorno. Generally speaking, these terms 
share the same concept. 
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To Marcuse (1991), when aliened rationality reaches a certain degree, the foreseeable 
impacts will be “the closing of the political universe” (p. 19), “the conquest of the unhappy 
consciousness: repressive desublimation” (p. 56), and “the closing of the universe of 
discourse” (p. 84). In other words, because such social consciousness (i.e., technological 
rationality) created by the advanced industrial society controls and dominates political and 
social thinking, the goal of social development gradually becomes identical to governments’ 
goals, where all sorts of social problems are subsumed into the governance of states. Society 
could be extremely rich and so could be unusually poor; it could be a welfare state and also 
could be one that initiates wars. In terms of politics, oppositional parties are becoming 
identical; in terms of economics, unions and firms in fact are run by the same guiding logics. 
These notions are summarised by Marcuse (1991) as the one-dimension society—“the 
paralysis of criticism: society without opposition” (p. xli).  
Concept: Identity and Totality 
Marcuse’s (1991) argumentation on technological rationality explained not only how a 
one-dimension society is created but also how people living in such a society lose their 
negative thinking when facing the “triumph of positive thinking” (p. 170). By pointing out 
the concepts of identity and totality, Adorno (1990) also shared Marcuse’s concern regarding 
the changing society. 
To Adorno (1990), the characteristic of identity—or identity-thinking 30
For example, the term freedom originally contained diverse concepts, e.g., including its 
conditions and legal limitations; but, under the function of identity, humans easily and lazily 
recognize this term as ‘being free’. Freedom has lost its original intention (with required 
—is to 
categorize, connect, and simultaneously simplify concepts of various terms or humans’ 
cognitions in order to forge a particular way of thinking. In so doing, the contents of a term, 
which seemingly contains diverse and abundant meanings, become inwardly narrow and 
singular due to the operation of identity. 
                                                     
30 Gillian Rose (1978) concluded that identity-thinking, non-identity thinking, and rational identity 
thinking are three elements which constructed Adorno’s notion of identity(-thinking). Due to the 
limitation of page length, this thesis will only introduce the notion of identity-thinking in this chapter 
and non-identity thinking in Chapter 9. For a complete treatment of rational identity thinking, please 
refer to Rose’s (1978) book The Melancholy Science: An Introduction to the Thought of Theodor W. 
Adorno, Chapter 3. 
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conditions); instead, it is seen simply as the protection of personal interests in which people 
take ‘self-interests’ or ‘being free’ as the only way of thinking regarding freedom. While 
freedom is simplified to a particular way of thinking (i.e., identity-thinking), it testifies 
Adorno’s concern that the function of identify helps to create a certain ideology. Adorno 
(1973) stated that “identity is the primal form of ideology” (p. 148). Similarly, the 
identity-thinking of ‘being free’ is the ‘primal form’ that constructs the ideology of seeing 
freedom. 
The operating model of identity, according to Adorno (1990), is to pursue the 
quantitative singularity instead of the qualitative diversity which is the reason why Adorno 
was disgusted at identity(-thinking). The tragedy of Auschwitz is the example through which 
Adorno demonstrated the threat of Nazis looking for identity. Under the discipline of 
instrumental reason—evaluating things based on quantifiable matters, Jewish people were 
presented as the countable Others. Consequently, death in the Holocaust is not an individual 
matter but that of a quantifiable “specimen”31
Auschwitz testified to the threat of identity-thinking (i.e., the pursuit of sameness or 
totality) which could find theoretical support from Marx’s concept of commodity exchange 
as Adorno (1990) explained,  
. (Schweppenhäuser, 2009, p. 67; Adorno, 1990, 
p. 362). Once the subjects could be degraded to quantitative examples (i.e., quantifiable 
others or non-identical, non-historical gestated individuals), even humans could be dumped 
freely. 
The barter principle, the reduction of human labor to the abstract universal concept 
of average working hours, is fundamentally akin to the principle of identification. 
Barter is the social model of the principle, and without the principle there would be 
no barter. (p. 146) 
Adorno (1990) agreed with Marx that the capitalist society mechanism is built on the 
discipline of commodity exchange. This mechanism is an alienated social operating logic 
where the nature of humans is degraded like that of materials, helping to pursue identity and 
homophyly. During the process of exchange, the non-identifiable labouring outcomes 
                                                     
31 The Holocaust museum in Jerusalem has one of its key principles that they do not teach people 
about the Holocaust in terms of numbers, their pedagogy is based on telling personal stories because 
to talk in numbers and statistics is to perpetuate what the Nazis did. Their pedagogical principles echo 
Adorno’s aspect. 
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become commensurable and identifiable, eventually reaching their final destination: the 
totality. Totality (i.e., seeking identity) is a foreseeable destructive consequence which is 
what primarily concerned Adorno. He claimed, 
It is through barter that nonidentical individuals and performances become 
commensurable and identical. The spread of the principle imposes on the whole 
world an obligation to become identical, to become total. (1990, p. 146) 
Totality, the destination of identity-thinking, is what Adorno (1990) opposed the most. To 
understand Adorno’s attitude regarding totality, Marx’s and Lukacs’ perspectives should be 
reviewed. According to Marx (in Held, 1980), demand is the critical factor that causes 
human development through daily labouring. The process of humans’ labouring determines 
the social construction; it is also a way to understand the nature of humans such as the 
pursuit of rationality and freedom. Humans’ labouring is not only an economic material 
practice but also a way to prove their material existence.  
However, at a certain stage of their labouring, the division of labour is an inevitable 
phenomenon. The simplest division is that of material and spiritual labour (Marx & Engels, 
1970; Wolff, 2002). From such division, spiritual labour is able to break away from material 
labour to establish pure discourses such as theology and philosophy—that is, the battlefield 
wherein ideology works. To Marx (1971), humans’ consciousness is the products of their 
social practice/labouring. Only when consciousness eliminates material labour does it start to 
gain the characteristic of ideology functioning as ideology. It is also because of the division 
of material and spiritual labour that the division of subject and object starts to be seen as a 
way to recognize the world (Jay, 1984). 
Lukacs’s (1971) demonstration on totality is indeed based on recognizing the division 
of material and spiritual labour and that of subject and object (which, yet, is what Adorno 
(1990) was most against).  To Lukacs (1971), the proletariat have to recognize that their 
social consciousness is a reified (alienated) consciousness, which disengages from their daily 
labouring, and also have to identify their situation of being the object of the dominant class if 
they want to end this oppressed condition. Thus, he suggested we recognize the society as a 
totality where every social phenomenon should be investigated within the whole social 
context. In so doing, people are able to investigate the interaction between subjects and 
objects completely to reach their unity. Once the proletariat realizes their own proletarian 
consciousness, breaking through the dominance of capitalist ideology becomes possible. 
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Lukacs (1971) attempted to recreate the totality of the world via the dialectic of 
subject-object, i.e., to clearly identify object from subject and vice versa. This is to 
distinguish the ideology of the proletariat from that of the bourgeoisie and to transform the 
proletarian consciousness from being object to subject. Nevertheless, to Adorno, Lukacs’s 
logic of totality is not an objective dialectic. It still goes with the angle of subject-centred or 
human-centred. The subjects, eventually, engulf the objects; in other words, objects are the 
compelled and subdued targets under the subjects’ superiority. The triumph of subject will 
consequentially lead to the establishment of the sameness, which reflects a certain subject’s 
totality instead of totality of subject-object. 
The serious impact of identity and totality is that objects are incapable of realizing their 
predicament. They, as the objects of social development, misrecognized themselves as 
subjects. Such misrecognition of being the subject echoes Adorno and Horkheimer’s (1997) 
critique on the culture industry where they explained how customers suffer from the 
misunderstanding of choosing what they want; in fact, what they can consume is all the 
identical products representing nothing special but sameness. 
 
3.3 Culture Industry and Academic Industry 
In the previous section, this thesis briefly explained the Frankfurt School’s findings 
regarding problems of contemporary society. Their foundational concepts including dialectic 
of enlightenment, instrumental rationality, and identity and totality were introduced as well. 
These concepts echo their argumentations on the phenomenon of the culture industry.  
The notion of dialectic of enlightenment asks people to introspect ideas, which are 
taken for granted. While it is applied to explain the phenomenon of the culture industry, 
Horkheimer and Adorno wished to expose the real nature of contemporary artistic creations 
which had lost their original aura and were covered by sameness. (Works of ideological 
critique also share the same logic, i.e., to discover inappropriateness in rightness’ clothing.) 
The reason that cultural creations sink into the culture industry’s model of production is 
because of the development of instruments and technologies (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002; 
Marcuse, 1991). The instruments and technologies change the way of presenting artistic 
works which gradually undermine the nature of cultural creation, eventually, result in a 
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problem: instrumental rationalities have expelled ‘value-rational actions’ (Weber’s term) that 
cultural creations originally possessed. (This thesis will examine whether works of 
ideological critique suffer from such instrumental rationality, especially the curse of 
standardisation, in the empirical analysis chapters.) 
In discussion about the culture industry, modern artistic creations, on the surface, are 
seemingly various, but, in fact, conceal sameness, which results from the culture industry’s 
characteristics of compulsion, commodification, and standardisation. This is why Adorno 
(2002) warned us off identity-thinking and its subsequent totality which will wipe away the 
diversities of things and let human consciousness become what he called the “social cement” 
(p. 459; also see Adorno & Horkheimer, 1997). (This thesis will also discuss whether works 
of ideological critique reach nothing but sameness due to the impact of standardisation in the 
empirical analysis chapters.) 
This section will first introduce characteristics of the culture industry then investigate 
whether publications in academia gradually become the academic industry due to similar 
characteristics. It will question to what extent the works of ideological critiques become 
involved with these characteristics, especially the phenomenon of standardisation. 
Culture Industry 
Frankfurt School thinkers have argued that culture (i.e., the traditional elite culture, or the 
culture prior to capitalism) should take a position against society (Adorno & Horkheimer, 
1992). The function of artistic creation is not to parade society’s achievements but to reflect 
society’s contradictions. It is a function of “negative truth” (p. 37; Adorno, 1991, p. 26)—i.e., 
‘negativity’. Nevertheless, since the emergence of capitalism in the eighteenth century, the 
function of negativity has been lost. Thus, artistic creation (which should now be called 
cultural product) starts to confirm the logic of capitalism, which eventually generates a ‘mass 
culture’ peculiar to modern industrial society, contributing to what Adorno and Horkheimer 
named the culture industry32
Three features of the culture industry can be concluded with regard to the methods 
which produce cultural creations. First, a method of production is gradually combined with 
.  
                                                     
32 Why Adorno (and Horkheimer) switched the term from mass culture, used before 1974, to culture 
industry is explained in Adorno’s (1991) book The Culture Industry, Chapter 3. 
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scientific technology; second, this method begins representing the mercantile demands rather 
than presenting its creators’ ideas; and third, this method is progressively similar to the 
process of commodity production (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1992; 1997). The above three 
points correspond to the three characteristics of the culture industry respectively, that is, the 
compulsion (invisible controls), commodification, and standardisation.  
In terms of compulsion, it echoes what Marcuse (1991) argued: how the instrumental 
reason compulsively influences humans’ life principles in the advanced industrial society, 
making people think simply (one-dimensional thought). When cultural creations are 
compulsively produced through scientific technologies, scientific and instrumental 
rationalities will invisibly influence the human way of thinking which becomes the only 
scale to judge all things around; as a result, humans’ own thinking, comparatively speaking, 
seems redundant. Adorno (2002) answered why such a phenomenon occurred. It is because 
the compulsive characteristic of the culture industry is similar to the capacity of concrete 
which impedes humans from recognizing their real needs and interests. Under this condition, 
the culture industry is able to control public thought and psyche and further cultivate the 
obedient ideology that supports authority and maintains the status quo (Horkheimer & 
Adorno, 2002; Adorno, 1991). Adorno (2002) stated that the culture industry indeed is the 
“social cement” (p. 459) wherein, “The customer is not king, as the culture industry would 
have us believe, not its subject but its object” (Adorno, 1991, p. 99). 
Regarding the commercialized phenomenon, this means that humans’ perception of 
cultural creations is no longer different from that of consumer goods because human 
attitudes regarding cultural creations are governed by disciplines of value. This is to say, 
regardless of whether from the angle of artists (who produce), merchants (who price), or 
customers (who purchase), cultural products become nothing but one type of consumer good 
in the market depending on profits and exchange-value. Adorno (2002) considered jazz as an 
example. He explained the influences of commodification are that musical composition 
became market, sale, profit, and popularity-oriented which has fertilized what he called 
“musical fetishism” (p. 295). Namely, cultural creations in the age of commodification are 
valued by economic discipline instead of psychological or spiritual needs. 
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On the matter of standardisation, Horkheimer and Adorno (2002) argued that the way 
of producing artistic creations becomes increasingly similar to the standard way of producing 
commodities. Standardisation means to revise, even to remove, the original and peculiar 
characteristics of cultural materials, making them as simple as formalized components on a 
production line. This line represents a standard production procedure wherein materials 
selected to produce diverse types of cultural products might be different, but the producing 
logic remains the same. As a result, cultural products are able to be massively produced (or 
reproduced, duplicated) which not only reduces costs but also increases efficiency to gain 
maximum benefits.  
From such a standard procedure, the production process will be simplified. For this 
reason, a tiny modification in the production process could furnish commodities with many 
different styles seeming to be multiple and customized, thereby meeting all individual 
demands. This echoes what Strinati (2004) has argued: “The more cultural products are 
actually standardized, the more they appear to be individualized33
In summary, to the Frankfurt School, culture should essentially possess the function of 
negativity against society. Yet, such a function has disappeared since the invasion of 
capitalism has made creations of culture industrialized, which is the result of three 
characteristics: compulsion, commodification, and standardisation. ‘Culture industry’ is used 
to explain this phenomenon happening in cultural creations. Suffering from the power of the 
culture industry, cultural products compulsorily limit human thinking and impede people 
” (p. 57). A critical impact 
of standardisation is that it conveys the value of capitalists and eliminates the specialities of 
cultural creations. (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002; Adorno, 1991). All these seemingly 
individualized cultural creations are in fact conveying a kind of pseudo-individuality and 
false-need, of which customers are never aware and which could be seen as the ideological 
function of the culture industry. 
                                                     
33 The film The Island (Bay, 2005) illustrates the same logic: that even a complicated production like 
human consciousness can easily be evolved into diverse personalities if a slight alteration to the 
standard procedure is set up. In this film, the main character, Jordan Two Delta (played by Scarlett 
Johansson), keeps defending her claim that she does have memories from before the catastrophe 
portrayed in the film, such as memories of her childhood, mother, grandmother, pets, farm, and 
especially her bicycle. While she is remembering, Steve Buscemi, the technician of this island, has no 
choice but to interrupt her by saying, “No. Memory imprints. There's only, like, 12 stories. They 
change around little details. But they're all pretty much the same” (Bay, 2005). 
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from recognizing their real needs and interests. Simultaneously, the culture industry also 
reshapes human attitudes regarding the value of cultural creations, which is scaled by the 
criteria of market, sale, profit, and popularity. Characteristics of compulsion and 
commodification result from and in another characteristic of the culture industry, 
standardisation, which puts cultural materials into the standard production procedure in order 
to massively produce products of culture. Standardisation not only eliminates the culture’s 
specialities but also creates pseudo-individuality and false-needs for the public. 
Academic Industry 
If the Frankfurt School’s critique on the impact of the culture industry is to discover social 
phenomenon of their time, and in turn to express their diverse perspectives toward social 
reality (e.g., dialectic of enlightenment, instrumental reason, identity-thinking, and totality), 
then the characteristics and production logics of the culture industry (i.e., compulsion, 
commodification, and standardisation) are also applicable to academic publications. In this 
thesis, academic publications can be classified as a genre of cultural creations since, to a 
great degree, they have been influenced by the same characteristics and production logics 
discussed above.  
The first similarity is the compulsive nature of academic publications. The compulsive 
phenomenon in academia refers to the fact that people who want to work in academia are 
forced to adopt, even accept, those reputed scholars’ ideas or acknowledged concepts. Just as 
iOS and Android dominate the mobile operating systems market, some famous scholars and 
ideas encompassing biblical zeal have dominated certain research fields. Not all 
masterpieces can be acknowledged at the time they are written34
This compulsive phenomenon also testifies Althusser’s (1971) idea: the reproduction of 
the relation of production. The value of one academic publication is easily sublimed based 
on its authors’ reputation (e.g., written by a renowned scholar); simultaneously, once the 
, yet today’s famous scholars’ 
opinions and citations of particular literature have become the standard for judging new and 
emerging academics’ works.  
                                                     
34 The Italian scholar Giovanni Vico is a good example. His thought was neglected in his time but 
was rediscovered by Jules Michelet a hundred years later, which opened the way to the development 
of communist thought (Wilson, 1972). 
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value of such a publication is granted, it helps to build this scholar’s reputation again. This 
phenomenon also echoes Foucault’s (1980) notion of knowledge-power.  
The academic consent of a time/field is the conscious representation of the leading 
scholars who control the research direction of their time/field. These leading scholars also 
keep reproducing their reputation in one field through cooperation between their vested 
fames and new works. Great-masters and acknowledged ideas or jargon become a 
compulsive strength in the age of academic industry, which invisibly shapes variety into 
identity (-thinking) leading to ‘academic cement’. 
The second similarity is the commercialized trend growing in academia wherein 
academic publications have lost their ‘aura35’, becoming the real commodities governed by 
disciplines of exchange-value. In contemporary academia, people have to pay to download 
an academic article from, for example, Sage Publications, just as they do to download music 
from iTunes. This phenomenon may seem ironic if the purchased article is one criticising the 
greed of capitalism from a communist perspective36
 
. This ironic contradiction is much more 
serious when the electronic format of an academic publication has saved the major 
traditional printing cost. People have ignored what Marx (Marx & Engels, 1982) argued that 
“once the product is produced, its price is determined by the costs necessarily incurred in 
reproducing it” (p. 424, emphasis original). Unquestionably, the action of selling an 
academic article (that criticises capitalism) per se is the triumph of capitalism, let alone 
selling an electronic edition.  
                                                     
35 This thesis adopts Benjamin’s (2003a) term aura to describe the exclusive characteristic which 
belongs to individual artistic creations only. Yet, this does not mean that Benjamin himself possessed 
the same perspective as Adorno and Horkheimer did regarding the ‘loss’ of such individual specialty 
of arts. While Adorno and Horkheimer (1992) considered the artistic creation in the age of capitalism 
as ‘culture industry’, Benjamin held a different perspective. In the article The Work of Art in the Age 
of Mechanical Reproduction, he argued that cultural creations are widely available and being 
massively reproduced due to the technological developments, but it is not that bad. To Benjamin, 
although the ‘aura’ of a cultural creation disappears, intimacy between compositions and audiences is 
created. In the past, only the rich were able to access particular cultural masterpieces; but, nowadays, 
everyone can do so. Mechanical reproduction helps to tear down the fence between groups which is a 
good thing for reducing class differences. 
36 This thesis here especially refers to the research fields of the social sciences. Most academic 
findings in the applied sciences, such as mechanical engineering, pertain to business inventions and 
innovations in modern society (e.g., the application of motor engines), so it is senseless to argue that 
these academic publications have reading costs. Nevertheless, the purpose of social science, to a great 
degree, is to pursue a better development of human society. In terms of this thesis’ position, they 
should be ashamed if socialists are looking for profits from what they have written.  
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Moreover, another commercialized phenomenon is that academic publications are 
market-oriented and can be put on shelves if they have commercial potential, as per the 
following example: Anthony Giddens visited the president of Taiwan, Shui-Bian Chen, in 
2002, to advocate his notion of ‘the third way’. Before he went, few of his books had been 
published in Taiwan’s book market. However, more than five were published right after his 
visit. The publishers simply purchased the copyrights from mainland China and translated 
the Simple Chinese to Traditional Chinese. His books were published not because of how 
great his theory was but because he was President Chen’s spiritual mentor37
It should be noted that the above critiques on commercialized and compulsive 
phenomena within academia are not to argue how much financial benefit reputed scholars 
could obtain since academic publications could never compete with general publications. 
Rather, it is because academic publications should be different from mass commercial 
publications. Academic publications, as a way of representing culture, should maintain what 
the Frankfurt School theorists had insisted— the negativity of cultural creations.  
. Giddens and his 
books are commodities. Taiwanese consumers purchased Giddens’s books not to read 
(maybe this was the original intention), but rather for fashion, to collect, or to testify the 
moment of hope. Academic works, to publishers, are no different from mystery novels, as 
they are all essentially commodities to generate profits. 
So far, this section has explained the compulsive and commercialized phenomenon in 
academia and now turns to the phenomena of standardisation. In general publication (e.g., 
novels, magazines) standardisation is a common feature in which although books’ titles seem 
varied, the vaunted special contents (e.g., secrets of succeeding in the stock market) are no 
different from one book to another. Under the standardized production logic, the content of 
general publications is like consumer goods which are random combinations of similar and 
common ingredients wherein a tiny variation could result in a large number of varieties down 
the line. Standardisation in general publication is an inarguable fact; yet, has standardisation 
occurred in academic publications? 
                                                     
37 Chen said that he was inspired by Giddens’s ‘the third way’ to achieve a political solution between 
two conflicting opinions in Taiwan—maintaining independence versus uniting with China. People in 
Taiwan suddenly found this a great idea, one that might be useful in dealing with their difficulties. 
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Seriously, Has Standardisation Occurred in Academic Publications? 
There will be huge critique if this thesis claims that academic publications also follow the 
same standardized production logic. Generally speaking, most people believe that academic 
publications are different from general publications because every scholar possesses their 
‘free will’ to present their unique academic ideas.  
Nevertheless, while discussing the abilities of general critics in Chapter 2, this thesis 
has argued:  
1. If the truth results from the relationship between subject and object, it shows 
nothing but a certain ideology. 
2. If the truth comes from the relationship between subject and subject, so-called 
intersubjective agreement will contribute to nothing but a dominant ideology. 
 
Accordingly, a question should be asked: to what extent does scholars’ so-called ‘free will’ 
represent their ideology (of what they think ‘not ideology’) as well as contribute to a certain 
dominant ideology (of their own understanding of seeking the truth)?  
 This thesis argues that believing in such rationality of ‘I have free will’—taking the 
logic of dialectic of enlightenment—is irrational. ‘I have free will’ per se is an ideology. No 
one is capable of escaping from the influence of ideology. Yet, such argument cannot be 
suggested from nothing. To test this argument, this thesis attempts to investigate if 
standardisation occurred in academic publications. 
This chapter has investigated how standardisation has contributed to the birth of culture 
industry. Its characteristic is to create a normal model, via reducing the diversities, to 
maximise efficiency and profits of production, and finally to establish identity-thinking. 
Similarly, if such a phenomenon of standardisation also happens to academic publications, it 
means that there is a rule guiding scholars to compose their academic works despite the rule 
resulting from individuals’ ideologies or the social (total) ideology surrounding individuals. 
If such standardisation really impacts academic publications, it indicates that works of 
ideological critiques are limited, which is not as freely expressing critics’ thoughts as people 
used to think. 
This thesis states that standardisation has indeed happened to academic publications. It 
plays an ideological guiding discipline which emerges in the form of standard writing 
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procedures (SWPs). Different research fields have their own SWPs to discuss specific 
subjects in their field. The foreseeable influences are: because academic publications are 
standardized, a tiny change (e.g., permutation combination of contents or ideas) could make 
every publication (e.g., books, papers) seem unique even though they are composed of 
similar concepts. Therefore, academic publications could be easily and massively 
(re-)produced38
To determine/prove this standardized phenomenon or so-called standard writing 
procedures, in the empirical analysis chapters (5 to 8), this thesis will focus on articles whose 
authors claim undertake investigations via the angle of ideological critique/analysis. The 
rationale for selecting such types of academic publications (i.e., IAC articles) is based on the 
discussion in Chapter 2. This thesis, in Chapter 2, has promoted ideological critics to a 
higher position as the few people who are able to carry the role of real-intellectuals. They are, 
or might be, the most capable people who can escape from the intervention of ideology. 
Hence, their works —ideological critiques— are the most suitable research data to examine 
their immunity against (their or social) ideology. By examining academic critics’ works of 
ideological critique/analysis, this thesis wishes to answer whether standard procedures 
(SWPs) for writing IAC articles exist, and further to investigate IAC analysts’ capacity 
against (their or social) ideology as well as their limitation of undertaking ideological 
critique. 
 since they are gradually tending towards identical thinking and eventually 
total discourse. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter is an introspection of Chapter 2 examining whether academic publications of 
ideological critics could avoid the influence of capitalism with an inspiration from what has 
happened to cultural creations. The Frankfurt School theorists detected the phenomenon of 
the ideology-life complex and explained it with notions of dialectics of enlightenment, 
instrumental rationality, and identity-thinking and totality. These notions are their theoretical 
basis to criticise the problem of industrialized artistic creations. They determined three 
                                                     
38 Massive production here does not mean quantitative amounts of visible printing; instead, it refers to 
publishing output of reputed scholars who massively reproduce and duplicate their (old) ideas, that is, 
new context for an old idea. 
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characteristics of the culture industry: compulsion, commodification, and standardisation.  
This chapter adopts these three characteristics to examine whether academic 
publications have being industrialized, especially focusing on the phenomenon of 
standardisation. The reason for doing so is that standardisation is an ideological guiding 
discipline that emerged in the form of standard writing procedures. In short, standardisation 
is an ideology. To justify this argument, this thesis concentrates on ideological critics who 
work on ideological critique/analysis, since they are, or might be, the most likely people to 
escape from the intervention of ideology. Before advancing to the chapters on findings, this 
thesis will explain the methodology of the empirical analysis in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Methodology 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 3, this thesis stated that standardisation has indeed happened to academic 
publications. It is an ideological guiding discipline which emerges in the form of standard 
writing procedures (SWPs). Whether this presumption is valid is the mission of the empirical 
analysis chapters (5 to 8). Before advancing to the empirical analysis, this chapter will 
explain how this thesis undertakes the analytical mission, including how research data are 
collected, how the analytical methods are applied, and how the analytical outcomes are 
presented.  
 
4.2 Data Collection and Research Objectives 
Data Collection 
The research objects examined in this thesis are all academic publications such as journal 
articles or book chapters, but only if the articles claim to be written from the angle of 
ideological analysis or critique. The keywords ideological critique, ideological analysis, 
ideological criticism, critique of ideology, and analysis of ideology have been used to search 
the archives of academic publishing companies (e.g., Sage, Routledge, SwetsWise), the 
catalogue of the University of Sheffield Library, as well as Google Books and Google 
Scholar to collect related articles for this study. 37 articles whose ‘title’ precisely matched 
the above-listed keywords have been collected. From these potential samples, only 33 
articles, whose content displayed the application of ideology-related concepts, were selected 
as the main analytical data. 
Although there should be more scholars who deal with this topic without directly and 
clearly titling their articles with the keywords mentioned above, the decision was made for 
this thesis to only focus on these 33 pieces of data. This is because, as discussed in Chapter 2, 
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the research object of this thesis is academic scholars who decide to adopt the angle of 
ideological critique/analysis to investigate their research, or who display their research 
interests in ideology (as their articles’ titles have revealed). In so doing, it will meet the 
mission of this thesis: studying those who are the most likely persons to escape from the 
intervention of ideology (since ideology, to them, could be seen as a research object39
These 33 articles related to ideological critique/analysis are listed in Table 4-1. In this 
table, RA is the abbreviation for Research Articles, which are all followed with numbers to 
refer to certain articles, e.g., RA07, RA33. These ‘RA+number’ codes are applied to 
substitute for the original title of articles in later writing. Lastly, all 33 collected articles are 
stored on a disk attached as Appendix 1. 
). 
 
Table 4-1: List of Collected Research Articles and Their Reference 
Research  
Articles Reference 
RA01 Moss, G. & O'Loughlin, B. (2005) New Labour's Information Age Policy Programme: An Ideology Analysis, Journal of Political Ideologies, 10(2): 165-183. 
RA02 
Abbas, T. (2001). Media Capital and the Representation of South Asian Muslims in the 
British Press: An Ideological Analysis, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 21(2): 
245-257. 
RA03 
Sakamoto, R. (2001). Dream of a Modern Subject: Maruyama Masao, Fukuzawa 
Yukichi, and 'Asia' as the Limit of Ideology Critique, Japanese Studies, 21(2): 
137-153. 
RA04 
Bishop, R. (2001). Old Dogs, New Tricks? An Ideological Analysis of Thematic Shifts in 
Television Advertising for Diet Products, 1990-2000, Journal of Communication 
Inquiry, 25: 334-352. 
RA05 
Brennen, B. & Duffy, M. (2003). "If A Problem Cannot Be Solved, Enlarge It": An 
Ideological Critique of the "Other" in Pearl Harbor and September 11 New York 
Times Coverage, Journalism Studies, 4(1): 3-14. 
RA06 Bishop, R. (2005). The Wayward Child: An Ideological Analysis of Sports Contract Holdout Coverage, Journalism Studies, 6(4): 445-459. 
RA07 Hazelton, M. (1990). Medical Discourse on Contemporary Nurse Education: An Ideological Analysis, Journal of Sociology, 26(1): 107-125. 
RA08 Crawford, K. (1998). The Construction of the National Curriculum: An Ideological and Political Analysis, Research Papers in Education, 13(3): 261-276. 
RA09 Medvic, S. K. (2007). Old Democrats in New Clothing?: An Ideological Analysis of a Democratic Party Faction, Party Politics, 13(5):587-609. 
RA10 Goss, B. M. (2005). "Jeffersonian Poetry": An Ideological Analysis of George F. Will's Editorials (2002–2004), Journalism Studies, 6(4):417-429. 
RA11 Kerr, M. (1960). Rashid Rida and Islamic Legal Reform: An Ideological Analysis, The Muslim World, 50(2): 99-108. 
                                                     
39 Focusing on articles related to ideological critique, for this thesis, has a philosophical significance. 
Any analysis or critique on X’s ideology is not to answer what exactly this X is. Instead, it is to 
understand how X’s definition is transformed through time, or how X’s interpretation-right is being 
competed under a certain relationship of power. That is to say, studying the ideology of a certain field 
could be considered as the study of such research’s origin as well as destination. Studying ideology 
per se could be seen as the foundation of any research. 
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RA12 
Ewick, P. & Silbey, S. S. (1999). Common Knowledge and Ideological Critique: The 
Significance of Knowing that the 'Haves' Come out Ahead, Law and Society Review 
33(4): 1025-1044. 
RA13 Garrison, J. L. (1978), Public Assistance in Egypt: An Ideological Analysis , Middle East Journal, 32(3): 279-290. 
RA14 Palermo, J. (1977). Reading Asante’s Myth of Afrocentricity: An Ideological Critique, Philosophy of Education, 1997: 100-111. 
RA15 Apple, Michael W. (1985). Teaching and "Women's Work": A Comparative Historical and Ideological Analysis, Teachers College Record, 86(3): 455-473. 
RA16 
Ferreira, S. Morais, A. M. & Neves, I. P. (2011). Science Curricula Design: Analysis of 
Authors’ Ideological and Pedagogical Principles, International Studies in Sociology 
of Education, 21(2): 137-159. 
RA17 
Weltman, D. (2003). The Pragmatics of Peremptory Assertion: An Ideological Analysis 
of Word 'Just' in Local Politicians' Denials of Politics, Discourse Society,14: 
349-373. 
RA18 
Hansen, J. T. (2006). Is the Best Practices Movement Consistent With the Values of the 
Counseling Profession? A Critical Analysis of Best Practices Ideology, Counseling 
and Values, 50: 165-160. 
RA19 
Downes, D. (2010). Harry Potter and the Deathly Hollowness: A Narratological and 
Ideological Critique of J. K. Rowling's Magical System, International Research in 
Children’s Literature 3(2): 162–175. 
RA20 
Smith, D. E. (1975). An Analysis of Ideological Structures and how Women are 
Excluded: Considerations for Academic Women, Canadian Review of Sociology, 
12(4): 353-369. 
RA21 Weintraub, A. N. (2006). Dangdut Soul: Who are 'the People' in Indonesian Popular Music?, Asian Journal of Communication, 16(4):411-431. 
RA22 Haslanger, S. (2007). "But Mom, Crop-Tops Are Cute!" Social Knowledge, Social Structure and Ideology Critique, Philosophical Issues, 17(1): 70-91. 
RA23 Barker, P. J., Reynolds, W. & Ward, T. (1995). The Proper Focus of Nursing: A Critique of the Caring Ideology, International Journal of Nursing Studies, 32(4): 386-397. 
RA24 Lu, X. (1990). An Ideological/Cultural Analysis of Political Slogans in Communist China. Discourse Society, 10:487-508. 
RA25 
DeFoster, R. (2010). American Gun Culture, School Shootings, and a “Frontier 
Mentality”: An Ideological Analysis of British Editorial Pages in the Decade After 
Columbine, Communication, Culture & Critique, 3(4): 466-484. 
RA26 
Rooney, E. (1984). From Republican Movement to Workers' Party: An Ideological 
Analysis, In C. Curtin, M. Kelly, & L. O'Dowd, Culture and Ideology in Ireland, 
pp. 79-98. Galway: Galway University Press. 
RA27 
Jones, B. G. (2008). The Global Political Economy of Social Crisis: Towards a Critique 
of the 'Failed State' Ideology. Review of International Political Economy, 15(2): 
180–205. 
RA28 Talshir, G. (2003). A Threefold Ideological Analysis of Die Grünen: From Ecologized Socialism to Political Liberalism?, Journal of Political Ideologies, 8(2):157-184. 
RA29 Ewing, S. (1991). The Russian Social Insurance Movement, 1912-1914: An Ideological Analysis, Slavic Review, 50(4): 914-926. 
RA30 Harvey, D. L. & Reed, M. H. (1996). The Culture of Poverty: An Ideological Analysis. Sociological Perspectives, 39(4): 465-495. 
RA31 Dilevko, J. (2001). An Ideological Analysis of Digital Reference Service Models. Library Trends, 50(2): 218-244. 
RA32 
Johnston, K. (1983). A Discourse for All Seasons? An Ideological Analysis of the 
Schools Commission Reports, 1973 to 1981, The Australian Journal of Education, 
27(1): 17-32. 
RA33 
Gillespie, J. (2002). Transplanted Company Law: An Ideological and Cultural Analysis 
of Market-Entry in Vietnam, International and Comparative Law Quarterly. 51(3): 
641-672. 
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Research Objectives of Empirical Analysis  
In the following four chapters of empirical analysis, two major research objectives are 
undertaken. Based on the inspiration of the concept, standardisation, offered by the 
Frankfurt School, the first research objective is to examine whether standard procedures 
(SWPs) for writing academic articles related to ideological analysis/critique exist. If SWPs 
do exist, it means that there is indeed a rule guiding analysts to write their IAC articles. It 
further implies that in spite of every effort IAC analysts have made to break through the cage 
of ideology, eventually they are still prisoners of (their own or social total) ideology. 
Through such investigation, this thesis might be able to test if humans, even critics 
specialising in ideology, can be immune from the power of ideology, or to find out what 
limitation IAC critics have faced. 
 Of course, showing SWPs does not necessarily show that ideological critique is 
paradoxical. In fact, those induced commonalities (i.e., SWPs) between diverse IAC articles, 
from another perspective, also contribute to the second objective of this empirical analysis: 
to establish a methodology specifically for research studies which adopt an angle of 
ideological analysis/critique for their analyses. By following such an IAC method, an 
effective critique on social issues is expectable. Analysts could easily analyse or criticise 
their research subjects ideologically, which might help to generate emancipation in diverse 
research fields. This methodology focuses more on how ideology works in X or how X 
reveals a certain ideology rather than directly claiming that X contains/is a (bad/wrong) 
ideology. This methodology of ideological critique is based on a rigorous theoretical 
foundation, which will be explained through discussion. 
 
4.3 Methods of Empirical Analysis: Literature and Discourse Analysis 
In order to examine whether standard procedures exist for writing IAC articles, two 
methodologies—literature analysis and discourse analysis—will be adopted. 
Literature Analysis 
To begin with, literature analysis (or documentary analysis) is a method which begins with 
collecting literature data, continuing to identify data, and finally to classify and induce 
findings to achieve an understanding of one research subject (Carey, 2012). The collection 
Methodology 
69 
step was introduced in the previous section 4.2. The classified/induced findings (i.e., 6 SWPs) 
will be explained gradually through the following 4 chapters. The key step, especially to this 
thesis, is how to identify the similarities within the collected literature in order to 
claim/induce them as procedures of SWPs. 
Content analysis in quantitative research calculates data based on accurate key-words. 
For example, to calculate how many words of ‘articulation’ are used in one article in order to 
display its reference to, for example, the contribution of ideological hegemony. Gathering 
statistics from collected IAC articles is also the key method applied in this thesis. Yet, since 
IAC analysts are from diverse research fields, in adopting different methods to carry out 
(what they themselves think) the so-called ideological analysis/critique, it is difficult to 
obtain reliable statistics to reveal the significance of findings. In fact, this thesis has found 
that many analysts described concepts related to ideology in their discourse without applying 
those specific terminologies, which are well known/developed in ideology research40
Hence, what statistics this thesis attempts to gather, to identify the notions applied in 
the collected IAC articles, are based on three types of qualitative-oriented ‘concepts’: first, 
the precise usage of terminologies (e.g., articulation), second, the related ideas (e.g., 
applying a concept analogous to the concept of articulation), and third, the ways of 
description (e.g., a description which reveals a phenomenon of articulation).  
. This 
feature implies that if the statistics, which this thesis calculates to reveal the prominent 
concepts of ideology, are only based on specific ideology-related key-words, then the 
findings would be questionable. 
 
                                                     
40 Research article 01 is a good example that explains how the notion of articulation is revealed in the 
article without using the word articulation or related vocabularies. The authors, Moss and O’Loughlin 
(2005), analyse how New Labour uses “opinion polls, focus groups, consultations and other social 
scientific techniques” to articulate concepts of science and establish a public-orientation to establish 
an epistemological foundation for its information age policy (p. 167). Moss and O’Loughlin argue that 
New Labour also connects concepts of “globalisation, reflexive modernity, and the information age” 
to rationalize its policy ideology (pp. 167-168). Moreover, by claiming equality and justice, New 
Labour is able to link “welfare” to “life politics”, which means that people have to help themselves 
before asking for government assistance (p. 169). Other examples of dis/re-articulation can be easily 
found in their writing. All in all, the core argument of this article (which goes through a 
dis/re-articulation perspective) is that New Labour’s information age policy (the main subject) 
articulates everything (e.g., knowledge, skills, usage ability), which supports its importance in the 
information age; at the same time, the government’s social responsibility and duty are disarticulated 
from the old ideology. 
Methodology 
70 
Once a concept (based on the above three types) is repeatedly identified among diverse 
IAC articles, accumulating to a certain noticeable degree, it will be pre-considered as part of 
the SWPs. Finally, after a categorising/classifying process based on the similarity between 
these identified concepts, this thesis finally induces six SWPs.  
Discourse Analysis 
Although IAC analysts’ diverse research backgrounds might lead them to adopt different 
methods to undertake (what they think) the so-called ideological analysis/critique, all writing 
is discursive. Analysing their diverse discourses is a way to explore what specific 
significance is concealed within their writings. 
 Fairclough (1992a) suggested that a good discourse analysis should comprise three 
levels: textual, discursive, and social practice. Firstly, the level of textual practice 
emphasizes the linguistic structure of sentences to examine the most basic and simplest 
usage of words in the whole context. This is to see the various cognitions and feelings that a 
different usage of words might bring to readers (Fairclough, 1992a). Textual practice can be 
seen as the foundation work of making ideology. In this regard, in order to obtain or 
establish a referencing basis for later practical analysis, this research has reviewed related 
literature including semiotic, textual, and multimodal analysis which are all notions 
explaining why the most basic signs, words, structures, icons, colour, and typography are 
capable of signifying certain connotations (Machin, 2007). 
Semiotic concepts will be introduced in Chapter 6, which is considered one of the 
sub-SWPs. In this thesis, semiotics is more related to an epistemological foundation of 
understanding how meanings of things are generated instead of being a practical analytical 
method. In terms of textual analysis, it is to practically examine the usages of verb, tense, 
punctuation, modal form, etc. in texts to see how meanings change with diverse usages. This 
thesis has summarised the basic notions of textual analysis as listed in Appendix 4-1 which is 
the referencing basis of this thesis to analyse IAC articles. The multimodal analysis is less 
related to this thesis, as all collected IAC articles are words instead of images (except for 
RA04). Yet, this thesis has summarized its basic notions in Appendix 4-2, which benefits 
other types of ideological analysis/critique, such as analysing the connotations of images 
(e.g., newspapers’ printed adverts or TVs’ dynamic adverts). For that, it is worth involving 
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every angle of ideological analysis/critique as this thesis attempts to establish a methodology 
of ideological analysis/critique. 
Fairclough’s (1992a) second level—discursive practice—is to investigate how texts are 
written by the author (and understood by readers) to ascertain which particular meanings are 
signified. To Fairclough (1995), discursive practice is always within a dominating, 
competing, reconstructing, or re-recognising process between diverse discourses (e.g., other 
texts read before). That is what he claimed as the process of ‘intertextual analysis’ suggested 
to argue against Foucault’s notion of discourse (Fairclough, 1992b). He stated that Foucault 
simplified discourse analysis which focused on the text only. Fairclough argued a good 
discourse analysis should not only focus on the analysed text per se, other discourses outside 
this text should be considered as well (ibid). 
 Accordingly, the significance that Fairclough’s concept of ‘discursive practice’ brought 
to this thesis is that the authority/validation of claiming SWPs cannot be determined based 
on the finding of single text (IAC article). That is to say, although particular terms, concepts, 
or ways of description might imply certain connotation in one IAC article, they might refer 
to nothing in other IAC articles. Therefore, what this thesis should find is the commonalities 
across most IAC articles which reveal similar logic, carrying certain ideology. 
 The third level of Fairclough’s (1992a) discourse analysis is social practice. Although 
connotation of texts could be detected via diverse research methods such as semiotic or 
textual analysis (his first level—textual practice), written texts also carry their authors’ 
personal ideology. For this reason, it is important to simultaneously examine how social 
factors work on texts while undertaking the ‘textual practice’. This is the mission of the 
second level, discursive practice, which plays the role of “link” (1998, p. 144) between 
textual practice and social practice. To Fairclough, these three levels do not practice 
independently but interdependently.  
 This thesis argues that Fairclough’s concept social practice in fact refers to the concept 
of ideology. The analysis of ‘social practice’ is to investigate how the IAC analysts’ ideology, 
as well as social total ideology, influences their written works. For example, in procedure 6, 
revealing personal viewpoints, this thesis investigates IAC analysts’ personal background 
(i.e., social practice) to see how it influences their writings (i.e., textual practice). This 
mission could be undertaken through the discourse practice. 
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To conclude, literature analysis and discourse analysis are two guiding methods for the 
coming empirical analysis. The former explains how this thesis induces SWPs (i.e, from 
collecting literature data, continuing to identify it, and finally to classify and induce findings). 
In discourse analysis, its first level, textual practice, could be seen as the practical method to 
determine how signs (words) have certain connotation. Yet, the role of social practice cannot 
be ignored because it always influences the making of text from outside. In order to see what 
certain meanings (textual and social meanings) are signified in texts, discursive practice is 
the mission to be done. 
 
Lastly, as mentioned above, since it is difficult to extract common characteristics and 
consider them as SWPs just from first time analysis and since one new-found feature in an 
article does not mean that it necessarily applies to all, for this reason, unceasing 
re-examination of all collected IAC articles to test one new finding are required in order to 
obtain a fair final induction. In other words, this thesis could claim a feature as one of the 
SWPs ONLY after repeated ‘finding and proving’ processes are done. The mission of this 
thesis might be achieved only by continually looking for common features and 
simultaneously unceasingly verifying these new-found-features in all IAC articles. All of 
which are based on the discipline of literature analysis and the practice of discourse analysis.  
For example, not until the examination of research article No. 24 (RA24), did this 
thesis find the causality of how IAC analysts’ background (i.e., Chinese) might influence the 
way they present (i.e., revealing disgust at the China Communist Party). Due to this new 
finding, this thesis has had to re-investigate all analysed articles to see if this finding applied 
to most of the IAC articles, or if such phenomena were applied to RA 24 only. There will 
always be new features found during analysis, even in repeatedly examined articles. For this 
reason, unceasingly re-verifying these new found features in all collected IAC articles is 
important and is the authority that this thesis could claim as one feature (part) of the SWPs. 
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4.4 Presentation in Empirical Analysis Chapters (5-8) 
Framework 
This is a study focusing on the entangled relationship between humans and ideology, 
specifically concentrating on academic critics who work on ideological analysis or critique. 
Regarding the concept of humans (i.e., intellectuals or ideological critics) and the critiques, 
this thesis has offered literature reviews of both terms in Chapter 2. With regard to the 
discussion of ideology theory, this has not been addressed yet. In fact, this thesis will not 
offer a literature review of ideology in a single chapter. Instead, specific literature reviews of 
ideology will be presented together with related empirical analysis reports in the same 
discussion block. That is, although the following chapters 5-8 mainly focus on explaining 
what SWPs this thesis has found, the corresponding ideology theories will be introduced 
before explaining these SWPs.  
 For example, Chapter 6 explains the analytical pathways of ideological 
critique/analysis (Procedure 2), including Marx’s, Althusser’s, Gramscian, Semiotic and 
Historical Descriptive analytical pathways. As shown in Figure 4-1, in each discussion topic 
(see green box), this thesis first introduces the related ideology theories (see red box), and 
then provides the empirical reports regarding analysis of 33 IAC articles (see blue box). By 
such a framework arrangement, this thesis wishes to create a resonance between theoretical 
understandings and empirical practices.   
 
Figure 4-1: Presentation of Literature and Empirical Analysis 
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Examples 
Regarding the presentation of the empirical analysis, this thesis will only provide 2 or 3 
examples found in IAC articles to explain each procedure (or sub-procedure) of SWPs. This 
is not only because of the limitation of pages but also to provide unhindered reading. Despite 
this, all other examples of the same SWPs in all IAC articles will be collated and listed in a 
reference-table attached at the end of each discussion. Take one reference-table (Table 6-1) 
from the empirical analysis chapter as an example (see Figure 4-2). This table collects all 
references/examples regarding all 33 IAC articles which apply concepts of Marx (i.e., 
Marx’s Analytical Pathway in SWPs) to analyse their research. For instance, in Research 
Article 02, readers can find the application of Marx’s concepts on pages 247, 248, 249, and 
253 as the blue box in Figure 4-2.  
 
Figure 4-2: How other SWPs Examples can be found in the Reference Table 
 
 
To further explain the design and function of the reference-table.  
 SWPs Code: will be explained in next section. 
 Research Articles: are abbreviated as RA, which are followed with numbers to refer to 
certain articles, e.g., RA07. References of each article are in Table 4-1. 
 Found References/Examples: display all other examples related to the SWPs procedure of 
current discussion. Take RA13 in Figure 4-2 as an example (see red box). ‘p.287’ refers 
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to the original journal’s/book’s page. ‘(9)’ means the document page, which is provided 
for readers to quickly find the reference in the original IAC articles. All collected IAC 
articles are sorted in the disk attached as the Appendix 1. ‘c’ refers to specific 
concept-code of the discussion topic; it varies from one topic to another. For instance, in 
this example (Marx’s Pathway case), ‘c’ refers to Marx’s concept of ‘false consciousness’. 
In Althusser’s pathway case (see Chapter 6, Table 6-3), ‘c’ refers to the concept of 
‘interpellation’. Differences in each concept-code are provided at the bottom of each 
reference-table (see green box in Figure 4-2). 
SWPs Codes and How they are Presented in IAC Articles. 
In order to accurately record analysis findings, as well as to create a clear referencing system, 
this thesis has generated what it refers to as ‘SWPs Codes’ to undertake this task. Every 
SWPs Code refers to a particular (sub-)procedure of SWPs, (or say, each (sub-)procedure 
possesses its own SWPs Code). These codes are simply the abbreviation of the SWPs’ name. 
For example, in the previous Figure 4-2, the SWPs Code is ‘P2-M’ which is the abbreviation 
of ‘Procedure 2: Applying Theoretical Foundations—Marx’s Analytical Pathway’.  
During the process of analysis, once any part (e.g., words, sentences, or, paragraphs) of 
writings in 33 IAC articles are considered as referring to a specific (sub-)procedure of SWPs, 
a corresponding ‘SWPs Code’ will be marked alongside the detected parts of writing in that 
IAC article, as per the blue box in Figure 4-3. 
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Figure 4-3: SWPs Codes Marked in IAC Articles 
 
  
Additionally, all SWPs Codes created for this thesis are listed as the following Table 4-2. 
This table provides a map of all found/induced/established procedures of SWPs thus far. In 
this table, ‘Content Index’ is added, which indicates the part, section, and chapter to which 
the discussion refers. 
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   Table 4-2: SWPs Codes and Content Index of SWPs 
Procedure of Key Points/Sub-steps SWPs Codes Index 
1 Identifying Essential Elements 
Finding the Classes P1-FC 5.2 
Involving Power P1-PR 5.3 
Presenting the Reality P1-IP 5.5 
2 Appropriating a Theoretical Foundation 
Marx’s Analytical Pathway  P2-M 6.2 
Althusser’s Analytical Pathway  P2-A 6.3 
Gramscian Analytical Pathway P2-G 6.4 
Pathway of Historical Description P2-HD 6.6 
Semiotic Analytical Pathway P2-S 6.7 
3 Connoting Certain Meanings P3-C 7.2 
4 Illustrating (Articulating and Interpellating) 
1 via Thoroughly Understanding the 
History or Literature 
Finding the Similarities  P4-1-FS 7.5 
Using References P4-1-UR 7.5 
2 through Specific Presenting Techniques  
Transferring  P4-2-T 7.6 
Direct Statement P4-2-DS 7.6 
Writing Skills P4-2-WS 7.6 
Explaining P4-2-E 7.6 
5 Selecting Expression Styles 
Purely Descriptive Style P5-PDS 8.2 
Interpretative Style P5-IS 8.2 
Defensive and Corrective Style P5-DCS 8.2 
6 Revealing Personal Viewpoints 
1 via Declaring a Standpoint Optimism P6-1-P 8.6 Pessimism P6-1-O 8.6 
2 through the Narrating Traits 
Title Selection P6-2-TS 8.7 
Asking Questions P6-2-AQ 8.7 
Personal Background P6-2-PB 8.7 
Assertive Declaration P6-2-AD 8.7 
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How to Match SWPs Codes Within IAC Articles (How to Use the Disk) 
This thesis usually offers 2 to 3 examples in each discussion of SWPs. Other related 
examples/references are collated and listed in the ‘reference tables’ which are the channels to 
find further examples in all IAC articles stored in the disk (Appendix 1). All analysis tracks 
of each IAC article were recorded by using ‘SWPs Codes’. 
Supposed readers wish to see how RA05 applies Marx’s analytical pathway (SWPs 
Code is P2-M) aside from the example that this thesis has displayed in the main text. RA05 
can be found on the disk (Appendix 1). 
The following Figure 4-4 shows the connection between the reference table, P2-M, and 
IAC article, RA05 (see red box). The reference table of P2-M shows that readers can find the 
application of Marx’s concepts (see green box) on page 4 (see blue box). ‘(2)’ means the 
document page (see yellow box).  
 
Figure 4-4: Connection Between Reference Table and IAC Articles 
 
 
Moreover, the ‘arrowhead sign’ marked in IAC articles means the beginning of one 
SWP (see Figure 4-5). For example, in Figure 4-5, the arrowhead sign in the blue box means 
that procedure P2-S of the SWPs begins from this line. Similarly, in the green box, procedure 
P4-1-FS(MC), starts from the line where the arrowhead sign is.  
Where an asterisk is combined with a number, such as *1 in the red box on the right 
means that this thesis also provides extra explanation for the reasons why this 
sentence/paragraph is considered to possess such a characteristic. Only by clicking the 
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hyperlinked asterisk (the red box on the top left), will a note box with an explanation appear 
(middle red box), as in Figure 4-5. 
 
Figure 4-5: Reference of Arrowhead and Asterisk Signs (Note Box) 
 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter introduces the methodology specifically for later empirical analysis chapters 
(5-8). It has explained how research data (i.e., 33 IAC articles) were collected and the two 
research objectives of empirical analysis (i.e., examining the existence of SWPs and 
establishing a methodology for ideological critique). Literature and discourse analysis are 
two methods underpinning the empirical analysis. The former explains how this thesis 
induces SWPs (i.e, from collecting literature data, continuing to identify it, and finally to 
classify and induce findings). The latter adopts Fairclough’s three dimensions of discourse 
analysis (i.e., textual, discursive, social practice) guiding this thesis to examine the 
relationship among IAC analysts, their works, and outside social ideology. Finally, how this 
thesis presents research outcomes was also introduced in this chapter. 
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Section of Empirical Analysis (Chapters 5-8) 
 
Introduction 
—Standard Writing Procedures of Ideological Critique 
 
 
In Chapter 2, this thesis introduced two subjects—intellectual and ideological critique. It 
argues that intellectuals are the few people who are capable of working on ideological 
critique. Whilst, in Chapter 3, this thesis adopted three arguments in relation to the culture 
industry—the phenomenon of compulsion (invisible controls), commodification, and 
standardisation as offered by the Frankfurt School—to examine whether scholars’ works 
(particularly ideology-critics’) are being industrialized (especially focusing on the 
standardisation of their IAC works).  
 Yet, this argument does not mean that standardisation is bad. Showing standard 
procedures for writing IAC articles does not necessarily show that ideological critique is 
paradoxical. In fact, if the standard procedure for writing IAC articles exist, effective 
critiques could be made easily which might also help to generate emancipation in diverse 
research fields. What concerns this thesis is that if standardisation indeed happens to 
academic publications, especially works related to ideology, it means there is a guiding 
principle for scholars to follow; the undeniable fact is that such a principle inevitably results 
from either their own or social total ideology. Since an analysis or critique is based on ones’ 
ideology to argue against others’, from where might critics acquire the authority to claim that 
‘my argument is right’? 
In order to verify this assumed academic phenomenon of standardisation and 
investigate the capacity of ideological critics to escape the shackles of ideology, the 
following empirical analysis (chapters 5-8) will test whether a similar formation of discourse 
(i.e., the standard writing procedure) exists for analysts from different fields to write articles 
related to ideological critique/analysis. To determine or to establish/conclude such standard 
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writing procedures is to demonstrate the question discussed in later chapters: Can 
ideology-specialists (human beings) be immune from the influence of ideology? Or, what 
factors limit ideological critics’ capacity to undertake ideological critiques? 
 Although this thesis has distinguished the concept of ideological critique from general 
critique in Chapter 2, such discussion is based on a broad meaning of ideology. A clear and 
systematic discussion of ideology theories is still missing. Hence, findings of empirical 
analysis and its related ideology theories will be presented together in the following chapters. 
In so doing, the aim is not only to provide a link between theory and practice, but more 
importantly, the aspiration to classify the current predicament of ideology research. 
According to Abercrombie et al. (2006), there are three types of dimension to the 
concept of ideology: first, specific kinds of beliefs, e.g., communism, capitalism, socialism; 
second, a distorted or false belief; and third, a set of beliefs (which has nothing to do with 
true or false) which is in cooperation with the construction of consciousness under the 
manipulation of power in a certain social condition (e.g., humans’ belief in one social 
movement). 
However, not everyone is aware of the above distinctions applying the term ideology. 
In fact, the problem of understanding ideology is the problem of epistemology. People 
usually neglect what they indeed refer to when they talk about ideology. Do they refer to the 
essence of the term ideology? Do they refer to the process of making an ideology? Do they 
mean the influence of ideology? Do they simply indicate ‘specific kinds of beliefs’, such as 
capitalism (i.e., the first type)? Do they try to reveal the false ideology that certain groups 
force people to believe (i.e., the second type)? Or, do they try to illustrate ‘a set of beliefs’ 
such as the belief in a student movement (i.e., the third type)?  
Since people remain lost in diverse epistemology regarding ideology perspectives, the 
term ideology is lost in the process of definition and recognition. Words like ‘ideology’ and 
‘ideological’ often only retain the negative or obscure meanings (Purvis & Hunt, 1993). 
Ideology-related words all become ‘adjectives’ for purposes of emphasis; they are merely 
part of the vocabularies that users or readers mention or read without paying any attention41
                                                     
41 Of course, here, it mainly refers to those academicians who are not specialized in ideology study. 
To them, the word ideology is applied for the purpose of ‘emphasis’ which usually goes with the 
negative characteristic of ideology. Please refer to later discussion in this Chapter.  
. 
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In brief, words related to ideology are used as ornamentation. Most readers, even academic 
scholars, care little about how ideology works or how it affects other matters; they have no 
thought for the significance of ideology. Yet, surprisingly, terminologies, such as alienation, 
dominant ideology, material existence, articulation, interpellation, relation of production, 
RSAs/ISAs, hegemony, false consciousness, reification or labour, have been applied through 
discussions related to topics of ideology. These terms resulted from diverse epistemological 
angles regarding ideology’s characteristics, but they have become entangled in diverse 
ideology discourses. 
 For this predicament of ideology research, a new map of understanding ideology will 
be suggested. This is also the reason why the literature of ideology theory has not yet been 
introduced. The related literature of ideology will be introduced and discussed together with 
corresponding empirical analysis results in order to map a clear structure of ideology. 
Accordingly, this thesis distinguishes the question ‘what is ideology?’ into two perspectives: 
the nature of ideology and the making of ideology. Understanding the nature of ideology is 
the first procedure of the six SWPs for writing IAC articles. Regarding the making of 
ideology, this will be explained throughout the discussion in the other five procedures. It is 
further divided into two dimensions: Ideology concealed in texts and ideology embedded in 
analysts. These six standard writing procedures are listed below. A map showing detailed 
concepts of these procedures is drawn as Figure 5-1. 
 
Procedure 1: identifying essential elements—the nature of ideology (Chapter 5);  
Procedure 2: applying theoretical foundations—the making of ideology (Chapter 6); 
Procedure 3: connoting certain meanings—ideology concealed in texts (Chapter 7); 
Procedure 4: illustrating—ideology concealed in texts (Chapter 7); 
Procedure 5: selecting expression styles—ideology embedded in analysts (Chapter 8); 
Procedure 6: revealing personal viewpoints—ideology embedded in analysts (Chapter 8). 
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Figure 5-1: Standard Writing Procedures 
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Chapter 5  
 
Procedure 1: Identifying Essential Elements 
—The Nature of Ideology 
 
5.1. Introduction 
The first of the six procedures is to identify essential elements, or the procedure to 
understand the nature of ideology. This thesis argues that ideology is a term about relations 
which contains three elements: Class, power, and reality. Here, the term Class has been 
redefined/reinterpreted by this thesis and will be explained in a later section. Simply put, the 
first procedure (identifying essential elements) is to confirm 1) which research subjects IAC 
analysts are concerned with (i.e., Class); 2) what the presumed phenomenon is which invites 
the analysts’ motivation (i.e., Reality); and 3) how this phenomenon is presented/constructed 
(i.e., Power). These three elements form the initial motivation of analysts and, most 
importantly, determine their presumed standpoints which have affected their eventual 
conclusion, even though the analysts might reach that through different analysis/critique 
methods. 
The relationship between Class, reality, and power as well as their interaction, resulting 
in creating various terminologies, are displayed as Figure 5-2. Individual elements and the 
relationships between them will be theoretically discussed and accompanied with the 
empirical analysis results. However, before this thesis advances to the first procedure, some 
of Marx’s fundamental concepts should be introduced for a better understanding of ideology 
in later discussion, especially to explain why this thesis redefines the term Class to replace 
class (which is argued not to suit all ideology-related discussions), thereby considering Class 
as the essential element of ideology. 
Marx’s Fundamental Concepts for Understanding Ideology 
Labour has been a critical factor in the making of humans’ history. Lukacs (1971) argued that 
the construction of social existence is not about evolution but labour, which also 
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distinguishes the difference between mankind and animals. Labour refers to the way people 
arrange their activities for maintaining their lives in human society. It also refers to how 
people transform their efforts so that they might exchange these for other necessities. To 
Marx (1976), whenever humans enter into exchanges with the world, they try to remain 
independent and subjective, but not subject to others. Marx defined the labouring process as 
a process of objectification through which humans can manifest their real abilities and 
demonstrate their free will. In other words, labour is an extension of the existence of the 
human species’ being (Suchting, 1983).  
 
Figure 5-2: The Nature of Ideology 
 
Nevertheless, since the invasion of the logic of capitalism, humans no longer work for 
the sake of accomplishing their own volition. The logic of capitalism implies an important 
notion: the division of labour. In order to maximise the efficiency of production and profits, 
capitalists divide the production process into several specific units. Marx quoted from 
Ferguson to describe this phenomenon: “Manufacturers, accordingly, prosper most where the 
mind is least consulted, and where the workshop may ... be considered as an engine, the parts 
of which are men” (1976, p. 397). That is to say, professional skills needed in the past are no 
longer required under the logic of capitalism, meaning that workers are replaceable and, as 
Marx explained, workers are paid by capitalists not for their labour but their labour-power. 
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 Accordingly, labour means that humans develop natural materials from one form to 
another (e.g., from wood to chairs). This can be defined as including two types of labour 
practice. In the first, workers use tools to create what they need. It is a process of 
objectification in which humans are able to distinguish themselves from their creations. It 
also means that nature is something humans could appropriate and transform to the form of 
what they need. In so doing, humans display their ability and free will.  
 Yet, the key point is the second type. In the second, capitalists use workers’ 
labour-power to produce products; thus, workers themselves become tools and are alienated. 
Simply put, humans not only materialize/reify the nature; they are also alienated by 
themselves, as Marx and Engels (1970) said, 
As long, therefore, as activity is not voluntarily, but naturally, divided, man’s own 
deed becomes an alien power opposed to him, which enslaves him instead of being 
controlled by him. (p.53) 
Hence, when the ‘relation of production’ of capitalism impacts on humans’ free will, people 
are alienated. Originally, the products (results of labour) that humans make should be part of 
their will; a product should be identified with the person who produces it. However, under 
the logic of the division of labour, the relationship between products and producers changed. 
As Eagleton (1991) pointed out, “In certain social conditions, Marx argues, human powers, 
products and processes escape from the control of human subjects and come to assume an 
apparently autonomous existence”(p. 70). That is, the condition of alienation occurs because 
the link between humans’ will and their work has disappeared. There are four types of 
alienation that humankind suffers: People are alienated from 1) themselves,42 2) the results 
of their labour,43 3) the production process,44 and 4) other people45
 Thus, the result of the division of labour is that “the devaluation of the world of men is 
in direct proportion to the increasing value of the world of things” (Marx, 1970, p107; 
emphasis original). This asymmetric and paradoxical subject-object relationship produces 
 (Marx, 1970). 
                                                     
42 Being replaceable workers, their personal values are neglected, let alone their being able to pursue 
the honour of achievement. 
43 The results (products) of a person’s labour belong to capitalists; whereas, for example, people 
might hope to accumulate the fruits of their labour for themselves by old age. 
44 Workers are no longer important to capitalists because they are only a single part of the whole 
production process. They are replaceable.  
45 Due to the division of labour, the relationship among workers is never again cooperative but 
competitive.  
Procedure 1: Identifying Essential Elements 
88 
alienated, estranged human beings who switch their position from the subject to the object as 
they are objectified by capitalism. 
Another critical logic of capitalism is the means of production. This comprises two 
interrelated notions: the material forces of production and the relations of production (Marx, 
1971). The former refers to visible equipment (e.g., machines) and invisible technology (e.g., 
‘know-how’) of production; the latter comprises the necessary rules during the process of 
production. For instance, a workplace may have a rule directing workers to work twelve 
hours a day and six days a week if they want to retain their job; there may also be a rule 
requiring a salary deduction if workers request an absence. These rules, which imply the 
invisible power to maintain the relationship between the dominant and the dominated groups 
in order to make everything run smoothly, are the relations of production. 
However, to Marx (1971), the condition of the means of production is not stable. This 
is because when time elapses, the development of the material force of production will 
eventually influence the change in the relations of production. The key point is that, to Marx, 
the relations of production representing the “economic structure of society, the real 
foundation” (p. 21) will influence the political structure, at a conscious level. That is to say, 
the unstable conditions within the means of production, together with the economic 
determination to political structure (existence of conditions), causes an inevitable struggle 
and revolution. Marx continued: “At a certain stage of development, the material productive 
forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production” (p. 22). 
Namely, from explaining why humans need labour (via discovering the phenomena of 
division of labour and alienation) to demonstrating the dominant logic of the relations of 
production, Marx’s analysis of the political economy has not only explained the operation of 
capitalism, but, most importantly, also explored the fact that human consciousness could be 
influenced by a certain group who possess the means of production. All the aforementioned 
notions unintentionally contribute to Marx’s concept of ideology. Simultaneously, the 
concept of ideology in turn also testifies the rationality of his political economic findings. 
 
Marx’s notions, discussed above, are the foundational concepts to understand his ideological 
perspective. These concepts could also be explained through this thesis’s 
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angle—Class/class46
First, Marx’s concept of ideology contains an implication: the existence of diverse 
classes. In The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Marx (1963) said,  
, power, and reality. 
Upon the different forms of property, upon the social conditions of existence, rises 
an entire superstructure of distinct and peculiarly formed sentiments, illusions, 
modes of thought and views of life (p. 47).  
This quotation indicates that different means of production and diverse social conditions of 
existence will construct various material conditions of people resulting in different groups of 
thought. Accordingly, classes’ (groups’) distinction is a component concept to understanding 
ideology. 
Second, Marx’s discussion of objectification, the division of labour, and alienation also 
display his position regarding the characteristic of ideology, that is, whether it is a false 
consciousness. This point explains that ideology is a term about the representation of 
reality—humans’ consciousness toward their existence and not just their existence47
Finally, although there is no particular writing in Marx’s works which describes the 
concept of power as other scholars, like Foucault, did, the notion of power indeed suffuses 
Marx’s works. His discussions, for example, of how capitalists exploited workers, how the 
economic structure influenced the upper political and conscious structure, and how workers 
were alienated due to capitalism, have all shown the track of power manipulation. 
.  
The above discussion explains Marx’s concepts through this thesis own dimension. A 
more detailed explanation will be provided in this chapter, with the aim of explaining why 
identifying these three elements (Class, reality, and power) and their relationship are the 
primary works that have to be undertaken before IAC analysts start their analysis. In the 
empirical analysis chapters, ideology-related literature will be discussed first. Following the 
above theoretical reviews are the empirical analysis results which are based on an analysis of 
                                                     
46 What has to be explained is that the angle of class so far still remains Marx’s regime. Even if the 
statement—ideology is composed of three elements (class, power, and reality)—suggested by this 
thesis could be accepted, it could only explain Marx’s ideology concept. In order to establish a 
concept which could be applied to any discussion related to ideology, the concept of class should be 
redefined (which is the task of the next section). Thus, an uppercase Class is adopted to distinguish 
this thesis’ definition of Class from Marx’s notion of class. 
47 This thesis in the conclusion Chapter 11 argues, Humans are only able to recognise the ‘analyzable’ 
or ‘visible’ part of ideology; but they will never ever detect any peace of the ‘invisible’ as well as the 
‘ontological’ part of ideology. Hence, there is always some other social existence that humans can 
never perceive.  
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33 IAC articles. In so doing, this thesis wishes to create a resonance between theoretical 
understandings and empirical practices.  
 
5.2 Finding the Classes 
Finding the class/Class is the first mission of the procedure Identifying Essential Elements in 
understanding the nature of ideology. To begin, this section will introduce Marx’s notion of 
class (due to the term class per se representing many basic concepts of ideology), and then 
continue to explain why this thesis has to revise and reinterpret the understanding of (Marx’s) 
class as (this thesis’s uppercased) Class in order to establish a new dimension which could 
be applied to all ideology discussions. 
Theoretical Review and Extension 
In The Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels (2009) declared, “The history of all hitherto 
existing society is the history of class struggles” (p. 5). They explained that diverse classes 
are divided across every period of human life, such that classes replace, compete, and 
struggle against other classes. It is a historical regulation. The following emergence of the 
bourgeoisie did not solve the tendency to struggle among classes but only simplified it and 
categorized mankind into two classes: the bourgeoisie and the proletarian (Marx & Engels, 
2009). Although the concept of class has a great importance in his works, Marx did not offer 
class with a systematic notion. Why bourgeoisie and proletarian? What was the relationship 
between the two that Marx wanted to tell us48
First, class refers to the ways in which people make their living. When Marx (2009) 
described the construction of society in capitalism, he distinguished six groups: landlords, 
capitalist, wage labourers, petty bourgeoisie, the professional classes and the 
lumpenproletariat (see also Parekh, 1982). The relationship between each group is flexible, 
? Hence, the following discussion will be based 
on a few perspectives as it attempts to answer Marx’s notion of class as well as explaining 
why this thesis retains the term Class. 
                                                     
48 Discussion began from explaining Marx’s concept of class does not mean that all ideological 
critique are following Marxist in form, even though this thesis keeps the usage of the term ‘Class’ 
which might cause readers to think so. This is what this thesis will suggest later: to take Marx’s ideas, 
e.g., class, as a method. Marx’s class is an angle to understand the characteristic of ideology. That is 
why this thesis has to revise the term class as uppercased Class in order to apply to all perspectives of 
ideological critique which will be discussed right away.  
Procedure 1: Identifying Essential Elements 
91 
so that sometimes they share common interests, identify with other groups, and occasionally 
even change from one group to another. It is also possible that one group may vanish entirely. 
Besides, Marx also adopted another investigative angle separating people simply into 
bourgeoisie and proletarian classes. This angle is based on the ‘economic conditions of 
existence’. Marx emphasized that the classification has nothing to do with the “‘identity’ of 
the ‘source’ of income” but with the way people make their living49
Second, class distinction results from the division of labour. In the Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, Marx (1970) sorted people into property owners and 
property-less workers which investigated the phenomenon of estranged labour. As discussed 
above, the condition of alienation is cursed by the division of labour in which workers lose 
the link between the outcomes of their labour, themselves, production process, and others. 
Since workers sell their calculable labour-power to capitalists, they are depreciated as the 
cheapest products. Workers (their labour-power) can be traded between capitalists while the 
latter accumulate their capital, which benefits from the surplus value of products, by 
exploiting the former (Marx, 1970). Moreover, Marx and Engels (1970), in the German 
Ideology, also used a similar description. They wrote,  
 (Parekh, 1982, p. 22). 
Namely, simply adopting the economic angle to distinguish classes is problematic because 
location of classes is easily shifted, and Marx knew this very well. To Marx, the standard of 
distinguishing classes has to consider the ways that people make their living, which is also 
the most distinct difference between the bourgeoisie and proletarian (instead of the economic 
determinism that the Second International misled; Lukacs, 1971). 
[…] the classes, already determined by the division of labour, which in every such 
mass of men separate out, and of which one dominates all the others. (p. 53-4) 
In short, the division of labour, which results from the logic of capitalism, results in the 
division of classes. It is more because after the division of labour, humans’ labour-power 
became tradable, which also caused the division of classes: the class to buy and the class to 
sell. 
                                                     
49 The economic conditions of existence means the way people obtain their social status and carry out 
relationships with others—how they should perform, act and respond. This is an angle to decide which 
class they belong to. For example, the income of office secretaries differs extensively from that of 
university professors, but they are categorized into the same class. It is the labouring style that decides 
their class status but not their income.  
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The third perspective is the possession of private property. In the German Ideology, 
Marx and Engels (1970) clearly discussed how diverse forms of division of labour 
influenced the possession of private property in different epochs. In the age before capitalism 
(including the primitive age, slavery, and feudal social system), the division of labour was 
inaccurate and the development of the material forces of production lagged behind the 
development of the ownership of property. At that time, the ownership of property belongs to 
tribal (primitive), ancient communal and state (slavery), and feudal or estate (feudal). The 
distinction of classes during these epochs was still unclear (Marx & Engels, 1970).  
Although it was possible to see capitalists in feudal society, their social role was still 
dominated by the nobility (Marx & Engels, 2009). Yet, as the material force of production 
developed and evolved, capitalists (who occupied the means of production) accumulated 
capital by exploiting the workers (who were not only alienated by division of labour but also 
excluded from ownership of means of production and private poverty). That is, capital 
accumulation helped capitalists to increasingly possess more private property (which also 
invisibly promoted their political influence50
 
) to distinguish themselves from those who had 
less private property. Although Marx (Marx & Engels, 1970) also admitted the existence of 
the petty bourgeoisie and a small peasant class, in his view, the private property of these 
negligible classes would eventually be exterminated through the industrial development. 
These classes would eventually be subsumed into the proletarian.  
Marx was considered to simplify diverse classes into two, the bourgeoisie and proletarian, 
which has been widely criticised (Lukacs, 1971; Gramsci, 1971). Critics argue that his 
(ideology) study only focused on the angle of class thus rendering it inadequate for analysing 
other topics in complex contemporary societies (Freeden, 2006). For instance, feminists 
argue that the class perspective is unable to explain the social position of gender 51
                                                     
50 In early capitalism society (manufacturing period), they are the pillars of states. In modern 
capitalism society, Marx named them the committee of a country to describe their power within the 
political region (Marx & Engels, 2009).  
. 
51 But, this criticism is unfair to Marx and perhaps not useful for understanding the notion of ideology. 
First, critics usually reverse cause and effect. It is agreed that Marx stood firm on the position of 
classes, especially the proletarian’s point of view, to criticise capitalism (Parekh, 1982). Critics ignore 
that Marx agreed the capability of proletarian after he investigated the political economy of his epoch. 
He started from studying the origins of commodities in order to analyse its value/surplus-value. With 
an understanding of the alienation phenomenon, which is generated from a division of labour, he 
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Nevertheless, as this thesis has tried to delineate Marx’s notion regarding class (through his 
discussion of the economic conditions of existence, the division of labour, and private 
property), it seems that Marx’s discourses on class have implied a demonstrative logic: 
whenever Marx talked about class, his logic always tries to convince us that there exists an 
invisible competing and unbalanced relationship between groups (despite talking about 
six classes, roles of division of labour, or ownership of private property).  
Drawing on Marx’s discussion of class, it is possible to claim that Marx never tried to 
distinguish classes. This thesis argues that what Marx wanted to suggest regarding the social 
diverse classes is the competing relationship for interests between the ‘haves’ and 
‘have-nots’. 
In fact, in the Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Marx (1963) did try to define 
what he meant by proletarian class. His words implied what this thesis has proposed—the 
concept of class refers to a competing relationship. He said,  
Insofar as millions of families live under conditions of existence that separate their 
mode of life, their interests, and their culture from those of the other classes, and put 
them in hostile opposition to the latter, they form a class (p. 124).  
To Marx (1963), the same conditions of existence, interests, and culture identity of a group 
(which thus holds a different position from another group) could shape a class. In other 
words, it cannot be a class if there is “no community, no national bond, and no political 
organisation among them” (p. 124). To a great extent, to Marx, recognizing the ‘difference’ 
and even holding ‘a hostile opposition’ to the other groups are necessary reasons in 
concretizing a class. His words also implied that what people should focus on is the 
                                                                                                                                                      
provided an analysis of commodity fetishism to explain the irrational human activities in capitalism. 
Namely, he did not first set up a presupposition of a class angle and then receive a conclusion of 
alienated condition of workers. Instead, he detected the alienated condition among human beings (e.g., 
workers) first, and then tracked back to find out that such a condition resulted from the unbalanced 
power relationship between two groups of people. Second, critics usually neglect historical factors. 
Marx’s (1971) explanation or contribution of ideology is based on his study of political economy in 
which he focused on questions of “capital, landed property, wage-labour, the State, foreign trade, 
world market” (p.20). As a result, the angle of class—classified by the bourgeoisie and the 
proletarian— is what Marx concluded after his extensive studies as well as the notion of class struggle 
being the possible solution that he found. The historical background determines his focus on 
dimension of class instead of gender and racial issues, which, frankly speaking, were not the main 
social issues in his epoch. Nevertheless, critics usually possess a narrow eyesight on recognition of 
class (e.g., capitalists/workers), gender (male/female), or race (e.g., white/black). They neglected that 
all these subjects share the same characteristic in any ideology discussion. This is the major work of 
this chapter which will be left to the main context.  
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relationship (of political struggle) between two classes, rather than simply asking those 
sluggish definitional questions52
 
.  
One more argument requires discussion before concluding why Marx’s concept of class has 
led this thesis to claim that ‘Class’ is one of three critical components of ideology. That is, to 
consider Marx’s ideas as a method. 
Lukacs (1971) defended what is real Marxism, or in his words, the Orthodox Marxism. 
He explained,  
Orthodox Marxism, therefore, does not imply the uncritical acceptance of the results 
of Marx’s investigations. It is not the ‘belief’ in this or that thesis, nor the exegesis 
of a ‘sacred’ book. On the contrary, orthodox refers exclusively to method. It is the 
scientific conviction that dialectical materialism is the road to truth and that its 
methods can be developed, expanded and deepened only along the lines laid down 
by its founders. (p. 1) 
Lukacs’ words suggest that the real contribution of Marx’s ideas should be seen as a method. 
If Marx’s concept of class could be considered as an angle to observe society (instead of 
being limited to his political economic study), then this ‘class concept’ should never simply 
be understood as a term which is distinguished by the economic differences or by the 
ownership of means of production. Instead, the concept of class should lead analysts to 
detect the constant argumentative logic that Marx revealed in his different writings, that is, a 
(competing) relationship between diverse groups (which is what exactly this thesis stands for 
regarding Marx’s concept of class).  
Accordingly, there is a need to redefine and reinterpret the concept of class. In order to 
distinguish this thesis’ angle from Marx’s angle, uppercased Class is used. The difference 
between class and Class is: while the lowercased class signifies a distinction between 
bourgeoisie/capitalists and proletarian/workers (usually criticised as inadequate for analysing 
other social topics, e.g., gender differences, regarding ideology research), the uppercased 
Class is suggested to refer to a competing relationship between diverse groups (which is 
expected to apply to any discussion related to ideology).  
                                                     
52 Questions such as: What is the bourgeoisie? How do we define the proletarian class? And, to which 
class does the petty-bourgeois belong?  
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How and why this notion of Class could be applied to all ideology research? An 
explanation of its characteristic is needed. This thesis argues: 
1. Any analysis regarding ideology contains a set of inter-definitional Classes. They 
are the Primary Class and the Secondary Class. Such a distinction (i.e., primary 
and secondary) is based on the semiotic notion of ‘binary opposition’ which will 
be introduced in Chapter 6. Simply put, how humans recognize a thing is never 
from the thing per se but from the meaning of the thing. What a thing means could 
only be understood through what this thing does not mean. For example, the 
meaning of justice could only be understood through what is not justice. 
2. Primary Class here refers to the main research subject while Secondary Class 
means its opposite/compared subject. Yet, the latter might not always appear (or 
cannot be discovered); it depends on the angle of power (see discussion in section 
5.4 Class & Power) or the ‘expression styles’ of IAC analysts (see discussion in 
Chapter 8). 
3. The perspective of power which the analysts of ideology research adopt will 
determine how they present the relationship between Primary and Secondary 
Class.  
3-1. The relationship between the Primary and Secondary Class could be to 
compete for power, interests, or interpretation rights. The equation could be 
presented as: 
 
 Not all the Primary Class in any researched phenomena are on the powerful 
side, some are described as the powerless image. Thus, the resistant and 
negotiating condition exists. 
3-2. While the perspective of power plays a marginal role in an analysis, this kind 
of analysis usually purely describes the Primary Class wherein the Secondary 
Class seems to be absent. Yet, according to semiotics, the way of 
 
The Primary Class 
dominates  
resists  
negotiates with 
the Secondary Class. 
 
｛ 
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understanding the Primary Class still relies on concepts of the ‘non-Primary’ 
Class —that is, the invisible and opposite Secondary Class53
It could be argued that, according to the concept of Class described above, adopting 
words such as ‘subject’ or ‘group’ instead of ‘Class’ could still have exactly the same 
meaning (e.g., the Primary Group instead of the Primary Class). The word Class could be 
easily confused with Marx’s class. The reasons for retaining this term are: first, it is Marx 
who uncovered and conceptualized the injustice relationship in human societies. Since 
Marx’s concepts of ideology were developed from the investigation of the unbalanced 
relationship between dominant and dominated classes, there is no need to create additional 
terminology which might lose the original motive of investigating ideology—that is, to 
investigate the political struggle between classes.  
.  
Second, the word class itself contains a critical meaning that incorporates 
discriminating and fighting characteristics—i.e., competing—which could be seen as the 
cause of the birth of ideology. Hence, as with explanation offered above, there is a fourth 
reinterpretation to the concept of Class:  
4. The term Class in this thesis refers to diverse, competing relationships, including 
dominating, negotiating, compromising, and resisting relationships. Only when the 
concept of Class is seen as a relationship between diverse groups (instead of 
simply referring to the capitalists/labour or the bourgeoisie/proletarian), could it 
apply to any ideology discussion. For example, while it is in the feminist 
discussion, the Class relationship refers to the female Class and the male Class. 
While the discussion goes further to investigate the racial ideology within one 
gender, for example, female, the Class means the ideological competition between 
the white female Class and other different ethnic backgrounds female Class. As a 
result, all research regarding ideology could be analysed through the angle of Class 
only if a (competing) relationship within such research could be discovered. 
 
                                                     
53 For example, RA28 explains how the ideology of Die Grünen (The German Green Party) shifts 
from ecologized socialism to political liberalism. Die Grünen is the Primary Class in this case. Even 
this article does not compare Die Grünen with other parties, the invisible concept of ‘what Die Grünen 
is not’ is still embedded in the analyst’s (or readers’) cognition. This is why the ‘shift from ecologized 
socialism to political liberalism’ means significance to this analyst. 
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Empirical Analysis 
In the previous part of the literature review, Marx’s notion of class has been extended as 
(competing) relationships between two groups (e.g., male/female, eastern/western, 
white/black, party 1/party 2, etc.). Such a (competing) relationship has been found in this 
thesis’ research data (i.e., 33 IAC articles) listed as Table 5-1. Again, the Primary Class 
means the main research subject while the Secondary Class refers to the opposite/compared 
subject in the 33 IAC articles (whether the Secondary Class appears/is described depends on 
the degree of power that the IAC analysts apply). Discourse battlefield means the topic of 
articles wherein the Primary (and Secondary) Class acts to fight or construct their ideological 
leadership 
 
 
Table 5-1: Classes and their Discourse Battlefield 
RA Classes Relationship Discourse Battlefield Primary Class Secondary Class 
01 
New Labour Party’s 
technology policy 
Definition of citizen’s 
responsibility toward society 
(concealed Secondary Class) 
New Labour Party’s technology 
policy 
02 Otherized South Asian Muslims 
Western World, British Media, British press 
03 
Maruyama Masao’s ideas 
(of Japanese Fascism, 
Asia) 
Fukuzawa Yukichi’s ideas 
(of Japanese Fascism, Asia), 
authors’ own ideas 
Masao’s and Yukichi’s Articles 
04 Ideology of Modern dieting 
Fad dieting Media, TV Advertisements 
05 
Otherized 
Japanese-Americans and 
Muslim and 
Arab-Americans 
The definition of a(n) (real) 
American Citizen 
Media, U.S. press: New York Times 
& Times 
06 A sport player/worker Professional sport team/owner 
Media, Seattle sports writers 
07 
Nursing education 
system 
Hospital education system Medical discourse in: 1. Formal 
government inquiry: Submission; 2. 
Informal print media. 
08 
New Right ideology: 
fears of a 'sense of loss' 
The fundamental principle 
of conservatism 
1. Documentation (e.g., The 
National Curriculum 5-16); 2. 
Interview 17 people serving in 
HMI, NCC. 
Traditional subject-based 
curriculum 
Academic curriculum 
09 New Democrat ideology Democrat Party philosophy ADA, National Journal & DW- NOMINATE Scores (p. 588) 
10 George F. Will’s 
right-wing meta-ideology 
The reality that an IAC 
Article’s author suggests 
(concealed Secondary Class) 
196 of Will’s editorials 
11 Idea of reformer, Rashid 
Rida 
Idea of conservative 
(concealed Secondary Class) 
Islamic Legal Reform,  
12 
The “Haves” 
People who understand 
law 
The “Have nots” 
People who don’t understand 
law 
Whether the “Haves” come out 
ahead 
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13 Public Assistance Law under New Regime 
Public Assistance Law under 
Old Regime 
Meaning of Public Assistant 
14 
Concept of 
Afrocentricity in 
Curriculum 
Non- Afrocentricity concept 
(concealed Secondary Class) 
Educational Curriculum Model 
15 Female teachers Male teachers School curricula 
16 
Four Authors’ Ideologies on Science Curricula Design Trend and Ideology of Science 
Curricular Contexts Personal ideological 
principle 
Social pedagogical principle 
17 Usage of the word ‘Just’ on Denials 
Without Using  
(conceal Secondary Class) 
Social Impression toward Local 
Politicians' Denials of Politics 
18 Ideology of Holding Value of ‘Best Practice’ 
Value of Traditional Practice Value of the Counselling Profession 
19 Rowling's Magical System 
Absurd Narrative Logic of Narrative 
20 Female Scholars Male Scholars Right and Position in Academia 
21 What real Dangdut music means 
What Dangdut music 
represents in contemporary 
Meaning of “the people” in 
Dangdut music 
22 The diverse perspectives of seeing crop-top between How meaning of a thing is defined.  daughters’ viewpoints Parents’ viewpoints 
23 
Ideology of “new caring” 
created by medical 
discourse 
Original meaning of 
“caring”  
Meaning of “caring” 
24 
The Chinese Communist 
Party’s diverse political 
slogans at different 
times. 
Compared with Author’s 
attitude toward these slogans 
(concealed Secondary Class) 
People’s ideology shift 
25 
How British see 
American Gun Culture 
Usually compared to 
author’s ideology of 
American Gun Culture 
(concealed) 
British Editorial Pages and author’s 
own opinions 
26 
Ireland Republican 
Movement 
Corresponding historical 
background (concealed 
Secondary Class) 
The ideology shift (e.g., from a 
physical force organisation to a 
socialist party) 
27 
Perspective suggested by 
the western country and 
academic 
Perspective regarding related 
(post-)colonial, cold war 
history 
The definition of failed state. 
(take Somalia as example) 
28 
The political ideology shift within Die Grünen Party. based on investigation of their 
Basic Programme in 1980 and 2002 Old/new ideology New/old ideology 
29 Bolshevik/Menshevik’s faction policy position 
Menshevik /Bolshevik’s 
faction policy position 
Russian Social Insurances 
Movement 
30 
Other scholars’ 
(mis-)understanding of 
“Subculture of Poverty” 
Author’s (correct) 
understanding of such a 
notion 
Oscar Lewis’ notion of “Subculture 
of Poverty” 
31 
Digital reference service 
models, 
e.g., 
de-professionalization 
(Traditional) reference 
service, e.g., 
professionalization 
What is good to reference work 
32 
Official discourse about 
education in every report 
Reports in other years 
(as comparison) 
Schools Commission Reports, 
especially on educational equality 
and participation topics 
33 
Borrowed company law, 
Vietnam elites legislator, 
government 
Application of law 
Vietnam executor, local 
council  
Theory and practice of company 
law 
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Table 5-1 offers a holistic view of the Primary and Secondary Class in 33 IAC articles. 
Other texts/references which display related discussion of (sub-)Primary (and Secondary) 
Class are listed in Table 5-2. 
 
Table 5-2: Finding the Classes 
SWPs Code: P1-FC (Finding the Class) 
Articles Found References/Examples 
RA02 p.246(2); p.248(4); p.249(5); p.250(6); p.251(7); p.254(10);  
RA03 p.138(2); p.140(4); p.142(6); p.143(7); p.144(8); p.145(9); p.146(10); p.147(11); p.148(12); p.149(13); p.150(14); p.151(15);  
RA04 p.338(5); p.350(17);  
RA05 p.6(4); p.12(10);  
RA06 p.446(2); p.450(6); p.456(12); p.457(13);  
RA07 p.107(1); p.109(3); p.110(4); p.111(5); p.112(6); p.113(7); p.114(8); p.115(9); p.116(10); p.119(13);  
RA08 p.261(1); p.263(3); p.264(4); p.265(5); p.270(10); p.271(11); p.272(12);  
RA09 p.588(2); p.592(6); p.593(7);  
RA10 p.418(2); p.420(4); p.421(5); p.423(7); p.424(8); p.425(9); p.427(11);  
RA11 p.99(1); p.100(2); p.105(7);  
RA12 p.1025(1); p.1026(2); p.1029(5); p.1039(15);  
RA14 p.104(5);  
RA15 p.455(1); p.456(2); p.457(3); p.464(10); p.466(12); p.467(13); p.469(15);  
RA16 p.138(2); p.145(9); p.147(11); p.151(15);  
RA20 p.355(3); p.356(4); p.362(10); p.363(11); p.364(12); p.365(13); p.367(15);  
RA21 p.413(3); p.414(4); p.415(5); p.416(6); p.417(7); p.422(12); p.423(13); p.425(15); p.426(16);  
RA22 p.70(1); p.72(3); p.73(4); p.74(5); p.75(6); p.88(19);  
RA23 p.387(2); p.390(5); p.395(10);  
RA24 p.488(2); p.494(8); p.495(9); p.496(10); p.497(11); p.498(12);  
RA25 p.468(3); p.472(7); p.474(9);  
RA26 p.89(11); p.91(13); p.94(16); p.95(17);  
RA27 p.182(3); p.190(11); p.191(12); p.192(13); p.193(14); p.194(15); p.195(16); p.197(18);  
RA28 p.161(5); p.162(6); p.169(13); p.180(24);  
RA29 p.921(8);  
RA30 p.468(4); p.469(5); p.474(10); p.478(14); p.488(24); p.489(25);  
RA31 p.219(2); p.223(6); p.230(13); p.231(14); p.232(15); p.234(17);  
RA32 p.17(1); p.21(5); p.24(8);  
RA33 p.643(3); p.644(4); p.648(8); p.650(10); p.653(13); p.654(14); p.655(15);  
 
To conclude, finding the Classes is one of three tasks to be done in the procedure of 
identifying essential elements. It is to distinguish the research’s main subject (i.e., the 
Primary Class) and its corresponding opposite identifiable or unidentifiable subjects (i.e., the 
Secondary Classes) as well as recognizing the competing relationship (including dominating, 
negotiating, compromising, and resisting styles) between these two subjects before analysts 
start their analysis. This is similar to the necessity film directors have in confirming their 
main actor/actress and other supporting roles (e.g., actress/actor, villains, etc.) before filming 
begins. 
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5.3 Involving Power 
In the previous section, this thesis re-defines Class (with uppercase capital letter) as a 
concept which refers to competing relationships between two (or more) groups that hold 
diverse opinions to strive for limited interests/resources. Such re-definition shares a logical 
similarity with Adam Schaff’s (1976) perspective. Schaff’s logic is that modern society is 
constructed of two classes, the “revolutionary” class and the “conservative” class (Schaff, 
1976, p. 246). The former refers to a class which is in a ‘rising’ trend, fighting for its rights; 
while the latter is the class, which is in a ‘falling’ trend, trying to maintain its dominant 
advantages. This rising and falling status of classes echoes this thesis’s perspective of Class, 
that is, a competing relationship. 
People used to think that this ‘rising’ and ‘falling’ relationship was only present in 
modern capitalist societies, regarding it as a positional shift of class due to economic factors. 
However, such a way of thinking may be doubtful, with the line from the film Enemy at the 
Gate (Annaud, 2001) stimulating a reflection. It says,  
Man will always be a man. There is no new man. We tried so hard to create a 
society that was equal, where there'd be nothing to envy your neighbour. But there's 
always something to envy. A smile, a friendship, something you don't have and 
want to appropriate. In this world, even a Soviet one, there will always be rich and 
poor. Rich in gifts, poor in gifts. Rich in love, poor in love. 
This story line explains that even in a society without class distinction (i.e., Marx’s angle), 
there always exist the differences of Classes (i.e., the angle of this thesis) such as innate gifts 
or love relationships. Human activities inevitably lead to the categories of the ‘haves’ and 
‘have-nots’. Whether to agree with Marx’s angle of (economically differentiated) classes54
 
 
or accepting this thesis’ angle of (competing) Classes, it is always the factor of power which 
creates the differences between the haves and the have-nots everywhere. The term Class 
refers to nothing if there is no power working inside. Similarly, the existence of power is 
founded on the interaction of Classes. Power cannot be found, analysed, and criticised if 
there are no Classes competing against one another. 
                                                     
54 Of course, this thesis here simply presents how most people think about Marx’s angle of class. In 
fact, Marx’s distinction of class is more focusing on the ownership of the means of production. 
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Theoretical Review  
Hay (2002) noted that researchers are usually confused with whether the discussion of power 
per se is related to an analytical perspective or a critical one. In the North American and 
British academies, scholars adopt qualitative methods, trying to measure the existence of 
power. A simple equation could be drawn: If X is influenced by Y or Y directly controls X 
and this can be shown, then there is evidence of power. Based on the complexity of the 
design, the degree of power could even be measured as well. Researchers have tried many 
ways to analyse power: its existence, its function, or its influence. This could be seen as 
studying power from an analytical perspective. 
Perspective of Power Study 
The contradiction is: even if all criteria show that Y indeed directly influences X, does 
X really suffer from Y’s power as the analysts discover/think? For example, people in North 
Korea believe that they are the happiest human beings in the world (Demick, 2010), yet 
people who live elsewhere and examine this country, might consider North Koreans to be 
suffering under a dictatorship. This example shows: the process of analysing a case is 
simultaneously the process whereby analysts are making a judgement. As Lukes (1974, 2005) 
argues, to measure power or to claim one has power over others is a judgement made by 
personal value. Such a judgement reveals the analysts’ critical perspective while analysts 
consider themselves as possessing an analytical perspective to analyse their research subjects. 
Simply put, the discussion of power is always displayed within a process of seemingly 
neutral analysis which, conversely, will inevitably convey a personal critical judgement.55 
Facing this entanglement of ‘analytical’ and ‘critical’ perspectives, pretending to possess a 
neutral and objective position to analyse power is nonsense. It is the same as if this thesis 
How Does Power Operate? 
                                                     
55 The mixed analytical and critical perspectives usually cause the word, power, to be recognized as a 
derogatory term, becoming an ethical evaluation. Hay (2002) tries to redefine power, attempting to 
establish an angle of power analysis without personal judgement. He argues that an angle of 
“context-shaping” (p. 185) is the kernel of the power discussion which shares the same demonstrative 
logic when he adopts the strategic–relational approach to deal with the structure-agency debate. The 
discussion of power not only focuses on how A influences B; but, how B reacts and what change to 
the context where A and B together situate are important as well. He simply defines power as ‘the 
ability of actors to “have an effect” upon the context which defines the range of possibilities of others’ 
(p. 186). For more discussion of power, please refer to Hay (2002) Chapter 5 or Lukes (1974, 2005).  
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were to claim to offer a neutral and objective discussion on ideological critique which indeed 
would be hypocritical. In fact, to Lukes (1974, 2005), being able to identify the power 
operation per se is the mission of critique, even if revealing analysts’ subjectivity is 
unavoidable. 
The study of power mainly focuses on power’s nature, how power operation is 
identified, or how power operates. Regarding discussion on the nature of power, this can be 
found in Lukes’ (1974, 2005) works and several of Foucault’s (1980, 1991b, 1998) 
publications, although it is not this section’s topic. This section focuses on how the operation 
of power is identified (how power operates) in the dimension of making ideology. The angles 
of Marxism (especially Marx, Gramsci, and Althusser) and Foucauldians will be offered. 
The operation of power is unidirectional and straightforward in Marx’s and Althusser’s 
concepts of ideology. From their perspectives, to explain the operation of power is to 
illustrate how one class dominates another class. Thus, power is repressively possessed by a 
class named ‘bourgeoisie’ which is incapable of anything but exploiting the ‘proletarian’ 
class. Although Gramsci did not emphasize the capacity of resistance as much as Foucault 
did, the power relation, in his perspective, is fluctuating which is reflected in his hegemony 
theory. If Marx’s and Althusser’s notion of power is inflexible and monopolized by a certain 
group, then, drawing on Gramsci’s (1971) hegemony theory, power does not only belong to a 
single group; instead, it is something that all groups could fight for the leadership in order to 
create their own hegemony.  
Yet, if to compare Gramsci with Foucault further, the latter contains an even more 
flexible attitude regarding the concept of power. Foucault held a notion of power opposite to 
that found in Marxism 56
                                                     
56 Foucault’s opposite position to that of Marxism, despite using the word ‘ideology’, should be 
considered with the social background Foucault himself lived in, where Marxism was part of the 
mainstream ideas of the time.  
 (Hunt & Wickham, 1994). To Foucault (1990), power is a 
“multiplicity of force relations” (p. 92). It is a process comprised of continuing negotiation, 
competition, and transformation, a support in which diverse power forces link together, and a 
strategy that is the reflection of social hegemony. Power cannot be possessed by specific 
groups because it is not a zero-sum game; instead, it is exercised immediately and anywhere 
(Foucault, 1980, 1991a, 2002). Hence, to Foucault, power is not only generated from the 
Procedure 1: Identifying Essential Elements 
103 
centre to the periphery, from the dominant to the oppressed class; in fact, the reverse is 
possible as well. 
 Although traditional Marxists and Foucauldians hold different perspectives of power, 
there are still some similarities regarding the concept of power in their discussions. First, 
both groups believe that power is a critical element that influences the way people sense 
society. Next and more importantly, both groups have explained how power functions. Power 
possesses a capacity to help the dominant groups maintain their vested interests by forcing 
people to obey certain rules or influencing people’s way of thinking. The more power 
operates, the more the vested social order is confirmed which could generally be categorized 
into two modes: the visible and the invisible.  
Althusser (1971) divided society into two steering states units, the “Repressive State 
Apparatus” (RSAs) and the “Ideological State Apparatus” (ISAs). The former includes not 
only “the police, the courts, the prison; but also the army” (p. 137); namely, it contains 
control units that “function by violence” (p. 143). The latter is comprised of the media, 
religious organisations, family, the educational system, etc.; namely, it controls society via 
peaceful methods, through daily activities. That is to say, the former represents a visible 
armed strength to keep human society in order; while the latter changes and influences 
people’s minds unobtrusively and imperceptibly. Altogether, these components constitute a 
society’s value system. Compared to Althusser, Gramsci (1971) divided society into two 
levels: “political society” and “civil society” (p. 12). The former is similar to Althusser’s 
RSAs, meaning a visible and violent power; the latter comes close to ISAs, that is, an 
invisible ideological power. Accordingly, it is reasonable to say that RSAs operate in the 
political society while ISAs work on the civil society. 
As discussed above, Althusser’s notion of power is unidirectional and straightforward. 
Whether ISA or RSA, to Althusser, they are all operated from the dominant to the oppressed 
side. On the contrary, Gramsci’s notion of power is much more flexible and negotiable 
(albeit not as much as Foucault’s). To Gramsci, although violent power is required for 
controlling a state, it is not enough. A government cannot always force people to accept 
policies by using armed force; instead, Gramsci (1971) suggested that the ruling class must 
develop “consent” (or, to use another term, the “intellectual and moral leadership”, p. 57), 
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which is identified by the majority of citizens57
The differences between the visible and invisible styles could also be found in 
Foucault’s discussion. By using a diachronic perspective, Foucault (1980) separated the 
types of power into ‘juridico-discursive’ power and modern power. The former is executed in 
political bodies, by states with a repressive position; while the latter is performed in societies 
with a productive perspective. Although Foucault’s division here was not as subtle as 
Althusser’s or Gramsci’s, his complete theory of power, in fact, is a theory about how visible 
power transfers to invisible power
.  
58
Of course, Gramsci’s notion of power is not as flexible as Foucault’s. It could even be 
claimed that Foucault’s discussion of power simultaneously admits the existence of 
resistance. Foucault (1978) argues, “Where there is power, there is resistance” (p. 95). He 
argued, 
. For example, as Foucault (1991a) quoted from Servan: 
“A stupid despot may constrain his slaves with iron chains; but a true politician binds them 
even more strongly by the chain of their own ideas” (pp.102-103).  
Resistances do not derive from a few heterogeneous principles; but neither are they 
a lure or a promise that is of necessity betrayed. They are the odd term in relations 
of power; they are inscribed in the latter as an irreducible opposite. (p. 96) 
Drawing on Foucault, it could be said that power and resistance share the same logic of 
                                                     
57 Gramsci (1971) goes further in that he distinguishes between organic ideology and arbitrary 
ideology within the whole of power ideology. Organic ideology represents the material interests for 
vested, systemic groups (e.g., his example, the religious group); arbitrary ideology, meanwhile, is the 
unconscious power exerted in daily life, which will combine the former’s material interests, and 
finally contribute to the formation of structuralized, systematized mechanisms such as educational 
systems.  
58 It is no doubt that Foucault’s efforts focused on the discussion of ‘power’ rather than ideology. 
This thesis here simply includes his basic concepts of power to explain how ideology might operate 
(in Foucault’s dimension). Although Foucault rejected using the term ideology, it seems that there is 
no cognitive difference to understanding his argumentation on ‘power’ even if the term power 
embedded in his articles were to be replaced by the term ideology. For example, his discussion of 
discipline and punishment which began from the visible style of power, e.g., ways of physical 
punishment, to his focuses on features of invisible power (e.g., concepts of juridico-discursive power 
or capillary movement) indeed is an explanation of how ideology disciplines the behaviour and 
cognition of prisoners.  Although the term ideology was not invented by Marx, the discussion of 
ideology was greatly associated with Marx’s related concepts. As a result, the term ideology was 
usually understood through the angle of determined, dominated relation, or false consciousness. At 
least, such ways of understanding the concept of ideology could be seen as the ‘dominated ideology’ 
in Foucault’s time. Accordingly, it is reasonable to argue that, to a great degree, Foucault’s rejecting 
the term ideology might simply because that he did not want to follow the common customs to use the 
term ideology. Foucault adopted the term discourse instead of ideology while discussing concepts of 
power and it has been argued that there is no difference between the two terms, discourse and 
ideology (e.g., Eagleton, 1991, or Purvis and Hunt, 1993) 
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expressing/demonstrating their strength. What makes them different depends on who applies 
it: the dominant or the oppressed sides. That is to say, power means that one side attempts to 
dominate, control, or influence the other side. When the same strength reacts reversely, it is 
named resistance (even though it is still the demonstration of power—the oppressed group’s 
power). If Gramsci claims that the oppressed side still possesses the possibility of fighting 
for power (or in his words: the ‘consent’), then Foucault would say that the power of all 
competitors is equal. 
 Hence, all of Althusser’s, Gramsci’s and Foucault’s notions share the same logic: that 
influence on the human mind is as efficient as torture of the human body (even though 
Foucault expressed this argumentation without involving the term ideology). Their ideas all 
described the history of humans’ appropriating power to maintain dominance as a 
transformation from visible to invisible power; that is, from armed force to ideological 
strength, from force to surveillance, or from punishment to self-disciplining. 
To conclude, power, as one of three essential elements of ideology, plays the key role to 
influence how other elements (i.e., Class and reality) and, eventually, how such ideology is 
seen. The discussion of power is always displayed within a process of seemingly neutral 
analysis, which will inevitably convey a personal critical judgement. Finally, it is agreed that 
the invisible operation of power works with much more efficiency on the human mind than 
applying a visible style. 
Empirical Analysis  
In the literature section, this thesis has pointed out that the investigation of power is always 
through a critical perspective (i.e., analysts’ own standard) which is covered by an analytical 
perspective (i.e., analysts think so). There is no denying that this thesis’s following analysis 
(on the power operation regarding 33 IAC articles) is inevitably to be a reflection of my 
personal judgement. This is an unavoidable dilemma. Yet, identifying the power relationship, 
although it results from analysts’ ideology, is still a way to understand how power operates 
(as Lukes might agree). 
From the 33 IAC articles, this thesis has concluded four styles of power 
operation/presentation. They are: 
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Style I: The visible or invisible power possessed by a certain group which directly 
constructs a reality for the other groups (in order to serve the former group’s interests). 
This is an angle of power close to Marx’s and Althusser’s perspective. 
Example 5-1: RA06 explains how news media (impeded by a sport team’s invisible 
threat to their future news resources) constructs/presents an image of Joey Galloway as a 
wayward child, greedy and disloyal by their sport news (in which so-called power works). 
Such an image demonizing Galloway is to sustain the authority of the sport’s team, its coach, 
and its vested authority. 
Example 5-2: RA21, by reviewing history, explains how the definition of Dangdut 
music has been appropriated by diverse groups to pursue their group interests (e.g., political 
or economic interests) in which the spirit of Dangdut music—originally representing the real 
life of people—is reinterpreted by invisible power to serve ideologies of certain groups. 
Other examples related to Style I can be found in RA02, RA04, RA05, RA06, RA07, 
RA10, RA12, RA15, RA18, RA20, RA21, RA23, RA24, and RA25. For a detailed 
explanation, please refer to Appendix 5-1. 
Style II: The operation of power is displayed in a negotiating process between the 
dominant and oppressed groups. This is a power competition close to Gramsci’s angle. 
Example 5-3: In RA08, the author suggests that the 1998 National Curriculum is a 
product of conscious competition and negotiation fought by diverse interest groups. The 
operation of power is reflected in how individuals and interest groups, who all possess 
different historical, social, and cultural backgrounds, together participate in the discussion 
and finally construct the legitimate curriculum knowledge (i.e., The 1998 National 
Curriculum). 
 Example 5-4: In RA14, if Asante’s notion of Afrocentricity tried to evoke black people 
to fight the interpretation-rights for themselves, then what this article (RA14) tries to argue is 
that such action of competition for the interpretation-rights is unsuccessful. The author of 
this article explains more about how power operates in a negotiating mode. 
Other examples related to Style II can be found in RA03, RA08, RA13, RA14, RA17, 
RA26, RA29, and RA32. For a detailed explanation, please refer to Appendix 5-1. 
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Style III: The oppressed group clarifies the misunderstanding, resists the installed 
viewpoints, or fights for their interpretation-rights. This is a style of power operation 
which is close to Foucault’s notion of resistance. 
Example 5-5: RA11 discusses how Islamic intellectuals internally fight for the 
interpretation-rights of the reform of Islamic Law. Nevertheless, due to the involvement of 
religion, these intellectuals’ arguments usually become a reform plan influenced by their 
particular thoughts. This is an article explaining how reformers, the intellectuals, attempt to 
fight for the interpretation-rights to rethink Islamic Law which is against the original vested 
ideas (even though they usually fail). 
Yet, this thesis discovered there was only one IAC article (RA11) which particularly 
focuses on the angle of resistance. In fact, most articles which display the angle of resistance 
usually combine discussion with other styles (e.g., I or II). RA30 is an example which 
simultaneously adopts Styles I (dominant) and III (resistant). 
Example 5-6: RA30 claims that Oscar Lewis’ notion of ‘subculture of poverty’, in the 
past thirty years, has been misunderstood as a critique on victims of poverty. The author of 
this article attempts to clarify how such power operates in (or is dominated by) the 
mainstream academic discourses of the past thirty years. (Style I) By distinguishing the 
dominated phenomenon, this author also tries to defend and redress such a misunderstanding 
of Lewis’ notion. (Style III) 
Other examples related to Style III can be found in RA11, RA27, RA30, RA31, and 
RA33. For a detailed explanation, please refer to Appendix 5-1. 
Style IV: The operation of power does not obviously reveal or apply in IAC 
articles. 
Example 5-7: RA09 does not talk about how power operates or how power constructs 
reality. The analyst of this article adopts quantitative data (e.g., voting statistics) to show 
where in the spectrum of political ideology (i.e., liberal, centrist, or conservative) these 
diverse factions of the Democrats party (i.e., Traditional Democrats, New Democrats, Blue 
Dogs) are located. 
Example 5-8: RA22 devotes pages on theoretically discussing the relationship between 
power and reality, to explain how power constructs reality. Nevertheless, while the author of 
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this article brings an example into her discussion, she does not clearly explain how her 
research objects—parents and daughters—apply their power or resistance to construct or 
defend their own value (i.e., whether crop-tops are cute or dorky). Hence, this article only 
discusses the notion of power theoretically; but, in its provided example, how power works 
is not explained. 
 RA09 seems only to discuss the position of political ideologies while RA22 did not 
explain how power worked. Does this Style IV, where ‘operation of power’ seems not to 
exist, qualify to be included in what this thesis has termed the ideological critique/analysis? 
Indeed, it is if the neutral characteristic of ideology’s nature is considered. Also, as 
explained in the methodology, Chapter 4, if a methodology of ideological critique/analysis 
were established, power should only be seen as one of its analysis angles but not all. Section 
5.4 will provide further discussion. 
Other examples related to Style IV can be found in RA01, RA09, RA16, RA19, RA22, 
and RA28. For a detailed explanation, please refer to Appendix 5-1. 
Appendix 5-1 shows a holistic view to explain what angle of power is applied in 33 
IAC articles. Table 5-3 provides the references which show how the notion of power was 
revealed within IAC analysts’ writings (texts). 
 
Table 5-3: Involving Power 
SWPs Code: P1-IP (Involving Power) 
Articles Found References/Examples 
RA01 p.166(2) 
RA02 p.245(1); p.248(4); p.249(5); p.250(6); p.251(7); p.253(9); p.254(10);  
RA05 p.3(1); p.4(2); p.5(3); p.6(4); p.13(11);  
RA06 p.445(1); p.446(2); p.447(3); p.448(4); p.449(5); p.450(6); p.451(7); p.456(12); p.457(13);  
RA07 p.107(1); p.108(2); p.109(3); p.110(4); p.111(5); p.114(8); p.115(9); p.116(10); p.117(11); p.118(12); p.119(13); p.122(16);  
RA08 p.261(1); p.262(2); p.263(3); p.264(4); p.265(5); p.267(7); p.270(10); p.273(13);  
RA10 p.418(2); p.419(3); p.426(10);  
RA11 p.100(2); p.102(4); p.103(5); p.104(6);  
RA12 p.1025(1); p.1026(2); p.1031(7); p.1032(8); p.1034(10); p.1035(11); p.1036(12); p.1037(13); p.1039(15);  
RA13 p.283(5);  
RA14 p.100(1); p.101(2); p.103(4); p.106(7);  
RA15 p.455(1); p.456(2); p.457(3); p.462(8); p.467(13); p.469(15);  
RA16 p.138(2); p.139(3); p.140(4); p.147(11); p.152(16); p.154(18);  
RA17 p.353(5); p.358(10);  
RA18 p.157(4); p.159(6);  
RA20 p.354(2); p.355(3); p.356(4); p.357(5); p.358(6); p.359(7); p.360(8); p.361(9); p.362(10); p.364(12); p.364(12); p.365(13);  
RA21 p.412(2); p.413(3); p.415(5); p.416(6); p.417(7); p.418(8); p.421(11); p.423(13); p.426(16); p.427(17);  
RA22 p.70(1); p.71(2); p.73(4); p.75(6); p.77(8); p.81(12); p.84(15); p.85(16); p.87(18);  
RA23 p.387(2); p.388(3); p.389(4); p.390(5); p.395(10); p.396(11);  
RA24 p.487(1); p.488(2); p.489(3); p.490(4); p.492(6); p.493(7); p.494(8); p.497(11); p.503(17); p.504(18);  
RA25 p.467(2); p.468(3); p.470(5); p.470-1(5-6); p.471(6); p.474(9); p.478(13); p.480(15);  
RA26 p.79(1); p.89-90(11-12); p.91(13); p.92(14); p.93(15); p.94(16);  
RA27 p.181(2); p.182(3); p.183(4); p.184(5); p.186(7); p.191(12); p.192(13); p.193(14); p.194(15); 
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p.195(16); p.197(18); p.198(19); p.199(20);  
RA28 p.161(5); p.171(15); p.179(23);  
RA29 p.915(2); p.918(5); p.921(8); p.922(9); p.923(10); p.925(12);  
RA30 p.466(2); p.470(6); p.488(24); p.489(25); p.490(26);  
RA31 p.232(15); p.240(23);  
RA32 p.17(1); p.18(2); p.19(3); p.21(5); p.22(6); p.28(12); p.30(14);  
RA33 p.643(3); p.646(6); p.649(9); p.650(10); p.651(11); p.653(13); p.654(14); p.655(15); p.656(16); p.658(18); p.660(20); p.661(21); p.662(22);  
 
 
5.4 Class and Power—Discussion of Dominant Ideology 
Theoretical Review  
In The German Ideology, Marx (Marx & Engels, 1970) wrote,  
The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which 
is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual 
force…. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the 
dominant material relationships….[T]hey rule as a class and determine the extent 
and compass of an epoch….[T]they do this in its whole range… among other things 
rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and 
distribution of the ideas of their age. (p. 64) 
This quotation presents Marx’s standard statement on capitalist society: what it would be 
when factors of power and Class are considered simultaneously in the analysis of ideology 
(i.e., the phenomenon when certain Class applies power to define things). Marx (1957) 
provided the example of the phenomenon of diverse groups, such as the bourgeoisie, the 
aristocracy, and the monarchy, competing for power after the collapse of the feudal 
system—i.e. whoever controls the material relations of production controls the power of 
interpretation (ideological strength); and, whoever controls the latter controls all. Of course, 
the proletarian class can generate ideology as well (i.e., Gramsci’s or Foucault’s viewpoint); 
but, the difference is that the proletarian’s ideological strength is powerless or lacking in 
relative power. Hence, the history of how the bourgeoisie defeated the feudal system via the 
logic of capitalism (e.g., division of labour, private property) is the history of how the 
bourgeoisie increased its ideological strength and created its dominant ideology59
 
.  
                                                     
59 Dominant ideology here has little to do with Gramsci’s notion of hegemony. Gramsci’s hegemony 
is considered as a battlefield in which all ideas, voices, and forces are fighting for the power of 
leadership in order to create consent. Yet, the discussion of dominant ideology is much a concept 
which follows Marx’s thread of thought. It is a unidirectional power operation which explains more 
about how certain groups create a common sense to the public. Please also refer to the previous 
section 5.3 Power for more explanation regarding the difference between the concept of dominant 
ideology and that of hegemony theory.  
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In addition, Lenin (in Bottomore, 1983) and Lukacs (1971) also shared the same notion: 
that ideology is the result of the interaction between diverse classes and power (e.g., political 
expression, pursuit of interests). Lenin held a neutral meaning in respect of the interactive 
results between power and classes which indicates his neutral attitude regarding the meaning 
of ideology60. He argued that even the proletarian class can have power to create its own 
ideology (Bottomore, 1983). The difference is that the bourgeoisie has more resources and 
opportunities to expand its ideology, preferably to create a certain (dominant) ideology 
which benefits their interests (Larrain, 1988). To Lukacs (1971), the unbalanced ownership 
of relations of production between two classes creates the reified proletarian class. This 
reification influences the proletariat’s condition of existence and its consciousness (Lukacs 
(1971). Hence, the dominant ideology is not defined by a villainous scheme from the 
bourgeoisie, but by the logic of capitalism, in which one is reified while the other benefits 
from it.61
The discussion of ‘dominant ideology’, so far, seems to carry a negative meaning, 
being displayed as an absolute power (i.e., one side dominates the other). Nevertheless, such 
recognition of the concept of dominant ideology is controversial. Eagleton’s (1991) 
explanation of how dominant ideology is created might show the reason why. 
  
First, an ideology has to state its system of values and beliefs, meaning that it has to 
distinguish its basic territory of ideas from others. Secondly, this ideology has to naturalize 
and universalize its basic ideas, and then this ideology could enlarge its capacity for 
interpretation. Next, this ideology has to eliminate and exclude other thoughts which are 
against it. Finally, this ideology has to obscure social reality to create an appropriate 
environment for itself. Eagleton’s suggestion involves several notions, such as mythology, 
interpellation and articulation, which will be discussed in the following chapters. His 
                                                     
60 In ideology literature, there is a discussion which focuses on the characteristic of ideology: whether 
ideology per se conveys a positive and neutral or a negative and critical characteristic. This discussion 
will be left to section 5.6 Reality and Power.  
61 A dominant ideology could result in diverse effects due to the class/Class/group differences. To the 
group whose group’s interests and consciousness are the same as the dominant ideology of the time, 
this dominant ideology will help them to carry out what Althusser called “reproduction the relation of 
production” in order to maintain their dominance (Althusser’s notion will be explained in Chapter 6). 
On the other hand, to those groups whose interests and consciousness collide with this dominant 
ideology, then the latter become the reason why members of these groups are alienated (in Marx’s 
term) or reified (in Lukacs’ term). For the notion of alienation or reification, please refer to section 5.2 
Class.  
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suggested process implies two points: dominant ideology is seen to contain a negative 
meaning, and ideology itself possesses an absolute power.  
Yet, in some sense, the above two points are inappropriate. First, not all dominant 
ideologies are negative. Plamenatz (1970) argued that dominant ideology involves two forms: 
instruction and indoctrination. Both of these involve transferring ideas from one class to 
another via communication channels (e.g., teaching, to maintain the social order). The 
difference is that the latter (i.e., indoctrination) additionally tries to make one class think and 
act as the other class (usually the dominant one) wants it to do. It causes relations of 
exploitation or distortion, which are done on purpose. This could be referred to as the 
negative meaning of dominant ideology. Differently, ‘instruction’ only guides people to 
follow the rules which are perceived normally (e.g. following the traffic rules).  
Second, because the concept of dominant ideology is usually misrecognised, people 
tend to consider that ideology itself possesses an absolute power. In other words, people 
always link ideology to a dominant power when they think of ideology negatively. However, 
this is not entirely so: not every ideology is related to the dominant power. For example, 
racialism and feminism are both ideologies, but they are not in a dominant position 
compared to other ideologies. In fact, different ideologies are not comparable, as Eagleton 
(1991) described that “all ideologies are politically oppositional” (p. 6; emphasis original). 
Some ideologies, such as capitalism and communism, represent political views; while others, 
such as the hegemony of Hollywood, refer to a culturally dominant viewpoint; others, such 
as racialism and feminism, are generated by diverging dimensions of seeing human practice. 
Thus, not all ideologies possess the dominant power because ‘ideology’ is a word 
representing a set of ideas which does not necessarily mean being involved with power 
competition in order to fight for dominance over others62
                                                     
62 Although this note is not quite relevant to the discussion of this section, the viewpoint of 
Abercrombie et al. (1978, 1990) regarding the topic of the dominant ideology is worth discussing. The 
concept of dominant ideology, to them, is more likely to carry a negative characteristic (even though, 
in many of the cases they studied, they did not discuss the nature of ideology: whether ideology 
possesses a positive or negative characteristic). Abercrombie et al. (1978, 1990) in their series of “the 
Dominant Ideologies” claimed that the ruling class suffers the dominant ideology more than the 
oppressed class. Take their study as an example. In the feudal age, the dominant class was more 
confined by the rule of the church than the dominated class. Privileged ideas of the church are usually 
linked within the discourse of intellectuals; the peasants did not fall under this influence because they 
were “unchurched”(1978, p. 157). Yet, their findings are arguable if the characteristics of one 
dominant ideology (i.e., positive or negative) is also put into consideration. Of course, the dominant 
. 
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Not all dominant ideologies have absolute power or possess negative purposes (e.g., 
control, exploitation, distortion), nor are they created to dominate other groups. For example, 
the neutral dominant ideology (such as ‘obeying the law is the obligation of citizens’) does 
not display a negative image to the public (even though, to some extent, such an ideology 
still invisibly helps certain groups to maintain their interests and dominant status). Hence, in 
any study on dominant ideologies, whether an ideology is a neutral dominant ideology or one 
with a negative meaning depends on the specific context in which an ideology is situated. 
To conclude, when factors of power and Class are considered simultaneously, diverse 
ideologies will be evoked, some of which will become the dominant ideology. Not every 
ideology holds the power to create dominance; and not every dominant ideology possesses a 
negative meaning. The condition to establish dominance, even one with a negative 
characteristic, depends on how the elements of ideology—power and Class— interact.  
Empirical Analysis  
The theoretical review part discussed the concept dominant ideology which results from the 
interaction between Class and power. In this empirical analysis part, findings have shown 
that some of the 33 IAC articles also reveal evidence of the concept of dominant ideology. 
Based on the previous theoretical discussion, this thesis will exhibit the critical/negative and 
neutral/positive examples of dominant ideology respectively. 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
ideology affects the dominant class more than the oppressed one. One ideology could become the 
dominant one only when it cooperates with power manipulation. While the dominant class is usually 
the one who controls the power, the ideology by which they use power to maintain is the ideology that 
they first believe in. People always use power to maintain what they have already had first, and then to 
ask for more if possible. If such an ideology makes them dominant, of course, they believe in this 
ideology more than others. However, as this thesis has explored a neutral characteristic of the concept 
of dominant ideology, based on this viewpoint, it is reasonable to answer why Abercrombie et al were 
so surprised at their findings. Their surprise implied that they possessed a negative characteristic 
viewpoint regarding the concept of dominant ideology. To them, the dominant ideology is a tool 
controlled by the dominant class; or, the dominant ideology refers to false consciousness which is 
designed for a purpose. In short, Abercrombie et al. presupposed a negative meaning regarding the 
concept of ideology which is created by a ruling class for the purposes of dominating another. For this 
reason, they think the oppressed class should be the one that is influenced the most. In fact, most of 
the cases they discussed are merely the dominant ideology with a neutral characteristic but not the one 
which is created on purpose in order to maintain the certain interests of the dominant class. They 
rarely discussed how power was applied to serve a certain class and their consciousness. Offering 
discussions of dominant ideology without considering its characteristic and the power operation, they 
indeed lost in contradictory argumentation.  
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Style I: dominant ideology with a negative characteristic 
Example 5-9: RA04 points out that diet companies, through advertisements, continually 
construct a certain ideology to their customers. Despite in different periods the purposes of 
advertisements are diverse (e.g., from fad dieting to healthy dieting adverts), the diet 
companies constantly imbue the same ideology—dieting is important—which is indeed a 
dominant ideology to the customers. The diet companies apply visible signs or slogans to 
spread the invisible unidirectional power to customers. To the author of RA04, customers’ 
recognition of ‘dieting is important’ carried by the TV advertisements is a negative dominant 
ideology because it neither sincerely meets customers’ real need nor offers them benefits. 
Instead, it only contributes to the diet companies’ interests.  
Example 5-10: RA27 explains how the West defines a type of country, such as Somalia, 
as a ‘failed state’ which reveals the dominant ideology of the West. This dominant ideology 
has resulted from the academic argumentations, news reports as well as imperial and 
post-colonialism. That is to say, the definition of a failed state is usually the imagination of 
the West which is often negatively presented. Nevertheless, such an imagination is still the 
only angle—i.e., the dominant ideology— for the world to evaluate the status of a country. 
Other IAC articles which reveal a dominant ideology with a negative characteristic are 
RA02, RA04, RA06, RA15, and RA27. Please refer to Appendix 5-1. 
Style II: dominant ideology with a neutral characteristic 
Example 5-11: The author of RA03 argued that because Maruyama Masao was “the 
most prominent and influential political theorist of postwar Japan”, his illustration toward 
Fukuzawa Yukichi has become the only way of thinking for the Japanese to understand 
Fukuzawa Yukichi’s political thought. In short, Masao’s way of understanding Yukichi is the 
dominant ideology for those who want to study Yukichi. Although the author of RA03 
criticised that Masao misunderstood Yukichi’s thoughts, this does not affect the fact that 
Masao’s way of understanding Yukichi is the dominant ideology for Japanese which has 
nothing to do with its truth or falsity (it is a misunderstanding only to the author of RA03). 
Example 5-12: RA12 adopts an interview method to investigate people who have legal 
experience in order to answer why people agree with such a (dominant) ideology that ‘the 
Haves come out ahead’. The interviewees include lawyers, the people who possess legal 
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knowledge, someone who is capable of hiring lawyers, and the one who is not. Based on 
their experiences, the author of RA12 answered why ‘the Haves come out ahead’ is the 
dominant ideology when people think of legal activities.  
Other IAC articles which reveal a dominant ideology with a neutral characteristic are 
RA03, RA07, RA11, RA12, RA18, RA30, and RA31. For a detailed explanation, please 
refer to Appendix 5-1. 
 
5.5 Presenting the Reality  
The reason why human beings work is not only that daily labouring provides a way to 
demonstrate their free will (or to complete what Marx called the process of objectification63
Nevertheless, the way humans sense the truth is varied, or how humans recognize 
reality is different due to humans’ diverse consciousness. It is humans’ interactions and 
social practices (including both material and political praxis, i.e., manual or mental labour) 
as well as the specific backgrounds of an epoch where people are situated that together 
influence the making of their consciousness. It is individuals’ own consciousness that 
determines how they consider what is real, the truth, or the reality which also results in 
constructing (/or is revealed as) different ideologies. Of course, these ideologies in turn will 
influence humans’ practices and knowledge of a time (i.e., their consciousness), which is the 
foundation of how they recognize the reality. It is a perpetually circulating movement. As 
such, to this thesis, the reality is the representation of ideology while ideology 
simultaneously influences how people recognize the reality.  
), 
but also because it is a way to obtain the daily needs that they require for maintaining their 
lives. If the necessities for everyday life were not necessary, then the daily labouring would 
also be unnecessary (Parekh, 1982). To Marx, the search for truth does not come about 
because of the human desire for truth or knowledge, but because, as Parekh (1982) explained, 
“they are needy beings who must engage in successful material and political praxis in order 
to satisfy their needs” (pp. 188-189). Namely, demanding their needs is the reason why 
humans look for truth, even for freedom.  
                                                     
63 For the concept of objectification, please refer to section 5.1 Introduction.  
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The problem is that humans are unable to determine what their consciousnesses or 
ideology really is (no one would rationally admit that they possess a false consciousness or 
are influenced by ideology), not to mention the fact the reality they consider as the truth is 
always the reflection of a certain ideology. Although the statement of why reality is the 
representation of ideology per se is as obscure and complex as the concept ideology, this 
thesis argues that once the reality of research phenomena is described, it is still able to 
discover one’s consciousnesses or ideology. In other words, how humans describe reality is 
how they invisibly expose their consciousness or ideology. Through the process of 
understanding how people describe reality, humans become able to comprehend how an 
ideology is created or what ideology it is.  
Accordingly, how 33 IAC articles describe the reality of their research will be 
described in this section. Yet, regarding the topic of reality, a critical debate in the ideology 
realm must not be overlooked, that is, whether ideology, by nature, is a false consciousness 
(does ideology per se represent a false reality?). Although scholars nowadays tend to agree 
that ideology has nothing to do with true or false but is just a channel to represent humans’ 
diverse consciousness (McLellan, 1995; Freeden, 2003; Eagleton, 1991; Thompson, 1984; 
Plamenatz, 1970), it is still worth discussing this ‘false consciousness debate’ since it is a 
critical point to understanding the essence of ideology.  
Hence, in the theoretical discussion part, this thesis will first focus on the question: is 
ideology a false consciousness (does ideology represent a false reality)? Following the 
theoretical discussion, the empirical analysis reports will be provided. Then, how reality is 
described in IAC articles will be explained. 
Theoretical Review—Whether Ideology is a False Consciousness (Does Ideology 
Represent a False Reality?)  
Marx’s perspective is usually the kernel of the discussion when arguing whether ideology is 
a false consciousness. Although later scholars such as McLellan (1995) argued strongly that 
“Marx never used the expression ‘false consciousness’” (p. 16), early discussion of Marx’s 
attitude toward ideology is often equated with false consciousness, for example, Plamenatz 
(1970) wrote that “Marx often called ideology ‘false consciousness’” (p. 23). Why Marx’s 
concept of ideology has been referred to as false consciousness could be explained as having 
two factors and one catalyst.  
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Marx’s example of correlating humans’ living circumstances with a camera obscura, 
which presents an upturned image on the human retina, could be the first factor. This 
correlation is based on Marx’s other concept, the division of labour64, in which the humans’ 
labour process is alienated.65
To Marx, “all thought is socially determined” (cited in Eagleton, 1991, p.89) which 
could be seen as the second factor. After he investigated civil society via the angle of 
political economy, Marx (1971) explained how the economic level determines the 
ideological level, claiming that “it is not the consciousness of men that determines their 
existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness” (p. 21). If the 
economic level can determine the ideological level, as Marx suggested, then whoever 
controls property at the economic level controls the making of human consciousness. Hence, 
when property owners look to accumulate their maximum interests, to some extent, 
information (all idea systems) cannot be truly presented but will work to maintain vested 
interests—in short, misinterpretations may occur. When the ideological level is determined 
by the economic level, thoughts will also be determined.  
 When the links between humans’ labour and the results of 
labour disappear, people forget that they are the sovereign of the results of their labour; on 
the contrary, they are subjected to their creations. The relation is reversed, just like the world 
seen through the mechanism of the camera obscura. Marx’s explanations of the commodities 
fetishism and religion are good examples of the way humans confuse their relationships with 
what they create. The created products obtain increasingly dominant power and finally 
surpass their producers.  
The above two factors might explain why some scholars consider Marx to link 
ideology with false consciousness. Nevertheless, it is Engels, the catalyst, who was 
acknowledged as Marx’s interpreter after his death, who identified ideology with false 
consciousness. Engels wrote (in a letter to Franz Mehring),  
Ideology is a process accomplished by the so-called thinker consciously, it is true, 
but with a false consciousness. The real motive forces impelling him unknown to 
him; otherwise, it simply would not be an ideological process. (Marx & Engels, 
1934, p. 511) 
                                                     
64 For the concept of the division of labour, please refer to previous section 5.1 Introduction.  
65 Marx pointed out four types of alienation. Please refer to Marx’s (1977) Economic & Philosophical 
Manuscripts of 1844. Or section 5.1 Introduction.  
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To Engels, ‘motive forces’ are an invisible power conducting subjects to an unknown 
condition where false-consciousness occurs. Although humans are involved with 
manipulating ideas, they do not purposely define an idea with a specific preferred meaning; 
in fact, they are also unaware of the motive forces. To Engels, the characteristic of false 
consciousness of ideology refers to two main effects that help to distort and shape reality as 
well as to sustain the contemporary social order (Festenstein & Kenny, 2005). Marx’s 
attitude toward reality in the notion of ideology is associated with Engels because the latter 
somehow compelled readers to understand Marx through his point of view after Marx’s 
death. If Engels’ innocent misleading66
First, how Marx related ideology to consciousness is important. In the Preface of A 
Contribution of the Critique of Political Economy, by explaining the transformation and 
relationship between the economic level (the material relation of production) and the 
ideological level (including “the legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophic,” Marx, 
1971, p. 21), Marx stated the function of the ideological level, “in which men become 
conscious of this conflict and fight it out” (p. 21). Hence, consciousness is the subject with 
which the ideological level is concerned, which is influenced by material economic relations. 
Thus far, the discussion has been about how ideology refers to consciousness, but not to false 
or true consciousness.  
 is forgivable, then what Marx’s attitude of ideology 
was and whether Marx did equal ideology with false consciousness or not should be 
discussed. 
Second, as McLellan (1995) pointed out, Marx’s notion of ideology is so ambiguous 
that Marx explained it in diverse writings; moreover, Marx did not deal with the ‘true/false 
dichotomy’ while he was discussing ideology. If Marx once thought that ideology was an 
                                                     
66 In fact, such an accusation against Engels is not fair. There is a fact: later scholars usually misquote 
and misunderstand the original authors. Some scholars quoted from Engels’ letter to Mehring and 
claimed that Engels considered ideology as false consciousness. Yet, to Larrain (1983), Engels’ whole 
letter to Mehring, in fact, had described the concept of ideology in a general way. This innocent 
mistake applies to lots of scholars’ understanding of Marx, without exception. Parekh (1982) argued 
that Marx’s notion of ideology mainly comes from The German Ideology and is mostly quoted from 
Marx’s careless remarks in that book, from which scholars usually only picked up words and created 
slogans and so often neglected the whole context that Marx referred to. It happened to Lukacs as well. 
Larrain (1983, 1988) pointed out that many researchers (e.g., Jones, Poulantzas, Adlam, McDonough 
and Seliger) who considered Lukacs as holding to the notion that ‘ideology is false-consciousness’, 
usually bypassed a critical point: They only quoted words from one part of Lukacs’ article and 
neglected the most important thing: the whole context. Obviously, that later scholar’s words 
appropriated from others are usually the reason for this false consciousness debate. 
Procedure 1: Identifying Essential Elements 
118 
illusion, a false-consciousness, it could only be found in his early writing, The German 
Ideology. In Marx’s later works, Capital, ideology is seen as a result of daily life. Hence, 
McLellan (1995) concluded that what Marx really cared about was the process of misleading 
and what specific reasons made people think the way the ruling class wanted them to think. 
McLellan suggested that, to Marx, ideology might display a distorted consciousness—or 
ideology is a channel to carry both true and false consciousness—but, its characteristic has 
nothing to do with true or false. 
Third, by investigating how Marx described/used the word ‘ideologist’, whether he 
equated ideology to false consciousness becomes clear. To Marx, Hegel and the Young 
Hegelians, or to use another term ‘the Holy Family’, are all ideologists (Parekh, 1982). If 
ideology refers to false consciousness, then ideologists could be seen as the people who 
create false consciousness. However, the above statement neither conforms to Marx’s 
starting position nor explains why he criticised Hegel and the Young Hegelians. Marx 
criticised them because they did nothing except create idealism67. That is why the sub-title of 
his book The Holy Family (Marx, 1957) is “Critique of Critical Critique”. Marx criticised 
them (the holy family) because their critiques were based on their own thoughts. To Marx, 
people who create or define things as such based on their own thoughts are ideologists, and 
the things ideologists have created or defined are ideologies. Most importantly, Marx did not 
mean that these ideologists (or their critiques) created a false consciousness (ideology)68
Based on the above three dimensions—first, ideology is a level based upon economics 
which displays human consciousness; second, ideology is only a channel to carry both true 
and false consciousness; third, the logical relation with which Marx explained the word 
ideologist—it is reasonable to claim that, to Marx, ideology has nothing to do with false 
consciousness.  
.  
 
Other later scholars also provided abundant demonstrations regarding this false 
consciousness debate. Yet, due to limited pages, this thesis can only offer a brief introduction 
                                                     
67 A detailed explanation of Marx’s critique on Hegelian idealism, please refer to Chapter 2 (Section 
2.3).  
68 Another way to explain why, to Marx, ideology is not false consciousness may be found in Marx’s 
explanation of the word ‘apologist’. Please refer to Parekh’s (1982), p. 11ff.  
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to their ideas. First, according to McLellan (1995), Lukacs usually put the terms of morals, 
ideology, religion and false consciousness together69 (as well as his partial writings70) which 
might imply from his position that ideology is equal to false consciousness. However, 
Lukacs’ heavy focus on the proletariat’s serious condition should be taken into consideration. 
In fact, to Lukacs (1971), not all ideologies are false consciousness. It is not one ideology 
which places a class consciousness into a false position, but the class condition in which 
people have already been situated; namely, it is the specific circumstance of classes which 
leads people to possess a false consciousness, but not ideology71
 To Lukacs (1971), since proletarians’ class consciousness is likely composed of the 
logic of capitalism, the only thing that matters is: if the proletariat only partly perceives 
capitalism’s logic, then false consciousness occurs. Thus, it is reasonable to say that, to 
Lukacs, false consciousness is a result of human consciousness when humans face the 
reification power of capitalism, which has nothing to do with ideology per se at all.
. As a result, Lukacs (1971) 
wished to clearly distinguish between true and false consciousness for the proletariat. He 
believed that the proletariat’s false consciousness results from the reification of class 
consciousness, which is generated from the logic of relations of production, so that 
capitalism possesses a political and economic advantage over other ideas.  
72
Second, Mannheim (1936) suggested that ideology is presented in both social and 
psychological forms. His attitude to reality in the notion of ideology can be found in his 
discussion of the psychological mode, which also refers to his other term, the ‘particular 
 
                                                     
69 As Lukacs wrote, “in the class struggle of the past the most varied ideologies, religions, moral and 
other forms of false consciousness were decisive” (cited in McLellan, 1995, p. 23).  
70  For example, as Lukacs (1971) wrote “[Consciousness] appears…as something which is 
subjectively justified in the social and historical situation, as something which can and should be 
understood, i.e. as ‘right’. At the same time, objectively, it by-passes the essence of the evolution of 
society and fails to pinpoint it and express it adequately. That is to say, objectively, it appears as a 
‘false consciousness’” (p. 50).  
71 From this point of view, it is understandable why his concept of totality attempts to identify the 
subject with the object. Please refer to Chapter 9 where this thesis has discussed and compared his and 
Adorno’s concept of totality. 
72  In order to escape from such false consciousness, Lukacs (1971) strongly pointed out the 
importance of ‘totality’. To him, connecting the consciousness with the whole society is the only way 
to figure out human beings’ real feelings and thoughts and to understand in what circumstance these 
feelings and thoughts are generated. Consequently, perceiving the reified condition and embedded 
false consciousness is the only way for the proletariat to restore the ownership over its consciousness. 
Only when the proletariat realises its condition of class-in-itself and conceive the condition of 
class-for-itself will the revolution and emancipation become possible (the concept of totality will be 
left to Chapter 9 while dealing with Adornos’ concept of totality).  
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conception of ideology’. In the psychological mode (or in the particular conception), 
ideology is seen as “conscious distortions, calculated lies, or forms of self-deception” 
(Freeden, 2003, p. 14)—in short, it is the result of misinterpretation. However, to Mannheim 
(1936), these distorted ideas are just thought which is created by diverse thinkers who stand 
for specific positions. The trap of seeing ideology as false consciousness arises from humans’ 
lacking a holistic perspective. Accordingly, why reality is described as false consciousness is 
not the problem of the discussed issue itself; instead, it is due to interpreters’ diverse stances 
as well as the different epochs in which they are situated. Mannheim concluded the above 
phenomenon as humans’ possessing the dimension of ‘relativism’.  
Conversely, Mannheim (1936) suggested another notion, ‘relationism’, to substitute for 
‘relativism’ in order to understand society. To him, what really matters in sensing reality is 
the ‘relation’ between interpreter and interpreted objects. From the angle of relationism, 
researchers will adjust their personal notions within the contemporary social values where 
evaluating reality is based on the relation between them (interpreters), their position, their 
research objects, and the “condition of existence and modes of thought” of that time (p. 70). 
In so doing, the angle of the ‘total conception of ideology’ will be taken where reality 
(ideology) will not simply be seen as false consciousness. 
Third, Gramsci (1971) disagreed with identifying ideology as false consciousness. His 
logic of disagreement is closer to Mannheim’s than Lukacs’ or Marx’s. To Gramsci (1971), 
false consciousness is a political or historical result which only applies to a particular 
condition and event. A false consciousness is claimed because the observer investigates the 
situation with his/her fixed thoughts. On the contrary, those people who are being observed 
might not think the same as the observers do. That is to say, Marx can never explicitly 
illustrate the consciousness of the proletariat because he was not situated in the same 
circumstances as the real proletariat class were. The false consciousness of the proletariat 
class could be just an imaginary figment of these observers’ minds, as they come from the 
bourgeoisie.  
Fourth, Althusser (1971) disputed the concept of false consciousness. His attitude of 
reality in the notion of ideology is that ideology represents humans’ imagination of social 
existence. Drawing on Althusser, reality, as an element of ideology, has nothing to do with 
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truth or falsehood, but is concerned with the ways of thinking to which people are 
accustomed. To Althusser (1971), ideology is a ‘system of representations’ or is an 
intermediary sphere into which subjects pour their consciousness and receive revised 
consciousness in return, which might be represented as unconscious. The phenomenon of the 
unconscious should be answered by a concept of imaginary. To Althusser (1971), ideology 
involves both ‘real lived relation’ and ‘imaginary lived relation’. The former refers to the 
‘relation’ between humans and the world in which they act; while the latter focuses on the 
way such relation is represented. Usually, the former is subsumed by the latter. Namely, the 
function of ideology is to represent the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real 
conditions of existence. Although the imaginary relationship seems to refer to the argument 
of making true or false consciousness, to Althusser, it is not. What Althusser really focused 
on was never the question of whether ideology is false consciousness or whether humans are 
able to truly recognize reality, but the question of how people understand the world through 
the system of ideological representation in which an imaginary relationship is created73
Finally, to other ideology discussants, Plamenatz (1970) argued that all consciousness is 
determined by the process of social construction, so that each consciousness refers to a 
different ideology separately. False consciousness is simply a part of all kinds of 
consciousness, which is generated from a specific social condition. Hence, ideology cannot 
dogmatically be seen as false consciousness. In addition, Žižek’s (1989) argument is similar 
to Gramsci’s position: false consciousness is a result of the judgement that contemporary 
people maintain their own points of view as they review past events. Žižek claims that if 
ideology is illusion, it will be displayed through humans’ social practice but not through their 
consciousness (e.g., people keep doing something, say, irrationally, and they do not even 
know why they do it). Ideology is not an expression of illusion, but embedded in the unusual 
condition which leads people to perform without thinking (Žižek, 1989).  
 
(Althusser, 1971; Eagleton, 1991; Montag, 2003).  
Larrain (1991) asserted that although the negative concept of ideology was expressed 
within Marx’s works, it does not mean that ideology refers to false consciousness. It could 
                                                     
73 How such imaginary relationship is created is answered in his discussion of ISA/RSA and concept 
of interpellation. 
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only mean that ideology possesses the function of distortion, which cannot be referred to as 
false consciousness. To Larrain (1991), the notion of false consciousness per se is as obscure 
as ideology in that it never tells what fake sensation that ideology involves. False 
consciousness is seen to involve results of error or mistake; but, some ideologies fail to refer 
to error or mistake. False consciousness is usually considered as being created by the ruling 
class to mislead the working class, which is not accurate. In fact, it is the logic of the 
relations of production that deceive workers’ consciousness. Moreover, Parekh’s (1982) 
disagreement is that ideology possesses the function of distortion as Larrain suggested, but 
not every distorted event that is caused by a false consciousness can be seen as ideological. 
As his example describes, the ‘sun goes around the earth’ is a distorted idea (a false 
consciousness), but it is not an ideology at all. Parekh argued that the difference between 
ideology and false consciousness is that the former combines a system of ideas but does not 
refer to a single idea (e.g., the sun goes around the earth). 
According to the discussion above, this section concludes that ideology is not false 
consciousness, given that false consciousness is not the nature/essence of ideology. 
Ideologies can survive dominance without having false consciousness. False consciousness 
is only a possible result/effect of reality. Reality, being an element of ideology, has nothing to 
do with falsehood or truth.  
Summary and Discussion 
 The platform of ideology for reality and for false-consciousness is different. The former 
is the host, while the latter is the parasite. An ideology could display with either a true or 
false perspective. The birth of a false consciousness requires two points: first, the operation 
of power indeed exists in the researched phenomenon; and, second, there are innocent 
subjects (Classes), who will not find out at all. False consciousness is defined only when the 
veiled groups are unaware of anything. That is to say, if subjects discover the truth, they no 
longer participate in false consciousness, even if they still suffer from its influence. This is 
because understanding is one thing, but to remove it is quite another.  
Moreover, the reason why ideology is an abstract concept is because the early 
elaborators, particularly Marx and Engels, did not clearly state what they were referring to 
when they adopted the notion of false consciousness to describe ideology. Did they refer to 
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false consciousness as the ‘possible results/effects’ of ideology, or did they consider false 
consciousness as the nature/essence of ideology? It seems that this false consciousness 
debate indeed has lost philosophical recognition.  
This thesis argues that the question of whether ideology is false consciousness is a 
question of epistemology from a theoretical dimension. In the practical dimension, when one 
false consciousness is invisibly and undoubtedly accepted, it is no longer the false 
consciousness but an ‘ideology’ which locates on an ontological level. In other words, the 
epistemology (e.g., false or neutral perspectives) scholars adopt when entering into debate is 
based on their personal educational background and life experiences, that is, their ideology. 
Accordingly, a statement such as “ideology is a false consciousness” per se is an ideology, 
which belongs to the angle of ontology.  
The ontology, like ideology, is located in the human subconscious domain with people 
being incapable of recognizing what it really is, and therefore, has determined what 
epistemology scholars adopt to evaluate all things in the world74
Empirical Analysis 
. What people can ascertain 
is that their epistemology has shifted (e.g., from adopting a negative to a natural angle of 
ideology). However, they are unable to understand why and how their epistemology shifts 
because “why and how” is the work of ontology. Ontology is the alter ego of ideology and 
vice versa. People always innocently think that they are able to perceive both, but what they 
have perceived is never the ontology and ideology. Ontology determines what epistemology 
a person possesses just as ideology determines the way people act.  
Although there is only one among the 33 IAC articles, the RA25, which theoretically and 
particularly discusses the false consciousness debate, there are still a few articles whose 
analyses indeed refer to such a debate. These IAC analysts mainly argue that their researched 
subject has constructed (/is suffering from) a false consciousness; or they explained that the 
ideology they had found is represented/constructed as a false consciousness. Two examples 
(Example 5-13 and 5-14) will be given later. Yet, what has to be emphasized here is that 
none of the 33 IAC articles directly claim that the essence of ideology per se is a false 
                                                     
74 This is why Hay (2002, 2007) states that ontology is prior to epistemology (cf. Bates & Jenkins, 
2007). 
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consciousness. This might imply that, after decades of debating, researchers of ideology 
today would agree that ideology is only a channel or tool to convey/represent a diverse 
reality (whether it is objective or constructed); it has nothing to do with true or false. 
Example 5-13: The author of RA04 argues that although diet companies continually 
revise the advertising of their products to create a fresh image of ‘we understand customers’ 
demands’, the purposes are all for their business. Namely, advertising varies periodically, but 
the goal of diet companies remains the same. Drawing on the view from RA04’s author, 
these various advertisings have created a false demand, i.e., the false consciousness, for the 
audiences. Thus, this author tries to explore the conversion of reality from a diachronic angle, 
and explains what reality (or false demand/consciousness) these advertisings really represent. 
Example 5-14: RA13 argues that Egypt’s social welfare plans were originally designed 
to manage the poverty problem in order to reach modernity. However, social welfare plans, 
such as ‘public assistance law’ and ‘social insurance’, have provided Egyptians with nothing 
but the false consciousnesses which is always just an imagination of social welfare. This is 
because those diverse welfare plans are more like rhetoric tools which helped diverse 
political regimes to maintain social order and their authority. The purpose of social welfare 
plans is not to help people; instead, it is to create a (false) consciousness that the 
‘government is helping people’. 
Other articles which refer to the discussion of false consciousness include RA02, RA04, 
RA10, RA13, RA17, RA21, RA22, RA23, RA24, RA25, RA27, RA28, RA30, and RA31. 
For a detailed explanation, please refer to Appendix 5-2. 
This thesis has argued that although the term reality is obscure, once the reality is described, 
it is able to reveal people’s consciousnesses or say, their ideologies. The moment when 
humans describe the reality they assume is simultaneously the moment when they invisibly 
expose their consciousness or ideology. Through the process of understanding how people 
describe reality, it is possible to discover how an ideology is created and what ideology it is 
as well. After the investigation of 33 IAC articles, this thesis has determined four ways of 
describing reality. 
How Reality Is Described 
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Way I: The IAC analysts show what the constructed reality is. This generally 
includes two dimensions of analysis: how W constructs a reality to maintain its interests (to 
dominate D), or how D is suffering from a constructed reality (created by W).  
Example 5-15: RA07 explains how medical discourse continually constructs a 
traditional image for the public. This constructed image (i.e., reality) is that nursing is subject 
to the medical profession. 
Example 5-16: the author of RA05 explains that, by using specific words and 
descriptions, the U.S. media has constructed Muslim and Arab-Americans as the ‘Other’ 
after 9/11. When Americans accepted the distinction of the Other (from us), to the author of 
RA05, they accepted a given consciousness. Hence, what Americans think after 9/11 (e.g., 
Muslim is the Other) is an ideology which represents a constructed reality. 
Example 5-17: RA24 points out how the Chinese Communist Party applies diverse 
visible political slogans to change people’s invisible consciousness, which reflects people’s 
thinking (i.e., diverse realities) through times (e.g., in the early era: to be loyal to leaders; in 
later eras: to rationalize the policy of economic development). The reality which represents 
people’s value here is constructed by the dominant group.  
Other IAC articles which describe the reality from a constructed angle include RA01, 
RA02, RA03, RA04, RA05, RA06, RA07, RA10, RA12, RA15, RA18, RA20, RA21, RA23, 
RA24, RA25, RA27, RA30, and RA31. For a detailed explanation, please refer to Appendix 
5-2. 
Way II: The IAC analysts simply illustrate the reality of their research; or 
objectively describe how a reality is presented which is based on a process of competition, 
negotiations, and compromise by diverse positions. 
Example 5-18: The author of RA09 employs quantitative data (e.g., voting statistics) to 
show readers where in the spectrum of political ideology (i.e., liberal, centrist, or 
conservative) these diverse factions (i.e., Traditional Democrats, New Democrats, Blue Dogs) 
of the Democrats party are located. The author simply presents what reality one faction holds 
without involving a discussion of power operation or whether such a reality is true or false. 
Example 5-19: The analyst of RA26 explains the conversion of the Ireland Republican 
Movement. Such a conversion shifts “from a physical force organisation to a socialist party 
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that emphasises economic rather than national issues.” He does not judge whether the reality, 
which represented the social condition of a time (e.g., in the ‘force’ or ‘party’ style stage), is 
influenced by power or is presented truthfully or falsely. The analyst just (objectively) 
presents the reality of certain times diachronically. 
The context of other IAC articles which simply or objectively illustrate the reality of 
the research includes RA08, RA09, RA17, RA22, RA26, RA32, and RA33. For a detailed 
explanation, please refer to Appendix 5-2. 
Way III: The IAC analysts arbitrarily or subjectively claim: the reality that their 
analyses have found is misrepresented (by a certain group); instead, the truth is X. In this 
theme, IAC analysts’ own opinion regarding ‘what the real reality should be’ is revealed 
overtly. 
Example 5-20: RA28 mainly discusses the ideology shift in Die Grünen (The German 
Green Party) from 1980 to 2002 which is based on an investigation of official documents. 
The author of this article thinks that Die Grünen nowadays possesses the liberalism ideology 
(i.e., the reality that the author himself considers) instead of the ideology of ecologized 
socialism that most people suppose. Namely, the IAC analyst denies one current ideology 
and reasserts another. 
Example 5-21: RA19 belongs to an analysis of cultural creation which analyses the 
narrative structure of Rowling’s Harry Potter. By pointing out the contradictory narrative 
embedded in this novel, the analyst of this article argues that Rowling has mixed up the first 
(i.e., real) and the second (i.e., magical) worlds. Namely, the reality that this novel presents 
to us (i.e., mixed world) is not the same as what Rowling and her readers thought (i.e., 
magical world). This analyst tells us what reality it is, to argue against what we used to think 
it is (It is A not B). 
Other IAC articles which show analysts’ arbitrary or subjective judgement include 
RA03, RA04, RA13, RA14, RA18, RA19, RA21, RA27, RA28, RA29, RA30, and RA31. 
For detailed explanation, please refer to Appendix 5-2. 
Way IV: That how reality is described is not clearly explained by the IAC analysts 
(Discussion of reality is hardly found). Although discussion of ideology, more or less, has 
to illustrate the figure of such ideology, there are still some articles which do not draw the 
Procedure 1: Identifying Essential Elements 
127 
shape of their research. These articles either focused on ‘how power acts’ in their research 
object (e.g., RA11) or simply introduce/present their research object75
Example 5-22: RA16 mainly explains the difference between the authors’ (i.e., people 
who designed curriculum for Portuguese middle school) personal ideological and the 
pedagogical principle of their works. This article does not clearly discuss what reality it is. 
. 
Examples of this way of describing reality include RA11 and RA16. For a detailed 
explanation, please refer to Appendix 5-2. 
Appendix 5-2 shows a holistic view to explain what angle of reality is applied in 33 
IAC articles. Table 5-4 provides the references which displays how the notion of reality was 
revealed within IAC analysts’ writings (texts). 
 
Table 5-4: Presenting the Reality 
SWPs Code: P1-PR (Presenting the Reality) 
Articles Found References/Examples 
RA01 p.165(1); p.166(2); p.172(8); p.174-5(10-11); p.176(12); p.177(13); p.177-8(13-4); p.178(14);  
RA02 p.246(2); p.249(5); p.250(6); p.252(8); p.253(9); p.254(10);  
RA03 p.144(8); p.147(11);  
RA04 p.335(2); p.338(5);  
RA05 p.3(1); p.6(4); p.7(5); p.8(6); p.9(7); p.10(8); p.11(9); p.12(10);  
RA06 p.446(2); p.448(4); p.452(8); p.456(12);  
RA07 p.113(7); p.114(8); p.115(9); p.116(10); p.117(11); p.118(12); p.119(13); p.122(16);  
RA08 p.263(3); p.264(4); p.269(9); p.272(12);  
RA09 p.588(2);  
RA10 p.418(2); p.426(10);  
RA11 p.99(1); p.103(5); p.104(6);  
RA12 p.1034(10); p.1036(12);  
RA13 p.284(6); p.285(7); p.287(9); p.288(10); p.289(11);  
RA14 p.100(1); p.101(2)a; p.109-10(10-1);  
RA15 p.455(1); p.456(2); p.457(3); p.462(8); p.466(12);  
RA16 p.138(2); p.152(16);  
RA17 p.352(4); p.354(6);  
RA18 p.157(4);  
RA20 p.354(2); p.356(4); p.357(5); p.359(7);  
RA21 p.411(1); p.412(2); p.413(3); p.417(7); p.420(10); p.421(11); p.424(14); p.427(17);  
RA22 p.70(1); p.71(2); p.81(12);  
RA23 p.387(2); p.389(4); p.390(5);  
RA24 p.492(6); p.494(8); p.497(11); p.498(12); p.499(13); p.501(15);  
RA25 p.467(2); p.478(13); p.480(15);  
RA26 p.79(1); p.87(9); p.88(10); p.90(12); p.92(14);  
RA27 p.181(2); p.183(4); p.191(12); p.198(19);  
RA28 p.168(12);  
RA29 p.914(1); p.915(2);  
RA30 p.466(2); p.485(21); p.489(25); p.490(26);  
RA31 p.219(2);  
RA32 p.21(5); p.24(8);  
RA33 p.641-2(1-2); p.664-5(24-5)b; p.666-7(26-7)b; p.667-9(27-9)b; p.670-1(30-1);  
 
 
                                                     
75 These IAC articles can be considered as papers which fall outside of the above categories. 
Although the analysts did not clearly draw the reality (what ideology it is) in their paper, their 
description still represents certain reality in which their interpretation of ‘what reality it is’ has led 
readers’ thinking.  
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5.6 Reality and Power 
In the previous section, this thesis has argued that through the process of describing the 
reality of researched phenomenon, the making of one ideology is revealed. Yet, the above 
statement neglects a critical point: it is only through the viewpoint of analysts that ideology 
could be recognized via such way (i.e., describing the researched phenomenon). On the 
contrary, to the public, everything in daily life represents the reality. To the public, so called 
reality indeed is the reality—or their consent or understanding of their life—which has 
nothing to do with the above statement: reality is the representation of ideology that guides 
their life and action. To the public, if ideology exists, whoever suffers from it or holds it 
without knowing will always be the ‘other’ instead of ‘us’. Namely, analysts sense the 
diverse styles of reality which contributes to the making of ideology while, to the public, 
reality is just the reality. 
The reason for pointing out the difference between analysts and the public here is to 
emphasize: only through the viewpoint of analysts can the reality, which contributes to the 
diverse representation of ideology, be described. Analysts are capable of distinguishing 
diverse realities because they have brought the concept of power into their analysis. 
Although reality, as one of three essential elements of ideology in this thesis’ presumption, is 
considered as being located in an objective position, intervention of power cannot be ignored 
when dealing with the topic of ideology. 
In the previous section, this thesis strived to purely and neutrally explain how reality is 
described in IAC articles; yet, the categorized four ways are still inevitably involved with 
power manipulation. Hence, this section will highlight the role of power to see how it 
influences the making of reality. Four types of reality resulting from the degree of power 
intervention are categorized. From low to strong intervention, they are: 1) objective, 2) 
presented, 3) constructed, and 4) hyper reality. 
Type I: The Objective Reality means that the factor of power does not become 
involved with the birth of reality at all. It could only be seen as a conceptual reality or a 
spiritual or real reality because it, essentially, cannot be presented by humans’ system of 
signification (e.g., oral languages, signs, gestures, etc.). It is an absolute reality that human 
beings can never recognize. 
Procedure 1: Identifying Essential Elements 
129 
Type II: The Presented Reality. In this thesis, it means the one which is close to the 
objective reality (but still unable to reach the realm). Even though some analysts of IAC 
articles seemingly objectively and purely describe their research, it is still impossible for 
them to analyse things without any intervention of their personal ideology. This is because 
even the apparently innocent words or structures of sentences, as well as the quotations or 
cited examples, all signify a certain angle of interpretation which is influenced by the 
invisible power intervention. Accordingly, the ways of describing the reality II76 and IV77
Type III: The Constructed Reality. Power here indeed works on the process of 
describing the reality. First, regarding the texts of articles only (and regardless of the 
subjectivities of analysts), IAC articles of this category usually attempt to tell readers ‘how 
power works on constructing humans consciousness’. Accordingly, Way I
, 
introduced in the previous section, belong to this category. IAC analysts who adopt Way II 
and Way IV try to stay in a neutral position to describe the reality of their research 
phenomenon. To compare, the degree of power intervention in Way II is more than that in 
Way IV. 
78 belongs to this 
category. Second, while the IAC analysts’ subjectivities directly show in their writings, they 
attempt to construct a reality to their readers. Way III79
Although the above three types of reality are displayed diversely, they are all the 
representation of ideology which is similar to the fact that even though steam, water, and ice 
have different formations, their chemical formula is the same, H2O. The degree of heat 
explains the diverse formation of H2O (i.e., steam, water, or ice) which is just like the degree 
of power influencing the representation of ideology (i.e., an objective, presented, or 
constructed reality).  
 is in this category. Analysts who 
adopt Way III often claim that the reality is not X but Y; in so doing, a new reality is 
constructed. Both Way I and Way III explain how power works on constructing a reality, 
whether it reflects the texts of IAC articles or reveals the IAC analysts’ subjectivities. 
                                                     
76 Way II: The IAC analysts simply illustrate the reality of their research; or objectively describe how 
a reality is presented. 
77 Way IV: How reality is described is not clearly explained by the IAC analysts. 
78 Way I: The IAC articles show what the constructed reality is. 
79 Way III: The IAC analysts arbitrarily or subjectively claim: the reality that their analyses have 
found is misrepresented; instead, the truth is… 
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Yet, what should be addressed here is that the different types of reality resulting from 
the degree of power intervention can only be distinguished through the viewpoint of analysts; 
this is because the factor of power is considered. In contrast, the public, to a great degree, are 
incapable of doing this. They do not have the ability, skill, or knowledge regarding ideology 
(e.g., aware of power factor) in order to distinguish the above diverse types of reality. To 
them, reality is the reality, or their consent, instead of ideology guiding their life and action. 
If ideology exists, the one who suffers from it or holds it without knowing will always be the 
‘other’ instead of ‘us’. Since the public is a group of people incapable of identifying the 
power of ideology, the influence is: the reality that they sense is much more ‘real’ than the 
reality per se.  
Accordingly, the fourth type of reality (based on the degree of power) is the Hyper 
Reality (Type IV) which is terminology appropriated from Baudrillard (1994). The 
hyper-reality particularly here refers to people who are incapable of perceiving power 
manipulation. To the public, the concept of power does not even exist in the way of their 
recognizing the reality; in their thought, there is no such specific group (i.e., Class notion) 
trying to maintain their hegemony either. While the power factor is considered to be 
inexistent by the public (even though it indeed exists and works), the reality they recognise 
becomes more ‘real’ than the reality per se.  
From the analysts’ perspective, this is a hyper-reality which indeed is what 
ideology-specialists called ‘the ideology’ that guides the public. Yet, ideology-specialists 
themselves also suffer from certain hyper-reality because there is always something that they 
do not know ‘they do not know’. That is why we call ideology, ‘ideology’. In short, to the 
public (in fact, even to ideology-specialists), the hyper-reality is the reality, their consent, or 
their way of understanding their life.  
To conclude, this section has focused on the role of power to see how it influences the 
making of reality. Four types of reality resulting from the degree of power intervention have 
been categorized. From low to strong intervention, they are: 1) objective, 2) presented, 3) 
constructed, and 4) hyper-reality. The first three are the reality that IAC analysts might 
discover while the last answers why ideology controls human beings without showing its 
existence. 
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5.7 Class and Reality—Discussion of Class Consciousness 
Theoretical Review  
When ideological analysis/critique examines the interaction between the elements of Class 
and reality, the discussion usually focuses on the topic of ‘class consciousness’. From a 
neutral and objective perspective, the concept of class consciousness simply represents the 
‘common thought’ of a group of people. However, while class consciousness is considered 
negatively, it means that the common thought that a group of people believe is falsely and 
purposely constructed by others. This group of people is incapable of perceiving their real 
condition, or their real class consciousness (cf. Lukacs, 1971). The problem is: once this 
group of people operate within such a false group consciousness, then what they have done 
is not for their own group interest; instead, all their efforts are to assist the other group of 
people, who possess more power than them, to maintain the other groups’ interests and 
dominance, or as Geuss (1981) described, the “functional and genetic properties” (p. 24). 
It could be said that almost all scholars who deal with the concept of class 
consciousness were particularly referring to a class consciousness which is veiled by another 
(false) consciousness, especially Marx and Lukacs.  
Marx thought that philosophers in the seventeenth century, on the surface, had 
developed their own philosophy, which finally contributed to knowledge bodies such as 
liberalism, utilitarianism and constructuralism (Parekh, 1982). In reality, to Marx, the 
knowledge they established was all constructed through the same logic which is based on 
certain social conditions of existence, so that the development of their philosophies was 
limited. The inner concept of knowledge has expressed nothing but the consciousness of the 
dominant class—the bourgeoisie—in their time, considering that all scholars are socially 
influenced yet fail to know their prejudices (Parekh, 1982).  
Marx and Engels (1970) claimed that “the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch 
the ruling ideas” (p. 64). In fact, intellectuals and their ideas are the representatives of the 
ruling class. They might not be the ruling class, but they are part of it (Boudon, 1989). This 
is also evidenced in Foucault’s (1991a) study of the prison, where he shared the same notion 
that intellectuals are the underclass of a ruling class. Diverse sets of knowledge such as 
liberalism and utilitarianism are products of the ruling class, and even criticism from 
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scholars, who are seen as helping people recognize injustices, is all made from the same 
ground. Hence, Marx took the angle of the proletarian to solve this dilemma80
Following Marx, Lenin’s (in Parekh, 1982) notion of class is the basic and critical 
detector to understand social reality. Compared to (petty-)bourgeois classes, who have to 
maintain their vested interests and are afraid of destabilising conflicts, the proletariat class 
has nothing to lose. To Lenin, the proletarians’ conditions of existence will eventually direct 
them to fight for the truth—seek their real interests, which so far have been exploited. Yet, 
Marx only called upon the proletariat to fight against those who possessed the means of 
production while Lenin reasserted the importance of being in a class struggle. It was not until 
Lukacs suggested the proletariat recognize their class consciousness, or awaken from the 
false class consciousness, that the possibility of reaching proletarians’ real interests became 
possible. 
. It is from the 
proletariat viewpoint (but not by proletarians themselves) that injustice and truth can clearly 
be seen (Boudon, 1989).  
To Lukacs (1971), the reality which represents each class’ consciousness is recognized 
differently. The bourgeoisie does not have to discover the truth because they (their class 
consciousness) represent the truth. On the contrary, to the proletariat, they must uncover the 
evil because the problem is not as Lenin envisioned—the proletariat class has nothing to 
lose—but a matter of vital importance. Although Lenin and Lukacs adopt different angles to 
see the situation of the proletarian, both believe that the proletarians’ viewpoint is the way to 
uncover the essence of capitalism which still follows Marx and Engels’ track.  
Moreover, Lukacs (1971) suggested, in order for the proletariat to awaken their class 
consciousness, they have to realize that they are situated in the condition of ‘class in itself’. 
This concept was originated from Kant’s notion ‘thing-in-itself’81
                                                     
80 As this thesis has discussed in the previous section 5.2 Class, Marx started his investigation from 
the position of political economy and concluded that the viewpoint of the proletariat is the best angle 
to understand capitalism. This angle could be seen as Marx’s (and Engels) standpoint of epistemology 
regarding roles of the proletarians.  
. Lukacs (1971) named 
Kant’s notion of thing-in-itself as the ‘first nature’ which signifies invisible concepts that 
81 In Kant (in Jones, 1977), there is a compass line to limit humans’ capacity of understanding the 
world, meaning that there are always some concepts which human beings are unable to make sense of 
for any sake. Kant named this field, which takes over the unperceivable concepts, “thing-in-itself” 
(p.14). By so doing, the concepts of object and subject are created. Conceptions will be classified to 
the field of ‘thing-in-itself’ as an object if humans cannot understand them. 
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humans do not understand and never will. Based on Kant’s notion, Lukacs (1971) elaborated 
to demonstrate that, in a reified world, humans cannot understand their visible creations 
because the identical relation between humans and their creations is split into a new 
relationship of subject and object. Lukacs defined this phenomenon as the ‘second nature’ in 
parallel to Kant’s notion of thing-in-itself (i.e., the first nature). Lukacs (1971) insisted that 
the subject and object should be in an identical relation and, can be identified. The 
thing-in-itself (the first nature) and the phenomenon of reification (the second nature) are just 
an unavoidable historical process at a certain point in human development. To him, objects 
are always understandable. Hence, the way to solve this problem is to create an identical 
subject-object or to reach the realm of totality82
Lukacs (1971) believed that the identical relationship would be approached only when 
proletarians realize their circumstances and turn their class position from ‘in themselves’ to 
‘for themselves’, through which class revolution will become possible. To Kant, the identical 
subject-object can be revealed thought art; to Hegel, it is not through art but history. Lukacs 
found the limitation of Hegel’s notion and extended the notion of history to class 
consciousness of the proletarian as discussed above (Lukacs, 1971, p. 142; Jones, 1977, p. 15; 
Eagleton, 2007, p. 98). That is to say, realizing that their class consciousness is a reified 
consciousness in the historical development, or veiled by a false (or other class’) 
consciousness, is the way for proletarians to escape the dominant ideology to recognize their 
real interests, ignoring that such a reified condition happens in the value or material 
dimension. 
 (Lukacs, 1971).  
To conclude, when the examining angle turns to Class and reality, the discussion in 
ideology theory mainly focuses on the debate of class consciousness. The concept of class 
consciousness could simply refer to the ‘common thought’ of a group when such a concept is 
viewed from a neutral dimension. Nevertheless, the concept of class consciousness is often 
seen to convey a negative meaning in ideology discussion. It implies that the sensible class 
consciousness which the oppressed class possess is a constructed one which is veiled by 
other (false) consciousness, so that the oppressed class is incapable of realizing their real 
class consciousness. Accordingly, what Lukacs meant by saying proletarian have to be aware 
                                                     
82 For Lukacs’ subject and object’ and ‘totality’, please refer to Chapter 9. 
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of their class consciousness is to realize their condition, which is veiled by a certain false 
consciousness offered by others. In so doing, they could retrieve their real class 
consciousness. Once they have done this, revolution becomes possible. 
Empirical Analysis 
The following empirical analysis reports will display both neutral and negative angles 
regarding the discussion of class consciousness in 33 IAC articles. What should be noted is 
that the following concept of ‘class’ refers to this thesis’ notion of Class not Marx’s class. 
For example, the ‘Class’ of RA15 refers to a ‘female teacher Class’ which is opposite to the 
‘male management Class’; or in RA19, it refers to a ‘readers Class’ which is formed by 
readers who love Rowling’s Harry Potter. 
First, the concept of Class consciousness maintains a neutral dimension which refers to 
the ‘common thought’ of a group of people. 
Example 5-23: The author of RA09 uses quantitative data (e.g., voting statistics) to 
show us where in the spectrum of political ideology (i.e., liberal, centrist, or conservative) 
these diverse factions (i.e., Traditional Democrats, New Democrats, Blue Dogs) of the 
Democrats party are located. The author simply presents what consciousness one faction 
holds without discussing the power operation or whether such a consciousness is right or 
wrong, good or bad for the people. Accordingly, the discussion of Class (faction) 
consciousness maintains a neutral dimension. 
Other IAC articles which reflect a neutral dimension of the concept of Class 
consciousness include RA09, RA16, RA26, and RA28. 
Second, the concept of Class consciousness refers to a consent which is (falsely) 
constructed by others’ consciousness. People in this group have to be aware of their 
condition to retrieve their real Class consciousness and interests. 
Example 5-24: RA15 applies history and quantitative data to explain how the value of 
man (and middle class) constructs the image (or the social roles) of female teachers (and 
working class). Such an image influences the public expectation of female teachers’ roles, 
their teaching contents, their wages as well as their Class (status) location. Thus, the Class 
consciousness which these female teachers have perceived, to the analyst of RA15, is not 
their real Class consciousness. 
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Other IAC articles which display a negative dimension of the concept of Class 
consciousness include RA15, RA19, RA20, RA21, RA24, and RA27. Uncategorized articles, 
which do not clearly involve the discussion of Class consciousness, are RA01 to RA08, 
RA10 to RA17, RA18, RA22, RA23, RA25, and RA29 to RA33. 
 
5.8 The Characteristic of Ideology 
This thesis argues that any discussion regarding the nature of ideology could be explained 
through the investigation of three essential elements of ideology—Class, power, and reality. 
So far, each element and their inter-relationship have been discussed. Related empirical 
analysis reports have also been provided. Nevertheless, it could be found that this thesis is 
unable to directly claim ‘what this concept means’ while dealing with concepts of dominant 
ideology and class consciousness. Instead, this thesis always has to consider the different 
dimension in which these concepts are discussed—i.e., whether it is through a 
neutral/positive or a negative dimension. This is because another topic in the ideology realm 
has not been dealt with yet, that is, the characteristic of ideology.  
The main argument regarding the characteristic of ideology rests on whether ideology 
per se, by nature, refers to a negative and critical, or a positive and neutral characteristic. 
McLellan (1995) suggests two trends to show the transformation of the characteristic. One 
trend originated in France while the other has German roots. 
In the French trend, Destutt de Tracy (followed by Durkheim, structuralist and 
empiricist) gave birth to the subject, idea-logy. He argued that “truth is correspondence with 
reality” (in McLellan, 1995, p. 8), in which humans are considered capable of recognizing 
the nature of science. Thus, to de Tracy, ways of looking for the truth is based on the 
physical sciences83
Yet, due to the unfinished business between Napoleon Bonaparte and de Tracy (to be 
discussed later), Napoleon started to label de Tracy and his followers as ideologues; 
. Ideology, from de Tracy’s perspective, is ‘positive and progressive’ and 
retains a neutral characteristic here.  
                                                     
83 To de Tracy, the concept of ‘idea-logy’ involved two characters, materialism and evolutionism. 
The former means that idea-logy is stimulated by human’s material activities, such as oral language, 
written language, personal gesture et cetera. Ideology is not created by invisible spirits or mystery. 
The evolutionism depicts a world: by studying in idea-logy, humans could improve their social and 
political condition in order to perfect the living environment (Baradat, 1997).  
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condemning that their ‘idea-logy’ study only focused on the ‘first causes’ and neglected the 
law and religious matters. Napoleon claimed that “this cloudy metaphysics […] attribute all 
the misfortunes of our fair France” (Barth, 1977, p.27 in McLellan, 1995, p.5). It is agreed 
that since Napoleon’s power intervened in academia, the way of seeing ideology has changed. 
The characteristic of ideology is now seen negatively. 
In the German trend, Hegel and Marx (via Mannheim and Habermas) started to focus 
rather on the “making of truth than on empirical observation” (in McLellan, 1995, p. 8). 
While de Tracy’s ‘physical science’ method is to empirically observe things to seek for truth, 
to Marx, truth is defined by specific social groups which are not the neutral expression of 
ideas but ideology. Ideology, to Marx, is seen as “illusory ideas, false ideas […] 
class-conditioned thought, unfounded ideas […], and a body of justificatory beliefs” (in 
Parekh, 1982, Introduction).  
Usually, Marx was considered to have a negative meaning of ideology. McLellan (1995) 
concluded two reasons. First, Marx adopted the angle of materialism to criticise and replace 
idealism (applied by Hegelians) in which ideology is the result associated with idealism. 
Second, Marx often described ideology as an “uneven distribution of resources and power” 
(ibid., p. 9). These two reasons have invisibly led later scholars to consider Marx as 
possessing a negative perspective of ideology.  
In fact, Marx described ideology in a neutral way as well.  In the Preface to A 
Contribution of the Critique of Political Economy, Marx (1971) explained that ideological 
forms are the result (reflection) of economic conditions of production, in which ideology did 
not refer to power, but only described a parallel relationship at the economic level.  
It is reasonable to say that such diverse angles regarding the characteristic of ideology 
resulted from the different historical background or relation of power that de Tracy, 
Napoleon, or Marx situated. There is not much contest to disagree that the characteristic of 
ideology could be neutral. Yet, since Marx is seen to identify ideology with a negative 
characteristic (even though he described ideology positively, too) and since his words always 
felt so wrong as well as so right, as a result, an expeditionary army regarding the 
characteristic of ideology allied and started their exploration. 
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Both Lenin and Lukacs despised the negative meaning/characteristic of ideology 
(Bottomore, 1983). To Lenin, ideology often referred to a specific consciousness of the 
dominant class, given that its members usually possess more power than the members of the 
dominated class; this current dominant consciousness might also be criticised/replaced by 
other consciousness (different political positions) somewhere in time. So, to Lenin, ideology 
is the expression of particular political ideas of diverse classes (Bottomore, 1983; Larrain, 
1988). Lukacs shared the same idea with Lenin: that both the bourgeoisie and proletariat 
classes have their own ideologies. Yet, different from Lenin, he suggested that it is not 
because the former possess more power than the latter but because the latter is reified 
(Bottomore, 1983). Namely, to Lenin and Lukacs, ideology itself has nothing to do with 
negative meanings; rather it is the expression of class consciousness.  
To Gramsci, the negative meaning of ideology is also possible while it is under certain 
social structures. If people consider that ideology only contains a negative meaning, to 
Gramsci, they simplify the way to recognize ideologies (McLellan, 1995). Habermas (in 
Geuss, 1981) suggested that ideology is a term about describing a thing. To answer ‘what 
this ideology is’ is to ask what this ideology refers to. If it refers to religion, for example, 
then it is a religious ideology. Ideology is the description of the things that people try to 
understand. From Habermas’ stance, ideology possesses a neutral characteristic. 
Later scholars such as Geuss (1981) and Thompson (1990), separately, provided their 
own system to explain the diverse characteristics of ideology. Geuss (1981) concluded on the 
descriptive, pejorative and positive senses of ideology. Ideology in the descriptive sense 
refers to a broad and pure anthropological perspective, from which ideology is understood to 
contain both discursive (concepts, ideas, beliefs) and non-discursive (gestures, rituals, 
attitudes) elements. That is to say, ideology is the description of concepts, beliefs, gestures or 
attitudes.84 Next, a pejorative (or critical) meaning of ideology implies that some people in a 
society are deceived, in that they cannot truly see the condition and power relations where 
they are situated.85
                                                     
84 Geuss (1981) claimed the classification of discursive and non-discursive elements here has nothing 
to do with explicit or implicit, but is related to the extent of sophistication in describing a thing. 
 The final meaning of ideology is with a positive sense that contains an 
85 Geuss (1981) explained this pejorative meaning at length through three angles. First, it has an 
epistemic purpose. Its purpose is to make people think the way this ideology wants them to think, or to 
transform a particular belief into a general belief to all citizens. Second, it has a functional purpose. Its 
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active meaning. Ideology here does not refer to something to be discovered, but something to 
be pursued or created, that people are able to use to “satisfy their wants and needs and 
further their interests” (p. 22). 
Moreover, Thompson (1990) simply concluded that the characteristics of ideology 
belong to either a descriptive definition or a prescriptive definition. The former is a 
delineation of reality without power intervening; while the latter is the product of power. A 
descriptive definition of ideology contains a neutral conception in which ideology is seen as 
“‘systems of thought’, ‘systems of belief’ or ‘symbolic systems’” (p.5); in fact, it may be 
seen as all sorts of “x-isms”. Thus, this conception is made without any judgement, 
misleading or illusory—it represents the reality or knowledge of a certain social life.86
 
 When 
a descriptive meaning of ideology is evaluated by power, it becomes a prescriptive definition 
in which the reality of ideology is abused depending on how one camp appropriates a 
specific intention to serve its interests. The prescriptive meaning of ideology is often 
presented as negative, pejorative, critical and one-sided, such that the word ‘ideological’ 
from this angle is usually linked with conspiratorial purposes or painted as supporting a 
specific dominant power (Thompson, 1990). 
Table 5-5: Diverse Distinction of the Characteristic of Ideology 
Main Char. & 
Representatives 
Positive or Neutral  Negative or Critical 
de Tracy, Lenin 
Lukacs (rejects negative meaning) 
Marx (neutral meaning) 
Napoleon, Marx  
Gramsci (Negative is possible) 
Similar Ideas &  
Advocators 
Descriptive  Prescriptive 
Habermas, Thompson Thompson 
Positive Descriptive Pejorative 
Geuss Geuss Geuss 
 
To conclude, Table 5-5 shows the diverse perspectives of seeing the characteristic of 
ideology. As discussion and classification continues, today most scholars agree that the 
                                                                                                                                                      
purpose is to support and stabilize the vested institutions, and to mask and hinder social controversy. 
Third, it creates a genetic reason, in that it tells the history of this consciousness (ideology) to make 
people accept the truth.  
86 However, frankly speaking, although ‘x-isms’, which are also defined as ideologies, seem to  
present a neutral description, some ‘x-isms’ are typically characterized by one camp as having a 
threatening meaning in order to demonize the other camp, e.g., capitalism versus communism during 
the Cold War (Freeden, 2003).  
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nature of ideology possesses a neutral characteristic. However, why does ideology, in many 
cases of research, seem to represent a negative meaning? The answer is power, that is, what 
angle of power analysts adopt. How do they describe the power operation? The factor of 
power makes a discussion of ideology be seen negatively. In the 33 IAC articles, although 
there are no analysts who are found to regard ideology with a negative characteristic, the 
angle of power these analysts adopted indeed has influenced their analyses, whereby the way 
they describe relative phenomena (e.g., dominant ideology of a regime) might be felt 
negatively. What has to be noticed is that the characteristic of ideology by nature is not 
negative. Instead, ideology is a channel where its characteristic might be seen negatively 
only when it is presented to be so which is also based on the dimension of power that the 
analysts possess.  
The following Table 5-6 shows the abstract of the three essential emblems—Class, 
reality, and power—and their relationship with a consideration of both neutral and negative 
dimensions.  
 
Table 5-6: Discussions with the Consideration of Characteristic of Ideology 
 The Characteristic of Ideology the Analysts Possess 
Positive or Neutral Negative or Critical 
Class 
Two Classes with a negotiating, 
compromising relationship. 
With a competing, oppositional relationship. 
Power 
To purely describe how power works 
between A and B, e.g., dominant, 
negotiating, compromising, or resistant. 
Power operation is shown as a tool to 
construct a certain idea from A to B on 
purpose. 
Reality 
To purely present the reality of the 
researched phenomenon. 
To emphasize that reality is a constructed one 
which does not present the truth. 
Class & 
power 
Simply refers to a prevailing ideology 
in a society. E.g., “Obeying the law is 
the obligation of citizens”. 
By applying power, a constructed dominant 
ideology could help a certain group to 
maintain its interests which might damage 
others. E.g., the dominant ideology of 
“obeying the law is the obligation of citizens” 
helps to maintain social order which mostly 
benefits those vested groups and their 
interests. 
Class & 
reality 
Refers to a ‘common thought’ of a 
group of people. E.g., Worldview of 
people who live in North Korea. 
Discussion usually attempts to claim that an 
oppressed group has to be aware of their 
(false) Class consciousness to reach their real 
interests. E.g., People of North Korea have to 
realize their condition to retrieve their real 
Class consciousness and interests. 
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Power & 
reality 
When power works on reality, it is 
always hard to maintain a positive or 
neutral result. 
Instead, it usually refers to a false 
consciousness which is constructed for a 
purpose. E.g., People who live in North 
Korea believe that their leader was born with 
God’s will to guide them. 
 
 
5.9 Class, Power and Reality—Hegemony Theory 
In the previous section, this thesis discussed the diverse angles of classifying the 
characteristic of ideology, and suggested that the angle of power that the analysts adopt (and 
the way they describe it) is the key reason to generate such a debate. Since power plays such 
a critical role in recognizing ideology, then a flexible concept of power is important, 
especially when all three elements are simultaneously considered in order to ultimately 
outline ideology.  
Gramsci’s hegemony theory is a suitable concept to delineate the relationship between 
the three essential elements (i.e., Class, power, and reality) of ideology. His attitude 
regarding power, compared to others such as Marx and Althusser, seems to stay in a 
relatively flexible and neutral position (yet, inferior to Foucault).  
When most people think of Gramsci’s hegemony theory, they read this theory with an 
understanding close to the concept of ‘dominant ideology’. Such an understanding reflects a 
stronger entanglement with power which is unidirectional and arbitrary. Nevertheless, 
drawing on Gramsci, the term hegemony should be more about “a process of struggle” 
(Ransome, 1992, p. 132). The concept of power in his world is not fixed and controlled; 
instead, it contains flexible and various dimensions such as dominant, negotiable, resistant, 
and compromising angles. Accordingly, his concept of hegemony grants ideology theory the 
possibility of alternation.87
Gramsci was influenced by Lenin. Yet, in contrast to Lenin, who saw “political 
hegemony” as the only way of controlling a country, Gramsci thought that having only 
 
                                                     
87 Nevertheless, the shortfall is that his notion was, as Salamini (1974) claimed, “elaborated in a 
specific Italian intellectual climate” (p. 360). Namely, the meaning of hegemony that people recognize 
today was, as Durham and Kellner suggested (2001), a demonstration of Gramsci’s prison letters in 
which he described why and how fascism could replace the “liberal bourgeois regime” in Italy (p. 33). 
Although the theory is unavoidably limited, it is Gramsci who defined the word ‘hegemony’ and 
provided “new ways of thinking about revolutionary politics and specifies a whole set of priorities” 
(Boggs, 1976, p. 20). 
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“domination” power does not guarantee a permanent regime. He offered the concept of 
“ideological hegemony” (Salamini, 1974, p. 368). Gramsci (1971) specified the notion of 
‘civil society’, which comes close to Althusser’s notion of ISAs, to explain how ideological 
power influences people. To Gramsci, although violent power is required to control a state, it 
is not enough. A government cannot always force people to accept policies by using armed 
force. Instead, he suggested that the ruling class must develop “consent,” identified by the 
majority of citizens (Ransome, 1992, p. 135; Femia, 1981, p. 42).  
Yet, achieving this ‘consent’ by the ruling class does not mean that the society will be 
stable and without struggle. Gramsci’s (1971) most important notion was that consensus is 
not controlled by a specific group; on the contrary, every social group has opportunities to 
compete for it. Any group can offer a totally different idea, even if the idea runs counter to 
the current dominant consensus. To Gramsci, ideology should be a battlefield in which all 
ideas, voices, and forces fight for their own territories and leadership in order to compete for 
consent (Gramsci, 1971)—in Gramsci’s own words, to fight for the “intellectual and moral 
leadership” (p. 57).  
That is to say, a dominant ideology is not born with and given to a ruling class; rather, a 
dominant ideology is the winner of that negotiation and competition. Again, his hegemony 
theory implies his position of possessing a flexible notion of power; it could be a dominant, 
negotiable, resistant, or compromising style of power operation. Based on such a viewpoint 
of power, his hegemony perspective provides the notion of ideology with a new analytical 
angle in which ideology is always within “a process of struggle” (Ransome, 1992, p. 132). 
 Consequently, by adopting three essential elements of ideology (Class, power and 
reality) to delineate Gramsci’s hegemony theory, it could be briefly described as: diverse 
groups (Classes) are fighting for leadership (via diverse style of power operation) to create 
their particular ideological hegemony (i.e., consent, diverse types of reality). Once one group 
creates a hegemony (Class and reality relations), they have to maintain it (Class and power 
relations). This process of maintaining simultaneously (re)produces the relations of 
production (power and reality relations) that empower the dominance of this hegemony. 
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5.10 Conclusion: Unfinished Business between de Tracy and Napoleon 
This thesis has investigated 33 IAC articles to testify whether standard writing procedures 
exist. Six procedures are concluded. This chapter has mainly focused on the first procedure, 
which is to identify essential elements of ideology (i.e., the researched phenomenon), 
including three essential elements, Class, power, and reality. These three elements and their 
interaction together delineate one ideology. In other words, investigating these three essential 
elements and their relationship explains what the nature of ideology it is.  
 This chapter has introduced the related ideology literature through the dimensions of 
Class, power, reality, and their relationship. Relative examples found in 33 IAC articles have 
also been provided. Applying the ‘Class, power, reality’ dimension to explain the nature of 
ideology is not new, as this dimension existed in de Tracy’s time when the term ideology was 
coined.  
Thus, this section will tell a story about the unfinished business between Napoleon and 
de Tracy to test the ‘Class, power, reality’ dimension (i.e., procedure 1: identifying essential 
elements) in understanding ideology. It is this chapter’s conclusion yet, could also be seen as 
its introduction. Not surprisingly, any discussion of ideology per se is a loop; the 
introduction is the conclusion, the conclusion, the introduction. 
Unfinished Business between de Tracy and Napoleon  
Although John Plamenatz (1970) offered the term ideology a different origination, most 
ideology researchers consider that this terminology was created by Destutt de Tracy. He 
named it “idea-logy” (McLellan, 1995, p.5). De Tracy, a French philosopher, had a 
complicated, unfinished business with the famous emperor, Napoleon Bonaparte. Despite the 
varying meanings of ideology pointed out by researchers from one generation to another, it 
can be confidently claimed that, if we return to examine the relationship between de Tracy 
and Napoleon, all questions regarding discussions of ideology can be found. 
With Napoleon’s help, de Tracy created a science subject, idea-logy, which focused on 
the ground, the origin, the nature and the essence of humans’ ideas (McLellan, 1995; Freeden, 
2003; Eagleton, 2007). To de Tracy, ideas can be found empirically (Freeden, 2003) through 
the “physical sensations” (McLellan, 1995, p.5). He wished that researchers could dismiss 
their own stereotype and short-sighted views to deal with a rigorous analysis of human ideas. 
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It is reasonable to say that idea-logy possessed an energetic meaning at this moment, that is, 
ideology maintained a positive, or at least, a neutral position.  
As previously set out, these French men had unfinished business. De Tracy received his 
sponsorship from Napoleon, but Napoleon was also the one who kicked away the ladder. A 
strong empire requires many elements to maintain its power; in Napoleon’s case, it was 
mainly a religious element. Nevertheless, his close relationship with religion received much 
critique from de Tracy and his followers. Based on an unbalanced relationship of power, the 
latter was defeated by Napoleon easily. Napoleon claimed that “this cloudy metaphysics 
[will…] attribute all the misfortunes of our fair France” (Barth, 1977, p.27 in McLellan, 
1995, p.5). Napoleon also promoted law and history to a higher position which, to him, could 
maintain France’s honour (McLellan, 1995). The winner rules, while the loser is ruled. 
Napoleon demonstrated the notion of ideological hegemony. Most researchers reported that 
the notion of ideology started to convey a negative meaning from then on.  
Applying to the statement of this thesis, the concepts of ideology such as ‘dominant 
ideology’ (e.g., here, religion) and ‘dominant Class’ (e.g., Napoleon and his courtiers) 
surpassing the oppressed Class (e.g., de Tracy and his fellows) and their opinions (e.g., new 
subject idea-logy) are revealed here. With Napoleon’s dominant position he could twist an 
idea easily, which refers to the notion of power operation. With Napoleon’s (unbalanced) 
relationship with de Tracy displays the concept of ‘competing Classes’. Moreover, his words 
of ‘cloudy metaphysics’ and ‘misfortunes of our fair France (emphasis added)’ also 
indirectly implied the discussion about whether ideology is ‘false consciousness’. This true 
or false consciousness also points to the origin of such a discussion, that is, how reality is 
described. 
 To conclude, this thesis applies the story of de Tracy and Napoleon to demonstrate that 
identifying ideology’s three composing elements, Class, power, reality, and their relationship 
(i.e., the first procedure of SWP) is a means to understanding the structure, feature, and even 
the nature of the researched phenomenon. While identifying these essential elements of 
research phenomenon, it is able to reveal the nature of such ideology (phenomenon) which is 
also the foundation work to analyse or criticise this ideology (phenomenon). 
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Chapter 6 
 
Procedure 2: Applying Theoretical Foundations 
— The Making of Ideology 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The first procedure of SWPs introduced in the previous chapter is to identify essential 
elements of a researched phenomenon. This is a procedure to understand the nature of the 
researched phenomenon which is composed of three essential elements: Class, power, and 
reality. These three elements and their interaction together delineate an ideology, which 
forms analysts’ initial motivation and their presumed standpoints that might have affected the 
conclusion drawn through the analysis.  
It might be argued that although the nature of researched phenomenon might be similar, 
ideological analysis/critique should be unique from one case to another once their practical 
and detailed writing texts are considered. Yet, this thesis argues there are still some common 
features among these seemingly diverse ideological analyses. Even the apparently unique 
writings still reveal certain commonalities, which are the foundation that this thesis inducted 
to SWPs. 
If the first procedure (identifying essential elements) is to study the nature of the 
researched phenomenon, then the following five procedures could be seen as ways to 
investigate how/why such a phenomenon conveys a certain ideology or can be seen as an 
ideology, that is, to understand the making of ideology. These procedures will be introduced in 
the following chapters, including procedures of 2) applying theoretical foundations, 3) 
connoting certain meanings, 4) illustrating (incl. articulating and interpellating), 5) selecting 
expression styles, and 6) revealing personal viewpoints. 
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Procedure 2: Applying Theoretical Foundations  
Although the IAC analysts’ academic background is different and the subjects they 
investigate are diverse, many similarities among these 33 IAC articles can be found, 
including the application of theories which, to a great degree, could influence the structure, 
writing trend, argument, or even the conclusion of an IAC article. 
Therefore, understanding the theoretical foundation adopted by IAC analysts in their 
articles will help to comprehend the ideology of the researched phenomenon that they have 
tried to present/construct, or convince us to believe. This thesis has inducted 33 IAC analysts’ 
common application of ideology theories into five theoretical foundations (or analytical 
pathways). They are: 1) Marx’s, 2) Althusser’s, 3) Gramscian, 4) historical descriptive, and 5) 
semiotic analytical pathways. 
Whilst five pathways have been inducted, this does not mean that IAC analysts only 
adopt one pathway to analyse their research, nor does it mean that methods of analysing 
ideology are limited to these five dimensions. Works of ideological analysis or critique are 
various and abundant. The following discussion will gradually introduce these five analytical 
pathways. Related theoretical review will be provided first, and followed by offering the 
results from empirical analysis. Moreover, since establishing a methodology for ideological 
analysis/critique is also an aim of this thesis, how to apply these theoretical foundations (or 
analytical pathways) will be suggested as well. 
 
6.2 Marx’s Analytical Pathway 
Theoretical Review 
Although de Tracy set up the term idea-logy, the initial discussion of ideology stemmed from 
Marx’s related discourses. To understand Marx’s perspective on ideology, or to understand 
how he explained the relationship between humans’ activity and their corresponding 
consciousness, all discussions have to return to his critique on political economy. Marx 
(1971) wrote,  
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In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite 
relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production 
appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of 
production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic 
structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political 
superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The 
mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, 
political and intellectual life. (pp. 20-21) 
By studying political economy, Marx explained the concepts of material productive forces, 
means of production, and the relations of production together with how capital defines 
economic activities. These conceptual discussions together comprise what he claimed to be 
the economic base-structure. Another concept based on this base-structure is what Marx 
named the political superstructure. Regarding the relationship between these two structures, 
Marx argued that following the development of capitalism, an inevitable clash between the 
productive forces and the relations of production would lead to the alteration of the 
base-structure, which, simultaneously, would also induce the adjustment of the 
superstructure. In other words, the superstructure is an inevitable corollary of the 
base-structure; or say, the economic base-structure directly determines the superstructure. 
Marx’s demonstrative logic is reflected in his words, “It is not the consciousness of men that 
determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness” (p. 
21).  
 What should be noted here is that Marx’s attitude regarding this gradually 
conceptualizing notion of ideology so far has not referred to a concept with negative 
meaning or capability (e.g., distortion). Marx just simply explained how economic factors 
determine humans’ thoughts without judgement. 
To Marx, the alteration which happens in the economic base-structure is observable and 
which could be found through natural science evidence. Differently, the form of alteration 
that most concerned him was “the legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophic — in short, 
ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out” (p. 21). 
That is to say, what human beings should be most worried about are those ideological 
forms which attempt to pretend that everything is going well. Accordingly, the question 
arises of how to appraise whether these ideological forms are beneficial or harmful to people, 
and most importantly, who can determine this? Capitalists, the governors, educators, or…? 
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Marx (1971) answered,  
Just as one does not judge an individual by what he thinks about himself, so one 
cannot judge such a period of transformation by its consciousness,  
but, on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained from the contradictions of 
material life, from the conflict existing between the social forces of production and 
the relations of production. (p. 21) 
The first quotation implies his critique on the idealism which is demonstrated in his books 
The Holy Family and The Germany Ideology 88
As a result, if the economic base-structure plays such an important role, then a new 
question emerges: who controls the base-structure? Or, who controls those ideological forms 
which indeed results from the alteration of the base-structure? Above questions or the 
question of how and why ideology is created, could find answers in Marx and Engels’ (1970) 
book The German Ideology where Marx described the function of ideology, albeit through 
abstract concepts, as 
. The second quotation refers to his 
methodology of dialectical materialism. Drawing on Marx (1971), whether those ideological 
forms are beneficial or harmful is impossible to examine through idealism since it would be 
adopting one side’s consciousness to judge/evaluate consciousness of the other side. Instead, 
the alteration in the economic base-structure is the pivot to be scrutinized which echoes 
Marx’s perspective: humans’ social existence determines their consciousness.  
The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which 
is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. 
(p. 64, emphasis original) 
These words reveal his concern about who controls the relations of production, or, who are 
dominated. This concern initiated his investigation into the inequality which resulted from 
unbalanced power relations. As the notion of power is considered, the study of (false) 
consciousness which is offered/constructed by certain groups to influence/control other 
groups become one of the key points to understand Marx’s ideology concepts. Marx’s 
contribution conceptualizing the notion of ideology is that he has found a competing 
relationship between diverse classes (i.e., the bourgeoisie and the proletariat). This also 
resulted in other discussions of social phenomenon such as alienation and fetishism. 
                                                     
88 For his critique on Holy Family’s idealism, please refer to Chapter 5. 
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Marx’s concept of ideology derived from his investigation on the unbalanced power 
relation between two classes. The ingredients of his ideology theory included concepts such 
as division of labour, relation of production, base/superstructure, false-consciousness, 
alienation, class struggle, which were all introduced in the previous chapter. While an IAC 
article adopts these concepts to explain its researched phenomenon, it could be said that such 
an article applies to Marx’s analytical pathway (or the Marxist form of ideological 
analysis/critique) which could be abstracted as follows: 
MaWhoever controls the relation of production (base-structure) 
Mbcontrols the power of interpretation (superstructure).  
McThis “who” is capable of creating (false) consciousness (to Marx, the ‘who’ is the 
dominant class). 
MdWhile the dominated group lives under this (false) consciousness, 
Meit also suffers from four types of alienated condition. 
MfAs a result, they are unable to freely perform their free will to reach the destination of 
being objectification. 
MgIn order to remove the (false) consciousness, the dominated group has to sense this 
oppressed condition, to jump from class-in-itself to class-for-itself. 
Empirical Analysis 
The previous section first explained the birth of Marx’s concept of ideology, then revealed 
Marx’s consistent argument—the competing relationship between diverse classes. His 
concepts have been utilized to establish what this thesis calls Marx’s analytical pathway. Of 
course, this pathway could be extended. Here, RA02 is taken as an example to explain how 
Marx’s pathway was applied in practical analysis. 
 Example 6-1: RA02 considers how the UK media misrepresents Islam where Islam is 
stigmatized through a violent, irrational, and radical image. The application of Marx’s 
analytical pathway in RA02 could be drawn as follows: 
MaThe access right of media (newspapers) in the UK is mainly controlled by white 
English people. 
MbHence, they also control the power to define Islam and Muslims. 
McThey created a stigmatized image of Islam and Muslims 
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Mesuch that the Islamic immigrants who live in the UK cannot determine who they are 
and they have become alienated from themselves. 
 
Most IAC articles which were examined in this thesis did not simply adopt a particular set of 
ideology concepts (e.g., only Marx’s) to demonstrate their arguments. Due to the diverse 
research cases, the concepts adopted by IAC analysts depend on the arguments that IAC 
analysts make. Thus, Example 6-1 only shows how Marx’s pathway was applied to RA02 
with a holistic perspective. It does not mean that RA02 only adopts Marx’s concept of 
ideology to compose its discourse; other analytical pathways (e.g., Althusser’s, Gramscian, 
etc.) could also be found in RA02.  
To provide a better understanding of how Marx’s analytical pathway was applied, Table 
6-1 is a reference list showing the application of Marx’s analytical pathway in the 33 IAC 
articles. The original IAC articles could be found in the disk attached in Appendix 1. 
 
Table 6-1: Reference of IAC Articles Which Apply Marx’s Analytical Pathway 
SWPs Code: P2-M (Marx’s Analytical Pathway) 
Articles Found References/Examples 
RA01 p.166(2); p.172(8) 
RA02 p.247(3)c; p.248(4)a,b; p.249(5)a,b; p.253(9)c;  
RA03 p.143(7);  
RA05 p.3(1); p.4(2); p.12(10); p.13(11);  
RA06 p.445(1)a,b; p.446(2); p.448(4)a,b; p.450(6)a,b,c; p.456(12); p.457(13)a,b;  
RA07 p.107(1); p.108(2)c; p.109(3); p.110(4)c; p.113(7); p.114(8); p.116(10);  
RA08 p.261(1)a,b; p.264(4)b,c;  
RA10 p.419(3); p.424(8); p.427(11)c;  
RA11 p.101(3); p.105(7); p.107(9); p.108(10);  
RA12 p.1025(1)a,b; p.1026(2)c; p.1029(5);  
RA13 p.287(9)c;  
RA14 p.100(1)c,d; p.101(2)c,d; p.102(3)c; p.103(4)a,b,c; p.105(6)c.d; p.106(7);  
RA15 p.455(1); p.456(2); p.457(3); p.462(8); p.465(11); p.467(13); p.468(14); p.469(15);  
RA16 p.138(2)a,b; p.139(3);  
RA20 p.354(2)a,b,c; p.355(3)a,b; p.356(4); p.357(5)a,b; p.358(6)a,b; p.361(9)a,b; p.362(10); p.364(12); p.366(14)c; p.367(15)f;  
RA21 p.412(2)c; p.413(3)c; p.415(5); p.416(6); p.421(11); p.423(13)c; p.425(15); p.427(17)c;  
RA22 p.70(1)c,f; p.71(2); p.73(4)c; p.74(5)c; p.75(6)c; p.76(7)b; p.77(8); p.78(9); p.79(10); p.80(11);  
RA23 p.387(2); p.388(3); p.390(5)c; p.394(9); p.395(10)c; p.396(11)a,b,c;  
RA24 p.487(1)c; p.489(3); p.490(4); p.491(5); p.494(8)a,b; p.495(9); p.496(10); p.498(12)c;  
RA25 p.470-1(5-6); p.478(13)a,b;  
RA27 p.181(2)a,b; p.182(3)a,b,c; p.186(7)a,b,c; p.187(8)c; p.190(11); p.191(12)c; p.192(13); p.197(18)c; p.198(19)a,b; p.198(19); p.199(20)c;  
RA28 p.161(5); p.163(7); p.164(8); p.170(14)c; p.171(15); p.172(16); p.173(17); p.179(23);  
RA29 p.915(2); p.918(5); p.919(6); p.920(7); p.925-6(12-13);  
RA30 p.466(2); p.467(3); p.469(5)c; p.471(7); p.472(8); p.473(9); p.479(15)c; p.480(16)c; p.481(17); p.482(18)c; p.483(19)c; p.485(21); p.486(22); p.488(24); p.489(25)a,b,c; p.490(26)a,b;  
RA31 p.219(2)c; p.223(6); p.226(9)c; p.228(11)c; p.229(12)c; p.230(13); p.231(14)c; p.232(15); p.233(16); p.240(23); p.241(24);  
RA32 p.18(2); p.20(4); p.24(8); p.26(10)d;  
RA33 p.650(10)b; p.652(12); p.653(13); p.655(15)a.b; p.656(16); p.658(18)b,c; p.661(21)c,d; p.662(22)d; p.670(30)b,c;  
Concepts a: Base-structure); b: super-structure; c: (false)-consciousness; d: alienation. 
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Application of Marx’s Analytical Pathway 
The above discussion has just described how Marx’s concepts of ideology were applied in 
IAC articles. The following Table 6-2 is a suggestion for future IAC analysts to apply Marx’s 
way of analysing ideology. It explains that if the methodology of ideological 
analysis/critique could be established, as suggested in Chapter 4, then this table (6-2) 
explains how future IAC analysts, and under what conditions, might apply Marx’s concepts 
in their writings. Establishing a set of procedures (i.e., methodology) for ideological 
analysis/critique is an ambition of this thesis although not its primary focus. Thus, the 
following table can only provide a brief explanation based on the concepts mentioned above. 
It does not refer to Marx’s entire concept of ideology. 
 
Table 6-2: Application of Marx’s Analytical Pathway 
Concept of Ideology The Applicable Condition 
Class Struggle* 
When the primary research subjects and other subjects are within 
a mutually competitive relationship (i.e., competition for power, 
rights and interests, authority to interpret, rights to control…etc.), 
the concept of Class Struggle can be adopted to describe the 
opposing relation between the two. 
Base/ 
Superstructure 
When the research topic implies how a vested group takes 
advantage of its economic predominance (here, it does not merely 
refer to money but also to the relation of production) by utilizing 
the mechanism of superstructure (e.g., education, religion) to gain 
the authority to define something, analysts could apply notions of 
base-structure and super-structure to acquire a theoretical support. 
Alienation 
When analysts try to describe how human beings lose their 
identification of themselves or their relationships and linkage to 
their achievements, the concepts of alienation can be applied, e.g., 
when they feel no connection with their own identity, their 
co-workers, their work results and the working environment. 
Class-in-itself/ 
Class-for-itself* 
This concept is often adopted to provide utopian advice about 
what research subjects should do in order to remove the bondage, 
namely that the oppressed group needs to realize their living 
condition as jumping from class-in-itself to class-for-itself. 
*The term Class here refers to this thesis’ extended concept of a competing relationship 
between diverse groups. 
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6.3 Althusser’s Analytical Pathway 
Althusser’s contribution to ideology is that his notions make the ideology visible and 
analysable which is what Marx lacks. The notion of ideology in Marx is an abstract concept 
that simply exists; no one can answer why it exists. Conversely, Althusser tells people how 
and why ideology comes into existence. His notion provides an analytical dimension to 
concretize the process of ideological analysis instead of simply referring one phenomenon to 
an ideology. In short, his focus is on how ideology is formed. 
Althusser argued that “ideology has a material existence” (1971, p. 165) which is the 
foundational concept to understand how ideology is formed. His other interpretations 
regarding ideology include “the individual is interpellated [by ideology] as a subject” (p. 
182), “ideology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions 
of existence” (p. 162), and ideology is to “[reproduce] the relations of production” (p. 148). 
All concepts help to establish his viewpoint of ideology. 
Theoretical Review 
The concept of “ideology has a material existence” indicates that ideology is no longer an 
abstract concept. It is born neither from nothing nor from a simple spirit or thought. Instead, 
it lives in human beings’ daily practice. People usually consider ‘thought’ as abstract 
nothingness; yet, even the ‘thinking process’ in humans’ brain has a material existence 
(Freeden, 2003). Mankind cannot generate anything without referring to the concepts which 
they have already known, as Wittgenstein (2003) claimed, “whereof one cannot speak 
thereof one must be silent” (p. 3). Hence, visible written works, images, human gestures, 
invisible thoughts, and oral language all possess materiality, which is the framework of 
ideology. Similarly, whether to criticise/analyse an ideology or to write IAC articles, analysts 
cannot avoid using the signs (i.e., written language) because all phenomena, which analysts 
are capable of perceiving, recognising, understanding and further presenting to readers, can 
only be expressed via material semiotic elements.  
Besides, if the concept, ‘ideology has a material existence’, means what constructs 
ideology, then Althusser’s other concept, interpellation, refers to how such ideology prevails 
or maintains itself. To Althusser (1971), the making of an ideology does not generate from 
nothing but requires a process of what he called interpellation, which is operated by the 
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Ideological State Apparatus (ISAs89
However, a man proposing to a woman does not mean that the latter has to accept the 
proposal. This situation suggests that in an interpellation process, responses from individuals 
are a critical requirement. “[A]nswering the call”, as Althusser (1971, p. 170) described, is 
the way to undertake the making of an ideology, meaning that only when the woman says 
“yes”, is this proposal (referring to: a marriage, a serious relationship, a responsibility—in 
sum, all thoughts when people consider the action of proposal) a success. Otherwise, the 
proposal fails to interpellate this women as its subject (i.e., the marriage). Similarly, only 
when readers accept the arguments that IAC analysts suggest, then it could be said that IAC 
analysts successfully interpellate readers as subjects of their articles. 
). The task of the ISAs is to “interpellate individuals as 
subjects” (p. 182). Interpellation is a process to connect external signs and logic of the world 
with internal signs and logic of an individual. In other words, the process of interpellation is 
to let individuals realize the same signs and logic both in this ideology and in their daily 
activities and, most importantly, to create a connection. In so doing, it could be said that this 
ideology interpellates individuals of the world as subjects of itself (i.e., the subjects which 
are subjected to this ideology).  
Foucault’s (1991a) notion of discipline shares the same function with Althusser’s 
interpellation. While interpellation only succeeds in receiving responses from individuals, 
discipline adopts an active mode to direct individuals into its rules. To Althusser, ideology 
interpellates individuals as subjects; to Foucault, the mechanism of discipline90
                                                     
89 For the concept of ISA, please refer to Chapter 5.  
 trains 
90 In Discipline and Punishment, Foucault (1991) suggested that discipline is a mechanism that 
distinguishes humans’ activities via a binary opposition system, especially focusing on the operation 
of power. The effect of discipline is accomplished not only by assigning individuals to the place 
where they belong but also by prohibiting and eliminating individuals from other opposite ideas. 
Likewise, the mechanism of discipline is similar to Shakespeare’s (2004) famous line in Hamlet that 
“To be, or not to be—that is the question” (p. 164); but, the critical point is that the mechanism of 
discipline makes the decision not the oppressed individuals.  Foucault (1991) depicted several 
concepts of how the mechanism of discipline works. Firstly, a closed space is required. For the 
purpose of this thesis, the closed spaces not only refers to concreted constructions such as schools, 
hospitals and prisons as Foucault’s research objects but also indicate a closed information receiving 
mode, e.g. watching the same News channel every day (from the viewpoint of this thesis, reading the 
same demonstrative style of IAC articles). Secondly, a normalized timetable designed to monitor and 
command individuals step by step is required. Individuals are similar to machines, controlled by a 
time-tabled schedule to execute the ordered missions. In a word, individuals are objected (from the 
viewpoint of this thesis, if SWP exists, it echoes this second point). Thirdly, repetition of commanded 
activities is required for individuals (Foucault, 1991). Mechanism of repetition in Foucault’s angle is 
to train individuals to perform requested orders instinctively, e.g. training of soldiers. From the 
perspective of making an ideology, it refers to the function that by sensing the signs and logic of this 
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individuals as subjects of it. Both of them successfully explain how an ideology (or the 
discipline) is identified by individuals.  
Moreover, when one ideology, which is based on material foundations, successfully 
interpellates individuals as subjects of itself, this ideology “‘represents’ the imaginary 
relation of individuals to these social relations” (Althusser, 1971, p. 162). When a woman 
accepts the proposal (i.e., the interpellation is completed), the ideology of marriage comes to 
her mind as she automatically links material existence (e.g., a ring, a ritual of proposal) to 
her future life (whether happy or tragic) via her imagination of stories about marriages that 
she projects for herself. Similarly, as readers read the arguments (i.e., displayed by writing 
texts—material components) suggested by the IAC analysts, once they accept (i.e., 
interpellation completed), they will automatically link these arguments to all the concepts 
and theories they already know providing credits and validity to those arguments. That is to 
say, because of a material component and interpellation process, human beings obtain an 
invisible consent, an imagination of the social relations that this ideology presents or 
constructs. 
Finally, to Althusser, if the process of interpellation works and finally creates a specific 
ideology or makes individuals identify with the vested ideology, then what this ideology 
should do in order to maintain or enlarge its dominance is to “[reproduce] the relations of 
production” (Althusser, 1971, p. 148).  
This notion originated from Marx’s concept the relations of production 91
                                                                                                                                                      
ideology repeatedly, individuals will easily be disciplined. Finally, evaluation observation, 
punishment and compensation (award) are required. Foucault described that individuals will be 
classified into diverse sections based on evaluation of their performance and disciplined degree 
followed by punishment or compensation. This classified system is designed to establish an 
observation system in which individuals are monitored by each other. In so doing, the cost of 
supervision and control is also reduced.  
 which 
explains the operational model of capitalism, e.g. Marx’s discussion of surplus value and 
capital accumulation. However, to Althusser, such a mechanism (e.g., the operation of 
capitalism) does not always guarantee success. He found out that ‘reproduction’ is the key 
that helps the vested mechanism to establish and maintain its dominance. To reproduce 
91 The relations of production means, from Marx’s stance, the mechanism of how workers produce 
products based on the forces and means of production, and this mechanism changes across different 
time periods. It is an invisible rule/mechanism—e.g., working time schedule, boss’s superiority, 
reward and punishment, or annual profits being divided based on shareholding ratio—that makes 
people (e.g., workers) of an epoch obey without questioning. 
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means to repeat the past successful mechanism. For example, to strictly execute the 
punishment disciplines in order to make sure that no exceptions exist. Once the rule is 
repeatedly identified, the vested relations of production continue to prevail. Because of this 
function of ideology, society maintains its running model, the ruling class retains its 
advantage, and individuals are satisfied with the way things are, namely that the function of 
‘reproduction’ is to maintain social order.  
According to Althusser’s basic concepts of ideology introduced above, an analytical 
pathway based on these could be drawn as follows: 
Aa Ideologies have a material existence. 
Ab Hence, when a group controls the Ideological State Apparatus (ISAs),  
Ac it is able to appropriate those material elements to interpellate individuals. 
AdIdeology represents the imaginary relation of individuals to those social relations. 
AeWhen individuals are hailed by ideology, they become the subject of it.  
Af After accomplishing the interpellation, the ideology has to reproduce the relation of 
production in order to ensure its existence.  
Empirical Analysis 
Example 6-2: RA20 is taken as an example. It explains how academia is dominated by males 
and excludes females from interpretation-rights via forms of thought, images, and symbols. 
Althusser’s analytical pathway applied to RA20 could be drawn as follows: 
Ab“Universities, schools, broadcasting and publishing corporations, and the like are the 
ideological institutions of the society” (Smith, 1975, p. 354), which are controlled by 
men. 
AaBased on the application of academic production (e.g., forms of thought, images, and 
symbols, p. 353),  
Acwomen unconsciously accept (agree with) the academic rules which are dominated by 
men. 
AdUnder this circumstance, women even “throw the control to others [men]” (p. 364) 
possessing an imagination relation where men are superior to them whereby women are 
excluded. 
AeAs a result, they become the subjects of men’s academic regime. (p. 365) 
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To provide a better understanding of how Althusser’s analytical pathway was applied, Table 
6-3 is a reference list providing guidance to determine the application of his analytical 
pathway in the collected 33 IAC articles. The original IAC articles could be found in the disk 
attached in Appendix 1. 
 
Table 6-3: Reference of IAC Articles Which Apply Althusser’s Analytical Pathway 
SWPs Code: P2-A (Althusser’s Analytical Pathway) 
Articles Found References/Examples 
RA01 p.166(2); p.173(9);  
RA02 p.245(1)b; p.248(4)b; p.249(5)b,c,e;  
RA04 p.335(2); p.338(5)d; p.339(6);  
RA05 p.3(1); p.5(3); p.6(4);  
RA06 p.457(13)b,e;  
RA07 p.108(2); p.109(3)e; p.110(4)e; p.113(7)d;  
RA08 p.264(4)b,e;  
RA10 p.419(3)a,d; p.420(4)b;  
RA11 p.100(2)b; p.101(3)e; p.105(7);  
RA12 p.1025(1)e; p.1027(3)a; p.1028(4)d; p.1037(13); p.1038(14); p.1039(15);  
RA13 p.279(1)c;  
RA14 p.100(1)b,d; p.101(2); p.102(3)d; p.103(4)a,b,c,d; p.106(7);  
RA15 p.456(2)e; p.458(4)b; p.462(8)e; p.466(12)e; p.467(13)e; p.469(15);  
RA16 p.138(2)a,e; p.139(3)b,e;  
RA20 p.354(2)a,b,e; p.356(4)a,b; p.358(6)b; p.359(7)a,b,e; p.361(9)b,e; p.362(10)b; p.363(11)b;  
RA21 p.413(3)e; p.417(7)e; p.418(8)b; p.422(12); p.423(13)b; p.427(17)a,e;  
RA22 p.71(2)a; p.72(3)d; p.73(4)e; p.75(6)a,d,e; p.76(7)a,d; p.77(8); p.78(9)a,e; p.79(10)a,c; p.80(11); p.85(16); p.88(19);  
RA24 p.488(2); p.490(4)a; p.491(5)a; p.494(8);  
RA25 p.469(4)a; p.470(5)b,d,e; p.480(15);  
RA26 p.91(13)c;  
RA27 p.181(2)b,e,f; p.182(3)c,f; p.184(5)a,c; p.185(6)b; p.186(7)e; p.188(9)b,e; p.192(13)d; p.197(18); p.198(19)b,e; p.199(20)e;  
RA28 p.164(8)a; p.177(21)a;  
RA29 p.914(1); p.917(4); p.918(5);  
RA30 p.466(2)b; p.479(15)e; p.480(16)e; p.482(18); p.485(21); p.487(23)e; p.490(26);  
RA32 p.17(1)b; p.18(2)a,b; p.27(11)e; p.28(12);  
RA33 p.650(10)b; p.661(21)b; p.670(30)b; p.672(32)d;  
Concepts a: Materiality; b: ISA; c:Interpellation; d: Imagination of social existence; 
e: Reproduction of the relation of production. 
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Application of Althusser’s Analytical Pathway 
The following Table 6-4 is a suggestion for future IAC analysts to apply Althusser’s pathway 
to analyse ideology. 
 
Table 6-4: Application of Althusser’s Analytical Pathway 
Concept of Ideology The Applicable Discourse Condition 
ISA 
When the research topic focuses on the institutions, which usually 
provide a neutral expression to the public (e.g. schools), the notion 
of ISA can be adopted to theoretically link the institution and 
ideologically invisible power together. 
 
Materiality 
This notion is mostly considered as the presumed basis which is 
applied to analyse ‘what’ constructs one ideology. By explaining 
the characteristics of ideology, it responses to why those abstract, 
pure, and spiritual concepts could be analysed. 
Interpellation 
This notion can be employed to describe how individuals are 
convinced by specific ideology, that is, the process of 
interpellation. This is the theoretical basis that can be adopted to 
demonstrate the active capacity of ideology. 
Imaginary Relation 
The meaning of imaginary relation here does not refer to a fantasy, 
but recognition of one’s own conscious position, that is, the 
analysts can adopt this concept to describe how research subjects 
deem their own situation as being normal. This is because that 
“ideology ‘represents’ the imaginary relation of individuals to 
these social relations”. 
To Reproduce the 
Relation of Production 
Analysts can take this notion to illustrate how ideology maintains 
its existence. 
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6.4 Gramscian Analytical Pathway 
If Althusser’s pathway offered a channel to analyse how ideology is formed, then Gramscian 
concepts help to illustrate the competing phenomenon between diverse ideologies and 
explain how one vested ideology maintains or enlarges its dominance. Furthermore, if 
Gramsci’s concept of hegemony explains how one ideology maintains its dominance, then 
Laclau and Mouffe’s (2001) notion of (dis/re-)articulation provides a clear map illustrating 
how hegemony is established, revised, and strengthened. Gramsci’s hegemony theory was 
introduced in the previous chapter92
Theoretical Review 
; the following discussion will mainly focus on the 
aspect of articulation.   
The notion of (dis/re)-articulation was addressed by Laclau and Mouffe which was applied 
by Hall (in Grossberg, 1996, Interview) in his cultural studies. The former invented the idea 
to investigate the allied relationship between political groups while the latter appropriated 
this idea to explain the question of identity. To Laclau and Mouffe (2001), all social groups 
can form political associations with their particular political purposes; yet, no one can just 
perform self-importantly and independently. One association has to cooperate with another 
(i.e., articulate) in a specific agenda in which they share common interests in a particular 
social condition. These allied associations can disarticulate their united relationship once 
they face disagreement of opinions or interests and they can rearticulate if needed. The 
process of (dis/re)-articulation never ends because, as Laclau and Mouffe (2001) claim, “this 
articulation should be constantly re-created and renegotiated, and there is no final point at 
which a balance will be definitively achieved” (p. 188).  
 Hall (in Grossberg, 1996; interview) explained that the concept of articulation is similar 
to a tractor-trailer in which the tractor can link to many trailers. Hall described that, 
An articulation is thus the form of the connection that can make a unity of two 
different elements, under certain conditions. It is a linkage which is not necessary, 
determined, absolute and essential for all time. (p. 141) 
                                                     
92 Simply put, hegemony should be seen as a battlefield in which all ideas, voices, and forces are 
fighting for their own territories in order to compete for consent—in Gramsci’s (1971) words, to fight 
for the “intellectual and moral leadership” (p. 57). Once a hegemony/ideology is created, it has to 
maintain its power because there is no guarantee that such hegemony/ideology can last forever. The 
making of hegemony is always within a process of struggle. 
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Hence, a hegemony, or a dominant ideology, has to articulate or rearticulate other voices and 
opinions (in short, everything that benefits its dominant ideology), and it also must 
disarticulate anything which is injurious in order to spread its hegemony.  
 Based on Gramsci’s hegemony theory together with his other notions (e.g., civil society, 
leadership), and Laclau and Mouffe’s supplementary concept, articulation, a Gramscian 
analytical pathway could be drawn as follows: 
Ga Ideology is a battlefield that exists in civil society 
Gb in which various voices and opinions are allowed to negotiate, to compete for consent, 
that is, the “intellectual and moral leadership” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 57.).  
Gc In order to achieve hegemony, methods of war of position, 
Gd(re)articulation, 
Geand disarticulation are often adopted to gain the leadership. 
 
(Thus far, the notion of hegemony refers to a ‘process’ of fighting for consent.) 
 
GfWhen one of the competing groups obtains hegemony,  
Ggit has to maintain and enlarge its dominance to ensure the safety of its ideological 
hegemony, which has to go through the same strategies of 
Gd (re)articulation (i.e., to absorb everything that benefits its dominant ideology), 
Ge and disarticulation (i.e., to obviate anything which is injurious to its hegemony).  
Empirical Analysis 
Gramsci’s notion illustrates how certain ideological hegemony is established and how it 
further maintains its dominance. This notion is broadly applied in IAC articles. 
 Example 6-3: RA06 explains how news media constructs/presents Joey Galloway as an 
image of wayward child, greedy, and disloyal through their sport news. Such an image of 
demonizing Galloway is to sustain the authority of the sports team, its coach, and their 
vested authority. 
Gb The professional sports team, the Seattle Seahawks, and the all-star player, Joey 
Galloway, are fighting for interpretation rights over a salary issue  
Ga in Seattle newspapers.  
Procedure 2: Applying Theoretical Foundation 
160 
Ma However, the sports team not only has taken advantage of access to media space 
(Mb because the team controls who can interview its players), 
Gc but also appropriated a strategy of relationship, which begins from quoting the coach’s 
fairness of speeches, then the teammates’ complaints, and finally the family’s 
admonition, step by step.  
GfThe sports team eventually creates its hegemony of authority over this event.  
Gd To accomplish this hegemony, the sports team has articulated that it is offering a fair 
salary and being open-hearted, and has articulated negative adjectives such as wayward, 
greedy, selfish, modern racism, and lacking in team spirit in relation to the player, 
Galloway.  
Gg Finally, the player compromised, and the sports team again enlarges its 
unchallengeable hegemony. 
Examples of Articulation 
Due to the importance of articulation in the process of ideological analysis or critique, this 
thesis provides an additional example to explain how the notion of articulation functions. 
RA01 is an example that testifies to this notion without using terminologies like ‘articulation’ 
or related vocabularies.  
 Example 6-4: The authors, Moss and O’Loughlin (2005), analyse how New Labour 
uses ‘opinion polls’, ‘focus groups’, ‘consultations’, and other social ‘scientific techniques’ 
to link concepts of science and public-orientation together to establish an epistemological 
foundation for the party’s information age policy (p. 167). The authors argued that New 
Labour also connects concepts of ‘globalisation’, ‘reflexive modernity’, and the ‘information 
age’ with humans’ daily experiences to rationalize the emerging ideology of this policy (pp. 
167-168). Moreover, by claiming equality and justice, New Labour is able to connect 
‘welfare’ to ‘life politics’, which means people have to help themselves before asking for 
government assistance (p. 169); as a result, government’s responsibilities and duties are 
forgotten.  
 Other tracks of application of dis/re-articulation can be found in RA01. The core 
argument of this article is that New Labour’s information age policy (the main subject, or the 
Primary Class) articulates everything (e.g., knowledge, skills, users’ abilities), which 
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supports its importance in the information age. At the same time, the government’s social 
responsibility and duty are disarticulated from the old ideology. As a result, authors of this 
article claim New Labour has shown the party’s ideological shift. 
 To provide a better understanding of how the Gramscian analytical pathway was 
applied, Table 6-5 is a reference showing the application of a Gramscian analytical pathway 
in the collected 33 IAC articles. The original IAC articles could be found in the disk attached 
in Appendix 1. 
 
Table 6-5: Reference of IAC Articles Which Apply Gramscian Analytical Pathway 
SWPs Code: P2-G (Gramsican Analytical Pathway) 
Articles Found References/Examples 
RA01 p.167(3); p.168-70(4-6); p.172(8); p.172-3(8-9); p.179(15);  
RA02 p.247(3)d; p.251(7)b; p.253(9)b; p.140(4)b;  
RA03 p.137(1)d; p.138(2)b; p.141(5)b; p.143(7)d; p.144(8)d; p.145(9)b; p.149(13)b; p.152(16)d;  
RA04 p.334(1)d; p.335(2)d; p.336(3)b; p.337(4)f; p.338(5); p.339(6)d; p.340(7)b; p.349(16)d; p.350(17)d,f;  
RA05 p.3(1); p.5(3); p.6(4); p.8(6); p.11(9);  
RA06 p.445(1); p.446(2); p.447(3)d; p.449(5); p.450(6); p.451(7)d; p.452(8)d; p.453(9)d; p.454(10)d; p.456(12)d;  
RA07 p.108(2)c,d; p.109(3); p.110(4); p.111(5)b; p.112(6); p.113(7)d; p.114(8); p.115(9)d; p.116(10); p.119(13)d; p.122(16)d;  
RA08 p.261(1)b; p.262(2)e; p.263(3)b,c; p.264(4)b; p.265(5)b,e; p.266(6)b,d; p.267(7)b; p.267-8(7-8); p.269(9)b; p.270(10)b; p.271(11)b; p.272(12)b; p.273(13)b; p.274(14)e,f;  
RA09 p.588(2)b; p.589(3)b,d; p.592(6)b;  
RA10 p.419(3)d; p.424(8)d; p.425(9)d; p.427(11);  
RA11 p.99(1)b; p.100(2); p.101(3)b; p.103(5)b; p.104(6); p.105(7); p.106(8); p.107(9); p.108(10)b;  
RA12 p.1026(2)e; p.1026(2); p.1031(7)b; p.1035(11); p.1036(12)b; p.1037(13); p.1039(15)d;  
RA13 p.279(1)f; p.281(3)d; pp.283-4(5-6)b; p.290(12)d,f;  
RA14 p.104(5)b; p.106(7)d;  
RA15 p.455(1); p.456(2); p.457(3); p.460(6); p.462(8); p.465(11)b,d; p.467(13)d; p.468(14)b; p.469(15)b; p.469(15);  
RA16 p.139(3); p.140(4); p.145(9); p.147(11)b; p.148(12)e; p.150(14); p.151(15); p.152(16)b; p.153(17); p.154(18)d; p.155(19)e;  
RA17 p.350(2)b; p.354(6); p.364(16)d; p.369(21);  
RA18 p.155(2); p.158(5); p.159(6);  
RA20 p.354(2); p.356(4); p.357(5)d; p.358(6); p.366(14); p.367(15);  
RA21 p.412(2); p.413(3)d; p.414(4)d; p.415(5)d; p.417(7); p.419(9); p.420(10)d; p.421(11)b,d; p.424(14)d; p.425(15)b; p.426(16)b; p.427(17)b;  
RA22 p.71(2); p.72(3)b; p.73(4)b; p.74(5)b; p.81(12); p.85(16); p.87(18)f;  
RA23 p.388(3)b; p.389(4); p.392(7); p.395(10); p.396(11)d;  
RA24 p.488(2); p.492-3(6-7)d; p.493(7)d; p.494(8); p.495(9)b,d; p.499(13)b; p.500(14)b; p.503(17);  
RA25 p.466-8(1-3)b; p.467(2); p.468-9(3-4)d; p.469(4)d; p.470(5)b,e; p.473(8)b; p.473-4(8-9)b; p.474(9)b; p.475(10)d; p.476(11)b; p.478(13)b,e,f; p.480(15)b;  
RA26 p.79(1)b; p.80(2)d,e; p.83(5)d; p.85(7); p.87(9)d,f; p.88(10)b; p.89(11)b; p.91(13)b; p.92(14)b; p.94(16)b,d; p.95(17)d; p.96(18)d;  
RA27 p.181(2)b,e; p.183(4)b,d; p.184(5)d; p.186(7)b,e; p.191(12); p.192(13)b; p.193(14); p.194(15); p.195(16); p.196(17); p.197(18); p.198(19);  
RA28 p.158(2)d; p.162(6)c,d; p.163(7)c,d; p.164(8)d; p.165(9)b; p.166(10)b; p.168(12); p.169(13); p.171(15)c; p.172(16); p.173(17)d; p.174(18)f; p.180(24);  
RA29 p.914(1); p.915(2); p.917(4); p.918(5); p.919(6); p.920(7); p.921(8); p.922(9); p.923(10); p.924(11); p.925(12);  
RA30 p.467(3)b; p.468(4); p.469(5); p.470(6); p.471(7)d; p.472(8)d; p.473(9); p.474(10); p.476(12)b; p.477(13)b; p.481(17)d; p.482(18); p.485(21)d; p.486(22); p.487(23); p.489(25)d; p.490(26);  
RA31 p.221(4)d; p.222(5)d; p.225(8)d; p.228(11)d; p.233(16)b; p.234(17)b; p.240(23)d; p.241(24)b,d;  
RA32 p.17(1)d; p.18(2)b,d; p.21(5)b,c,d; p.22(6)c,d,e,f; p.24(8)d; p.26(10); p.28(12)d; p.30(14)d;  
RA33 
p.643(3)f; p.646(6)b; p.648(8)b; p.649(9)b; p.650(10)b,e; p.651(11)b; p.652(12); p.654(14)b; 
p.655(15)b,d,f; p.656(16)b; p.658(18)b,e; p.658-9(18-9)d; p.662(22)b; p.664(24)b; p.666(26)b; 
p.669(29)b; p.670(30)d,f; p.671(31)b; p.672(32)b;  
Concepts a: Civil society; b: Intellectual and moral leadership; c: War of position 
d: (Dis/re)-Articulation; e:Consent; f: Hegemony 
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Application of Gramscian Analytical Pathway  
The following Table 6-6 is a suggestion for future IAC analysts who might wish to adopt 
Gramscian analytical pathway to compose their analysis. 
 
Table 6-6: Application of Gramscian Analytical Pathway 
Concept of Ideology The Applicable Discourse Condition 
Battlefield 
When the analysts try to analyse the mutual competition between 
two concepts, they could introduce the concept of the battlefield 
of ideology to describe where these two powers will compete. The 
most familiar battlefields will be the authority to use the media 
and the prerogatives to speak and occupy channels to expound a 
phenomenon. 
Civil Society This concept is the same as ISA. 
Intellectual and Moral 
Leadership 
This notion provides researchers with an exposition about what 
the diverse voices fight for in the battlefield of ideology (whether 
it is fighting for the prerogative to access the media or the 
authority to expound a phenomenon). It is a lexicon to represent 
what diverse voices contend.  
War of Position 
This is a battle strategy. If the analysts try to illustrate that the 
discovered hegemony in their research is constructed gradually 
they can employ this notion. 
Articulation/ 
Disarticulation 
When the analysts try to explain the process of how their research 
subjects eliminate some concepts which are originally 
unfavourable to them and also increase others that are beneficial 
instead, this notion offers a theoretical response to illustrate how a 
fixed hegemony operates to hold its dominance. 
Hegemony 
This notion can be applied from two perspectives. First, the 
analysts can illustrate the advantage of a vested dominant 
ideology. Second, this notion can also be employed to describe 
how the oppressed group is capable of competing for consent to 
change the living conditions where they are situated. Analysts of 
such type of writing usually posses an optimistic and hopeful 
position. 
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6.5 Examples of Application of Diverse Pathways 
As previously mentioned, this thesis has summed up three analytical pathways which offer a 
clear map to explain how common concepts of ideology are applied; yet, how concepts of 
ideology in practice are applied (e.g., to adopt Marx’s or Althusser’s notions) depends on 
IAC analysts’ viewpoints and the arguments they try to make. RA04 can be considered as an 
example to show how Althusser’s and Gramscian pathways are applied together.  
 Example 6-5: RA04 discusses how diet companies continually revise the advertising 
appeal of their products (which, to the author, creates a false image) to maintain their 
customers’ demands. Since the 1980s, the diet industry has been criticised for selling 
unsubstantiated diet products which have usually claimed to possess the effect of fad dieting.  
 In order to maintain business93
Abdiet companies use TV advertising 
,  
Aato transmit the texts, images, speeches, and body gestures which convey diet companies’ 
new sales strategy.  
AcThrough advertising, diet companies hope to capture audiences’ attention and desires.  
 These TV advertisements show that 
Gediet companies themselves disagreed with the old diet method—fad dieting—which 
they used to promote;  
Gdinstead, they suggest a new way of thinking—healthy dieting. 
AdThese advertising signs are designed to create a (an imaginary) relationship between 
customers and the demand for diet products.  
AeOnce audiences accept the message from TV advertisements, the new concept—healthy 
dieting— will be connected to people’s consciousness. 
GfIt also upholds the hegemony of the importance of dieting. 
AfThese TV adverts, again, reproduce the relation of ‘thin is good and fat is bad’.  
GcTo successfully reproduce the hegemony of diet, a long-term, and gradual revision of 
TV advertising strategy is required.  
                                                     
93 References of each step are briefly listed here. For a detail explanation, please refer to previous 
sections. Ab: ISAs. Aa: material existence. Ac: start to interpellate audiences. Ge: disarticulation. Gd: 
articulation. Ad: imaginary relationship. Ae: interpellation completed. Gf: hegemony. Af: 
reproduction the relation of production. Gc: strategy of war of position. 
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In the previous sections, this thesis has introduced three analytical pathways, including 
Marx’s, Althusser’s, and Gramscian. It could be concluded as the Marxism analytical 
pathways. The following sections will introduce two other analytical angles that are 
frequently applied in IAC articles or which are the guiding rule to conduct analysts’ writings. 
They are historical description and semiotic analytical pathways.  
 
6.6 Pathway of Historical Description  
The analytical pathway of historical description, which is termed by this thesis, is usually 
applied to illustrate the researched objects’ ideology shift through time. Frankly speaking, 
this historical descriptive pathway does not have theoretical foundations; in other words, this 
thesis is incapable of finding clear literatures to delineate this pathway. It cannot be 
categorized as textual analysis, nor can it be seen as discourse analysis. This is because those 
IAC articles, which applied ‘historical descriptive’ pathway, do not focus on the specific text 
or power-operation (which is what textual analysis and discourse analysis often do). Instead, 
IAC analysts who adopted this pathway were more likely to tell ‘stories’ without any 
intension. This thesis specifically identified this pathway because it indicates two points: first, 
the special characteristic of ideological analysis; second, the dilemma of that. 
 First, regarding the special characteristic of ideological analysis, it means that the 
process of describing history per se is the process of undertaking ideological 
critique/analysis as well as the process of constructing ideology, forcing readers to believe 
what they should believe. The purpose of describing history is to interpellate readers as 
subjects of the analysts’ arguments. This logic is similar to the relationship between the terms 
analysis and critique, which is explained in the Chapter 1 (Section 1.4).  While the terms 
describing, analysing, and constructing are interdependent and refer to the same action, the 
pathway of the historical description indicates that the IAC analysts undertake their 
ideological analysis simply by telling histories of their research objects; the process whereby 
they describe history per se, simultaneously, is also the process of analysing or constructing 
ideology. 
 Moreover, the IAC articles, which applied this pathway, ‘do not intend’ to tell readers 
what to believe. The word ‘intend’ here means that readers could clearly perceive what IAC 
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analysts try to emphasise (e.g., telling readers what are the power relation, the dominant 
relation, and the false consciousness of the researched phenomenon, which the former three 
pathways usually do). On the contrary, the words ‘do not intend’ means that the IAC articles 
almost objectively and neutrally present the ideology shift of their research phenomenon 
through historical development (e.g., simply and purely telling what happened in history).  
 The more IAC analysts simply and purely describe the research, the more readers will 
be interpellated. This is because, in the application of the historical descriptive pathway, the 
appearance of the article’s authors is hidden. As a result, a neutral and objective image of 
such article is created. 
 In this pathway, citing from literature is a common manner. Right after a simple and 
pure description, IAC analysts usually provide ‘quotations’ to support/echo/prove what they 
just wrote. These citations play the function of constructing ideology that tries to interpellate 
readers in order to promote the validity and reliability of their writings. These selected 
quotations, the cited extent, and its order of presentation, to a great degree, have not only 
proven the argument that IAC analysts wish to make but also guided the direction the 
analysts wanted their readers to follow. Edward P. Thompson’s (1991) The Making of the 
English Working Class could be seen as the model of applying what this thesis called the 
pathway of historical description. 
 Namely, the application of the historical descriptive pathway will help to create a 
seemingly neutral and objective ideological analysis. While this pathway is applied together 
with other pathways (which is commonplace in 33 collected IAC articles), the historical 
description part of the context will help the whole article to gain more validity and reliability. 
 The pathway of historical description cannot simply be abstracted as examples here 
because it is a style based on the whole context, which can only be detected through a 
holistic angle. Thus, this thesis can only provide a reference list to show the location in 33 
IAC articles that applied what this thesis termed the analytical pathway of historical 
description, as Table 6-7 shows. The original IAC articles could be found in the disk attached 
in Appendix 1. 
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Table 6-7: Reference of IAC Articles Which Apply Pathway of Historical Description 
SWPs Code: P2-HD (Analytical Pathway of Historical Description) 
Articles Found References/Examples 
RA02 p.246(2); p.247(3); p.250(6); p.254(10);  
RA03 p.141(5); p.142(6);  
RA04 p.335(2); p.336(3);  
RA05 pp.5-6(3-4); pp.6-7(4-5); pp.7-9(5-7); pp.9-11(7-9) 
RA07 p.111(5); p.112(6);  
RA08 p.263(3);  
RA09 p.590(4); p.591(5); p.604(18);  
RA13 p.279-82(1-4); pp.283-90(5-12) 
RA15 p.458(4); p.459(5); p.460(6); p.461(7); p.462(8); p.464(10); p.466(12); p.467(13); p.468(14);  
RA17 p.353(5);  
RA21 p.413(3); p.414(4); p.415(5); p.416(6); p.417(7); p.418(8); p.420(10); p.423(13);  
RA24 p.488(2); p.492(6); p.493(7); p.494-5(8-9); p.495(9); p.496(10); p.497(11); p.499-502(13-16);  
RA25 p.468-9(3-4); p.471-2(6-7);  
RA26 Entirecontext 
RA27 p.182(3); p.187(8); p.188(9); p.189(10); p.190(11); p.193(14); p.194(15); p.195(16); p.196(17);  
RA28 p.160(4); p.161(5); p.162(6); p.167(11);  
RA29 Entirecontext 
RA30 p.467(3); p.468(4); p.469(5); p.470(6);  
RA32 p.19(3); p.19-22(3-6); p.25(9);  
RA33 p.641(1); p.642-3(2-3); p.646-9(6-9); p.651-2(11-2); p.655(15); p.658(18); p.660(20); p.661(21); p.666(26); p.667(27);  
 
 As mentioned in the first point, while IAC articles are simply and purely described, the 
track of IAC analysts’ subjectivities will be easily forgotten so that a neutral and objective 
image of such an article can be created. The more an IAC articles looks objective, the more 
readers will be interpellated. Yet, the above statement ignores a point. While this thesis 
claims that the pathway of historical description could help to create a neutral or objective 
image of IAC articles, does it mean that their IAC analysts really purely describe their 
researches without involving their subjectivity? Or does it just mean that the readers (like me) 
lose their ability to criticise due to their being unfamiliar with such a research topic, 
especially the history part? Here comes the second point: the dilemma of ideological 
analysis—IAC analysts’ capacity to comprehend the researched phenomenon (e.g., contexts). 
 Take my own experience of analysing (reading) these 33 IAC articles for example. 
While the IAC articles refer to specific subjects, events, or phenomena that are based on a 
synchronic dimension, it is not difficult to comprehend or analyse such articles. However, 
while the IAC articles are based on a historical dimension to investigate how ideology shifts 
over time, the mission of analysis becomes tough, which is simply due to my unfamiliarity of 
the researched topic’s history. In short, if it is difficult for readers to comprehend the history 
of the IAC articles’ topics or the lack of relative concepts of such a topic, it will be inefficient 
to detect the connotation of the IAC articles or to detect whether these articles convey certain 
ideology. Take RA25 and RA24 for examples. 
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 Example 6-6: RA25 deals with the Ireland’s Republican Movement. To me, without an 
understanding of Ireland’s history, analysis could only rely on the printed texts. As a result, 
unless the author of RA25 adopts a particular way to present this article (e.g., Marx’s 
pathway), use specific vocabularies (e.g., alienation), or obviously make judgements (e.g., A 
is right, B is wrong), the descriptions in this article will be seen neutrally and accurately to 
those readers who are unfamiliar with Ireland (e.g., myself). On the contrary, if RA25 is 
passed to readers from, for example, Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland, England, etc., 
their understanding of this article will be different (even if they are academic scholars who 
specialise in this topic). To them, even an unremarkable description (e.g., an angle of history) 
could make a difference, implying their diverse historical viewpoints. 
 Example 6-7: RA24 is an ideological and cultural analysis of political slogans in 
communist China. As a Taiwanese, my understanding of the personages, historical 
transference, and slogans (which are translated from Chinese to English) will be much 
deeper than those of other readers, such as British students. To British students who major in 
politics, RA24 might be seen as a neutral and normal article, while it is comparatively easier 
for me to dig out the personal ideology of the author. Of course, it is also inevitable that I 
might understand this article through my personal ideology, such as my understanding of 
Chinese history from the angle of being Taiwanese. 
 To conclude, the description of history is a pathway to analyse as well as construct 
ideology. Through the manner of telling histories, this pathway could create a neutral and 
objective image for ideological analysis/critique, where the articles’ authors are ignored. This 
pathway even functions efficiently in interpellating readers, especially when these readers 
are unfamiliar with the history of the researched topic. 
 
6.7 Semiotic Analytical Pathway 
Except for those IAC articles which deal with media presentation (e.g., RA02, RA04, RA06, 
RA10, RA25), it is hard to find obvious applications of semiotic concepts in IAC articles. 
Yet, many semiotic concepts are indeed the invisible guiding rule which influences the 
making of IAC articles, even though those analysts were probably unaware of their 
following the semiotic disciplines. It cannot be said that IAC articles obviously apply 
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semiotics to analyse their research. It can only be said that IAC analysts imperceptibly 
followed the semiotic rules to conduct their analysis. Hence, this section is more about 
theoretically explaining how IAC analysts unintentionally followed the rule of semiotics to 
undertake their analysis instead of explaining how they practicably adopt semiotics.  
 This section still first introduced the concept of semiotics and then provides examples 
related to empirical analysis. Although the theoretical review may seem long-winded, these 
semiotic concepts are the foundation of Procedure 3, connoting certain meanings, which 
needs to be explained at this stage. Moreover, since this thesis has the ambition to establish 
the methodology for ideological analysis/critique, semiotics is an indispensable method to 
analyse/criticise ideology. 
Theoretical Review 
In section 6.3, this thesis has discussed Althusser’s concept of ideology as having a “material 
existence” (1971, p. 165), which is a key point to making ideology analysable. In order to 
further understand why ideology has a material existence, an easy way is to investigate 
humans’ signification systems (such as gestures, facial expressions, languages, etc.) that 
construct ideology. Ideology, to a great extent, is the outcome of a specific language. 
Understanding the construction of language is a way to discover how an ideology is made.  
 Saussure (as cited in Sturrock, 2003), divided language into “parole” and “langue” (p. 
30). The former is a platform for language to demonstrate/perform itself, while the latter is 
the set of rules or, in Saussure’s term, “the grammar of the language” (p. 30). For instance, 
this English article (a style of displaying language) can be finished only if, first, I understand 
English grammar and vocabularies (langue—the rules of English writing), and, second, I 
write (parole—performance) it down.  
 The rules, grammar, and structure of language not only make the use of a language 
possible but also dictate how language should be used. Langue is composed of three 
elements: signs, syntagms, and paradigms (Fiske, 1990). Concepts of syntagms and 
paradigms will be discussed later. What Saussure is truly interested in is nothing but signs. 
 Saussure (as cited in Fiske, 1990) declared that signs are composed of two parts: a 
“signifier” and a “signified” (see Figure 6-1). The former is a sign’s “sound” or “image” 
(Berger, 2000, p. 37), which is the form or the figure of an object without any meaning. The 
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latter (signified) refers to the “concept” or the meaning of an object that is embedded inside 
people’s minds when they think of such an object. In short, ‘signified’ means that people can 
recognise the meaning of one object without even practically seeing this object (Berger, 2000; 
Fiske, 1990).  
  
Figure 6-1: Saussure’s Concept of Sign 
 
Source: Fiske, J. (1990, p. 44) 
 
To Saussure (in Fiske, 1990), the relationship between signifier and signified is arbitrary. It 
means that there is no absolute cause to link the word, such as ‘justice’ (signifier) to the 
‘meaning’ of justice (signified). One thing’s meaning must receive the answer from what this 
thing does not mean—why A is A is because A is not B. The meaning of ‘justice’ is not 
generated by itself; differently, justice receives its meaning from what is not justice. In other 
words, it is the positional difference of a thing (e.g., one concept) within the system of 
language that determines its meaning, but not the natural existence of such a thing (e.g., the 
‘word’ justice per se).  
 Thus, the question ‘what does this sign mean?’ can only be answered with ‘what does 
this sign not mean?’ This special relation between signs, which generates the meaning of 
signs, is what Levi-Strauss (as cited in Fiske, 1990) called “binary oppositions” (p. 116). 
Levi-Strauss argued, “A binary opposition is a system of two related categories that […] 
comprises the universe” (in Fiske, p. 116). Fiske (1990) described that when a binary 
opposition functions perfectly, one thing that does not belong to category A must belong to 
category B. Although binary oppositions are not the best way to define everything humans 
experience, people understand the world most easily through them (p. 118).  
Procedure 2: Applying Theoretical Foundation 
170 
 Accordingly, the making of ideology is not to pick up one phenomenon referring it to a 
specific meaning, and then claim ‘this is an ideology I found’. Instead, it is through the 
notion of binary opposition that the meaning of a thing is defined by what it is not. 
 The concept of binary opposition helps to understand the meaning of a sign (of course, 
by what the sign does not mean); yet to understand the meaning of the whole context (i.e., to 
understand the ideology of such a context), it has to reply on the other two aforementioned 
semiotic concepts, that is, the syntagms and paradigms. 
Syntagm refers to a combination of diverse signs in which the meaning of language 
(e.g., an oral or written sentence) is generated (Fiske, 1990; Robert & Kress, 1988). As 
Figure 6-2 shows, the sentence is composed of diverse signs (e.g., the subject I, the noun suit, 
and the location school). Through this way, meaning of this sentence can be confirmed. Most 
importantly, the composing of signs in this syntagm structure has to obey the grammar—that 
is, what Saussure called the ‘langue’; in this way, readers are able to make sense of this 
sentence. 
In addition, paradigm is a selection pool where a sign (e.g., suit) can be substituted for 
another similar set of signs (e.g., set of clothing; Fiske, 1990; Robert & Kress, 1988). As 
Figure 6-2 shows, sign I (representing the subject) could be replaced with you, he, or even a 
name, like Tom or Mary. According to the notion of binary opposition, a diverse selection of 
sets of signs (e.g., I instead of he; school instead of church) will create different meanings of 
the sentence. For example, the meaning of ‘I wear a coat’ to school is different from that of 
wearing a ‘T-shirt’, which implies seasonal differences. 
 
Figure 6-2: Relation of Signs, the Syntagmatic Structure, and the Paradigmatic Choices 
 
  
I 
You 
Binary opposition 
wear a  suit  to  
T-Shirt 
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jacket He 
She coat 
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Paradigmatic choice 
Syntagmatic structure 
Paradigmatic choice 
Binary 
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 In Chapter 5, this thesis claimed that it is able to identify the Primary Class and its 
corresponding Secondary Class in all IAC articles (of course, in some cases, the Secondary 
Class is not obvious). They are in a binary oppositional relationship. They define each other. 
It is reasonable to say that any ideologies are all constructed by many signs. Except the 
Primary Class (sign), there must exist many subordinate signs that stand for the same 
position with the Primary Class. Together they all contribute to the making of one ideology. 
This thesis simply named these signs as Sub-Primary Classes (henceforth, Sub-PCs). Surely, 
the corresponding Sub-Secondary Classes (henceforth, Sub-SCs) do exist as well.  
 Thus, based on semiotic concepts—signs (with a binary oppositional relationship, i.e., 
the Primary Class v.s. Secondary Class, the Sub-PCs v.s. Sub-SCs), syntagmatic structure, 
and paradigmatic choices—the map of how one ideology is recognised could be drawn as in 
Figure 6-3 (How Reality is Constructed). (Of course, the making of ideology is very 
complex, which will be detailed in Procedure 3: Connoting Certain Meanings, displayed as 
Figure 7-3.) 
 
Figure 6-3: How Reality is Constructed (from the Semiotic Perspective) 
 
  
The following discussion will provide two examples. The first one theoretically explains 
how the basic semiotic notions can be applied to illustrate the making of ideology which is 
based on the model of Figure 6-3. Another example practically shows how IAC analyst, 
Bishop, undertook his research via the dimension of semiotics.  
Empirical Analysis 
Example 6-8 (theoretical dimension): The quotations below cited from RA02 (Abbas, 2001) 
have explained how the IAC analyst, Abbas, described (presented/created) the reality of his 
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research, which can be analysed through the semiotic analytical pathway. This quotation 
says:  
This paper is a theoretical attempt to explain the ideological nature of anti-Muslim 
discourse found in the British press. It is argued that dominant media capital, that is 
held in ever fewer hands, seeks to subvert South Asian Muslims by endeavouring to 
define an explicitly negative view of Islam. (p. 245)  
From the first sentence, British press can be seen as the Primary Class. This shows that the 
analyst of RA02 tried to show how the British press describes Muslims94. The second 
sentence reveals several of the Sub-Primary Classes, such as the terms dominant media 
capital, subvert, South Asian Muslims, endeavouring to define, etc. Based on these two 
sentences, a reality, 95
 
 represented ideologically, which the analyst of RA02 tried to 
present/create, can be simply drawn as in Figure 6-4 (see syntagmatic structure 1). 
                                                     
94 Of course, Muslims could be the Primary Class as well; if so, the discourse becomes how Muslims 
are described by the British press. The selection of an ‘active’ or ‘passive voice’ could influence the 
feeling when people read (which will be further discussed in the next chapter). The former style could 
create a dominant and arbitrary image to the British press while the latter (passive) expresses a 
suffering image to Muslims. Based on this thesis’s analysis of this article, the author of RA02 is closer 
to arguing how the British press actively constructs a negative image on Islam. Thus, in this example, 
the British press is seen as the Primary Class.  
95 Whether it is a presented-reality or a constructed-reality depends on how readers, i.e., you and me, 
interpret it. Please refer to discussion in the previous chapter. 
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Figure 6-4: How the British Press Describes Muslims from the Semiotics Perspective 
 
                           Invisible Binary Oppositional Signs (Secondary Class + sub-SCs)  
                              Syntagmatic Structure 2  (Simulated Example) 
   
 
                            
 
 
 
                              Syntagmatic Structure 1  (Example of RA02) 
                            Visible Signs in Context (Primary Class + sub-PRs)  
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 Although it is difficult to exactly detect the corresponding Secondary Class (and the 
Sub-SCs), the binary oppositional relationship between the Primary and the Secondary 
Classes does exist. Let us consider some word switches, as shown in Figure 6-4 (see 
simulated example of syntagmatic structure 2). In the syntagmatic structure 2, the word/sign 
integrate replaces subvert (from syntagmatic structure 1). Y (i.e., other paradigmatic choices: 
religions like Buddhism or Hinduism) replaces the term Muslims. In short, all signs (e.g., 
subvert or Muslims) in the structure of language are changeable; once any sign in a sentence 
is changed, the meaning of such sentence will be different. As the syntagmatic structure 2 in 
Figure 6-4 indicates: media X is described to adopt a ‘positive’ or at least a ‘neutral’ position 
to present its object Y, in which media X helps society’s integration instead of distinction. 
 Namely, what semiotic analysis does is to determine what signs the analysts use (e.g., 
British press, subvert, Muslims) and compare with other possible signs that the analysts do 
not use (e.g., X press, integrate, Y religion). In so analysing, the meaning of one sentence 
emerges. A sentence is composed of signs; a paragraph is composed of sentences; an article 
is composed of paragraphs. While this relationship is recognised, how (the analyst’s) 
reality96
 Figure 6-4 theoretically shows how this thesis analysed RA02 in terms of semiotics, 
which revealed how the analyst of RA02 unintentionally followed the semiotic rules to 
conduct his IAC work. The following example takes RA04 to ascertain how analyst, Ronald 
Bishop, undertook his analysis via semiotics. 
 of such an article is presented/created and what it is could be delineated.  
 Example 6-9 (practical dimension): Bishop in RA04 explained how a diet company’s 
product, Ultra Slim-Fast, conveys a professional and scientific image. His application of 
semiotics was revealed in his analysis in relation to a TV commercial. He wrote: 
In 1996, the company introduced the “Slim-Fast Institute.” One Institute 
commercial began with white-coated characters scurrying around behind a pair of 
imposing glass doors, which open, allowing the viewer to pass through. Would-be 
scientists are shown eyeing test tubes and convening to discuss complex figures 
on a wall chart. (p. 343; emphasis added) 
Boldface is added to reveal the track of semiotic analysis. In this example, the diet company’s 
                                                     
96 The discussion of semiotics so far can only explain how reality is constructed. Of course, the term 
reality, to a great degree, could refer to ideology, as the previous chapter has discussed how reality 
represents ideology. Yet, regarding the making of ideology, the notion of connotation should be 
considered in order to provide a complete explanation which will be explained in Procedure 3: 
Connoting certain meanings.  
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‘Slim-Fast Institute’ is the Primary Class, which is what the commercial tries to highlight. 
Through Bishop’s description, several Sub-Primary Classes could be identified (as shown in 
boldface) which are applied to promote reliability of the Slim-Fast Institute. Based on semiotic 
analysis, Bishop revealed how the TV commercial applied specific signs to create certain 
meanings. (This example will be further explained later)  
 Yet, what meanings (i.e., connotation) the signs bring to readers (explaining why 
ideology emerges) is impossible to detect simply by the basic semiotic notions suggested 
above. It requires extra analytical work, which will be explained in the next SWPs procedure 
(procedure 3: connoting certain meanings). The purpose of suggesting semiotics as an 
analytical pathway is not only to echo Althusser’s concept of ideology as having a “material 
existence” (1971, p. 165). It is also that since all IAC articles employ signs, there is no 
reason to ignore the most basic elements, which always carry the possibility to create 
ideologies. 
 Again, in order to provide a better understanding of how the semiotic analytical 
pathway was applied, Table 6-8 is a reference showing the application of semiotics in the 
collected 33 IAC articles. The original IAC articles could be found in the disk attached in 
Appendix 1. 
 
Table 6-8. Reference of IAC Articles Which Apply Semiotic Analytical Pathway 
SWPs Code: P2-S (Semiotic Analytical Pathway) 
Articles Found References/Examples 
RA02 p.249(5);  
RA03 p.143(7); p.149(13); p.150(14);  
RA04 p.341(8); p.342(9); p.343(10); p.344(11); p.345(12); p.346(13); p.347(14); p.348(15); p.350(17);  
RA05 p.3(1); p.4(2); pp.6-7(4-5); pp.7-9(5-7); pp.9-11(7-9);  
RA06 p.446(2); p.447(3); p.448(4); p.449(5); p.450(6); p.451(7); p.452(8); p.453(9); p.454(10);  
RA07 p.108(2); p.110(4); p.113(7); p.115(9); p.118(12); p.119(13);  
RA08 p.262(2); p.263(3); p.272(12); p.273(13);  
RA09 p.591(5); p.592(6);  
RA10 p.418(2); p.419(3); p.420(4); p.421(5); p.422(6); p.423(7); p.425(9); p.427(11);  
RA11 p.102(4);  
RA12 p.1032(8); p.1034(10); p.1036(12); p.1037(13);  
RA14 p.100(1);  
RA16 p.145(9); p.146(10); p.147(11);  
RA17 p.355(7); p.356(8); p.359(11); p.360(12); p.361(13); p.364(16); p.365(17); p.367(19); p.368(20);  
RA18 p.159(6);  
RA19 p.167(6);  
RA20 p.356(4); p.362(10); p.364(12); p.367(15);  
RA21 p.414(4); p.415(5); p.419(9); p.420(10); p.421(11); p.422(12); p.425(15); p.427(17);  
RA22 p.72(3); p.73(4); p.75(6); p.76(7); p.79(10); p.82(13); p.83(14);  
RA23 p.391(6); p.392(7);  
RA24 p.489(3); p.490(4); p.491(5); p.496(10); p.497(11); p.499(13);  
RA25 p.469(4); p.472(7); p.474(9); p.477(12); p.480(15); p.480-1(15-6);  
RA27 p.180(1); p.181(2); p.184(5); p.197(18); p.198(19);  
RA28 p.167(11); p.170(14); p.171(15); p.174(18);  
RA29 p.919(6);  
RA30 p.466(2); p.468(4); p.470(6); p.471(7); p.473(9);  
RA31 p.222(5); p.224(7); p.226(9); p.229(12); p.231(14); p.233(16); p.235(18); p.236(19); p.240(23);  
RA32 p.18(2);  
RA33 p.657(17); p.662(22);  
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Application of the Semiotic Analytical Pathway 
The following Table 6-9 provides guidance for future IAC analysts to analyse/criticise 
ideology if they plan to adopt a semiotic analytical pathway. Yet many semiotic notions, such 
as language, parole, langue, signifier, signified, etc., are simply the theoretical concepts. 
There are only a few concepts (such as signs with binary oppositional relationships, 
syntagmatic structures, and paradigmatic choices) that can be applied to practical analysis. 
Thus, the following Table 6-9 only displays the application of these concepts. 
 
Table 6-9. Application of Semiotic Analytical Pathway 
Concept of Ideology The Applicable Discourse Condition 
Signs 
(Binary Opposition) 
First, future IAC analysts have to find out the main subject of 
their research, i.e., the Primary Class (sign) and its other 
subordinate signs. This is a basic and essential step for 
ideological analysis. Then, although it is not always detectable, 
analysts have to detect the secondary sign and its companies 
based on the notion of binary opposition. The meaning of the 
Primary Class emerges from its binary oppositional relationship 
with the Secondary Class. Hence, the more signs of contexts are 
recognised, the better the analysts can obtain the skeleton of 
such contexts. 
Syntagmatic Structure 
In this axis of the syntagmatic structure, diverse signs join 
together to create meaning. Thus, analysts have to investigate 
how signs are applied as well as to detect what extra specific 
signs are included in this axis. One more or one less sign in the 
axis changes the meaning. The more the analysts can realise the 
structure of a sentence, a paragraph, a section (a chapter), or a 
whole context, the better they understand the meaning of texts. 
Paradigmatic Choices 
Paradigmatic choices mean the different selections within a set 
of similar signs. Thus, analysts have to detect what sign is 
selected in the similar sets of signs, because whenever a single 
composed sign on this axis changes, the meaning of reference 
changes (e.g., like and dislike). The more analysts understand 
what sign is selected, the better they can detect the differences of 
signification. 
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6.8 Conclusion and Discussion 
What concerns analysts the most determines the invisible guiding mechanism, which 
influences how they undertake their analysis. The theoretical perspectives that IAC analysts 
apply to analyse their research, of course, are diverse, and depend on the theoretical concepts 
with which the IAC analysts are familiar as well as according to their education background. 
Yet, among these seemingly diverse styles, which composed the 33 IAC articles, there are 
still some common theoretical applications revealed in analysts’ analysis. This chapter has 
introduced five analytical pathways, including Marx’s, Althusser’s, Gramscian, historical 
descriptive, and semiotic analytical pathways. 
 Yet, undeniably, the above five pathways, to a very great extent, represent my own 
ideology regarding ideological analysis/critique. What theories I have read influence (in fact, 
determine) what pathways I am able to discover. People can only understand/find out what 
they have already known. That is to say, even though the collected IAC articles are from 
diverse research fields, the analytical pathways that this thesis has introduced are limited to 
my own ideology. Such limitation also evokes this thesis’s research question again: whether 
humans are capable of escaping from the influence of ideology. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Procedure 3: Connoting Certain Meanings  
& Procedure 4: Illustration 
— Ideology Concealed in Texts 
 
 
In Procedure 1, this thesis suggests IAC analysts to identify essential elements of their 
research phenomenon, recognising the significance of these three elements, Class, power, 
and reality as well as their interrelationship. This is a procedure to identify the nature of 
ideology. In Procedure 2: selecting theoretical foundations, IAC analysts apply the theories 
to explain and verify the phenomena they have found in their research. Five analytical 
pathways are inducted by this thesis, including Marx’s, Althusser’s, Gramscian, historical 
description, and semiotic pathways. Procedure 2 is to examine the making of ideology. 
 This chapter deals with procedure 3 and 4. Procedure 3 provides a theoretical basis for 
explaining why and how one phenomenon becomes (is considered as) an ideology. In this 
chapter, Barthes’ mythology is introduced. His notion helps to explain why the meaning of 
one sign transforms to another meaning, or how a phenomenon implies a certain ideology. 
This procedure is a bridge to connect the readers’ original simple consciousness to the land 
of ideology.  
 If Barthes explained how diverse simple signs convey specific connotations, which 
together construct a certain ideology or preferred reading though a theoretical perspective, 
then what Procedure 4, Illustration, does is to detect the techniques (i.e., illustrating 
techniques) that IAC analysts usually use in which their writings demonstrate the same 
tracks/logics of operation as in the theory of mythology.  
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Procedure 3: Connoting Certain Meanings 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In Procedure 2 (Chapter 5), this thesis offered Figure 6-3 to explain how reality is 
constructed (i.e., revealing certain ideology) through the application of basic semiotic 
notions. However, strictly speaking, Figure 6-3 can only be seen as a basic model because 
this figure simply regards ‘signs’ as an integer (the whole) of meaning, which ignores that 
signs in fact are composed of the signified and signifier as Saussure’s semiotics suggested. 
Accordingly, a better structure of reality should be drawn as Figure 7-1 (How Reality is 
Constructed with the Notion of the Sign). Figure 7-1 is the advanced edition of Figure 6-3. 
They share the same logic to explain how reality (or ideology) is constructed. Understanding 
that sign is composed of signifier and signified is the key to understanding Barthes’ 
mythology which is also the bridge to understanding why/how a simple sign is able to carry 
certain connotation/ideology. Ideology was not born out of nothing. 
 
Figure 7-1: How Reality is Constructed based on the Notion of Sign (Signified & Signifier) 
 
Compare   Figure 6-3: How Reality is Constructed (from the Semiotic Perspective) 
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 As discussed in Chapter 5, the concept ideology possesses two characteristics— 
negative and positive meaning/function. From a positive or neutral angle of the characteristic 
of ideology, claiming that Figure 6-3 (or Figure 7-1) can explain how a reality (or ideology) 
is presented should be acceptable. The reality (ideology) is constructed by diverse signs in 
the syntagmatic structure axis. These diverse signs are all selected from their own 
paradigmatic choice pools. 
 However, it is undeniable that ideology is mostly seen to convey ‘a distorted or false 
belief’, thereby having a negative meaning/function. Here comes a question: What is the 
basis for analysts to assert that Y (e.g., a film or context) conveys an ideology (e.g., an 
American hegemony)? What is the authority for analysts to refer to one phenomenon as 
ideology with a negative characteristic? Accordingly, when an ideology is negatively 
presented, simply adopting Figure 7-1 (or Figure 6-3) to explain how reality (ideology) is 
constructed is problematic. (A new Figure 7-3 will be provided to amend this problem in a 
later discussion.) 
 In fact, this problem has been discovered in 33 collected IAC articles, which shows that 
almost none of the IAC analysts are capable of clearly explaining why their research 
phenomenon carries/represents a certain ideology, or how one ideology is constructed. 
Instead, they just directly state one thing as an ideology. Such kind of statement is barely 
enough to be accepted when the characteristic of ideology refers to a positive or neutral 
dimension; yet, when it refers to a negative characteristic of ideology, directly stating that X 
signifies an ideology is debatable.  
 This is also the common critique of ideological analysis/critique: by whose authority 
are you so confident in claiming this is an ideology? Why this ideology is the ideology 
cannot be validated by random or arbitrary allegation after all. It always needs a theoretical 
foundation, especially when the researched phenomenon is referring to a negative 
characteristic of ideology. 
 Therefore, this section (Procedure 3: Connoting Certain Meanings) will introduce 
Barthes’s notion of mythology to solve the shortcoming of randomly or arbitrarily labelling 
one phenomenon as an ideology. Barthes’s notion helps to explain why the meaning of one 
sign transforms to another meaning, how a phenomenon implies a certain ideology, or how 
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such an ideology comes to exist. This is an important foundation to comprehend the making 
of ideology which is also a bridge to connect the readers’ original simple consciousness to 
the land of ideology. 
 
7.2 Connoting Certain Meanings 
Drawing on Barthes’s (1993) mythology, it can be said that the difference between a neutral 
characteristic (e.g., specific kinds of beliefs) and a negative characteristic of ideology (e.g., a 
distorted or false belief) is the connotation. The reason why one ideology is negatively 
recognised (or why one ideology is deemed to convey a negative image) is that the meaning 
of the signs which construct one ideology no longer refers to its original meaning; instead, 
these signs signify a new meaning, i.e., a connotation, resulting from certain power and 
cultural influences.  
 In his other work, Elements of Semiology, Barthes (1968) reinterpreted semiotics. He 
suggested two levels, denotation and connotation, to understand the meaning of signs, or the 
system of signification. The first level, denotation, refers to Saussure’s semiotic concepts. In 
terms of the second level97
 
 (i.e., connotation), his concept of myth has explained how signs 
start to carry certain meanings.  
 
 
 
                                                     
97 Regarding the second level (i.e., connotation), Barthes in his life has suggested three dimensions to 
explain how connotation emerges, including the concepts of connotation (1968), myth (1993), and 
symbol (1977 in Fiske, 1990).  In respect of the concept symbol, in fact, Barthes did not provide a 
systematic explanation of how the connotation of symbol emerges (Fiske, 1990). According to Fiske 
(1990), symbol can be explained as an object that will become a symbol when the original meaning of 
this object is adopted to describe another thing (Fiske, 1990). For example, when people distinguish 
the gender for a toilet, they usually use a pipe to refer to male while using high heels to signify female.  
In terms of the concept of connotation (method angle), this thesis argues, to a great degree, Barthes’s 
notion of connotation (method angle) shares the same operational logic with his aspect of myth. Using 
Barthes’s own example to explain this similarity: a man sends a bunch of roses to a woman; based on 
the meaning of the sign, roses refer to a type of flower (compare to Barthes’s first order system). Only 
when they are sent from one person to another, do roses start to signify love (compare to Barthes’s 
second order system). Barthes explained that the sign of the rose has shifted its meaning from material 
meaning (a flower) to a cultural meaning (love).  Regarding Barthes’ concept of myth, comparatively 
speaking, this concept was well expounded. Thus, this thesis will adopt his concept of myth to explain 
how the meaning of signs change. 
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Theoretical Review—Barthes’s Mythology 
Barthes wrote (1993),  
Myth is a system of communication […] a message […] a mode of signification, a 
form […] a type of speech […] Myth is not defined by the object of its message, 
but by the way in which it utters this message. [Myth is] a type of social usage 
which is added to pure matter. (p. 109, emphasis original) 
Barthes’s own words simply provided his definition of myth, which explained two features 
of his mythology. First, the function of myth refers to a process; and second, power 
operation is embedded in this process. 
 To Barthes (1993), myth is a two-dimensional (or two steps, two orders) operation on 
the sign. He provided a pattern displaying the relationship between myth and sign as well as 
how myth functions, as Figure 7-2 shows. 
 
Figure 7-2: Barthes’s Myth Model 
 
Source: Barthes, R. (1993, p. 113; colour boxes added) 
 
 As elucidated in section 6.7 (semiotic analytical pathway), a sign is composed of the 
signified and signifier; meaning of one sign is confirmed according to the binary oppositional 
relationship between this sign and others. To Barthes, this is the basis of semiotics (i.e., the 
‘language’ part in Figure 7-2, see blue dotted box), which only shows the meaning of 
denotation, referring to the first level of the signification system (i.e., Saussure’s semiotic 
concepts). Barthes (1993) argued that Saussure only focussed on the relationship between 
signifier and signified and, as Fiske (1990) explained, ignored the “external meaning” of the 
signs (p. 44). Despite the fact that the ‘paradigmatic choices’ or the ‘syntagmatic structure’ of 
those signs remains unchanged, these same signs can still convey diverse meaning within a 
specific cultural or social background. It could be said that Barthes emphasised more the 
‘hidden meaning’ of the structure of signs than the ‘structure’ of signs per se (the latter is 
Saussure’s work).  
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 To Barthes (1993), the ‘hidden’ meaning of signs could be found in what he named the 
“second-order semiological system” (Barthes, 1993, p. 114), as the ‘myth’ part in Figure 7-2 
shows (see red dotted box), where the myth helps to create connotations98
 How does myth work in Barthes’s semiological system? To Barthes, a sign in the 
first-order system has its original meaning, history, and story. So, the first step that myth 
operates is to hollow out the original meaning of the sign (i.e., the ‘3. Sign’ in Figure 7-2) of 
the first-order system. In so doing, this sign will only maintain its ‘form’ without any 
‘concept’ inside, which, according to the semiotic concept, becomes a new signifier—a 
signifier of the second-order system (i.e., the I SIGNIFIER in Figure 7-2). 
. Based on this 
two-order semiological system, it is understandable that myth is a concept that relies on the 
first-order system and exercises on the second-order system where connotation emerges.  
 While the meaning of a sign (3. Sign) in the first-order system is hollowed out and 
becomes the new signifier (I SIGNIFIER) of the second-order system, the next step that 
myth operates is to immediately introduce a new meaning, a new history, or a new story 
which myth prefers (i.e., a new signified, II SIGNIFIED in Figure 7-2) and to link this new 
meaning with the new signifier (i.e., I SIGNIFIER or the hollowed sign ‘3. Sign’). The 
reason a myth can do so is due to the arbitrary relationship between the signifier and 
signified. As a result, the connotation (i.e., III SIGN, invisible) of the original sign (i.e., 3. 
Sign, visible) comes to exist. 
 Namely, how myth works is to make the first-order system’s ‘3. Sign’ become the 
second-order system’s “I SIGNIFIER”. As Barthes (1993) explained, the sign “in the first 
system […] becomes a mere signifier in the second” (p. 114). Simultaneously, the new II 
SIGNIFIED, which myth prefers, will be arbitrarily linked to this I SIGNIFIER. In so doing, 
this original sign (i.e., “3. Sign”) will be displayed with a totally different meaning (i.e., 
connotation, the invisible III SIGN) to readers. 
 
                                                     
98 What has to be noted first is that, to Barthes, the connotation here does not simply refer to a ‘false’ 
concept; instead, it means what meaning of signs is recognized within a certain cultural background. 
While the meaning of signs that people perceive damages the interests of one group of people, the 
discovery of what meaning (connotation) such signs signify becomes very important. Barthes argues, 
the more people that take the meaning of signs for granted, the more dangerous the signs are. In order 
to discover how this ‘common sense’ (i.e., connotation) works, it has to go through mythological 
analysis. 
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 What one has to notice is that the ‘new meaning (connotation, i.e., III SIGN)’ that myth 
reinstalls into the hollowed sign (i.e., 3. Sign) is not the myth of what people used to think 
when reading this term itself. Myth does not refer to any meaning. Myth, as Barthes claims, 
is the “signification” that is a process—transforming signs of the first-order system into a 
new signifier (hollowed form) in the second order, and then arbitrarily linking with a new 
signified (myth’s preferred concept)— assisting a sign to start to signify certain connotations 
(p. 121).  
 Nevertheless, the reason a myth is able to function is not simply because of the above 
process. Another point that makes myth special is that myth always has an ‘excuse’ 
whenever one interrogates its (sneaky) influence and efficiency. This excuse is what Barthes 
(1993) called myth’s “alibi” (p. 123). Barthes further explains:  
The essential point in all this is that the form does not suppress the meaning, it only 
impoverishes it, it puts it at a distance … [Its meaning] is a death with reprieve; the 
meaning loses its value, but keeps its life. The meaning will be for the form like an 
instantaneous reserve of history, a tamed richness, which it is possible to call and 
dismiss in a sort of rapid alternation. (p. 118)  
What Barthes tried to say is that although the meaning of the sign in/of the first-order system 
is hollowed by myth, the original meaning of this sign never disappears. It will show up 
again when the intention of myth is detected. When one argues that myth changes the 
meaning of a sign, myth can always confidently offer its ‘alibi’ to refute criticisms by 
claiming that ‘nothing has changed’ because it is ‘still the same sign’ (i.e., 3. Sign), which 
represents the same meaning (instead of the new reinstalled meaning). When readers are 
again negligent, myth will immediately connect readers to the connotations that myth 
actually wants to convey imperceptibly.  
 That is to say, myth’s functioning process always needs a citadel where it can pretend 
to be innocent and guiltless; but myth will stealthily take over the authority of interpretation 
when people do not pay attention to what they read/see. Barthes (1993) concluded, “It is this 
constant game of hide-and-seek between the meaning [i.e., 3. Sign] and the form [i.e., I 
SIGNIFIER] which defines myth” (p. 118).  
 To conclude, the two levels of the semiological system are the key points as to why 
myth can display its strength to transform the meaning of signs. Myth will hollow the 
original meaning of sign (i.e., 3. Sign) of the first-order system and make it the new signifier 
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(i.e., I SIGNIFIER) of the second-order system. Simultaneously, a new meaning (i.e., II 
SIGNIFIED), which myth prefers, will be arbitrarily linked to the I SIGNIFIER. As a result, 
when readers see this sign, they do not read the original meaning (i.e., ‘3. Sign’); instead, 
what they perceive is the connotation of such sign (i.e., the invisible III SIGN). Of course, 
when one argues myth’s intervention in signs, myth will defend that nothing has changed 
because the sign is still the same sign, which also represents the same meaning (original 
meaning). This is myth’s alibi. Myth always enjoys playing hide-and-seek.  
 
This section theoretically discusses how simple signs, once having the aid of myth, start to 
convey certain connotations. How myth functions could refer to the previous Figure 7-2. In 
the latter Example 7-1, this thesis will take RA17 to explain how myth works on a single 
sign (i.e., the word ‘just’) to convey a connotation.  
 Yet in most cases, the connotation of an ideology is usually generated from the 
cooperation of several signs. That is to say: in the process of making an ideology, not all 
signs can individually reveal its connotation; sometimes, a sign can display a connotation 
only when it teams up with other signs99. Accordingly, a map to explain how and why signs 
together signify other connotations (i.e., the making of ideology) can be drawn as Figure 
7-3100
                                                     
99 Take Barthes’s (1993) own example of the black soldier who salutes to a French flag. Saluting, as a 
single sign, refers to the gesture of a hand (the signifier) and the meaning of respect (the signified). 
While this sign cooperates with other signs, such as ‘black people’ and the ‘French flag’, a new 
meaning, or say, a connotation—France’s generousness—comes to exist. 
, which is a combination of Figure 7-2 (explaining how myth functions) and Figure 6-3 
(referring to basic semiotic notions). It again testifies that the basic semiotic notion, such as 
syntagmatic structure, and paradigmatic choices should not be ignored while analysing 
ideology. 
100 In this figure, the oppositional part only displays the structure of sign (i.e., sign = signifier + 
signified) instead of the Barthes’s myth model (two-order system). This is because the (second-order) 
connotations result from the (first-order) primary signs; the (first-order) primary signs are defined by 
their binary oppositional relationship with the secondary signs. The secondary signs have nothing to 
do with the operation of myth. The Secondary Classes play the comparison roles. 
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Figure 7-3: How Reality is Constructed from the Myth Operation (Barthes’s Concept) 
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 The following examples will explain how a single sign (Example 7-1) signifies a 
connotation as well as how diverse signs work together (Example 7-2) to convey a 
connotation. 
Empirical Analysis 
Example 7-1: How a single sign reveals a connotation. In RA17, the IAC analyst, David 
Weltman, analysed how the single word, just, was appropriated for political intention (to 
deny things). Weltman pointed out that usage of just was able to create comparability 
between speeches: as he explained, “speakers appear to argue for an ideologically preferred 
version, and so at the same time against an alternative, or dispreferred one” (2003, p. 350). 
His explanation, to a great extent, echoes the function of myth in generating connotations. To 
simply adopt one extract provided in Weltman’s article, where one of his interviewees 
answers the question of why he joins the Labour Party: 
And that is I want to help people. And the reason why I’m in the Labour Party is 
that I just see that the people who need the help the most are more likely to be 
helped through Labour policies than they are through Conservative policies. It’s 
really just as simple as that. But I didn’t learn my politics through university. If you 
like I learnt it in the university of life. (p. 358; layout is revised; emphasis original) 
In this example, the first-order system is: this politician is definitely a member of the Labour 
Party. How myth works in this case? The myth first decreases the importance of the 
politician’s party-background (i.e., to empty the original meaning) and then to implant a 
neutral role for this politician which works on the second-order system. Because the 
politician “just [sees] that the people […] are more likely to be helped through Labour 
policies”, he joined the Labour Party. The word just offers a space for this politician to 
maintain a neutral political position: It is to help people that he joins the Labour Party.  
 Similarly, when the critics argue that this politician, by using the word just, tries to 
de-emphasise his identity as a Labour Party member and guides the spotlight to focus on ‘he 
wants to help people’, the myth will respond, ‘No, he did not deny his identity as a Labour 
Party member. He just thinks that this Party is a good place to help people’. Namely, in this 
example, the politician adopts the word just to create a neutral political position, preventing 
him from appearing to have a closer relationship with a specific political party. Just is the 
gangplank of the mythical process of ideology. 
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 How a single sign starts to carry its connotation was explained in the above example 
7-1. How diverse signs together construct a certain connotation (i.e., ideology) will be 
illustrated below.  
 Example 7-2: In RA04, IAC analyst, Ronald Bishop, explained how a diet company’s 
product, Ultra Slim-Fast, conveys a professional and scientific image. He wrote: 
In 1996, the company introduced the “Slim-Fast Institute.” One Institute 
commercial began with white-coated characters scurrying around behind a pair of 
imposing glass doors, which open, allowing the viewer to pass through. Would-be 
scientists are shown eyeing test tubes and convening to discuss complex figures 
on a wall chart. (2001, p. 343; emphasis added) 
In this example, the diet company’s ‘Slim-Fast Institute’ is the Primary Class, which is what this 
commercial tries to promote. Several Sub-Primary Classes could be identified as well (as shown 
in boldface). They are all signs which are able to signify specific connotations to promote 
reliability of the Slim-Fast Institute. This thesis has indicated their common connotations, which 
are revealed according Barthes’s mythology, as Figure 7-4 shows.  
 How might their connotations emerge? Take Sub-PC A as an example (see Figure 7-4, red 
words). At the first-order system, the sign from the TV (or IAC article) is ‘white coat’, which is 
composed of the 1.Signifier: a white coat (image), and the 2.Signified: a coat is a type of clothing 
(concept); accordingly, the 3.Sign here refers to ‘white coat is a type of clothing’.  
 At the second-order system, the meaning of the 3.Sign is hollowed, becoming a form 
without any concept (i.e., I SIGNIFIER: white coat is a type of clothing). At the same time, 
the myth will reinstall a new concept (i.e., the II SIGNIFIED: a professional sense101
 
) to 
connect with this hollowed I SIGNIFIER. As a result, the connotation of Sub-PC A emerges, 
that is, III SIGN: white coat signifies a professional sense. Myth works in other Sub-Primary 
Classes (B-G) through the same logic as well, as Figure 7-4 shows. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
101 Why ‘professional sense’? It has to consider the colour ‘white’ mean to us as well as the place that 
‘white coat’ is shown. This point will be further explained later 
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Figure 7-4: The Reality that the TV Frame Constructs Through the Operation of Myth 
 
 
So far, the Primary Class still refers to the ‘Slim-Fast Institute’. It is not until Bishop wrote 
down the following sentence (as the TV advert continues), the real Primary Class (to which 
the Slim-Fast Institute in fact serves) as well as the connotation it carries—Ultra Slim-Fast is 
safe and professional—reveals. Bishop (2001) wrote: 
The activity continues as we are told that Ultra Slim-Fast is nutritionally beneficial 
and that using the product is part of a healthy lifestyle. (p. 343) 
That is to say, right after the appearance of the above sentence, the original meaning of Ultra 
Slim-Fast—as being a product—has been emptied to become a pure ‘form’ without any 
‘concept’ inside. Simultaneously, myth immediately replaces a new meaning—a professional, 
scientific, and safe concept—which results from Bishop’s earlier description (i.e., the 
previous quotation: Sub-Primary Classes A–G). The entire mythological process can be 
drawn as Figure 7-5 (please refer to theoretical Figure 7-3 and the previous Figure 7-4).  
 As explained before, myth always has excuses. When it faces critiques—such as: this 
advertising utilises professional and scientific frames (signs) to provide credits to the product 
Ultra Slim-Fast— myth will retreat back to the original fort and reply, ‘No. This is just a 
frame picturing a laboratory, something necessary for any product’s development’; or ‘We 
simply adopt the condition of laboratory as the background of our advertisement’. This is the 
process of explaining how ideology plays the game of hide-and-seek as it inserts specific 
meanings in ordinary signs. 
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Figure 7-5: Why the Diet Product Ultra Slim-Fast Conveys a ‘Professional, Scientific and Safe’ Connotation (Mythological Process) 
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 The above two examples are provided to explain how myth functions, or, in other 
words, to prove how Barthes’s notion of myth delineates the making of ideology. Yet, as 
mentioned earlier, most IAC articles usually directly state one thing as an ideology instead of 
systematically and clearly explaining why such a phenomenon signifies an ideology or how 
one ideology is constructed. This is also the reason why this thesis suggests Procedure 3: 
Connoting Certain Significances that is expected to be the bridge to mend their 
demonstrative shortcoming.  
 The following example shows what the concept of myth can do to intensify the 
demonstration that IAC analysts usually ignore.  
 Example 7-3: In RA07, the IAC analyst, Michael Hazelton, quoted a paragraph from 
his research data, an official report named Submission. The Submission says: 
The shift from hospital-based to college-based training had been a disaster for the 
public hospital system. The nurses came out of college with a degree but no 
practical experience. Some of them cannot even put on a bandage. (1990, p. 119) 
His citing these words from the Submission shows that he himself has discovered the 
connotation of this paragraph—that is, Submission’s words attempt to slander college-based 
nurse training and to define such training with images of incompetency. Yet, Hazelton failed 
to tell his readers why and how these words possess such a negative connotation. This is why 
this thesis suggests Barthes’s mythology to redeem such kinds of demonstrative shortcoming, 
which happens a lot in most of the IAC articles that this thesis has investigated. 
 In this example, the critical factor that connects the college-based nurses to images of 
incompetency and inexperience (or, as the quotation says, ‘a disaster for the public hospital 
system’) is from the Submission’s description: they “cannot even put on a bandage” (p. 119). 
To the public’s traditional recognition, bandaging is a necessary skill that all nurses should 
be equipped with.  
 The myth functions first by emptying the original meaning/value of college-based 
nurses—i.e., their efforts to obtain degrees—and second by replacing it with the traditional 
public consciousness—i.e., nurses must be skilled in bandaging. In other words, myth will 
wipe away the necessity and importance of college-trained nurses, who possess other 
medical knowledge and skills, and displace them with the connotation that traditional skills 
(e.g., bandaging) are much more important. As a result, after the operation of myth in 
creating connotation, images of incompetency have been connected to college-trained 
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nurses.  
 Again, while the critics argue that the ideology of this report, Submission, expresses 
disdain for the college-trained nurses, the myth will retreat to the literal meaning of words 
and reply, ‘No, the report only points out their inexperience with bandaging compared to 
hospital-trained nurses. This report does not mean college-trained nurses are incompetent’. 
Consequently, this operation of myth, by playing the game of hide-and-seek, helps certain 
group to maintain or intensify their certain ideology (i.e., the orthodoxy of hospital-based 
nurse training). 
 To conclude, in this section, this thesis has provided examples to explain how myth 
operates based on a single sign as well as a set of signs to convey a certain connotation in 
which one ideology is established. Moreover, this thesis also explained why and how 
Barthes’s mythology could be a bridge to redeem the demonstrative shortcoming where IAC 
analysts usually neglect.  
 Table 7-1 is a reference list guiding identification of how IAC analysts’ writings 
pointed out the connotation that their research subjects convey, even though, in most cases, 
they did not provide adequate demonstrations to support their findings. Yet, Barthes’ 
mythology could mend such shortcoming. The original IAC articles could be found in the 
disk attached in Appendix 1. 
 
Table 7-1: Reference of IAC Articles Which Imply the Existence of Connotation 
SWPs Code: P3-C (Connoting Certain Significances) 
Articles Found References/Examples 
RA01 p.173(9); p.178(14); 180(16);  
RA03 p.139(3); p.140(4); p.141(5); p.143(7); p.144(8); p.146(10); p.148(12); p.149(13); p.151(15);  
RA04 p.338(5); p.339(6); p.341(8); p.342(9); p.343(10); p.344(11); p.345(12); p.346(13); p.347(14); p.348(15); p.351(18);  
RA06 p.447(3); p.448(4); p.450(6); p.451(7); p.453(9); p.454(10); p.455(11); p.456(12); p.457(13);  
RA07 p.118(12); p.119(13); p.122(16);  
RA08 p.271(11);  
RA10 p.419(3); p.422(6); p.425(9);  
RA12 p.1031(7); p.1032(8); p.1036(12); p.1040(16);  
RA15 p.465(11); p.467(13); p.468(14);  
RA16 p.139(3); p.140(4); p.145(9); p.147(11); p.148(12); p.150(14); p.152(16);  
RA17 p.351(3); p.355(7); p.356(8); p.359(11); p.360(12); p.361(13); p.363(15); p.364(16); p.365(17); p.366(18); p.368(20); p.369(21);  
RA18 p.159(6);  
RA20 p.362(10); p.363(11);  
RA21 p.419(9); p.420(10); p.421(11); p.423(13); p.425(15); p.426(16);  
RA23 p.387(2); p.390(5)a; p.391(6); p.393(8);  
RA24 p.500(14); p.501(15);  
RA28 p.167(11); p.175(19); p.176(20)a; p.180(24);  
RA29 p.923(10)a;  
RA30 p.466(2)a; p.471(7); p.472(8); p.473(9); p.474(10); p.484(20); p.490(26);  
RA31 p.223(6); p.224(7); p.225(8); p.228(11); p.229(12);  
RA32 p.22(6); p.24(8); p.25(9);  
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Application of Barthes’s Mythology 
Concepts of mythology are much easier to apply in visual analysis, such as advertising, TV 
programmes, and films because the basic elements (e.g., colours, gestures) of their signs are 
much more recognisable. Yet, mythology can still be applied to text, as the above three 
examples have shown. Hence, this part will suggest two points for future analysts who apply 
Barthes’s mythology to illustrate the making of ideology.  
 First, as mentioned previously, the process of describing phenomena per se is the 
process of analysing and constructing an ideology. For this reason, analysts are required to 
possess the capacity of describing phenomena before they are able to examine how others 
describe their research studies. In order to obtain such ability, analysts have to understand 
well the describing methods they can apply (to describe their research). After realising how 
self might describe phenomena, then it is possible to understand what describing methods 
others might apply to do the same.  
 Second, in order to realise what elements they can apply, future analysts are required to 
comprehend the meaning of elements—i.e., signs, including the birth of its meaning, as well 
as its different meaning in diverse cultural backgrounds, which is what Barthes emphasised 
the most. This is also to answer why the ‘white coat’ in example 7-2 refers to a ‘professional 
sense’. 
 For instance, the gesture of people lifting their hats means a greeting that originated in 
medieval times when knights took off their helmets in order to prove their goodwill. This 
movement of lifting a hand to the head also explains the meaning of salute. A salute refers to 
the respect that is based on the meaning of taking off a helmet to show no hostility in the past 
(Machin, 2007; Panofsky, 1955; Van Leeuwen, 2001). As IAC analysts, they have to 
understand the (original) meaning of helmet (that is, people are armed to fight) before they 
can detect the connotation of the image, in Barthes’ own example, showing a black soldier’s 
salute to a French flag. 
 Regarding the meaning of the same signs in different cultures, for example, yellow can 
mean sunny, but in some cultures it refers to sickness, as when people have a liver disease 
(Kress & Van Leeuwen, 2002). Japanese people dress in white clothing at weddings, while 
such dress refers to funeral affairs in Taiwanese culture. Similarly, being IAC analysts, the 
more they can comprehend the meaning of the same elements/signs in different cultures, the 
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better they can accurately determine the connotation their research subjects carry.  
 In short, future IAC analysts should possess the ability to describe their research 
phenomena before they are able to examine how others’ texts conceal particular connotation. 
To thoroughly understand the meaning of signs, including their origins and diversity in 
different backgrounds, is a way to undertake their analysis/critique. 
 
7.3 Conclusion 
It is reasonable to say that the most common critique on ideological analysis or critique 
should be: By whose authority are you so confident in claiming this is an ideology? It points 
out that why ideology is considered as ideology cannot be validated by random or arbitrary 
allegation. It always needs a theoretical basis, especially when the researched phenomenon is 
referring to a negative characteristic of ideology. Simply claiming that ‘one phenomenon 
represents an ideology’ without explaining why and how is irresponsible and incomplete, 
which, unfortunately, is the common argumentative shortcoming that this thesis has found in 
most of our 33 IAC articles. 
 Thus, this thesis introduces Barthes’s concept of mythology to mend this argumentative 
shortcoming. Of course, Barthes’s concept of mythology is one of many ways to discover 
connotations that are based on Saussure’s semiotic concepts. The process of operation of 
myth relies on a two-order semiological system where connotation results from the 
transformation between the first-order system’s sign and the second-order system’s signifier. 
Because of this process, why and how a simple sign is able to convey a connotation is 
answered. Barthes’s notion not only helps to mend the argumentative shortcoming; it also 
helps ideological analysis to obtain more reliability and validity. 
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Procedure 4: Illustration (Articulation and Interpellation) 
 
7.4 Introduction 
In Procedure 2, selecting theoretical foundations, this thesis introduced the basic semiotic 
concepts which help to explain how reality (or a neutral characteristic of ideology) is 
presented. By introducing the notion of mythology in Procedure 3 connoting certain 
meanings, how ideology, especially one with a negative meaning, is constructed becomes 
clear. The concept of mythology helps us to comprehend how simple signs are able to carry 
certain connotations.  
 If Procedure 3, based on a theoretical perspective (i.e., mythology), explains how 
diverse signs convey specific connotations, which might further reveal a certain ideology, 
then Procedure 4, Illustration, determines practically the same function as the concept of 
myth suggests, enabling ordinary signs to start their journey and carry connotations. In short, 
Procedure 4 attempts to discover the kinds of illustrating techniques that IAC analysts 
frequently apply. By using these techniques, IAC analysts’ written words start to carry 
certain connotation. 
 Accordingly, this section will first explain why the term illustration is used in this 
thesis as well as its relationship with other terms, articulation and interpellation. Next, two 
illustrating techniques will be introduced, including the depiction of research subjects via a 
thorough understanding of their history and literature, and through specific presenting 
techniques.  
Theoretical Discussion—The Meaning of Illustration 
Whether analysing or criticizing an ideology (or the IAC works) or whether purely 
presenting or constructing IAC articles/reports, analysts’ illustrations (i.e., their words) 
always play an influential role in determining readers’ understanding. From a semiotic 
perspective, illustrations are the product of signs which echoes Althusser’s notion: ideology 
has a material existence. The basis of material existence permits the possibility of whether to 
analyse or criticise, to purely present or construct ideologies, all of which are embraced in 
the same way, illustrating.  
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 This thesis suggests that every process of illustrating anything in any context contains 
two major means, that is, interpellation and (dis/re-)articulation. The former’s concept is 
generated from Althusser while the latter is from Gramscian (specifically in Laclau & 
Mouffe, 2001). A specific ideology interpellates individuals as its subjects as well as 
dis/re-articulating elements to empower its hegemony; this refers to the process of ‘making’ 
(i.e., purely presenting or constructing) ideologies. Similarly, it is through telling people how 
individuals are interpellated and what elements are dis/re-articulated that analysts unveil the 
connotation of ideologies, which refers to the process of ‘analysing or criticising’ 
ideologies102
 Whether to make (purely present or construct) or to tell (analyse or criticise), they are 
all based on analysts’ illustrating actions. Thus, in this thesis, the term illustration is adopted 
to refer to both concepts of articulation and interpellation. In other words, ideology is 
presented or constructed as well as analysed or criticised through the illustrating process, 
which could be seen as comprising the consecutive actions of articulation and interpellation.  
.  
Although notions of articulation and interpellation possess their own theoretical origin, 
this study states that each term is indeed the alter ego of the other. They are complementary. 
Both notions are a batch of terminologies which interact with and depend upon the other. A 
bolder perspective might be that they are merely two different terminologies which refer to 
the same characteristic dealing with the same mission in the realm of ideology. This is 
because a successful action of interpellation results from a long term process of 
(dis/re-)articulation which reflects the individuals’ life experience. On the other hand, 
whether the work of (dis/re-)articulation is valid can only be attested to when individuals are 
successfully interpellated to accept the points of (dis/re-)articulating. 
Why has the term illustration been introduced here? Although interpellation and 
articulation are concepts agreed to be capable of explaining ‘how ideology is formed or 
revealed’, these two terms are considered to possess an active, aggressive, or attempted 
                                                     
102 Additionally, how IAC analysts make their readers believe what they have argued is also through 
their illustration of arguments. That is still the process of interpellation and articulation. What has to 
be noted is that whether they purely present their findings or not, they inevitably and unintentionally 
create a new ideology. Again, it is back to the process of constructing ideology. This is what this 
thesis stated in Chapter 4, that understanding the making of ideology is to analyse it, and the process 
of analysing an ideology is also that of making a new ideology. This is surely a permanent loop in any 
ideology-related research which will be discussed in later chapters. 
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implication while probing ideologies. In fact, not every (IAC) analysts intends to embed 
connotations in contexts during their writing process, even though their works might indeed 
construct an ideology. If the terms interpellation and articulation are used to explain how 
they compose their writings, it seems that they analyse/criticise for purpose which contains 
deliberate intentions. Hence, the reason why the term illustration is introduced here is simple: 
first, to create a term, which holds a pure and neutral characteristic, in order to avoid the 
active or attempted characteristic of both interpellation and articulation. Second, since this 
thesis argues that interpellation and articulation are in fact the alter ego of the other carrying 
the same mission in making ideology, a simplified and neutral term illustrating/illustration to 
replace them seems reasonable. 
Thus, based on an investigation of 33 IAC articles, how IAC analysts illustrate their 
research—i.e., how they interpellate their readers to accept their argument and how they 
(dis/re-)articulate concepts needed to complete their argument— in order to undertake their 
ideological analysis/critique has been induced as two dimensions, first, via a thoroughly 
understanding of the research subjects’ history and literature, and second, through specific 
describing/presenting techniques. 
 
7.5 Illustration—Via A Thoroughly Understanding of the Research Subjects’ 
History or Literature 
In the previous discussion of myth, this study pointed out that all signs possess certain 
meanings whose origin could be retrospectively traced (e.g., the meaning of saluting). Once 
these signs are appropriated within a new context, intentionally or accidentally, connotations 
might emerge (e.g., black soldier salutes to a French flag). Accordingly, this thesis argues 
that analysts are required to comprehend the meaning of signs (including its original 
meaning and its different meaning in diverse cultural backgrounds) to reach a comprehensive 
analysed result.  
 Since any ideology is shaped through a long-term historical process in which all 
elements of it interact with and influence one another, thoroughly understanding the 
researched subjects’ history or literature becomes the critical point to detect such a shaping 
process. This is similar to the importance of historical statistics in sports since these data 
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could help to analyse opponents’ performance and habits in order to defeat them. The more 
analysts can comprehend the history and literature, the better they might detect the 
ideological track of their research subjects, and, the more efficiently they can apply the 
history/literature to construct a certain ideology. 
 Two IAC analysts’ common illustrating (i.e., interpellating and articulating.) techniques 
based on their thoroughly understanding the history or literature are: first, finding similarities 
(and further to make comparison) and, second, using references. 
Finding Similarities (and Making Comparison) 
Finding similarities here means to uncover the similarities of texts, concepts, and history 
(events) between researched subjects and certain history or literature. Regarding texts in 
particular, it refers to the similarity of texts’ figure, pronunciation, or implied meaning 
between the researched texts and texts in literature. 
The birth of connotation here is based on this logic: if the texts/concepts/history in a 
certain history or literature refer to a specific meaning, then the similar texts/concepts/history 
found in the researched subjects will easily be linked to signify the same meaning.  
Example 7-4: Regarding the similarities of texts, take RA19 for example. In RA19, the 
IAC analyst, Daragh Downes (2010), utilized the illustrating aspect of finding similarities in 
his research in order to explain why some parts of J. K. Rowling’s writings were based on a 
projection of Nazi history. As Downes wrote, 
We hear Grindelwald; we think of a certain other Teutonic dark wizard. We hear 
pure-blood philosophy; we think of Aryan supremacy. We hear Nurmengard; we 
think of Nuremberg. We hear reign of terror; we think of Lebensraum, ghettos 
and camps. We hear mainland Europe; we think of – mainland Europe. We hear 
1945; we think of – 1945. (p. 167; emphasis added) 
The pair of Nurmengard and Nuremberg refers to similar words, especially in its figure. 
Other pairs of terms (e.g., pure-blood vs. Aryan or reign of terror vs. Lebensraum) 
emphasized above apply to the similarities of implied meaning or history. All these pairs of 
terms together create the similarities between the Harry Potter story and Nazi history. 
Further discussion of this point is provided in the conclusion.  
 Example 7-5: In terms of finding similarities of concepts, take RA22 and RA25 as 
examples. In RA22, the author, Haslanger (2007), argued how gender stereotype leads to 
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gender identity. She found the similarity of stereotypical thinking that girls are usually bad at 
mathematics in order to support and equate her argument that “highly gender coded clothing 
has been found to be one such thing” (p. 76). She attempted to argue that girls were not born 
with bad mathematical skills as well as not being supposed to wear certain styles of clothing 
(to be girls), which are both gender stereotypes. In addition, in RA25, the IAC analyst, 
DeFoster (2010), argued how the media presented the news of the Columbine school 
shooting as having “marked a watershed in coverage of these kinds of tragedies” (p. 466). 
She pointed out the similarity of news coverage in the Gulf War—“the exhaustive, cyclical, 
round-the-clock news coverage” (p. 466) —to show how and why such media reports 
influenced audiences’ attitude and public discourse in the coverage of Columbine. 
 In the above cases, these analysts attempted to use specific concepts with which people 
are already familiar to help readers understand their arguments. Of course, if readers are 
unfamiliar with these similar concepts offered—e.g., mathematical gender stereotyping and 
the style of news report from the Gulf War—or readers do not even consider that any 
similarities exist (i.e., readers did not ‘answer the call’, Althusser’s term), then these analysts 
fail to interpellate their readers. Yet, if readers are familiar with these compared concepts and 
agree with the similarities drawn, then the process of interpellation (to accept analysts’ 
arguments) will be easier and more efficient. 
 Accordingly, the ideological function of finding similarities is that the IAC analysts, on 
the surface, seem to merely suggest a comparison for readers (and readers have free will to 
agree or disagree). In fact, claiming the similarities between the researched subjects and the 
related history/literature, is an efficient way of allowing analysts to infer or directly claim 
that their research subjects possess the same concept/ideology (because the history/literature 
has already demonstrated it). In other words, finding similarities is about shaping the vantage 
point from which something is viewed which echoes to Hall’s (2004) notion of ‘preferred 
reading’ (explained in Chapter 9). 
 Example 7-6: In regard to finding similarities of history, RA05 can be used as an 
example. In RA05, the IAC analysts, Brennen and Duffy (2003), explained how media 
represented Arab-Americans in the 9/11 events through a comparison with the Pearl Harbor 
incident. In both situations American territory was attacked. The authors found several 
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similarities such as, “civil liberties [were] curtailed” (p. 6); government asked people to 
“return to normalcy” (p. 7); Japanese and Arab-Americans were presented as “targets of 
harassment” (p. 9), “oppositional voices [were]  muted” (p. 11). According to them, these 
similarities were drawn in news coverage of both events. They found that both Japanese and 
Arab-Americans were tagged with an image of the Others.  
 It is interesting that, although RA05 claimed to examine both events, most discussions 
and citation of news-texts were placed on the Pearl Harbor side. For example, after a long 
discussion of how government asked people to ‘return to normalcy’, the authors only had 
one sentence103
 To conclude, whether J. K. Rowling was conscious/unconscious to create such 
similarities in her novel, once her texts became influential, they require examination. Finding 
similarities (based on a thorough understanding of history and literature) could be seen as the 
basic technique in which to proceed with an ideological analysis/critique, through which it 
should be possible to predict and prevent the possible influences from, for instance, 
Rowling’s concealed fascist ideology embedded in the Harry Potter series. Of course, 
whether the similarities exist between researched contexts and history depends on the readers. 
Once readers agree with the similarities suggested by the authors, it becomes the easier and 
more efficient way to pass the recognition regarding history/literature to current researched 
contexts. Once the connection of similarities is created, whatever arguments the analysts 
suggest, readers will automatically connect these arguments to the analysts’ research subject.  
 to claim that it is the same as in the news coverage of 9/11. It seems that, on 
the surface, Brennen and Duffy attempted to create a reasonable comparison between two 
events. In fact, it is through highlighting events’ similarities that they transferred and 
connected what people understood about an old event to a current one. As a result, authors 
do not have to address much about 9/ 11. Whatever points they took to explain Pearl Harbor, 
readers will automatically connect to their 9/11 argument based on the ideological illustrating 
aspect of finding similarities. 
 Reference of finding similarities (and making comparison) which were frequently 
applied in 33 IAC articles is listed as Table 7-2. 
 
                                                     
103 The sentence is: As will be shown, this is also a powerful theme seen in the coverage following 
9/11. 
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Table 7-2: Reference of Finding Similarities 
SWPs Code: P4-1-FS(MC) (Finding the Similarities and Making Comparison) 
Articles Found References/Examples 
RA01 p.178(14)b; 179(15)b;  
RA03 p.142(6)b;  
RA05 p.3(1)b; p.4(2)b; p.7(5)a; p.8(6)a; p.10(8)b; pp.10-11(8-9)a; p.11(9)a;  
RA06 p.447(3)a; p.457(13)b;  
RA07 p.110(4)a;  
RA08 p.269(9)b;  
RA09 p.603(17)b;  
RA10 p.422(6)a; p.426(10)b;  
RA12 p.1030(6)b; p.1038(14)a;  
RA14 p.101(2)a;  
RA17 p.357(9)a; p.362(14)a; p.365(17)a;  
RA18 p.159(6)b;  
RA19 p.164(3)a; p.165(4)a; p.167(6)a,b; p.168(7)b; p.169(8)b; p.170(9)b;  
RA20 p.357(5)a; p.366(14)a;  
RA22 p.73(4)a; p.76(7); p.85(16);  
RA23 p.388(3)b; p.389(4)a; p.390(5)a; p.394(9)a; p.395(10)a;  
RA24 p.488(2)b; p.488-9(2-3)b; p.490(4)b; p.497(11)a,b; p.498(12)b; p.504(18)b;  
RA25 p.466(1)a; p.477(12)b; p.478(13)a;  
RA26 p.83(5)b; p.84(6)b; p.95(17)b;  
RA27 p.199(20)b;  
RA28 p.164(8)a,b; p.171(15)a; p.179(23)a;  
RA30 p.471(7)a; p.476(12)b; p.488(24)b;  
RA31 p.222(5)a; p.226(9)a; p.227(10)b; p.228(11)a; p.229(12)a; p.230(13)b; p.232(15)b;  
RA32 p.18(2)b; p.19(3)b;  
RA33 p.663-4(23-4)a; p.665(25)b;  
Concepts a: Finding the Similarities; b: Making comparison. 
 
 
Using References 
Using references means that analysts cite certain terminologies, sentences, or data to echo, 
testify, or prove their arguments. Any selected quotation or terminology in ideological works, 
in fact, is applied to articulate with analysts’ own opinions in order to interpellate readers to 
accept what they argue. The more analysts thoroughly understand the history or literature of 
their research subjects, the more they can skilfully apply words, terminology or famous 
quotations, and the more reliability and validity of their argument they can claim.  
 First, in respect of encoding, the action of selecting certain references is the result of 
ideological operations which represent the analysts’ own ideology. These selected quotations, 
the cited extent, and order of presentation, to a great degree, have not only demonstrated the 
argument IAC analysts wish to make but have also indicated the direction the analysts want 
their readers to follow. These cited references help to rationalize the analysts’ own words 
instead of displaying its own original meaning, which, on the one hand, echoes Barthes’ 
notion ‘the death of the author’ whilst on the other these selected quotations are able to 
generate an entirely different meaning. Take IAC article RA25 for example. 
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 Example 7-7: RA25 is a twelve thousand word article in which 275 quotations104
Throughout the coverage, money was cited as Galloway’s sole motivation for 
holding out. “The Seahawks thought they had given Joey Galloway 35 million 
reasons to end his holdout,” Farnsworth wrote in the Post-Intelligencer after 
Galloway rejected the Seahawks’ offer (1999c, p. 1). “In a business supported 
primarily by fans who can’t afford decent furniture, he mocks the $5 million a 
year on the table,” columnist Ron Judd wrote. “He laughs off a $7 million 
signing bonus he’s never earned. Give me $10 million, he says. Then we’ll talk 
about my loyalty” (1999, p. 3; emphasis added). 
 from 
literature or newspapers (its research subjects) are cited. These 275 quotations contain about 
2800 words. Take one paragraph in page 454 of RA25 as an example. 
The cited references might help to rationalize the analysts’ own intention instead of 
displaying its own meaning; or, in this case, it could be said that the analysts help readers to 
examine/conclude how newspapers talked about Galloway. Either dimension of thinking is 
possible depending on readers’ recognition. The point is that using references indeed is a way 
to reveal analysts’ personal opinion, or, at least, representing what the analysts consider as 
important (otherwise, they would not have cited such words to generate an argument).  
 Next, in terms of decoding, readers never perceive meanings of contexts from 
quotations and meanings of the analysts’ own words separately. Quotations and analysts’ 
own words usually are seen as a ‘whole’. In most cases, quotations are not read with the 
original meaning, but are served as a foil to complete the analysts’ own words which together 
construct a certain meaning (or ideology). Take RA12 for example.  
 Example 7-8: In RA12, Ewick and Silbey (1999) quoted (first sentence cited below) 
and wrote (the second sentence),  
So I thought what I would do, in a magnanimous gesture, is I would file an 
appeal for everybody in my poker game. Just do them all at the same time. 
Thus, to Alan Fox the law is a gift he can bestow upon others. […] In fact, Alan Fox 
plays law as he plays poker. He said, “Because people who are really my friends, I 
couldn't do enough for them.” Besides, Alan Fox told us, “It's fun.” 
Although Alan Fox indeed links his appeal to a ‘poker game’, his words (the first sentence, 
cited by Ewick and Silbey) became the evidence/resource for Ewick and Silbey to 
manipulate support for what they attempt to argue. As a result, they created a crafty image of 
Alan Fox. Although Ewick and Silbey seem to positively describe Fox’s faith to his friends, 
                                                     
104 It was counted by this thesis. 
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their words (“In fact, Alan Fox plays law as he plays poker”) and the term they cited (“It's 
fun”) still subverts readers’ cognition regarding Fox’s attitude toward law.  
 Finally, the most critical power of using reference is to create an ‘alibi’ for the analysts 
where the analysts’ tracks disappear. By quoting from others’ words, the analysts are able to 
place themselves outside the debated issues to avoid being criticised as ‘over subjectivity’. In 
short, the technique of using references usually displays a faith: let the truth speak for itself 
in which the subjectivity of analysts has been reduced. It seems that it is the quotation 
speaking rather than the analysts. Take RA08 for example. 
 Example 7-9: The following quotations are the final sentences in the conclusion section 
of RA08. The IAC analyst, Crawford (1998, p. 274), cited and wrote,  
Hatcher and Troyna (1994, p.156) have asked, ‘Which actor dominated in the 
relationship among those two shape and implement government policies?’, and (p. 
165), ‘The crucial question is, in the struggle over the curriculum, which element is 
dominant? We would argue that state control has the upper hand…’. Within the 
contexts of influence and text production, the construction of the National 
Curriculum supports this conclusion. 
In this final paragraph, Crawford quoted other scholars’ argument instead of writing his own 
interrogating sentences. In so doing, he kept himself away from personal judgement. While 
some may argue that this conclusion is too arbitrary, these citations will provide him an alibi 
where he (his subjectivity) is absent, which provides himself with a neutral and objective 
image. Simultaneously, while readers are neglected, his personal ideology (which leads to his 
selection of these quotations) is cleverly revealed through these quotations. 
 To conclude, cited words or famous quotations never speak for themselves. Analysts’ 
actions of selecting a certain reference are the results of ideological operation which 
represent their own ideology. Mostly, when analysts cite, they hardly wish to display the 
original meaning of such quotations. Instead, they appropriate the selected quotations to 
support their own arguments and sometimes the meaning of such a quotation deviates. Last, 
the most critical power of using reference is to create an alibi for the analysts where their 
tracks disappear, which could offer them a neutral and objective image. Hence, by 
thoroughly understanding the research subjects’ history or literature, analysts are able to 
select suitable references which not only help to echo, testify, or prove their arguments, but 
also convey their intentions. References are used to be articulated with the analysts’ own 
ideas in order to interpellate readers to accept their arguments.  
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 Other examples of using references which were frequently applied in 33 IAC articles is 
listed as Table 7-3. 
 
Table 7-3: Examples of Using References 
SWPs Code: P4-1-UR (Using References) 
Articles Found References/Examples 
RA01 p.165(1); p.167(3); p.168(4); p.169(5); p.170(6); p.171(7); p.172(8); p.173(9); p.174(10); p.175(11); p.176(12); 177(13); p.178(14); 179(15); 180(16);  
RA02 p.247(3); p.248(4); p.249(5); p.250(6); p.251(7); p.252(8); p.253(9); p.254(10);  
RA03 p.137(1); p.139(3); p.140(4); p.141(5); p.142(6); p.143(7)a,b; p.144(8); p.145(9); p.146(10); p.147(11)a,b; p.148(12); p.149(13); p.150(14); p.151(15); p.152(16); p.153(17);  
RA04 p.336(3); p.337(4); p.338(5); p.339(6)a,b; p.340(7); p.343(10); p.345(12); p.347(14); p.348(15); p.349(16); p.350(17); p.351(18);  
RA05 p.3(1); p.4(2); p.5(3); p.6(4); p.7(5); p.8(6); p.9(7); p.10(8); p.11(9); p.12(10); p.13(11);  
RA06 p.446(2)a,b; p.447(3); p.448(4); p.449(5); p.450(6); p.451(7); p.452(8); p.453(9); p.454(10); p.455(11); p.456(12);  
RA07 p.108(2)a,b; p.109(3)b; p.110(4); p.111(5); p.115(9); p.116(10); p.117(11)b; p.118(12); p.119(13);  
RA08 p.262(2); p.263(3); p.264(4); p.265(5); p.266(6); p.267(7); p.268(8); p.269(9); p.270(10); p.271(11); p.272(12); p.273(13); p.274(14);  
RA09 p.588(2); p.589(3); p.589-90(3-4); p.590(4); p.591(5); p.592(6); p.593(7); p.593-4(7-8); p.594(8); p.598(12); p.603(17);  
RA10 p.417(1); p.418(2); p.419(3); p.420(4); p.421(5); p.422(6); p.423(7); p.424(8); p.425(9); p.426(10);  
RA11 p.104(6); p.105(7); p.106(8); p.107(9);  
RA12 p.1025(1); p.1028(4); p.1029(5); p.1030(6); p.1031(7); p.1032(8); p.1033(9); p.1034(10); p.1035(11); p.1037(13)a,b; p.1038(14); p.1040(16);  
RA13 p.279(1); p.280(2); p.281(3); p.282(4); p.283(5); p.284(6); p.285(7); p.290(12);  
RA14 p.100(1)a,b; p.101(2)a,b; p.102(3); p.103(4)a,b; p.104(5)a,b; p.105(6); p.106(7); p.107(8); p.107-8(8-9)b; p.108(9)a,b; p.109(10);  
RA15 p.455-6(1-2); p.457(3); p.458(4); p.461(7); p.462(8); p.463(9); p.464(10); p.465(11); p.466(12); p.468(14);  
RA16 p.137(1); p.138(2); p.141(5); p.145(9); p.146(10); p.147(11); p.148(12); p.149(13); p.150(14);  
RA17 p.351(3)a,b; p.352(4); p.353(5); p.355(7); p.356(8); p.357(9); p.362(14)a,b; p.366(18)b;  
RA18 p.154(1); p.155(2); p.157(4);  
RA19 p.162(1); p.163(2); p.164(3); p.165(4); p.166(5); p.167(6); p.168(7); p.169(8); p.170(9); p.171(10)a,b; p.172(11); p.173(12);  
RA20 p.355(3); p.357(5); p.358(6); p.362(10); p.363(11); p.364(12); p.365(13); p.366(14);  
RA21 p.412(2); p.414(4); p.416(6); p.417(7); p.418(8); p.419(9); p.420(10); p.421(11); p.422(12); p.423(13); p.424(14); p.425(15); p.426(16);  
RA22 p.70(1); p.71(2); p.75(6); p.76(7); p.77(8); p.78(9); p.82(13); p.83-4(14-5); p.86(17);  
RA23 p.386(1); p.387(2); p.388(3); p.389(4); p.390(5); p.391(6); p.392(7); p.393(8); p.394(9); p.395(10);  
RA24 p.487(1); p.488(2); p.489(3)a,b; p.490(4); p.491(5); p.492(6); p.494(8); p.495(9)a,b; p.496(10); p.497(11); p.498(12); p.499(13); p.500(14); p.501(15); p.503(17); p.504(18);  
RA25 p.466(1); p.467(2); p.468(3); p.469(4); p.470(5); p.472(7)a,b; p.473(8); p.474(9); p.475(10); p.476(11); p.477(12); p.479(14); p.480(15); p.481(16);  
RA26 p.79(1); p.81(3); p.82(4); p.83(5); p.84(6); p.86(8); p.87(9); p.88(10); p.92(14); p.93(15); p.94(16); p.95(17);  
RA27 p.181(2); p.182(3); p.183(4); p.184(5); p.185(6); p.186(7); p.188(9); p.193(14); p.194(15); p.195(16); p.196(17); p.199(20);  
RA28 p.158(2); p.160(4); p.162(6); p.163(7); p.164-5(8-9); p.167(11); p.168-9(12-3); p.169(13); p.170(14); p.171(15); p.172(16); p.173(17); p.174(18); p.175(19); p.176(20); p.177(21);  
RA29 p.914(1); p.915(2); p.916(3); p.917(4); p.918(5); p.919(6); p.922(9); p.923(10); p.924(11); p.925(12);  
RA30 p.470(6); p.471(7); p.472(8); p.473(9); p.474(10); p.475(11); p.476(12); p.477(13); p.478(14); p.479(15); p.480(16)b; p.481(17); p.482(18); p.483-4(19-20); p.486(22)b; p.487(23)b; p.488(24);  
RA31 
p.218(1); p.219(2); p.220(3); p.221(4); p.222(5); p.223(6); p.224(7); p.225(8); p.226(9)a,b; 
p.227(10); p.228(11); p.229(12); p.230(13); p.231(14); p.232(15); p.233(16); p.234(17); p.235(18); 
p.236(19); p.237(20); p.238(21); p.239(22)a,b; p.240(23); p.241(24)a,b; p.242(25);  
RA32 p.20(4); p.22(6); p.23(7); p.24(8); p.25(9); p.26(10); p.27(11); p.28(12); p.29(13);  
RA33 p.642(2); p.644(4)a,b; p.645(5)a,b; p.646(6); p.650(10)b; p.652(12); p.653(13); p.654(14); p.655(15); p.656(16); p.657(17); p.659(19); p.660(20); p.664(24);  
Concepts a: General referencing; b: references from reputed people of the research field. 
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7.6 Illustration—Through Specific Presenting Techniques  
The preceding sections on finding similarities and using references have explained how 
analysts articulate certain concepts of their arguments to interpellate readers as subjects of 
their research (or their ideology). These two techniques are based on a requirement: thorough 
understanding of the research subjects’ history or literature. Yet, if analysts are not familiar 
with, for instance, Nazi history, they are unable to recognise the fascist ideology embedded 
in Rowling’s Harry Potter, not to mention to apply related references to support or convey 
their argument. 
 Indeed tracks of ideological manipulation (by IAC analysts) are revealed throughout 
IAC articles. The following discussion will focus on how simple words, due to analysts’ 
specific presenting techniques, start to display specific meanings or help to undertake 
ideological manipulation to influence readers. In other words, it is to examine those specific 
presenting techniques that analysts unconsciously but frequently apply, which are shown to 
contain the actions of articulation and interpellation. Four presenting techniques are found, 
including techniques of transferring, using inarguable data, writing, and last, explaining. 
Transferring (Rhetorics of Persuasion) 
There is a special presenting technique found in 33 IAC articles, which is termed as the 
process of transferring. By applying it, IAC analysts could easily rationalise their argument 
without even providing systematic argumentation. This presenting technique of transferring 
is like creating a channel, through which analysts’ written words will become neutral, 
objective, and reasonable which also helps to create analysts’ credibility and assists them to 
interpellate readers to accept their argument. Three transferring styles were found: a) giving 
confession, b) giving a compliment first, then criticising, and c) self-criticising first, then 
defending. 
By admitting that ‘I am not sure’, ‘It is unclear’, ‘My argument might be wrong’ as well as 
stating ‘there is no right or wrong’—in short, an uncertainty, analysts could achieve a 
humble and objective image. They are sincere about doing their research (otherwise they 
would not make the confession which might challenge their argument). Style a is based on 
this logic: How can readers judge analysts’ arguments since the latter are not arrogant and do 
Style a) Giving Confession. 
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not boast of their rightness; they are even brave enough to admit their shortcoming? As a 
result, their written words are seen as credible and honest which eventually will help IAC 
analysts to interpellate readers to their later arguments. This style is especially useful to 
ideological analysis/critique because once analysts confess that ‘I might be wrong’, it is hard 
to judge their suffering from their own ideology.  
 Example 7-10 (all emphasis added): 
I do not want to claim that the interviews necessarily provided ‘true’ accounts of 
events. (RA08, p. 263) 
This second ‘should,’ it might be argued, is a pragmatic or moral ‘should’. (RA22, 
pp. 73-4)  
“Caring”, therefore, may—or may not—distinguish nurses from others; (RA23, 
1995, p. 387) 
In RA08, the analyst claimed that he was unable to tell the truth. Such statement tried to 
create a neutral and objective image for him, making his readers believe that his analysis was 
not involved with his personal opinion. Although uncertain demonstration is unacceptable in 
academic writing, it cannot be denied that, to a great degree, uncertainty could help analysts 
to avoid being criticised as overly subjective. 
Analysts compliment their analysing/interrogating research subjects first. In so doing, a fair 
image of ‘they are not the picky people who only criticise others’ could be created; they 
know how to ‘appreciate’ others. Once the image of being an impartial analyst is shaped, 
analysts’ later critiques will be much more acceptable. This is similar to academic 
supervising where tutors usually praise students’ work first and then point out their problems. 
With this process, tutors’ comments will be more appreciated instead of either having 
students lose their confidence or thinking that their tutor is too fastidious. Take RA24 for 
example. 
Style b) Giving Compliment first (to built a fair image), and then Criticise.  
 Example 7-11: In RA24, the IAC analyst, Lu, almost introduced and explained every 
Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) political slogans and their political influences negatively 
through her article. She also pointed out how her family suffered from the CCP’s tyranny. 
Yet, she started to positively illustrate slogans’ meaning that when her discussion dealt with 
slogans from Deng Xiaoping's period, she also praised the contribution of Deng’s slogans. 
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As she wrote,  
This presentation of ‘facts105
Nevertheless, there was no reason for her to praise Deng Xiaoping's leadership and start to 
agree with these new slogans, as her invisible political position exposed her disgust at the 
CCP almost in her whole context (e.g., her family’s experiences of suffering). As expected, 
while she commended the CCP's new slogan of returning to traditional values, she 
immediately added a comment, which followed the previous quotation, saying, 
’ also served to restore national pride and return the 
country to traditional Chinese values, such as Maoist’s utilitarianism. (p. 500; 
emphasis added) 
However, at the same time, what the government failed to explain or deliberately 
avoided explaining, was the building of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’. It 
is not clear whether this was because the Chinese leadership feared that the adoption 
of capitalism on a large scale would create chaos, or because they feared losing face 
on a global scale by directly admitting their interest in and pursuit of capitalism. (p. 
500) 
In the above quotation, Lu started to tell us that the CCP did not explain the meaning of such 
a slogan and she continued by commenting on why the CCP was afraid to do so. Her words 
again put the CCP into a distrusted position, which has remained attached to her political 
stance. Namely, she praised the CCP first to establish an image of ‘her being a fair/neutral 
analyst’, indicating that she is not only criticising without rationality. After giving a 
compliment, her following critiques were more acceptable and credible/convincing.  
Analysts using this style are usually first to criticise themselves or their supporting/defending 
subjects, or to admit that their or their defending subjects’ condition is not as bad as 
compared to the past. This implies that they know they should not complain too much. In so 
doing, they create an impression to readers: they understand the importance of introspection 
and appreciation. After such a self-examining image is built, they can start to proclaim their 
points or to argue what is still unfair to them. Since they initially self-criticise, their 
subsequent words will easily be seen as being honest, which ultimately will help IAC 
analysts to interpellate readers to their later arguments. Take RA20 for example. 
Style c) Self-criticise first, and then defend. 
                                                     
105 Footnote added. The term ‘fact’, according to Lu (1999), is “defined as what is present in the text 
and its medium” (p. 492). “Its medium” refers to the CCP’s political magazine in her discussion. 
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 Example 7-12: In RA20, the analyst, Smith (1975), wrote, 
Women have of course had access to and used the limited and largely domestic zone 
of women's magazines, television programs, women's novels, poetry, soap operas, 
etc. But, this is a limited zone. It follows the contours of their restricted role in the 
society. (pp. 354-355; emphasis added) 
In this case, Smith first admitted that women nowadays have obtained something that they 
did not have in the past (and they indeed appreciate). Yet, what Smith attempted to argue was 
the argument shown from the word ‘but’ in the above quotation. Thus, through this 
transferring process, Smith could avoid criticism such as ‘the role of women is much better 
nowadays, why are you still unsatisfied and asking for more?’ Analysts’ self-questioning first 
before defending will offer the impression to readers that they have thoroughly investigated 
every viewpoint including their own challenges. After such impression is created, analysts 
are able to proclaim their argument, which will be more readily accepted.  
 To conclude, using the presenting techniques of transferring could be compared to 
building a region of money laundering, through which analysts are able to give their written 
words a neutral and objective image. Transferring contains three styles: a. giving a 
confession; b. giving a compliment first, then criticising; and c. self-criticising first, then 
defending. Through the process of transferring, IAC analysts’ arguments become objective, 
neutral, and rational so that their words will be easier and more efficient to articulate certain 
ideas and debates, thereby interpellating readers to agree. 
 Other example of transferring applied in 33 IAC articles are listed in Table 7-4. 
 
Table 7-4: References of Transferring 
SWPs Code: P4-2-T (Transferring) 
Articles Found References/Examples 
RA01 p.165-6(1-2),p.167(3); p.168(4); p.173(9); p.175(11); p.177(12); 179(15); 180(16);  
RA02 p.246(2)e; p.247(3)e; p.252(8)a; p.254(10)e;  
RA03 p.138(2)c; p.147(11)e;  
RA04 p.338(5)e; p.350(17)b;  
RA05 p.5(3); p.6(4); p.7(5); p.8(6); p.9(7); p.10(8); p.11(9);  
RA06 p.447(3)a; p.457(13)b; p.458(14)a,d;  
RA07 p.107(1)b; p.109(3)e; p.119(13)a;  
RA08 p.263(3)b,c; p.264(4)a; p.265(5)a; p.266(6)a; p.269(9)d; p.274(14)b,c;  
RA09 p.589(3)a; p.591(5)c; p.599-600(13-14)b; p.600(14)b,c; p.601(15)c;  
RA10 p.418(2)c,d; p.419(3)b; p.422(6)a; p.425(9)c; p.426(10)d; p.427(11)d;  
RA12 p.1026(2)e; p.1034(10)a;  
RA13 pp.280-1(2-3)a; p.281(3)a,e; p.284(6)d; p.285(7)a; p.288(10)b,c; p.290(12)d;  
RA14 p.101(2)c; p.103(4)d; p.107(8)a; p.109(10)a;  
RA15 p.455(1)a; p.456(2)b; p.465(11)d; p.467(13)b;  
RA16 p.140(4)d; p.144(8)b; p.154(18)b;  
RA17 p.357(9)b,c; p.366(18)a; p.367(19)b; p.369(21)e;  
RA18 p.154(1); p.155(2); p.156(3); p.157(4); p.158(5); p.159(6);  
RA19 p.162(1)a; p.163(2)e; p.164(3)c,e; p.166(5)d; p.167(6)a,d; p.168(7)a,c,d; p.171(10)a; p.173(12)a,c; p.174(13)a;  
RA20 p.354-5(2-3)c; p.355(3)a,b; p.357(5)b; p.358(6)b; p.360(8)b; p.362(10)b;  
RA21 p.424(14)c; p.427(17)b;  
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RA22 p.71(2)e; p.72(3)d; p.73(4)b; p.75(6)b; p.76(7)a,c; p.80(11)b; p.87(18)b; p.88(19)c;  
RA23 p.387(2)b; p.388(3)a; p.389(4)c,d; p.390(5)d; p.391(6)a; p.392(7)c; p.393(8)a,d; p.394(9)d; p.395(10)d;  
RA24 p.487(1)a; p.488(2)a; p.489(3)a; p.491(5)a,b; p.492(6)b; p.498(12)a,b,e; p.499(13)a; p.500(14)d;  
RA25 p.466(1)c; p.468(3)a; p.469(4)a; p.471(6)a;  
RA26 p.80(2)d; p.81(3)a; p.82(4)a; p.85(7)b; p.86(8)c; p.91(13)e; p.94(16)c; p.95(17)d;  
RA27 p.181(2)d; p.182(3)a,e; p.184(5)c,d; p.186(7)c;  
RA28 p.158(2)a,d; p.162(6)a; p.168(12)e; p.169(13)a; p.174(18)d; p.180(24)e;  
RA29 p.919(6);  
RA30 p.466(2)a; p.470(6)a; p.478(14)d; p.487(23)c;  
RA31 p.219(2)d; p.220(3)d; p.222(5)d; p.226(9)d; p.233(16)a; p.241(24)c;  
RA32 p.17(1)b; p.19(3)b; p.20(4)c; p.28(12)d;  
RA33 p.644(4)c; p.647(7)a; p.653(13)c; p.654(14)d; p.656(16)d; p.658(18)a; p.662(22)a; p.664(24)c; p.666(26)e; p.667(27)a,e; p.669(29)d; p.671(31)b;  
Concepts a: Giving confession; b: giving compliment first (to built a fair image), and then criticise; c: 
self-criticise first, and then defend. 
 
Using Inarguable Values 
The presenting technique of using inarguable values means that analysts adopt certain 
beliefs or data, which are considered to be unchallengeable, to build the authority of their 
arguments. Once this is created, their arguments will become accredited which will facilitate 
the ideology (e.g., analysts’ opinions) to interpellate readers as well as to (dis/re-)articulate 
viewpoints of the argument to lead readers to specific perceptions. This thesis has concluded 
two common inarguable values found in 33 IAC articles, including the unchallengeable 
social beliefs and the inarguable information/evidence.  
There are always some social beliefs which guide people’s cognition of recognising society. 
These beliefs are unchallengeable, otherwise they would infringe on the discipline that 
people believe (e.g., equalitarianism, humanism, or feminism). This thesis has found in 33 
IAC articles that caring for the inviolable groups like children, elders, and the disadvantaged 
are the common unchallengeable beliefs that the IAC analysts applied to support their 
arguments. Take RA01 as example.   
Unchallengeable Social Beliefs 
 Example 7-13: In RA01, the IAC analysts, Moss and O’Loughlin (2005), discussed the 
ideology shift in New Labour. The presenting technique of using inarguable values was 
applied in this article. They wrote, 
A clear embodiment of ‘futurity’ pinpointed by Ruth Lister is New Labour’s 
concept of the ‘child-citizen becoming worker’. The ‘citizen-worker’ [means] that 
social rights are earned through work. [Although] ‘Children are 100 per cent of the 
nation’s future’[…], [w]ith the concept of spending replaced by social investment, 
children are to be invested in as the citizen-workers of the future. The implication is 
that children are now not valued intrinsically, but instrumentally, as a means to 
economic growth, lower crime, and a healthier population of future adults. (p. 172) 
Procedure 4: Illustration (Articulation & Interpellation) 
211 
In their article’s section III (pages 171 to 174), Moss and O’Loughlin explained how the 
ideas of ‘futurity’, ‘social order’, ‘duty’, and ‘network’ together determined the ideology 
shift in New Labour. In the ‘futurity’ part, they took the role of children in New Labour’s 
new policies as their example. This helped to explain New Labour’s new idea that social 
rights are earned through work. Yet, it also demonized New Labour due to the inviolable 
social beliefs assigned to children. Protecting children is important. 
 New Labour attempted to introduce childcare policies based on a management 
perspective to demonstrate their ideal of scientific governance. However, from the two 
authors’ perspective, ‘suffering children’ are the key point, which enabled them to undertake 
the articulating manipulation; as a result, a heartless wrongdoers image was attached to New 
Labour. Hence, if Moss and O’Loughlin were successful in interpellating readers by 
applying unchallengeable social beliefs (i.e., taking care of children is important), it would 
become easier for them to obtain readers’ agreements in other discussions.  
In RA08, the IAC analyst, Crawford (1998), interviewed 17 people in his study. If the 
number of interviewees he mentioned was 5 instead of 17, then the reliability and validity of 
his research could be disputed. This example shows that some information, such as statistics, 
certain dates, names, and allusions, all possess the capacity to influence readers’ cognition. 
The information, especially when they are presented as an exact historical date or a clear 
statistic, under certain conditions, will be seen as evidence which will simultaneously make 
these information inarguable. Thus, by using certain information, not only are IAC analysts 
able to create a sense of reality to readers, it could also help to build the analysts’ credibility 
which is another efficient way to obtain readers’ trust. Take RA28 for example. 
Inarguable Information/Evidence 
 Example7-14: In RA28, the IAC analyst, Gayil Talshir (2003), explained how the 
concept of ecology was illustrated in the Green Party’s official document, the Grun2020. She 
wrote, 
Tellingly, ecology […] was conspicuously absent from the draft Grun2020 
programme until page 65. Ecology was subordinated to the concepts of freedom 
and justice […], acquiring only a derivative role in the new fundamental programme 
of the Greens. Ecological issues were discussed in 12 of the 156 pages of the draft 
programme. (p. 176, emphasis added) 
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Talshir explained that concepts of sustainability and ecological policies do not only belong to 
the Green Party, as people used to think. On the contrary, she demonstrated that even the 
Green Party itself did not talk much about ecological policies. Of course, such an argument 
is hard for readers to accept. As a result, she offered numbers (e.g., page quantities) as 
evidence, as the above quotation showed. Even if readers had not wanted to believe these 
figures, they are/became inarguable information/evidence because Talshir personally 
found/calculated them from the party’s official document. 
 To conclude, the presenting technique of using inarguable values means that analysts 
adopt a certain social beliefs or information/evidence, which is considered to be 
unchallengeable, to build their arguments’ authenticity. Having created this offers their 
arguments increased credibility which in turn facilitates the certain ideology to interpellate 
readers. In addition, the stance within the argument can be (dis/re) articulated thereby 
leading readers to a particular perception.  
 Other references of using inarguable values which were applied in 33 IAC articles are 
listed in Table 7-5. 
  
Table 7-5: References of Using Inarguable Values 
SWPs Code: P4-2-UIV (Using Inarguable Values) 
Articles Found References/Examples 
RA01 p.172(8); p.174(10); p.177(13); p.178(14);  
RA02 p.245(1); p.246(2); p.248(4); p.250(6); p.251(7); p.252(8); p.253(9);  
RA03 p.137(1); p.138(2); p.143(7); p.147(11); p.149(13); p.150(14);  
RA04 p.334(1); p.335(2); p.336(3); p.337(4); p.349(16); p.350(17);  
RA05 p.4(2); p.5(3); p.6(4); p.7(5); p.8(6); p.11(9); p.12(10);  
RA06 p.448(4); p.449(5); p.450(6); p.451(7);  
RA07 p.107(1); p.118(12); p.119(13);  
RA08 p.262(2); p.263(3); p.265(5); p.266(6); p.267(7); p.268(8); p.269(9); p.271(11);  
RA09 p.588(2); p.589(3); p.590(4); p.591(5); p.592(6); p.593(7); p.594(8); p.596(10); p.597(11); p.598(12); p.599(13); p.600(14); p.601(15); p.602(16);  
RA10 p.418(2); p.421(5); p.424(8); p.427(11);  
RA11 p.99(1); p.101(3);  
RA12 p.1027(3); p.1028(4); p.1035(11);  
RA13 p.279(1); p.280(2); p.281(3); p.282(4); p.283(5); p.284(6); p.285(7); p.286(8); p.287(9); p.288(10); p.289(11); p.290(12);  
RA14 p.100(1);  
RA15 p.455(1); p.456(2); p.457(3); p.458(4); p.459(5); p.460(6); p.465(11); p.466(12); p.467(13); p.468(14);  
RA16 p.137(1); p.140(4);  
RA17 p.353(5); p.354(6);  
RA18 p.156(3);  
RA19 p.163(2); p.171(10);  
RA20 p.357(5); p.358(6); p.359(7); p.360(8); p.361(9);  
RA21 p.411(1); p.412(2); p.413(3); p.414(4); p.415(5); p.416(6); p.417(7); p.418(8); p.420(10); p.421(11); p.422(12); p.424(14); p.425(15); p.426(16);  
RA23 p.390(5); p.393(8); p.396(11);  
RA24 p.487(1); p.488(2); p.492(6); p.493(7); p.495(9); p.496(10); p.500(14); p.501(15);  
RA25 p.467(2); p.471(6); p.472(7); p.473(8); p.474(9); p.475(10); p.476(11); p.477(12); p.478(13); p.479(14);  
RA26 p.79(1); p.80(2); p.81(3); p.82(4); p.83(5); p.85(7); p.87(9); p.88(10); p.91(13); p.92(14);  
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RA27 p.181(2); p.182(3); p.184(5); p.185(6); p.188(9); p.189(10); p.192(13); p.194(15); p.195(16); p.196(17); p.197(18);  
RA28 p.158(2); p.159(3); p.160(4); p.167(11); p.168(12); p.169(13); p.170(14); p.173(17); p.174(18); p.176(20); p.177(21); p.178(22); p.180(24);  
RA29 p.916(3); p.921(8); p.923(10); p.924(11);  
RA30 p.468(4); p.469(5);  
RA31 p.221(4); p.223(6); p.224(7); p.225(8); p.227(10); p.229(12); p.230(13); p.231(14); p.232(15);  
RA32 p.19(3); p.20(4); p.21(5); p.25(9); p.28(12); p.29(13);  
RA33 p.641(1); p.644(4); p.646(6); p.647(7); p.648(8); p.649(9); p.653(13); p.654(14); p.655(15); p.659(19); p.661(21); p.664(24); p.665(25); p.666(26); p.667(27); p.669(29);  
 
 
Writing Skills 
Another specific presenting technique frequently applied in 33 IAC articles, which helps to 
display analysts’ specific attitudes together with influencing readers’ cognition, is the 
analysts’ inconspicuous or unremarkable writing skills/habits. These writing skills/habits 
help to undertake the interpellating and the articulating manipulation. Three writing 
skills/habits that IAC analysts frequently applied were: skills of using a) punctuation marks, 
b) personal pronouns, and c) specific phrases.  
The uses of specific punctuation marks in academic articles, such as italics, boldface, 
quotation marks, parentheses as well as colon and dash, are to emphasise the importance of 
the marked terms or to highlight aspects. Yet, for ideological operation, punctuation marks 
not only expose analysts’ intentions, but also help to undertake the operations of articulation 
and interpellation.  
Skill a) Using Punctuation Marks 
 Using specific punctuation marks is similar to seeing the ‘Try your brakes’ traffic sign, 
in this case asking readers to decrease their driving speed whilst on the motorway of words. 
That split second could be the moment that hails readers to surrender, just as drivers are told 
to be vigilant, provided neither ignores the warning sign nor the emphasised words. Whilst 
there is no guarantee that drivers’ or readers’ attention will be attracted every time, if it 
happens there comes the possibility of articulation and interpellation where analysts’ ideas 
will likely be delivered to readers.  
 Example 7-15: In RA09, the IAC analyst, Medvic (2007, p. 600), adopts quantitative 
data (voting statistics) to show where in the spectrum of political ideology (i.e., liberal, 
centrist, or conservative) these diverse factions of the Democrats party (i.e., Traditional 
Democrats, New Democrats, Blue Dogs) are located. To explain the difference between 
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Traditional and New Democrats, he wrote,  
a. Traditional Democrats = –0.466 (differs significantly from b, c and d). 
b. New Democrats = –0.348 (differs significantly from a, c and d). 
c. New Democrats/Blue Dogs = –0.200 (differs significantly from a and b). 
d. Blue Dogs = –0.130 (differs significantly from a and b). 
In this case, parentheses (or brackets) were applied. Parentheses, according to the Oxford 
Online Dictionary, are “placed around extra information in a piece of writing”. On the 
surface, it is to add information or explanation. From an ideological operation perspective, it 
is to lead readers to read and comprehend a sentence in the way the analysts wish which 
assist the latter to interpellate the former as the subject of their arguments. This is especially 
because that words inside parentheses are usually seen as less important than the main text, 
which contains a function of what Barthes called the ‘alibi106
 In this example, the words that Medvic put in parentheses such as ‘(differs significantly 
from…)’ have already determined the direction to read the quantitative data
’; this is the reason why myth 
works successfully and efficiently.  
107
 Other explanation of the ideological function of punctuation marks is attached in 
Appendix 4-1: Basic Concepts of Textual Analysis.  
. It is also 
because these are words in parenthesis, that readers might easily underestimate the extra 
information from Medvic, so that they are easily interpellated as subjects of the analysts.  
Scholars in academia, especially young scholars, often use terms like this study, this survey, 
and this research, instead of I or we in their writing to appear to be coming from a neutral 
and objective position. Yet, the use of personal pronouns, on some occasions, could help 
analysts to interpellate their readers. Moss and O'Loughlin (2005), the analysts of RA05, 
implied and applied this function. They wrote, 
Skill b) Using Personal Pronouns 
 
 
                                                     
106 For the concept of ‘alibi’, please refer to Procedure 3 in this chapter. 
107 In this example, the words inside the parentheses show that the analyst wishes to create a 
relationship of a vs. b vs. (c+d). However, there is no reason to simply claim that c and d together 
differ from a and b just because the difference between them is less (-0.070). The analyst, by using 
additional words inside parentheses, has stressed his method of calculation being the only method 
readers should follow. On the surface, the parentheses signify an illusion of decreased importance 
whereas they are definitely there for the purpose of interpellation 
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The ubiquity of new interactive and networked technologies is heralding a new 
‘information age’, or ‘Our Information Age’ in New Labour’s inclusive terms. (p. 
170; emphasis original) 
They italicized the word ‘our’, which implies that they also realised the power of using 
personal pronouns, helping them to encourage readers to stand with them (the use of italics 
also echoes the function of using punctuation marks as discussed in the previous section). 
 The concealed ideological function of using personal pronouns reflects in its two 
purposes, first, to increase the intimacy with readers and second, to create the same enemy 
hatred with their readers. First, regarding the increase of intimacy, RA04 can be used as an 
example.  
 Example 7-16 (all emphasis added): In RA04, Bishop (2001) wrote,  
Instead, we are more obsessed with losing weight—and with using these “quick-fix” 
methods—than ever. (p. 335) 
We spend ＄6 billion a year on fraudulent diet products. (p. 335) 
In case of RA04, by using the term we, Bishop has created an imaginary community. The 
‘we’ he applied does not refer to any real persons. Instead, it refers to our social 
consciousness. We is seen here as a social totality, so that everyone, even if they are not a 
product user, has to face this problem since this is a community issue. Thus, by using we, 
Bishop raised the problem from a personal level to a social one. When readers agree with the 
seriousness, they will easily accept Bishop’s other arguments since we are implied to be as 
the whole. 
 Second, by using personal pronouns, analysts are able to forge an alliance where they 
and readers share a common hostility toward the same enemy. 
 Example 7-17: In RA04, after describing how diet companies persuade people to 
purchase their products by claiming the importance of being ‘thin’, the analyst immediately 
became his readers’ representative by asking a question,  
But are companies having any success in reshaping our relationship to weight loss? 
(p. 338, emphasis added).  
In another place, he wrote,  
The full range of our desires was placed in the service of advertising’s basic 
purpose—to provide effective mass distribution of products. (p. 340, emphasis 
added) 
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When the terms our relationship or our desires come to readers’ views, Bishop has created 
the impression that he is standing alongside readers and in so doing, readers feel that Bishop 
represents them to interrogate and fight against those diet companies. Once readers identify 
with Bishop, his other arguments opposing such organisations will also easily be accepted.  
 Sometimes, the use of personal pronouns could help emphasising the distinction among 
competing Classes in the research. Take RA20 for example. 
 Example 7-18: The analyst, Smith (1975), wrote, 
From this circle women have been to a large extent excluded. They have been 
admitted to it only by special licence and as individuals, not as representative of 
their sex. They can share in it only by receiving its terms and relevances and these 
are the terms and relevances of a discourse among men. (p. 354) 
What should be noted is that before this quotation, Smith used the word ‘men’ to describe 
males. Nevertheless, while describing women (as the above quotation shows), the word ‘they’ 
was adopted instead of the term ‘women’ (which was only used once at the beginning). In 
this way, Smith created a sharp comparison. While she criticised men, the word ‘men’ was 
visible to readers which helped them to recognize who the enemy really is. When she 
discussed the situation of females, the word ‘they’ was applied instead of ‘women’, to help to 
create a female’s image of being excluded with no right to ask for their social position and 
role or even the female term—women. 
There are specific words or phrases which, on the surface, might be seen as ordinary as it can 
be from the readers’ viewpoint; in fact, these words or phrases quietly and stealthily perform 
the functions of interpellation and articulation.  
Skill c) Using Specific Phrases 
 After investigating 33 IAC articles, this thesis has found three frequently applied types 
of phrases which possess great capacity to interpellate readers or articulate ideas to the 
analysts’ argument. They are, first, the phrases which could hide the analysts’ tracks; second, 
ordinal phrases/numbers; third, those phrases which claim to give evidence.  
First, IAC analysts usually adopt specific words or phrases to conceal their own 
subjectivities. In so doing, they could create a neutral and objective image for themselves 
which would help them to hail readers to accept their opinions. In terms of specific words, 
for example, the words ‘proponents’ in RA14, ‘one’ in RA29 (e.g., One could say, p. 917), 
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and ‘informant’ in RA33 are applied to create the effect of being the ‘third person’ to hide the 
tracks of analysts. Regarding how specific phrases convey such a function, RA12 will be 
used as an example. 
 Example 7-19: In RA12, the way of using specific phrases helps Ewick and Silbey 
(1999) to hide their roles, as authors, here. They wrote,  
Thus, being without resources, Ms. Sherman understood that she had little or no 
choice but to […]. Finding themselves in such a position of powerlessness, people 
often […]. Recognizing themselves as the "have nots" facing some […]. (p. 1034; 
emphasis added) 
Ewick and Silbey did not write ‘It is reasonable to say that Ms. Sherman believes’; instead 
they directly wrote ‘Ms. Sherman understood’ which is an affirmative sentence. By using 
such a description, they created the impression that Ms. Sherman is right here speaking or 
that they knew her well. They hide themselves with this specific phrase. This is their 
analysing by ideology criteria. Other novel-like writing styles, such as ‘finding themselves’ 
and ‘recognizing themselves’, also created a situation where the analysts hailed readers to be 
novel fans to accept their given ‘story’ instead of ‘analysis’. These phrases all convey the 
interpellation function to make readers believe. 
 By using such specific phrases, all analysts are able to obtain the alibi for their 
engagement. Through hiding their tracks from their articles, analysts are able to establish 
neutral and objective images for themselves. Once this is established, it becomes easier to 
convince readers.     
 Second, when analysts present their arguments by using ordinal phrases/numbers such 
as first, second, third, or, (1), (2), (3), on some occasions it will help to discipline readers. By 
using this, analysts create a clear map of their discussion for readers that can be easily 
followed. The more that readers follow these ordinals, the better able they are to understand 
analysts’ arguments; the more they realize what analysts try to argue, so they will be 
prisoners of the analysts’ arguments. Besides, through displaying arguments accompanied by 
these ordinal phrases/numbers, analysts are able to create a (false) impression that ‘my 
argument is systematic and clear’ which is also a reason to interpellate readers to approve the 
analysts’ efforts/credibility (not their argument). This phenomenon could easily be found by 
examining students’ reports, for example. While students seem to present their arguments by 
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using ordinal numbers, it will create a systematic image to examiners, even if their 
arguments are nonsense. 
 Third, it is common to see phrases such as ‘for example’ in many writing genres. When 
examples are linked well to analysts’ arguments, it is an efficient way to show support or 
evidence to readers and to persuade them, the opposite also applies. Yet, specifically in 
academic writing, weak examples, in fact, do not affect how academic readers value the 
analysts’ whole discourses as much as people used to think108
 Example 7-20: After arguing that his interviewee, a politician who used to be a teacher, 
is “politically opinionated and […] even politically engaged at a practical level”, the analyst, 
Weltman, continued to prove his argument by offering an example. He wrote, 
. This is thanks to the phrases 
(proclaiming to give examples) such as ‘for example’, which contains an ideological 
function. When the phrase ‘for example’ comes into readers’ view, they automatically switch 
their reading attitude whereby the given examples are unknowingly taken less seriously. 
Most academic scholars realize that exceptions can be found in every example. Weak 
examples can be replaced by more suitable ones only if the main arguments are reasonable. 
Examples are given to support the logic of analysts’ arguments; they play a subordinate role 
to the main argument. Take RA17 (Weltman, 2003) for example.  
She represents, for example, her own efforts as a teacher—especially working with 
underprivileged pupils—by reference to her self-proclaimed socialist beliefs. (p. 
365) 
In this case, by saying ‘for example’, Weltman did not have to explain all his interviewee’s 
beliefs related to being a teacher. Instead, he only had to select the particular part of his 
interviewee’s beliefs—the part which best suited his own argument 109
                                                     
108 The argument of this thesis here should be compared to the general public’s writing activities. In 
academic writing, analysts’ arguments are given prior to their examples. Yet, to the public’s writings 
such as daily informal debates, a weak example will destroy the whole argument. This is because most 
of the public apply examples to explain what they are trying to argue. Most of them are incapable of 
establishing a systematic argument. As a result, giving examples become the primary way to describe 
their arguments which also simultaneously reveals their weakness. 
. The term ‘for 
example’ diminishes readers’ watchfulness to ask Weltman for a systematic discussion. Since 
109 Of course, there is also a sense that this is good academic practice; to do otherwise would be to 
waste space. Yet, any selection of examples per se is already the conscious product of its analysts. The 
problem is that such personal conscious is concealed by the term ‘for example’ which provides 
analysts with more flexibility to demonstrate/defend their argument. This is also the argument why 
phrases like ‘for example’ possess ideological function. 
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such phrases (proclaiming to give examples, e.g., for example) possesses the function of 
lowering readers’ alertness, readers will easily agree with his main argument as well as the 
invisible embedded personal ideology while they are reading the examples.  
 Other references of the technique, Writing Skills, which were applied in 33 IAC articles 
are listed in Table 7-6. 
 
Table 7-6: References of Writing Skills 
SWPs Code: P4-2-WS (Writing Skills) 
Articles Found References/Examples 
RA01 p.165(1); p.167(3); p.168(4); p.170(6); p.171(7); p.173(9); p.174(10); p.175(11); 176(12); p.177(13); p.178(14); 179(15);  
RA02 p.245(1)d,g; p.246(2)a,e,g; p.247(3)a,e,g; p.248(4)a; p.249(5)a,g; p.250(6)a; p.251(7)a,d,g; p.252(8)d,e; p.253(9)g; p.254(10)d;  
RA03 
p.137(1)a; p.138(2)a,b; p.139(3)a,g; p.140(4)a; p.141(5)a,e,g; p.142(6)a,e; p.143(7)a,b; 
p.144(8)a,b,d,g; p.146(10)a,b,g; p.147(11)e; p.149(13)a,e; p.150(14)a; p.151(15)a,b; 
p.153(17)a,b,c;  
RA04 
p.334(1)a; p.335(2)a,b; p.336(3)g; p.337(4)a,b,e; p.338(5)a,b,c; p.339(6)a,b; p.340(7)b,e,g; 
p.341(8)g; p.342(9)b; p.343(10)b,g; p.344(11)a,b; p.345(12)a,b; p.346(13)a,b; p.347(14)a,g; 
p.348(15)a,b; p.349(16)a,b; p.350(17)a,b; p.351(18)a,b;  
RA05 p.3(1); p.4(2); p.5(3); p.6(4); p.7(5); p.10(8); p.12(10);  
RA06 p.445(1)a; p.446(2)a,b,g; p.447(3)a,b,g; p.448(4)a,b,g; p.449(5)a,g; p.450(6)a,d; p.451(7)a,g; p.453(9)a; p.454(10)a,g; p.455(11)a,b; p.456(12)a; p.457(13)a,b,e;  
RA07 p.108(2)a,g; p.111(5)a,g; p.112(6)a,f; p.113(7)a; p.114(8)a,b,e,g; p.115(9)a,e,g; p.116(10)e; p.117(11)a,g; p.118(12)a; p.119(13)a; p.122(16)a;  
RA08 p.262(2)e; p.263(3)g; p.264(4)d,e,g; p.265(5)e; p.266(6)g; p.268(8)g; p.269(9)e; p.270(10)b,f,g; p.273(13)e; p.274(14)b;  
RA09 
p.588(2)a,b,c,g; p.589(3)a; p.591(5)a,b,c,e,f,g; p.592(6)d; p.593(7)a,c,e; p.594(8)a,b; p.595(9)a,g; 
p.596(10)a,e,g; p.597(11)a; p.598(12)a; p.599(13)a,b,f; p.600(14)a,b; p.602(16)a; p.603(17)a,b,c; 
p.604(18)a,b,g;  
RA10 p.417(1)a; p.418(2)a; p.419(3)a,g; p.420(4)a,c; p.421(5)a,g; p.422(6)a,g; p.423(7)a,g; p.424(8)a,e; p.425(9)a,g; p.426(10)a;  
RA11 p.99(1)a,c,d; p.100(2)a; p.101(3)a,b,e,f; p.102(4)a; p.103(5)a; p.105(7)a,b; p.107(9)a;  
RA12 
p.1025(1)a; p.1026(2)a,c,e; p.1027(3)a,e,g; p.1028(4)a,g; p.1029(5)a; p.1030(6)a,b; p.1031(7)a,g; 
p.1033(9)a,b; p.1034(10)a,e,g; p.1035(11)a,b,e,g; p.1036(12)a,b,c,e; p.1037(13)a; p.1038(14)a,b; 
p.1039(15)a,b; p.1040(16)a,b;  
RA13 p.279(1)e,g; p.282(4)a; p.283(5)a,e,g; p.284(6)e,g; p.285(7)a; p.286(8)g; p.287(9)e; p.288(10)a; p.289(11)a; p.290(12)a;  
RA14 p.100(1)b,c,e,g; p.101(2)a,b,e; p.102(3)a,g; p.103(4)a,g; p.104(5)a,e,g; p.105(6)a; p.106(7)e,g; p.107(8)a,c,e,g; p.108(9)a,e.g; p.109(10)a,e,f; p.110(11)d;  
RA15 
p.455(1)a,b; p.456(2)a,b,g; p.457(3)a,b; p.458(4)b,g; p.459(5)b; p.460(6)b; p.461(7)a,g; p.462(8)a; 
p.463(9)c; p.464(10)a,b,g; p.465(11)b; p.466(12)a; p.467(13)a; p.468(14)a,e; p.469(15)a,b; 
p.470(16)a;  
RA16 
p.137(1)a; p.138(2)a; p.139(3)a,e; p.140(4)a; p.141(5)a; p.142(6)a; p.143(7)a,e; p.144(8)a; 
p.145(9)a,e; p.146(10)a,g; p.147(11)a; p.148(12)a; p.149(13)a; p.151(15)a,e; p.152(16)a,e; 
p.153(17)a,e; p.154(18)a,e;  
RA17 
p.349(1)a,e; p.350(2)a,g; p.351(3)a,b,g; p.352(4)a; p.353(5)a,g; p.354(6)a,g; p.355(7)a,g; 
p.356(8)a,b; p.357(9)a,b,g; p.358(10)b; p.359(11)a,b; p.360(12)a; p.361(13)a,b,d; p.362(14)e; 
p.363(15)a,b,e,g; p.364(16)a; p.365(17)a,b,e; p.366(18)a,b; p.367(19)a,g; p.368(20)a,b; 
p.369(21)a,b; p.370(22)b;  
RA18 p.154(1); p.155(2); p.156(3); p.157(4); p.158(5); p.159(6);  
RA19 p.162(1)b; p.163(2)b; p.164(3)b; p.165(4)a,b,c; p.166(5)a,c; p.167(6)a; p.168(7)a,b; p.169(8)a,b; p.170(9)a,b; p.171(10)a; p.172(11)a,b; p.173(12)a,e; p.174(13)a;  
RA20 
p.354(2)a,b,e; p.355(3)a,b,e,g; p.356(4)a,b; p.357(5)b; p.358(6)a,c,d,g; p.359(7)a,b; p.360(8)a,b,e; 
p.361(9)a,b; p.362(10)a,b,g; p.363(11)a,b; p.364(12)a,b,e; p.365(13)a,b,e,f; p.366(14)b; 
p.367(15)a,b;  
RA21 p.412(2)a; p.414(4)a,g; p.415(5)e,g; p.416(6)a; p.417(7)a,g; p.418(8)a,g; p.420(10)a,g; p.421(11)a; p.422(12)a,e; p.423(13)c; p.424(14)c,g; p.425(15)c; p.426(16)a; p.427(17)a,b;  
RA22 
p.71(2)a,d; p.72(3)a,c; p.73(4)a,b,g; p.74(5)a,e,g; p.75(6)a,b,c,g; p.76(7)a,c,g; p.77(8)a,b; 
p.78(9)a,b,c; p.79(10)a,c,d; p.80(11)b,c; p.81(12)a,b,c,e,g; p.82(13)a,b; p.83(14)a,b; 
p.84(15)a,b,c,g; p.85(16)a,b,c,g; p.86(17)b; p.87(18)c; p.88(19)a,b,g;  
RA23 p.387(2)a,b,e,g; p.388(3)a,c,e,g; p.389(4)a,g; p.390(5)a,g; p.391(6)g; p.392(7)b,c,d,e,g; p.393(8)b,c,g; p.394(9)c,g; p.395(10)b;  
RA24 p.488(2)e; p.490(4)a,g; p.491(5)a; p.492(6)g; p.493(7)e,g; p.494(8)a,e; p.495(9)e,g; p.497(11)e,g; p.498(12)a,e; p.499(13)g; p.503(17)e; p.504(18)e;  
RA25 
p.467(2)d; p.467(2)a; p.468(3)g; p.469(4)g; p.470(5)a; p.471(6)a,g; p.472(7)a,g; p.473(8)a,g; 
p.474(9)a,g; p.475(10)a,e,g; p.476(11)a,e; p.477(12)a,e; p.478(13)a,e; p.479(14)a,e; p.480(15)a,; 
p.481(16)a;  
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RA26 p.79(1)a,e; p.80(2)a,d,g; p.82(4)a,e; p.83(5)a,e; p.88(10)a,g; p.90(12)a; p.91(13)a; p.92(14)e; p.95(17)a; p.96(18)a;  
RA27 p.180(1)a,e; p.182(3)a; p.183(4)a,e; p.184(5)a,e,g; p.185(6)a,e; p.186(7)a; p.187(8)a; p.188(9)a; p.189(10)a,e; p.191(12)a,e,g; p.193(14)a; p.197(18)a,e; p.198(19)a,e; p.199(20)a;  
RA28 
p.158(2)a,e; p.159(3)a,g; p.160(4)a; p.161(5)a,c; p.162(6)a,e,g; p.163(7)a; p.164(8)a; p.165(9)a,g; 
p.166(10)a; p.167(11)a; p.168(12)a,g; p.169(13)a,c,e,g; p.170(14)a,e,g; p.171(15)a; p.172(16)a,g; 
p.173(17)a,e; p.174(18)a; p.175(19)a,c; p.176(20)a,g; p.177(21)a,g; p.178(22)a; p.179(23)a,c; 
p.180(24)a; p.181(25)a;  
RA29 p.915(2); p.916(3); p.917(4); p.919(6); p.922(9); p.925(12); p.926(13);  
RA30 
p.465(1)b; p.466(2)a,b; p.467(3)a,b,g; p.468(4)b; p.470(6)b,c; p.471(7)a; p.472(8)e; p.473(9)e; 
p.474(10)e; p.477(13)a,b,f; p.478(14)b,c; p.480(16)g; p.482(18)a; p.484(20)a; p.485(21)a,g; 
p.486(22)a,c; p.488(24)a,b; p.489(25)a,b; p.490(26)a;  
RA31 
p.219(2)a; p.220(3)a,c,e; p.221(4)a; p.222(5)a,c; p.223(6)a,c,e; p.224(7)a,e; p.225(8)a,e; 
p.226(9)c,e,g; p.227(10)a,e; p.228(11)a,e; p.229(12)a; p.231(14)a; p.233(16)a,g; p.234(17)c; 
p.235(18)a; p.236(19)a,c; p.237(20)a; p.238(21)a; p.239(22)a; p.240(23)a; p.241(24)a;  
RA32 p.17(1)c; p.18(2)a,b,c,e; p.19(3)b,g; p.20(4)a; p.21(5)e; p.22(6)g; p.23(7)b; p.24(8)b; p.26(10)a,b; p.28(12)b,c; p.29(13)b;  
RA33 
p.641(1)f; p.642(2)d,g; p.643(3)a; p.644(4)a; p.645(5)e; p.646(6)a,e,g; p.647(7)a; p.648(8)a,e,g; 
p.649(9)a;p.650(10)a,e,g;p.651(11)a,g; p.652(12)e,g; p.654(14)g; p.657(17)a,e,g; p.658(18)a,b,e,g; 
p.659(19)g; p.660(20)b,g; p.661(21)a; p.662(22)a,g; p.663(23)a,g; p.664(24)a,g,e; p.665(25)e,g; 
p.667(27)b,g; p.669(29)a,b; p.670(30)a,b,e,g; p.671(31)a,b,g,f; p.672(32)a;  
Concepts a: Using punctuation marks; b: using personal pronouns; c: using specific phrases; d: please refer to 
P6-2-AD;e: please refer to P6-2-AQ; f: sentence structure; g: please refer to P6-2-TS 
 
Explaining 
Another common presenting technique found in 33 IAC articles is termed as analysts’ 
(seemingly redundant) explaining action. Explaining here simply means that analysts 
especially spend spaces to explain the basic information of their research, such as the 
methodology they adopt, how they collect the research data and related theories or concepts.  
 Reasons for explaining the research methodology are not only to clarify how the 
analysts undertake their research but also to create the impression to readers that ‘this 
research is systematically guided by clear direction’. The purpose of explaining the related 
theories and concepts of research is to claim: ‘this research has its theoretical basis’ which 
simultaneously strengthen the preciseness and reliability of such research. Whether 
explaining the methodology or related research theories, both are frequently applied in IAC 
articles to help readers better understand the research (on the other hand, they also help 
analysts to interpellate readers).  
 How the ideological function of explaining operates is based on this belief: if the 
research data are imprudently collected, the conclusions are very likely to be unreliable. 
Because of this belief, when analysts especially take time to explain how they collect/select 
research data, their (seemingly redundant) explanation will help to convince readers or lead 
them to believe that their arguments and conclusion are valid. Take RA05 for example. 
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 Example 7-21: In RA05, the analysts, Brennen and Duffy (2003), used two pages to 
explain that the research data (i.e., news from the New York Times) they selected was reliable 
and impartial. In this case, they quoted the Time's slogan—All the News that's Fit to Print” (p. 
4)—to prove that New York Times offers “decency as much as accuracy” (p. 4) which is a 
newspaper “that other newspapers have strived to follow” (p. 4). Moreover, they quoted 
approximately 120 words (on page 4) to explain how other people had given credit to the 
New York Times. Their explanations helped to tell readers that their chosen research data was 
valid which helped to transfer the credit to their subsequent argument and conclusion. The 
presenting technique of explaining is to strive for readers’ trust in order to infuse analysts’ 
argument (i.e., ideology) into them. 
 In short, analysts’ explaining the basic information of their research, on the surface, is 
to let their readers clearly understand the methodology or related theories. In fact, the 
process of giving explanations is to direct readers to believe the importance, indispensability, 
and reliability of their studies as well as to lead readers to a certain way of thinking. In so 
doing, they are able to create a neutral and objective image for themselves whereby their 
arguments (i.e, their own ideology) will unknowingly influence the readers.  
 Other references of the technique, explaining, which were applied in 33 IAC articles 
are listed as Table 7-7. 
 
Table 7-7: References of Explaining 
SWPs Code: P4-2-E (Explaining) 
Articles Found References/Examples 
RA01 p.166(2); p.167(3); p.168(4);  
RA02 p.245(1)a; p.245-6(1-2)d; p.250(6)d; p.251-2(7-8)d;  
RA03 p.137(1)d; p.138(2)a,d; p.139(3)a,d; p.140(4)d; p.141(5)a; p.142(6)d; p.143(7)d; p.144(8)a; p.145(9)d; p.146(10)d; p.147(11)d; p.148(12)d; p.149(13)d;  
RA04 p.338(5)a,d; p.340(7)a,d; p.349(16)d;  
RA05 p.3(1); p.4(2); p.5(3); p.12(10);  
RA06 p.445(1)c; p.446(2)a,d; p.447(3)a,d; p.448(4)a,d; p.449(5)a,d; p.452(8)d;  
RA07 p.108(2)a,d; p.109(3)a,d; p.110(4)d; p.111(5)a,d; p.112(6)d; p.114(8); p.117(11)d; p.118(12)a,d; p.119(13)c;  
RA08 p.261(1)d; p.262(2)a,b,d; p.264(4)d; p.265(5)a,d; p.272(12)d;  
RA09 p.588(2)a; p.589(3)d; p.590(4)d; p.595(9)a; p.596(10)a; p.597(11)a; p.599(13)a; p.601(15)a;  
RA10 p.417(1)d; p.418(2)a,d; p.419(3)a,d; p.420(4)d;  
RA11 p.101(3)a,d; p.102(4)d; p.103(5)d; p.105(7)d; p.106(8)d; p.107(9);  
RA12 p.1026(2)d; p.1027(3)a; p.1028(4)c,d; p.1029(5)c; p.1030(6)c; p.1031(7)d; p.1032(8)c; p.1036(12)d; p.1037(13)d; p.1038(14)d; p.1040(16)c;  
RA13 p.282(4)d; p.284(6)d;  
RA14 p.100(1)a,d; p.101(2)a; p.102(3)a,d; p.103(4)a,d; p.104(5)a,d; p.105(6)c,d; p.106(7)d; p.107(8)d; p.108(9)d;  
RA15 p.456(2)a; p.457(3)a; p.458(4)a; p.468(14)a;  
RA16 p.138(2); p.139(3)a,d; p.140(4)a; p.141(5)a,d; p.142(6)a; p.143(7)a; p.144(8)a; p.145(9)a; p.146(10)a; p.151(15)a; p.154(18)d;  
RA17 p.350(2)a,b,d; p.351(3)a,d; p.352(4)a,d; p.353(5)a; p.354(6)a; p.355(7)a; p.356(8)d; p.357(9)a,d; p.358(10)a; p.362(14)d; p.366(18)d;  
RA18 p.154(1); p.155(2); p.156(3); p.157(4); p.158(5); p.159(6);  
RA19 p.162(1)c,d; p.163(2)c,d; p.164(3)c,d; p.166(5)c,d; p.167(6)c,d; p.169(8)c,d; p.173(12)c,d;  
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RA20 p.355(3)a,d; p.356(4)a,d; p.359(7)a; p.361(9)d; p.363(11)c; p.365(13)c; p.366(14)c;  
RA21 p.411(1)d; p.412(2)d; p.413(3)a,d; p.414(4)d; p.415(5)d; p.416(6)d;  
RA22 p.74(5)a; p.75(6)a,d; p.76(7)d; p.77(8)d; p.78(9)d; p.79(10)c,d; p.80(11)c; p.83(14)d; p.85(16)c;  
RA23 p.387(2)a,d; p.388(3)d; p.389(4)d; p.390(5)a; p.392(7)d; p.395(10)c,d;  
RA24 p.488(2)d; p.489(3)a,d; p.490(4)d; p.491(5)a,d; p.492(6)a,d; p.493(7)a,d; p.495(9)d; p.496(10)d; p.498(12)d; p.504(18)d;  
RA25 p.469(4)a,d; p.470-1(5-6)d; p.471(6)a,b; p.480(15)d;  
RA27 p.180(1)d; p.181(2); p.182(3)a; p.183(4)d; p.186(7)d; p.187(8)d; p.188(9)d;  
RA28 p.159(3)a; p.162(6)d; p.163(7)d; p.164(8)d; p.165(9)d; p.170(14)a; p.175(19)d; p.176(20)d;  
RA29 p.915(2); p.919(6);  
RA30 p.465(1)c; p.466(2)a,c,d; p.467(3)a,d; p.468(4)d; p.471(7)a; p.474(10)d; p.479(15)d; p.482(18)d; p.483(19)a; p.485(21)d; p.486(22)d; p.487(23)d;  
RA31 p.220(3)a; p.223(6)d; p.226(9)d; p.227(10)c; p.230(13)d; p.233(16)d; p.234(17)d; p.235(18)d; p.236(19)a; p.238(21)a; p.239(22)d; p.240(23)d;  
RA32 p.17(1)a; p.18(2)a,d; p.19(3)b; p.23(7)d; p.24(8)d;  
RA33 p.642(2)a,d; p.643(3)d; p.644(4)d; p.645(5)d; p.646(6)d; p.647(7)d; p.648(8)d; p.649(9)d; p.651(11)d; p.652(12)d; p.655(15)d; p.657(17)d; p.665(25)d; p.666(26)d;  
Concepts a: Explain the methodology and limitation; b: explaining how data is collected;  
c: explaining personal experience; d: explaining specific theories;  
 
7.7 Conclusion and Discussion 
In spite of how IAC analysts write their articles, the most likely purpose is to persuade 
readers to accept what they argue. When a reader accepts one article’s argument, it could say 
that such article successfully interpellates this reader as subject of its argument. This article 
succeeds in ideology competition. 
 In order to successfully obtain readers’ acknowledgment, providing professional, 
conscientious, systematic, and theoretical aspects, of course, are essential. Yet, there are still 
some unobtrusive ‘illustrating/presenting techniques’ which carry the capacity to undertake 
the ideological operation of interpellation and articulation. They could be the last push. 
Accordingly, the mission of Procedure 4 Illustration is to detect: what presenting techniques 
that IAC analysts apply are able to carry the operation of interpellation and articulation.  
Conclusion 
This section first stated that interpellation and articulation are alter egos of each other, which 
are all based on analysts’ illustrations. Two illustrating aspects are, first, via a thorough 
understanding of the research subjects’ history or literature, and second, through specific 
presenting techniques. 
 In terms of the former, when IAC analysts have a good understanding of the history or 
literature of their research subjects, they are able to utilize similar concepts from the past to 
justify their argument of the current research subjects. Through thoroughly understanding the 
history/literature, this becomes a treasury where analysts can find suitable references to attest 
their arguments. Finding similarities (and Making Comparison) to refer to certain arguments 
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or using references to justify the validity of the arguments are all part of the ideological 
operation which is hidden in the clothing of normal writing. 
 In terms of analysts’ illustration via specific presenting techniques, this thesis suggests 
four ways. The first is transferring, creating a channel, through which an analyst’s written 
words will become neutral, objective, and reasonable, helping to interpellate readers to 
accept the argument. Second, there are certain social beliefs that people cannot discard (for 
fear that their belief system might collapse) or scientific evidence they cannot challenge. 
When IAC analysts use these inarguable values, it helps to curb readers’ floating thoughts in 
order to finally ask them to accept the provided arguments. 
 Third, there are functions of interpellation or articulation which have resulted from IAC 
analysts’ writing skills/habits, including the usage of punctuation marks, personal pronouns, 
and specific phrases. These skills could create diverse implications which expose analysts’ 
particular attitudes as well as influencing readers’ cognition. Finally, when IAC analysts 
explain the basic information of their studies (such as how they collect/select research data), 
on the surface, they help readers to understand their research better; in fact, they help 
themselves to interpellate readers since their explanations lead (or limit) readers to a certain 
way of thinking. 
Discussion 
Whether this procedure, illustration (via understanding the history and through presenting 
techniques), possesses the ideological function of articulation and interpellation as this thesis 
states above is arguable. Although this thesis has theoretically explained the validity of these 
suggested concepts, they do refer to the invisible effects upon readers’ cognition which 
cannot be examined from IAC articles. Yet, it is because no one can absolutely deny these 
techniques’ ideological function and because these suggested techniques look absurd, that is 
why these techniques convey the invisible ideological function of articulation and 
interpellation. If their functions were recognisable and approvable, they would have become 
the ‘ideology’ (a fixed system of ideas) instead of the invisible ‘ideological function’. 
 Illustrating techniques of the Procedure 4, which are frequently applied by IAC analysts, 
should be seen as a ‘possible way’ to interpellate readers as subjects of the analysts as well as 
to articulate certain concepts of the analysts’ arguments, which are not guaranteed. In fact, 
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the process of interpellation and articulation (i.e., illustration) will never see immediate 
effects; instead, it is a long-term effectuation. The only guarantee to successfully influencing 
readers is through repetition including continuation and accumulation. 
 Continuation, from the analysts’ position, means to keep interpellating readers and 
articulating ideas to intensify arguments through diverse presenting techniques. 
Accumulation means that readers will eventually ‘answer the call’ (Althusser’s term) once 
they receive and are saturated with enough messages from analysts’ contexts. This is similar 
to the process of chasing a person you admire by writing billets-doux, for example. It does 
not matter if you write hundreds of letters that receive no positive responses, because it 
would be worth it if one of the letters, or even one sentence, touched the intended’s heart and 
moved him/her to realize your genuineness somewhere in time.  
 Triggering the making of an ideology always happens so silently that no one is able to 
detect when, where, and how this ideology started to exist, which has similarities with people 
not usually being able to verbalise why they have fallen in love with someone, as the feeling 
takes people by surprise. Yet, one thing that is guaranteed to succeed whether in 
interpellating readers or chasing a would-be love interest is repetition—continuation and 
accumulation. 
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Chapter 8 
 
Procedure 5: Selecting Expression Styles  
& Procedure 6: Revealing Personal Viewpoints 
— Ideology Embedded in Analysts 
 
 
The previous chapter specifically focused on ideological operation, which is concealed in 
IAC articles’ texts. This chapter turns the dimension to investigate ideological operation 
embedded in IAC analysts’ consciousness to ascertain what commonality they share while 
writing their IAC articles. This chapter contains the final two procedures of SWPs, 
procedure 5: selecting expression styles and procedure 6: revealing personal viewpoints. 
 Procedure 5 discusses the extent/degree to which IAC analysts involve their own 
viewpoints within their writings, which will correspondingly affect the extent to which the 
validation of an IAC article is recognised and accepted by the readers. Three styles have 
been classified which are, from lower participation to high involvement, the purely 
descriptive, interpretative, and defensive and corrective styles. In the final procedure 6, this 
thesis will focus on how IAC analysts intentionally/accidentally reveal their personal 
viewpoints (subjectivities) through their writing in two ways, first, via declaring a 
standpoint and, second, through their narrating traits. 
 This chapter will introduce these two procedures, then a conclusion for the all six 
procedures (Chapters 5-8) and further discussion will be provided. 
 
Procedure 5: Selecting (IAC) Expression Styles 
 
8.1 Introduction 
Diverse IAC analysts, from different backgrounds, compose various types of IAC articles. 
Some of them try to be neutral and objective to describe social phenomena while others 
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place themselves into the discussion to defend or argue against certain ideology. Accordingly, 
procedure 5 will categorise the expression styles that IAC analysts frequently apply based on 
the extent/degree that they involve their own viewpoints (including their attitudes, positions, 
judgements, preferences) within their writings.   
 This thesis adopts a holistic dimension to categorise the 33 collected IAC articles, in 
which three expression styles have been generalised. They are 1) the purely descriptive style, 
2) the interpretative style, and 3) the defensive and corrective style.  
 
8.2 Selecting Expression Styles 
Purely Descriptive Style 
The first style means that IAC analysts simply and purely describe the research phenomenon 
they have discovered without involving themselves with any personal subjectivity. With 
respect to this style, the most common research method that IAC analysts adopted includes 
literature review, interview surveys, or quantitative statistics. For example: 
 Example 8-1: RA09 does not talk about how power operates or how power constructs 
reality. The analyst of this article adopts quantitative data (e.g., voting statistics) to show us 
where in the spectrum of political ideology (i.e., liberal, centrist, or conservative) these 
diverse factions (i.e., Traditional Democrats, New Democrats, Blue Dogs) of the Democratic 
party are located. The analyst simply and purely describes what consciousness one faction 
holds without involving a discussion of power operation or whether this faction 
consciousness is true or false. The discussion maintains a neutral dimension. 
 Example 8-2: RA11 discusses how Islamic intellectuals internally fight for the 
interpretation-rights of the reform of Islamic law. The analyst of this article did not reveal 
much of his subjectivity; instead, his discussion is mainly based on historical explanation 
and quotation. As a result, this article is categorised as a purely descriptive style of 
ideological analysis110
                                                     
110 It is imaginable that readers might argue whether this style (purely descriptive) be claimed as 
‘ideological’ critique/analysis, or is not ‘purely descriptive’ terms which contradict ‘ideological’ 
analysis/critique? Two points could answer this argument. First, in the introduction chapter, this thesis 
suggested that the term ‘critique’ and ‘analysis’ are alter ego of each other. Second, in Chapter 5, this 
thesis has discussed the nature of ideology whereby it is possible for the term ideology to possess a 
positive/neutral characteristic. Based on these two points, a critique/analysis on ideology could be one 
.  
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 Other cases regarding IAC articles, which are written via a purely descriptive style, 
include RA09, RA11, RA29, and RA33. For a detailed explanation, please refer to Appendix 
6-1. 
 In short, the IAC analysts who adopted the purely descriptive style mostly tried to stand 
in a position outside of personal judgement. They were likely to recall history, cite relative 
quotation, or adopt quantitative statistics; that is, they let visible evidence speak for itself. It 
could say that this purely descriptive style usually responds to the IAC articles, which are 
based on the analytical pathway of historical description introduced in Procedure 2.  
 Yet, it is precisely because the research subject they tried to figure out was ideology 
itself that these IAC analysts, more or less, were likely to infuse their own subjective 
evaluations into their articles. Therefore, strictly speaking, this purely descriptive style can 
only be seen as an ideological analysis style that attempts to stay in a relatively neutral or 
positive position to undertake their analysis. 
Interpretative Style 
Another commonly applied IAC expression style is the interpretative style. Different from 
the first style where IAC analysts purely describe/present the (new) ideology they discovered, 
in the second style, they start to argue or judge their research subjects. In other words, after 
describing what ideology it is (the first style), IAC analysts continue to illustrate why this 
certain ideology is formed, to clarify the differentiation amongst diverse ideologies, or to 
explain how (and under what conditions) these ideologies are transformed (e.g., from old 
ones to new ones). Namely, the more one IAC analyst tries to interpret, the more their 
personal subjectivity is revealed. The track of their subjective intervention could be found 
throughout their words regardless of their doing so purposely or unconsciously. For example: 
 Example 8-3: RA22 theoretically discussed how reality is constructed, e.g., by different 
social structures, such as school vs. real society. The analyst designed an example (not a 
real-life example) to discuss how parents and daughters react to the question of whether a 
crop-top is cute or dorky. Although this analyst tried to examine what reasons (e.g., relative 
truth, social truth relativism) influence parents’ and daughters’ thoughts, the way he 
                                                                                                                                                      
in which its analysts neutrally and purely present their findings without displaying (much) of their 
personal opinions (ideology). 
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described it was obviously close to the parents’ position (even though he tried to present the 
argument neutrally and equally). Since this analyst involved his attitude in his discussion 
(e.g., he clearly determined that parents’ opinion is right), this article was categorised as an 
interpretative style of ideological analysis. 
 Example 8-4: RA14 is an article that obviously showed the analyst’s personal 
subjectivities. This article explained that Asante’s notion of Afrocentricity did not work out 
as Asante expected—to lead black people or Africans to escape from the dominance of the 
West. To the analyst of RA14, Asante’s demonstration still relies on the vested Western logic; 
the world is not changed due to Asante’s suggestion, and that black people are still alienated. 
The analyst’s subjectivity is found through his writing. He confirmedly argued that things are 
not going the way that Asante wished. This is an evaluation made from his point of view. 
 Other cases regarding IAC articles that are written via an interpretative style include 
RA01, RA05, RA08, RA14, RA15, RA17, RA22, RA24, RA28, and RA32. For a detailed 
explanation, please refer to Appendix 8-1. 
 In short, the interpretative ideological analysis style can be seen as an analytical 
extension of the first style. The difference is that the IAC articles are categorised into the 
interpretative style only when their IAC analysts involve personal subjectivities in their 
writings, regardless of whether it was done intentionally or unknowingly. 
Articles Categorised Between the Purely Descriptive and Interpretative Styles 
Although this thesis tries to distinguish diverse expression styles based on the degree to 
which IAC analysts involve themselves in their writing, there are still some cases that cannot 
be categorised into either purely descriptive or interpretative styles. In spite of how hard IAC 
analysts tried to purely describe their research objects, on some occasions, they still 
inevitably revealed their subjectivity due to, for example, the vocabularies they used or the 
unintentional judgements they made. Take RA12 and RA13 as examples. 
 Example 8-5: The first half of the RA12 was written via a purely descriptive style in 
which analysts simply presented stories of their interviewees and quoted these interviewees’ 
own words to show what they thought about the law. Yet in the second half of this article, the 
analysts started to bring their opinions to demonstrate how and why the ‘Haves come out 
ahead.’ For example, they wrote sentences such as “In answering these questions, we suggest 
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precisely the opposite […]” (p. 1036) and “We reiterate, however, that law’s power is only in 
part derived from its status as transcendent and ideal” (p. 1040). This thesis does not mean to 
find fault with the way they presented articles. These sentences indeed exposed the analysts’ 
position and attitude, which turned its expression angle from purely descriptive to an 
interpretative style. Thus, it should say that both purely descriptive and interpretive styles 
coexist in this article. 
 Example 8-6: RA13 adopted methods of historical narration and offered quantitative 
data to explain that Egypt’s social welfare plans (e.g., public assistance law and social 
insurance) indeed are the rhetoric tools that helped diverse political regimes to maintain 
social order and their authority. Regarding the analytical methods this article applied, it could 
be categorised as a purely descriptive style. Nevertheless, some of the analyst’s writings, 
such as “This sudden concern” (p. 280), “it is thus not surprising” (p. 281, 288, 290), “It no 
doubt seemed”, “would (of necessity?) be added” (p. 283), and “Ironically, . . .” (p. 290), to a 
great extent, have revealed her own preference and subjectivity. Although these subjective 
descriptions might be innocent writings due to the analyst’s writing behaviour, in a holistic 
view of this article, a fair categorising is to admit the existence of both styles in this article.  
 Other cases regarding IAC articles that are categorised between the purely descriptive 
and interpretative styles include RA12, RA13, RA16, RA25, and RA26. For a detailed 
explanation, please refer to Appendix 8-1. 
Defensive and Corrective Style 
The third one is the defensive and corrective style of ideological analysis. If the IAC analysts 
intentionally or unconsciously display their subjectivities in the interpretative style, then one 
could say that, in the defensive and corrective style, they directly and obviously expose their 
attitudes and even their emotions.  
 IAC analysts who adopt this style usually involved their opinions within the discussion, 
even though they may not have been aware of their involvement. Because of this, these IAC 
analysts are usually considered to be prejudiced, and the arguments they put forth in the 
articles seem as if they just want to refute or remonstrate something they consider justified. 
Although this expression style obviously reveals the analysts’ subjectivity, it does not mean 
that such ideological analysis is wrong or fails, which will be explained later. 
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 IAC analysts who write their articles via the defensive and corrective style usually 
share this common feature: they begin with (sometimes strongly) declaring how W is 
subjectively, intentionally, and mistakenly represented by an ideology (which is constructed 
by a certain group)—that is, the truth is not like what such ideology has averred. After 
defending, sometimes, they continue to explain what the genuine truth of W should be. 
 Namely, through the demonstrative process of ‘it is not . . . but . . .’, the IAC analysts 
explain what ideology they oppose, how this ideology is formed, what influences it might 
cause, and how the genuine reality is now treated negatively. Simply put, they defend and 
correct the misunderstood parts as well as tell readers what is right. Take RA07 for example.  
 Example 8-7: RA07 explained how the medical profession, which is continually 
superior in power to nursing, adopts its medical discourses to construct a traditional value: 
nursing is subject to the medical profession. Because of such discourses, when nursing tries 
to fight for its independent character, simultaneously, nursing is articulated to the images of 
crisis, militancy, radicalism, and incompetency. The analyst of this article criticised such 
false images of nursing and, by defending and redressing, he offered readers a real image of 
nursing. 
 In addition, IAC analysts who deployed the defensive and corrective style of 
ideological analysis, to a great extent, evinced a close connection with their backgrounds, 
such as education, ethnicity, nationality, and history. This finding will be mainly discussed in 
Procedure 6.  
 Other cases regarding IAC articles that were written via a defensive and corrective style 
include RA02, RA03, RA04, RA06, RA07, RA10, RA18, RA19, RA20, RA21, RA23, RA27, 
RA30, and RA31. For a detailed explanation, please refer to Appendix 8-1. 
 
8.3 Discussion and Application 
Discussion: Which Style is the Best? 
The procedure of selecting expression styles is distinguished by the degree that IAC analysts 
involve their own viewpoints (including their attitudes, positions, judgements, preferences, 
etc.) within their writings, which will correspondingly affect the extent to which the 
validation of an IAC article is recognised and accepted by readers. However, since it is 
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incapable of recognising who the readers are and what experiences they possess, no one is 
able to claim which expression styles are the best. In fact, any style that could interpellate 
readers as the subject of its argument is a suitable one, which, of course, depends on the 
subjects, readers’ backgrounds, and the media through which arguments are presented. 
 Theoretically speaking, IAC analysts who adopt the purely descriptive style can 
provide the article with an neutral and objective image, while analysts who write through the 
interpretative or defensive/corrective styles might incur criticisms such as ‘possessing too 
much of their personal ideology and standpoint.’ Yet, on some occasion, articles whose 
authors highly reveal their personal feelings/opinions on their analyses (i.e., the 
interpretative or defensive and corrective styles) could easily touch readers’ heart compared 
to articles written neutrally or objectively. Take RA02 as a practical example.  
 Example 8-8: The analyst of RA02, Tahir Abbas, explained how the British press 
misrepresents South Asian Muslims, all the while evincing a high degree of personal 
judgement. On the one hand, Western white people may deem this article as one full of 
complaints and querulousness, while a purely descriptive style of ideological analysis might 
more easily attract their attention to the media’s misrepresentation phenomenon. On the 
other hand, although the defensive and corrective styles obviously disclose the analysts’ high 
degree of subjectivity, this expression style could receive identification from a particular 
group of readers, especially those who agree with the same argument (i.e., the logic of “X 
press misrepresents Y”) or who have ever experienced the same situation (e.g., people who 
feel that they are misrepresented by the media, such as women, members of a subculture, or 
underprivileged and oppressed groups). 
 Accordingly, among these three expression styles, there is no best one for all 
ideological analysis/critique. It all depends on a case-by-case basis. This is all because no 
one knows who the readers are exactly, as well as when, where, and under what conditions 
the articles could interpellate readers as subjects of their arguments. 
Application of Three IAC Expression Styles 
The purpose of analysing one ideology (or say, writing IAC articles) is to tell readers what 
has been found and, most importantly, ask them to accept the argument. There is no right 
expression style to apply in all cases. The style that can influence the most readers is the best 
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(even though some styles might be purposely applied for certain reasons). Thus, the purpose 
of this section is to suggest to the future analysts some conditions of applying these 
expression styles. 
 Simply put, all IAC analysts have to observe in advance who their potential readers will 
be and where they hope their articles will be published (e.g., readers of ordinary 
newspapers/magazines, readers of general interest academic journals, or readers of journals 
in specific areas, e.g., gender, religion). Then they can decide whether they themselves 
should employ the purely descriptive, the interpretative, or the defensive and corrective 
styles that reveal the degrees of their subjective participation.  
 Table 8-1 shows the strategy to apply these expression styles. What one has to notice is 
that this table only concentrates on specific conditions, i.e., the potential readers and 
platform of publication. In fact, in practice, how IAC analysts express their articles is, no 
doubt, quite complicated. 
 
Table 8-1: Application of Three IAC Expression Styles 
Expected Readers/ 
Expected Publishing Platform  Position of Imaginary Readers Suggested Styles 
General public/ 
Informal media (e.g., local newspaper) 
Insiders  DCS* 
Unclear or neutral position IS/PDS>DCS 
Outsider or opposite opinion PDS>IS  
Specialists/ 
Professional media (e.g., journals)  
The same character PDS>IS>DCS 
Different character PDS>IS 
* PDS: The Purely Descriptive Style.  IS: The Interpretative Style.  
 DCS: The Defensive and Corrective Style.  
 
8.4 Conclusion  
To summarise this section (Procedure 5), this thesis has categorised three expression styles 
that IAC analysts usually adopt while writing their IAC articles. They are the purely 
descriptive, the interpretative, and the defensive and corrective styles, which are 
distinguished based on the degree to which IAC analysts involve their own viewpoints 
within their writings. Correspondingly, the diverse application of expression styles will affect 
the extent to which the validation of an IAC article is recognised and accepted by the readers. 
Yet this thesis cannot judge which styles are the best nor argue whether IAC analysts should 
involve subjectivity in their writing. Since no one can exactly predict who their readers 
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might be or when these readers could be interpellated as the subjects of their articles, the 
style that can influence the most readers is the suitable one. Moreover, these three expression 
styles of ideological analysis can be seen as references for future analysts. After recognising 
what characteristics their potential readers possess, as well as where they hope their articles 
will be published, these future analysts could select the appropriate expression styles to 
compose the most influential IAC articles.  
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Procedure 6: Revealing Personal Viewpoints  
 
8.5 Introduction 
Procedures 5 and 6 investigate the ideological operation embedded in IAC analysts’ 
consciousness to ascertain what commonality they share while writing their articles related 
to ideological critique. In Procedure 5, Selecting Expression Styles, this thesis has discussed 
the diverse extent to which IAC analysts involve personal subjectivities within their writing. 
 In this final Procedure 6, Exposing Personal Viewpoints, two sections of discussion are 
included. This thesis first explains how IAC analysts declare their standpoints which reflect 
their attitude regarding ideology, including its power, its capacity, and the possibility of 
resistance. In the second section, this thesis will focus on IAC analysts’ writings to 
investigate how unremarkable narrating traits that IAC analysts casually apply have invisibly 
exposed their subjectivities. Four narrating traits of IAC analysts are inducted: 1) title 
selection, 2) asking questions, 3) personal background, and 4) assertive declaration. 
 
8.6 Subjectivities Revealed— via Declaring a Standpoint 
In its analysis of the 33 IAC Articles, this thesis discovers how IAC analysts see the power 
of ideology as well as how they infer the final outcome of their research. Two standpoints 
could be drawn, the pessimistic or the optimistic attitudes. 
Declaring a Standpoint: Pessimistically 
A pessimistic attitude is usually revealed in IAC analysts’ writings in their encounter with the 
power of ideology. Their pessimistic discourses usually refer to a sense of powerlessness: in 
spite of the oppressed groups’ efforts to change, eventually they are incapable of escaping 
from the power of ideology (controlled by superior groups). The IAC articles’ discourses or 
conclusions, which adhere to such a pessimistic position, usually build on the concepts 
similar to notions of Gramsci’s ‘dominant hegemony’ or Althusser’s ‘reproduction of the 
relations of production’. These two notions share the same argumentative logic: the 
dominant groups will utilize their resources and power to continuously reproduce the 
relations of production, which can maintain their dominance over the subordinate classes, in 
order to sustain their hegemony. Take RA06 and RA14 as examples.  
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Example 8-9: The IAC analyst of RA06, Ronald Bishop (2005), expressed his 
pessimistic attitude of resistance regarding the influences of ideology constructed by certain 
groups. He wrote, 
Resistance is often reshaped so that it cannot offer a substantial challenge to the 
dominant ideology. Opponents are even given the “rhetorical tools” needed to 
mount a challenge, but their efforts only bring limited challenge to the dominant 
ideology. (p. 447) 
 Example 8-10: The analyst of RA14, James Palermo (1977), illustrated how one 
ideology constantly reproduces its rationality, which drives the younger generation to keep 
identifying with it. 
The school then, reproduces the relations of the exploited to exploiters repeating the 
capitalist relations of production, and inculcating within the child the ideology of 
the ruling class wrapped up in an apprenticeship with a variety of know-how 
knowledge. (p. 105) 
The first example echoes Gramsci’s demonstrative logic of dominant ideology while the 
second example responds to Althusser’s notion, even though the names of these two 
contributors of the ideology concepts were not mentioned.  
 There are plenty of reasons that can lead IAC analysts to espouse a pessimistic attitude 
toward ideologies: reasons such as the existence of ‘unbalanced power’ and ‘false 
consciousness’, ‘alienated subjects’, or the phenomenon of ‘otherization’. For example, in 
RA02 and RA06, the IAC analysts expounded that the interpretation-rights are possessed by 
a certain group due to the existence of an unbalanced power relationship. In RA04, RA14, 
RA18, these analysts adopted the concept of false consciousness to describe how a certain 
dominant ideology is maintained. In RA02, RA05, and RA10, the IAC analysts mainly 
discussed how subordinate groups are ‘otherized’ by the dominant groups and, as a result, 
lose their rights of speech and interpretation in the competition for ideological hegemony. 
Based on the above discussion and examples, the discourse logic of the IAC analysts 
who possess a pessimistic attitude can be drawn as:  
a) Since the power between two Classes is unbalanced (or reasons such as the influence of 
the false consciousness, or the subordinate groups’ being otherized),  
b) and under this inescapable circumstance, the dominant Class is able to continually 
reproduce the necessary elements (relations of production) to sustain its hegemony. 
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c) As a result, the oppressed Class lose their interpretation rights in the competition of 
ideological hegemony. The dominance in the relationship remains. 
 References of IAC articles whose analysts possess a pessimistic attitude are listed as 
Table 8-2. 
 
Table 8-2: References of Pessimistic Standpoint 
SWPs Code: P6-1-P (Pessimistic Attitude) 
Articles Found References/Examples 
RA01 p.166(2); p.178(14); 179(15);  
RA06 p.447(3) 
RA14 p.105(6) 
RA30 p.466(2);  
RA31 p.226(9);  
 
Declaring a Standpoint: Optimistically 
By contrast, IAC analysts who possess an optimistic attitude (which, of course, does not 
mean they neglect the power of ideology) will usually offer suggestions to escape from the 
cage of ideology after explaining how the power of ideology works in their research subject. 
On other occasions, IAC also offer their arguments which are close to another dimension of 
understanding Gramsci’s hegemony theory. The concept of the hegemony theory they 
employed focuses on the process of hegemonic struggle, implying that the hegemony (i.e., 
dominant ideology) is not immobile because the disadvantaged groups are still able to fight 
for ‘intellectual and moral leadership’ (Gramsci’s term). Take RA07 for example. 
 Example 8-11: In RA07, the analyst, Hazelton, (1990), explained that there is an 
unequal power relationship between independent nurse education and the nurse education 
which pertains to the medical profession. He also explained how the medical profession 
maintains its hegemony through discourses. Nevertheless, Hazelton also emphasized the 
existence of an “ideological struggle” (p. 108) while offering the concept of hegemony. He 
wrote that “hegemonic dominance is not akin to ‘a piece of heavy machinery’ which 
relentlessly guarantees the continued existence of a dominant class” (p. 109). This responds 
to the situation where he devoted a lengthy portion of his article to argue that the medical 
profession maintains its hegemony through discourses but, unexpectedly, came to the 
following irrelevant conclusion in the final sentence of the article. He concluded,  
to this end nurses should not be daunted by the task ahead, indeed, the very fact that 
nurse education is now situated firmly in the higher education sector represents a 
considerable success (p. 123).  
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It is reasonable to say that the reason why IAC analysts like Hazelton possess an optimistic 
attitude about escaping from the power of ideology is because they believe the ideological 
hegemony is able to be snatched, is changeable, and is not absolute. 
The other optimistic view discovered in IAC articles focuses on the discussion of class 
consciousness. This adopts discourses spanning from Marx to Lukacs, stating that if 
class-in-itself could be transformed to class-for-itself (that is, the awakening of class 
consciousness), it is possible to break through the shackles of ideology. Take RA20 for 
example. 
Example 8-12: The analyst, Smith (1975), expounded first that female academics are 
excluded because of manipulation derived from male language, judgement, signs, powers, 
and established knowledge. As a result, she accentuated that women are incapable of 
throwing off this yoke until awakening to their female self-consciousness. As she wrote,  
We cannot be content with working as academics in the box created by the male 
monopoly of artistic, ideological, and other symbolic resources so that we do in 
relation to women and arising out of our interests and experience. […] We must […] 
begin an examination and critique of how women are constituted as other in the 
ideological formations which establish the hegemony of male consciousness. [...] 
This means, for example, claiming the right to examine literature from the 
perspective of women […] constructing a sociology for women rather than of 
women. (p. 367) 
Accordingly, the reason why IAC analysts like Smith possess an optimistic attitude is 
because they believe they can recognize the unfairness and the oppressed predicament they 
are situated in, as long as their consciousness is awakened, which conforms to what Adorno 
(1973) said: “things should be different” (p. 203). 
 Based on the above discussion and examples, the discourse logic of IAC analysts who 
possess an optimistic attitude could be drawn as:  
a) Although unbalanced power, false consciousness, alienation, and otherization indeed exist 
and seem unavoidable,  
b) every voice is still able to strive for the ‘intellectual and moral leadership’ or rights of 
interpretation. Ideological hegemony is not immobile. 
c) Things might be different only based on one condition: the oppressed Class has to awaken 
to their Class consciousness, their interests, to become the ‘class-for-itself’ instead of 
‘class-in-itself’. 
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 References of IAC articles whose analysts possess an optimistic attitude are listed as 
Table 8-3. 
 
Table 8-3: References of Optimistic Standpoint 
SWPs Code: P6-1-O (Optimistic Attitude) 
Articles Found References/Examples 
RA07 p.109(3); p.123(17);  
RA12 p.1026(2);  
RA15 p.469-70(15-6);  
RA20 p.367(15);  
RA22 p.86(17); p.87(18);  
RA27 p.187(8);  
 
 
8.7 Subjectivities Revealed—due to IAC Analysts’ Narrating Traits 
The previous section showed how IAC analysts see the power of ideology as well as how 
they infer the final outcome of their research subjects. Two standpoints could be drawn, the 
pessimistic or the optimistic attitudes. If declaring a standpoint reflects IAC analysts’ attitude 
regarding ideology, then the following discussion, which focuses on analysts’ narrating traits, 
can be seen as another way to examine how they reveal their subjectivities. Four traits have 
been concluded. They are IAC analysts’ 1) title selection, 2) asking questions, 3) personal 
background, and 4) assertive declaration. 
Narrating Traits: IAC Analysts’ Title Selection.  
In journalism, if news is seen as a commodity, then the headline of this news is the 
advertisement of this commodity. How titles are selected, just like in the case of 
advertisements, determines whether readers read them or what angle they adopt when 
reading them.  
 Title selection in academic articles follows the same mechanism. Analysts could utilize 
titles or sub-titles to attract readers in order to force or influence them to agree or adopt their 
viewpoints. In other words, title/sub-title selection, a seemingly common and insignificant 
action, could reveal analysts’ (unintentional) subjectivities as well as influence readers’ 
cognition. The function of this trait is to lead readers to a certain way of thinking and making 
readers self-fulfil the argument that the title stated. 
 Title selection is found to be a frequently applied narrating trait in 33 IAC articles. Take 
a few IAC articles as examples. 
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 Example 8-13 (Sub-title Selection): In RA06, the analyst, Bishop (2005), denominated 
the section headings as ‘Making Concessions’ (p. 449) and ‘Hurting the Team’ (p. 451), in 
RA31, Dilevko (2001) named one heading ‘The Danger of Deskilling in Call Centers’ (p. 
222), and in RA23, Barker et al. (1995) subtitled a section as ‘The retreat from skills’ (p. 
392). Although these section headings reveal the main ideas of each section in advance, it is 
still a contention, which is over-determined by its analysts to the extent that it has already set 
up a reading angle for its readers. The reason why these headings reveal analysts’ 
subjectivities or lead readers to a certain way of thinking is because the vocabulary within 
the sub-title has already and originally carried specific judgemental meanings, such as 
concessions, hurting, danger, and retreat. IAC analysts’ sub-titles selection (unintentionally) 
reveals their attitude regarding their research. 
 In some situations, IAC analysts’ subjectivities are even more conspicuous when the 
title/subtitle is presented with punctuation which, to a great degree, has guided readers to 
accept a certain position. Take RA28 and RA21 for example. 
 Example 8-14: The article title of RA28 is: 
A threefold ideological analysis of Die Grünen: From Ecologized socialism to 
political liberalism? (p. 157)  
There is a question mark at the end. The analyst, Talshir (2003), claimed that the Green Party 
has switched its political ideology from ‘ecologized socialism’ to ‘political liberalism’. 
However, such a strong affirmative statement/finding can be criticised for excessive 
subjectivity. By using a question mark, Talshir’s title could establish an impression of 
standing in a neutral position. It seems Talshir is saying, ‘I am not that sure whether the 
ideology changed; I just offer a phenomenon that I have found; you, readers, should have 
your own perspectives’. Cunningly, it is this question mark, which on the surface offers 
Talshir’s statement a neutral position, which in fact intensifies readers’ consciousness to 
accept, confirm, and believe his statement—the Green Party indeed has switched their 
political ideology.  
 Other IAC articles whose titles were presented with question marks are listed below:  
Title of RA04, 
Old Dogs, New Tricks? An Ideological Analysis of Thematic Shifts in Television 
Advertising for Diet Products, 1990-2000 
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Title of RA09, 
Old Democrats in New Clothing?: An Ideological Analysis of a Democratic Party 
Faction 
Title of RA32, 
A Discourse for All Seasons? An Ideological Analysis of the Schools Commission 
reports, 1973 to 1981 
Although these titles were presented with question marks, they all reveal the analysts’ 
subjectivities (answer). A question mark here is a smoke-screen which helps analysts to 
create a neutral and objective image. As Barthes (1993) might claim, these question marks 
are the ‘alibi’ (p. 123) of IAC analysts’ subjectivities. 
 To conclude, most of the time, the title of an article will influence whether this article is 
attractive enough to read. Yet, from a perspective of ideological analysis, the selected 
titles/subtitles not only revealed the analyst’s attitude, but also had influenced the readers’ 
way of thinking. Sometimes, with the assistance of punctuation, the article title will help its 
author to create a neutral and objective image; but, it simultaneously and inevitably reveals 
the article’s (the analyst’s) preference, position, and subjectivities. 
 Other references which expose IAC analysts’ subjectivities due to their title selection 
are listed as Table 8-4. 
 
Table 8-4: References of Title Selection 
SWPs Code: P6-2-TS (Title Selection) 
Articles Found References/Examples 
RA02 p.250(6); p.252(8);  
RA04 p.334(1); p.335(2);  
RA05 p.6(4); p.11(9);  
RA08 p.264(4);  
RA09 p.587(1);  
RA15 p.456(2); p.468(14);  
RA18 p.154(1);  
RA20 p.357(5);  
RA21 p.411(1);  
RA22 p.71(2);  
RA23 p.392(7); p.393(8);  
RA24 p.494(8);  
RA25 p.476(11) 
RA27 p.187(8);  
RA28 p.157(1); p.167(11); p.173(17);  
RA30 p.476(12); p.483(19);  
RA31 p.220(3); p.222(5); p.230(13); p.236(19);  
RA32 p.17(1);  
RA33 p.655(15); p.657(17);  
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Narrating Traits: IAC Analysts’ Asking Questions 
Peculiarly, when academics ask questions in their articles, they are never sincerely inviting 
answers or allowing readers to think. Asking questions is a way to persuade or force readers 
to accept the author’s opinions. It happens to IAC analysts as well and their purpose of 
persuasion is even more apparent. Whenever the IAC analysts suggest questions, to a certain 
degree, they are (consciously/unconsciously) pretending to remain in a neutral position, 
when in fact, it is the most obvious way to divulge their personal attitude.  
Example 8-15: Some questions directly reveal the IAC analysts’ subjectivity, such as 
the example in RA30 (Harvey & Reed, 1996): 
There is also the suggestion that Lewis carefully delimited the culture of poverty 
concept to a “foreign country.” But did he? (p. 478) 
This sentence displays the analysts’ personal attitude without the need for any analysis to 
prove them, as the use of ‘But did he?’ has shown their answer. Yet, most questions which 
carry IAC analysts’ subjectivity are concealed. Take RA09 as example. 
 Example 8-16: The question asked in RA09 (Medvic, 2007): 
How different, in the end, is the Third Way from traditional Democratic liberalism? 
(p. 593) 
This sentence shows that the IAC analyst, Stephen K. Medvic, wished to imply: ‘there is no 
difference’. Readers can find implication (i.e., Medvic’s answer) from the above sentence 
especially when they read the term in the end. This term in the end not only imports to 
readers an indication—do not think too much, or no need to think—it also conveys a helpless 
logic (in spite of …., eventually…,), which leads readers to give up thinking of the possible 
differences. Because of these factors, even though the terminology ‘the Third way’ might 
have its own original meaning in other discussions, in this sentence, it is connected to 
‘traditional Democratic Liberalism’. 
In fact, how IAC analysts’ questions reveal their subjectivities and the answer they 
want readers to accept could be examined through a mathematic principle. In this equation, 
the question mark refers to a minus, a dubious intention (i.e., -). Therefore, when a sentence 
is described positively (i.e., +), then the IAC analysts hold a negative position (i.e., that 
minus times plus receives a minus). On the other hand, when a sentence is presented 
negatively (i.e., -), the IAC analysts hold a positive attitude (i.e., that minus times minus gets 
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a plus). To test the equation, we can observe two examples from RA22.  
Example 8-17: In RA22, the analyst, Haslanger (2007), asked,  
Are Crop-Tops Cute? (p. 71) 
and  
Under the circumstances it seems that there is something right about the Daughter’s 
reply to her Parents, and their reply is not enough. And yet, aren’t the parents right? 
(p. 72) 
According to the mathematic equation, it is possible to unveil Haslanger’s personal 
attitude—that is, Crop-Tops are not cute and parents are right.  
 Haslanger’s own writings in later pages confirmed this analysis. He suggested an 
answer after he asked a question. He writes, 
Is it possible to evaluate the epistemic practices of a milieu by standards that are not 
themselves milieu-relative? If not, … (p. 87). 
According to the equation, that a positive sentence (+) finishes with a question mark (-) 
shows the IAC analysts’ negative attitude. If Haslanger provides both sides of the answer, ‘If 
yes’ and ‘If not’, then the above questions (and his attitude) can remain in a neutral position. 
Yet, he only answered ‘If not’, which not only displays his negative position but also 
confirms the equation that this thesis suggests. What has to be noticed is that this equation 
applies to real question sentences or text in content only. As for the titles of articles, the 
question mark there is simply a smoke-screen to create a neutral and objective position for its 
analysts. 
 To conclude, whenever the IAC analysts suggest questions, they are 
(consciously/unconsciously) pretending to stay in a neutral position, when in fact, it is the 
most obvious way to divulge their personal attitude.  
 Other references which expose IAC analysts’ subjectivities due to their asking 
questions are listed as Table 8-5. 
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Table 8-5: References of Asking Questions 
SWPs Code: P6-2-AQ (Asking Questions) 
Articles Found References/Examples 
RA02 p.250(6);  
RA04 p.334(1); p.335(2);  
RA05 p.9(7);  
RA09 p.587(1);  
RA19 p.162(1); p.165(4); p.166(5); p.168(7); p.170(9); p.172(11); p.173(12);  
RA21 p.411(1); p.425(15); p.427(17);  
RA22 p.71(2);  
RA23 p.391(6);  
RA28 p.157(1); p.167(11); p.173(17);  
RA30 p.476(12);  
RA32 p.17(1);  
RA33 p.641(1); p.653(13); p.655(15);  
 
Narrating Traits: IAC Analysts’ Personal Background 
The IAC analysts’ background itself (e.g., racial, upbringing, academic knowledge, and 
political standpoints) is a critical factor which leads them to hold a certain argument as well 
as nourish their subjective writings. Take how the academic background of the RA07 analyst 
(Michael Hazelton) and the RA23 analysts (Barker, Reynolds, and Ward) influences their 
standpoint for example. 
 Example 8-18: Hazelton in RA07 explained how hospital-based nursing education 
utilizes medical discourse to reconstruct its dominance over nursing-based education when 
facing threats of losing its sovereignty. In RA23, Barker et al. illustrated how the dominant 
discourses occupy the interpretive rights to define the meaning of ‘caring’; as a result, a 
concept of ‘new-caring’ is infused to substitute for a definition of ‘caring’.  
 Most of the time, the IAC analysts of both articles (RA07, 23) adopted an impartial 
position to analyse their research; nevertheless, somehow they still unwittingly exposed their 
emotion which shows their certain attitude. After further investigation, this thesis found out 
that Hazelton (author of RA07) and Barker et al. (authors of RA23) all possess a nursing 
background.111
 Although it is uncommon to see IAC analysts directly display their subjectivities due to 
their background, it is still possible to observe how their background influences their 
 To a great degree, their academic background has already influenced their 
analysis. 
                                                     
111 Michael Hazelton is from the School of Nursing Studies, Institute of Technology, Tasmania. P.J. 
Barker is the Professor of Psychiatric Nursing Practice at the University of Newcastle Upon Tyne. W. 
Reynolds is a Senior Tutor at Highland College of Nursing, Raigmore Hospital. T. Ward is a clinical 
nurse specialist with Dundee Healthcare Unit. 
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arguments based on specific sentences.  
 Example 8-19: In RA25, the analyst, DeFoster (2010), wrote, 
An early article in the Times’ editorial coverage of the Columbine massacre called 
the two killers “deadly products of a pariah youth culture,” indirectly absolving the 
murderers of responsibility through the argument that their values were neutralized 
by peer culture and violent entertainment media (p. 474). 
DeFoster first quoted ‘deadly products of a pariah youth culture’ to explain how the 
European media defined those killers, and then followed with her critiques. To this thesis, the 
quotation DeFoster cited and his subsequent argument together revealed her subjectivity. The 
phrase “deadly products of a pariah youth culture” represents more the philosophy of Europe 
compared to American individual-orientated philosophy. On the other hand, her judgement 
that the Times “indirectly absolv[es] the murderers of responsibility” indeed reflects the 
American philosophy which refers to a more individual judgement/criticism. It is reasonable 
to say, to a certain degree, DeFoster’s American-educated background112
 To conclude, when IAC analysts deal with topics which are related to their background 
(e.g., educational, racial, or political), mostly, they are incapable of not involving their own 
opinion. That is to say, the moment they defend what they believe to be right is also the 
moment that their personal ideology influences their on-going analysis, which, of course, 
does not mean to be wrong or bad. Instead, it should say that if the endless loop of 
‘ideological critique of ideological critique of…’ is considered, analysts’ personal 
background becomes a factor to sustain this loop. 
 has led her to make 
such an analysis/judgement. 
 Other examples which show how IAC analysts expose their subjectivities due to their 
personal background are listed as Table 8-6. 
 
Table 8-6: References of Personal Background 
SWPs Code: P6-2-PB (Personal Background) 
Articles Found References/Examples 
RA02 p.245(1);  
RA05 p.5(3);  
RA15 p.455(1);  
RA21 p.411(1);  
RA24 p.487(1); p.494(8);  
RA31 p.218(1);  
                                                     
112 Her education background is: B.A. Mass Communication, magna cum laude, Winona State 
University; M.A. and PhD, Mass Communication, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis. Retrieved 
from http://sjmc.umn.edu/grad/gradprofile.php?UID=defos002 1st Oct. 2014. 
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Narrating Traits: IAC Analysts’ Assertive Declaration 
In the previous sections, this research has introduced three narrating traits that IAC analysts 
frequently applied in their analyses. In these traits, they (unintentionally) disclose their 
subjectivities through their writings. Nevertheless, the most obvious subjectivity intervening 
in IAC analysts’ writings is their assertive declarations. Such declarations include directly 
judging right from wrong, referring meanings of one thing to another, or claiming what the 
truth really is.  
 First of all, in terms of their directly judging right from wrong, take RA23 for example.  
 Example 8-20: In RA23, the analysts, Barker et al. (1995), wrote, 
The “science of caring” is not, however, an example of the “reflexive, 
language-based, interpretive” alternative scientific paradigm to which Van Maanen 
referred. The “science of caring” is, by contrast, an ideology of caring (p. 388); 
and 
This cannot, however, become the raison d’etre of nursing. “Caring” is the wrong 
focus for any intended development of the profession of nursing (p. 389); 
and 
That suggestion may be either foolhardy or dangerous, or both (p. 393); 
and 
The views of “caring” expressed by Waston, and Kirby and Slevin possess great 
potential for misleading the profession. Their faith in “caring" is central to the 
problem (p. 398). 
In these quotations (all emphasis added), Barker et al. did not hide or claim their position 
vaguely; instead, they directly expressed their position that X is not A but B (e.g., the first 
two quotations) or arbitrarily judged that Z’s viewpoints are wrong (e.g., the last two 
quotations). These examples all reveal the IAC analysts’ subjectivities. 
 Second, directly referring meanings of one thing to another is another form with which 
IAC analysts leak their attitudes. In such conditions, the IAC analysts do not even bother to 
negate or demonstrate in order to proclaim their ideas. Take RA24 for example. 
 Example 8-21: In RA24, the analyst, Lu (1990), judged, 
such slogans also called for contemplation and reflection on the ideological battle 
over the previous 30 years for which the Chinese people have paid a heavy price 
(p. 499, emphasis added).  
She is right if this ‘heavy price’ judgement is evaluated from the angle of capitalism or 
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humanism. Nevertheless, for people who desperately pursue equality, they could comment 
on Mao’s era by referring to what the Bible says: ‘I have fought the good fight, I have 
finished the course, I have kept the faith’ (II Timothy 4:7). In fact, there are still quite a few 
people in China who indeed believed in Mao’s line and were disgusted with the poverty gap 
that resulted from Deng’s economic reformation (Lee, 2013). Although the contemporary 
‘historical correctness’ supports Lu’s judgement, whether it ‘paid a heavy price’ is still 
uncertain from one person to another. ‘Paid a heavy price’, to a great degree, has revealed 
her political attitude. 
 Last, regarding the IAC analysts’ firmly claiming ‘what the truth really is’, RA15 and 
RA10 are taken as examples. 
 Example 8-22: In RA15, the IAC analyst, Apple (1985), described in several 
paragraphs (all emphasis added):  
I noted that it is a structurally significant fact that in the United States… (p. 455); 
and 
This is brought home by the fact that in our economy… (p. 457); 
and 
Added to this is the fact that… (p. 458); 
and 
The very fact that… (p. 468); 
In RA10, the analyst, Goss (2005), wrote in the introduction,  
In doing so, Will re-circulates and re-affirms the right-wing meta-ideology and 
endows it with prestige and the patina of “common sense”—even as it moves 
athwart of facts on the ground (p. 417).  
And in the conclusion, he writes that  
despite organised efforts to generate an ideologized “reality” that is anchored in 
right-wing fantasies and mythologies, what is real always asserts itself decisively 
in the final instance (p. 427).  
The above quotations, especially those phrases this thesis has emphasised, show that Apple 
and Goss seem to believe that reality does exist, and they well know what it is. Goss’s belief 
led him to judge that Will’s right-wing meta-ideology violates the reality. Although these 
quotations might be attributed to nothing but ‘just’ representing their personal writing style, 
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their subjectivities, especially in Apple’s case, are called into being when they assertively 
declare what the truth really is.  
 Other references which expose IAC analysts’ subjectivities due to their assertive 
declaration are listed as Table 8-7. 
 
Table 8-7: References of Assertive Declaration 
SWPs Code: P6-2-AD (Assertive Declaration) 
Articles Found References/Examples 
RA01 p.177(13); p.178(14); 179(15);  
RA02 p.245(1); p.252(8);  
RA03 p.139(3); p.140(4); p.141(5); p.142(6); p.143(7); p.144(8); p.146(10); p.148(12); p.149(13); p.150(14); p.151(15); p.153(17);  
RA04 p.335(2); p.338(5); p.340(7);  
RA05 p.3(1); p.7(5); p.8(6); p.9(7); p.10(8); p.11(9); p.12(10);  
RA06 p.449(5); p.450(6); p.451(7); p.452(8); p.457(13);  
RA07 p.107(1); p.113(7); p.114(8); p.115(9); p.116(10); p.117(11); p.118(12); p.119(13); p.122(16);  
RA08 p.263(3); p.264(4); p.267(7); p.269(9); p.270(10); p.271(11); p.272(12); p.273(13); p.274(14);  
RA09 p.588(2); p.594(8); p.600(14);  
RA10 p.417(1); p.420(4); p.424(8); p.425(9); p.426(10); p.427(11);  
RA11 p.99(1); p.104(6);  
RA12 p.1030(6); p.1031(7); p.1035(11); p.1036(12); p.1037(13); p.1038(14); p.1040(16);  
RA13 p.281(3); p.283(5); p.285(7); p.287(9); p.287-8(9-10); p.288(10); p.289(11);  
RA14 p.101(2); p.102(3); p.104(5); p.105(6); p.106(7); p.108(9); p.110(11);  
RA15 p.455(1); p.456(2); p.458(4); p.461(7); p.462(8); p.463(9);  
RA16 p.139(3); p.141(5); p.145(9); p.146(10); p.147(11); p.148(12); p.152(16); p.154(18); p.155(19);  
RA17 p.352(4); p.356(8); p.358(10); p.362(14); p.366(18); p.370(22);  
RA18 p.154(1); p.155(2); p.156(3); p.157(4); p.159(6); p.159-60(6-7);  
RA19 p.164(3); p.165(4); p.166(5); p.168(7); p.169(8); p.170(9); p.171(10); p.172(11); p.173(12);  
RA20 p.354(2); p.357(5); p.359(7); p.362(10); p.364(12); p.367(15);  
RA21 p.412(2); p.413(3); p.417(7); p.418(8); p.419(9); p.420(10); p.422(12); p.423(13); p.425(15); p.427(17);  
RA22 p.73(4); p.74(5); p.76(7); p.84(15);  
RA23 p.387(2); p.388(3); p.389(4); p.389(4); p.390(5); p.391(6); p.392(7); p.393(8); p.394(9); p.395(10); p.396(11);  
RA24 p.488(2); p.491(5); p.492(6); p.493(7); p.494(8); p.497(11); p.498(12); p.499(13); p.500(14); p.501(15); p.503(17); p.503(17);  
RA25 p.466(1); p.468(3); p.469(4); p.471(6); p.474(9); p.475(10); p.478(13); p.479(14);  
RA26 p.85(7); p.87(9); p.88(10); p.90(12); p.93(15); p.94(16); p.95(17); p.96(18);  
RA27 p.182(3); p.183(4); p.184(5); p.185(6); p.187(8); p.189(10); p.197(18); p.198(19);  
RA28 p.158(2); p.161(5); p.167(11); p.170(14); p.172(16); p.173(17); p.174(18); p.175(19); p.177(21); p.178(22); p.179(23);  
RA29 p.915(2); p.916(3); p.917(4); p.918(5); p.919(6); p.922(9); p.924(11); p.925(12);  
RA30 p.466(2); p.467(3); p.468(4); p.469(5); p.470(6); p.471(7); p.474(10); p.475(11); p.476(12); p.477(13); p.480(16); p.482(18); p.483(19); p.484(20); p.485(21); p.486(22); p.489(25); p.490(26);  
RA31 p.219(2); p.220(3); p.223(6); p.225(8); p.226(9); p.229(12); p.230(13); p.232(15); p.233(16); p.236(19); p.238(21);  
RA32 p.18(2); p.22(6); p.30(14);  
RA33 p.659(19); p.660(20); p.665(25); p.670(30); p.672(32);  
 
 
8.8 Conclusion 
In procedure 6, two sections of discussion are included. First, this thesis illustrated how IAC 
analysts declare their standpoints which reflect their attitude regarding the power of ideology, 
including two types of attitude. In terms of the pessimistic attitude, IAC analysts usually 
display a logic of discourse: the dominant groups will utilize their resources and power to 
continuously reproduce the relations of production, which can maintain their dominance over 
the subordinate classes. Hence, resistance is impossible. In terms of the optimistic attitude, 
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they usually imply that ideological hegemony is not immobile because every group is able to 
fight for its own interests which, as often suggested by analysts, is based on one condition: 
only when the oppressed Class awakens to their Class consciousness. 
 Second, this thesis focused on IAC analysts’ writings to investigate: what unremarkable 
narrating traits that IAC analysts casually apply have invisibly exposed their subjectivities. 
Four narrating traits are induced.  
 Regarding the 1) Title Selection, this thesis argues: the common and insignificant 
articles’ titles that IAC analysts select could expose the analysts’ (unintentional) 
subjectivities. It also can lead readers to a certain way of thinking as well as make readers 
self-fulfil the argument that the title implies. Concerning 2) Asking Question, whenever the 
IAC analysts suggest questions, they are pretending to stay in a fair position, when in fact, it 
is the most obvious way to divulge their personal attitude.  
 As regards the 3) Personal Background, when IAC analysts deal with topics which are 
related to their background (e.g., educational, racial, or political), they are incapable of not 
involving their own opinion. As a result, when they defend what they believe to be right 
(because their background taught them so), their argument usually reveals their personal 
ideology. Pertaining to 4) Assertive Declaration, it means that IAC analysts directly judge 
right from wrong as well as refer meanings of one thing to another. They clearly confirm 
what the truth really is. These four narrating traits are frequently seen in IAC articles which 
disclose IAC analysts’ subjectivities. 
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Section of Empirical Analysis (Chapters 5-8)  
 
Conclusion and Discussion 
 
 
Conclusion 
This study has expounded six standard procedures, which IAC analysts frequently applied 
when writing articles related to ideological analysis/critique, these are 1) identifying 
essential elements, 2) applying theoretical foundations, 3) connoting certain meanings, 4) 
illustration (i.e., articulation and interpellation), 5) selecting expression styles, and 6) 
revealing personal viewpoints.  
A key aspect to note is that these procedures should neither be deemed as sequential, 
nor should they be regarded as required components in every IAC article. Rather they should 
be regarded as operating in parallel. The procedures that IAC articles apply depend on the 
research topics as well as the analysts’ knowledge background. This is similar to when 
near-spectacles patients have an eye-glass prescription filled. Visual acuity of 1.2 is 
sufficient for patients to see comfortably. Yet, if the patients prefer, they can further correct 
the problem of astigmatism, or increase the dioptre of the glasses to have a better visual 
experience.  
As with visual acuity and personal preference (subject to need and finance) for better 
vision, so only a few procedures are required to compose an acceptable IAC article. Of 
course, analysts could apply more angles (procedures) to improve an analysis/critique, only 
if they are capable of doing so and, for example, have enough space to thoroughly discuss 
their research. 
The following Table 8-8 summarises the key points of the six standard procedures for 
writing (analysing/criticizing) IAC articles as proposed in this thesis. 
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Table 8-8: Summarises of Standard Writing Procedures 
Procedure 1: Identifying Essential Elements 
This procedure is to understand the nature of ideology, which is a term about relationship, containing three elements, Class, reality and power. These three 
elements form the initial motivation of analysts and, most important of all, their presumed standpoints which have affected the coming conclusion of the analysis, 
even though the analysts might arrive there through different analysis/critique methods. 
Key points/ Subdivision Explanation SWPs Codes Index 
FC Finding the Classes 
Class here refers to a competing relationship between diverse groups. Finding the Classes means 
to confirm what research subjects (i.e., competing Classes) the analysts are concerned with. 
P1-FC 5.2  
IP Involving Power 
Detecting how power is involved is a way to understand how an ideology is constructed or 
presented. It is agreed that the invisible operation of power works with much more efficiency on 
the human mind than applying a visible style. 
P1-IP 5. 3 
PR Presenting the Reality 
Through understanding how people describe reality, it is able to recognize how an ideology is 
created and what ideology it is. In ideological analysis/critique, analysts have to draw a portrait of 
reality for their readers, which tells what phenomena they have detected as well as revealing the 
reason that motivates them to perform such analysis. 
P1-PR 5.5 
 
Procedure 2: Applying Theoretical Foundation 
The theoretical foundation that the analysts adopt will influence the whole structure of the discourse including the departure point, the writing trend, and the basis 
of the argument. All differences could be derived from the manner in which the analysts consider the word ideology, what epistemological position they take in 
relationship to ideology, whose ideological theory they quote, and how they extend it. 
Key points/ Subdivision Explanation SWPs Codes Index 
M 
Marx’s 
Analytical Pathway 
This pathway is especially used to describe an unbalanced power relationship between two 
competing groups. Concepts applied here includes ‘Class struggle’, ‘alienation’, ‘base vs. 
superstructure’, and ‘class-in-itself vs. class-for-itself’. 
P2-M 6.2  
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A 
Althusser’s 
Analytical Pathway 
This pathway is particularly applied to explain how and why ideology comes into existence. 
Notions applied here includes ‘ISAs vs. RSAs’, ‘material existence’, ‘interpellation’, ‘imaginary 
relation’, and ‘reproduction of the relations of production’. 
P2-A 6.3  
G 
Gramscian 
Analytical Pathway 
This pathway is usually adopted to describe how an ideological hegemony is created. Yet, on the 
other angle, this pathway is also applied to stress the ‘process of struggle’, meaning that dominant 
ideology is not guaranteed; resistance is possible. Concepts applied here include ‘battlefield’, 
‘civil society’, ‘intellectual and moral leadership’, ’‘dis/re-articulation’, and ‘hegemony’. 
P2-G 6.4  
HD 
Analytical Pathway of 
Historical Description 
This pathway is usually applied to illustrate the ideology shift of the researched objects regarding 
the development of history. Through the manner of telling histories, this pathway could create a 
neutral and objective image for ideological analysis, where the articles’ authors are ignored. This 
pathway even functions efficiently in interpellating readers, especially when these readers are 
unfamiliar with the history of the researched topic. 
P2-HD 6.6  
S 
Semiotic 
Analytical Pathway 
This pathway is based on semiotic notions to examine how reality/ideology is 
constructed/presented, including the theoretical concepts, such as ‘language’, ‘parole’, ‘langue’, 
‘signifier’, and ‘signified’ as well as concept of ‘binary oppositional relationships’, ‘syntagmatic 
structures’, and ‘paradigmatic choices’, which could be practically applied in ideological analysis. 
P2-S 6.7  
 
Procedure 3: Connoting Certain Meanings SWPs Codes: P3-C Index: 7.2 
This procedure answers the common critique on ideological analysis: By whose authority are you so confident in claiming this is an ideology? Thus, this 
procedure is based on Barthes’s concept of mythology, which helps to mend the criticism above, a demonstrative shortcoming. In so doing, analysts will be able to 
theoretically answer why the so-called ideology is this ideology or how this ideology has come to exist. This procedure is a bridge to connect the readers’ original 
simple consciousness to the land of ideology. 
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Procedure 4: Illustration (Articulation and Interpellation) 
This thesis argues that whether to analyse or criticise an ideology (or the IAC works) or whether to purely present or to construct IAC articles/reports, it always 
has to go through analysts’ illustrations which is composed of two major means—interpellation and (dis/re-)articulation. Through the process of illustration, it is 
able to practically answer ‘how an ideology is formed or revealed’ or ‘why innocent signs turn into signs which carry certain connotation’. Two aspects are 
included. 
Key points/ Subdivision Explanation SWPs Codes Index 
1 Via Understanding the History or 
Literature 
Since any ideology is shaped through a long-term historical process, the more analysts 
could comprehend the history and literature, the better they can detect the ideological track 
of their research subject, and the more efficiently they can apply these history/literature to 
construct a certain ideology. 
 7.5 
FS Finding the Similarities 
It means to dig out the similarities of texts, concepts, and history (events) between 
researched subjects and certain history or literature. If the texts/concepts/history in a 
certain history or literature refers to a specific meaning, then the similar 
texts/concepts/history found in the researched subjects will easily be linked to signify the 
same meaning. 
P4-1-FS 7.5  
UR Using References 
References never speak for themselves. The action of selecting certain reference per se is 
the result of ideological operation which not only helps to echo, testify, or prove the 
analysts’ arguments, but also to convey their certain intentions. 
P4-1-UR 7.5  
2 Through Specific Presenting 
Techniques 
This part attempts to dig out: how simple signs start to display specific significances due to 
analysts’ presenting manners which reflect the ideological function of articulation and 
interpellation.  
 7.6 
T Transferring 
Transferring means the certain ways of presenting articles which contains the ideological 
effects. It is like to create a channel, through which analyst’s writing words will become 
neutral, objective, and reasonable. 
P4-2-T 7.6  
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UIV Using Inarguable Values 
It means that analysts adopt certain social belief or statistic data, which is considered to be 
unchallengeable, in order to build the authenticity of their arguments.  
P4-2-UIV 7.6  
WS Writing Skills 
The inconspicuous or unremarkable writing skills/habits , such as the usages of punctuation 
marks, personal pronouns, or specific phrases, could create diverse implications which 
display analysts’ certain attitude as well as to influence readers’ cognition. 
P4-2-WS 7.6 
E Explaining 
The process of giving explanation of researches (e.g., methodology or way of data 
collection) is to hail readers to believe the importance, indispensability, and reliability of 
such studies as well as to lead readers to a certain way of thinking. 
P4-2-E 7.6  
 
Procedure 5: Selecting Expression Styles 
Procedure 5 distinguishes three expression styles which is based on the degrees/extent that IAC analysts involve their own viewpoints (including their attitudes, 
positions, judgements, preferences, etc.) within their writings. Three expression styles, representing the degree of subjectivities that IAC analysts possess, have 
been generalised. 
Key points/ Subdivision Explanation SWPs Codes Index 
PDS Purely Descriptive Style 
It means the analysts simply and directly describe the ideology of their research subject without 
any judgement. 
P5-PDS 8.2  
IS Interpretative Style 
In the interpretative style, IAC analysts start to argue or judge their research subjects. They also 
continue to illustrate why this certain ideology is formed, to clarify the differentiation amongst 
diverse ideologies, or to explain how these ideologies are transformed. 
P5-IS 8.2  
DCS 
Defensive and 
Corrective Style 
In this style, IAC analysts directly and obviously expose their attitudes and even their emotions. 
Because of this, these analysts are usually considered to be prejudiced, and the arguments they 
put forth seem as if they just want to refute or remonstrate something they consider unjustified. 
P5-DCS 8.2  
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Procedure 6: Revealing Personal Viewpoints 
IAC analysts’ subjective tracks are everywhere in their writings. This procedure attempts to examine in what condition the IAC analysts reveal their personal 
viewpoints. Two dimensions are considered. 
Key points/ Subdivision Explanation SWPs Codes Index 
1 via Declaring a Standpoint 
Declaring a stands could reflect the analysts’ attitude regarding ideology, including its power, its 
capacity, and the possibility of resistance. 
 8.6  
P Pessimistically 
It refers to a sense of powerlessness: in spite of everything the oppressed groups effort to change, 
the ideological hegemony controlled by superior groups is unchallengeable. 
P6-1-P 8.6  
O Optimistically 
IAC analysts who possess this attitude believe that although unbalance power relationship indeed 
exists, the ideological hegemony is not immobile. Instead, hegemony could be snatched. 
P6-1-O 8.6 
2 Due to Narrating Traits 
This part attempts to dig out: how IAC analysts reveal their subjectivities due to their Narrating 
Traits. Four traits have been concluded. 
 8.7  
TS Title Selection 
IAC analysts utilize titles or sub-titles, which reflect their subjectivities, to attract readers in order 
to force or influence them to agree or adopt their viewpoints. 
P6-2-TS 8.7  
AQ Asking Questions 
Whenever the IAC analysts suggest questions, they are conspiratorially pretending to stay at a fair 
position, when in fact, it is the most obvious way to divulge their personal attitude.  
P6-2-AQ 8.7 
PB Personal Background 
IAC analysts’ background (e.g., racial, upbringing, knowledge, and political standpoints) is a 
critical factor which leads them to hold certain argument and nourishing their subjective writings. 
P6-2-PB 
8.7 
 
AD Assertive Declaration 
It means that IAC analysts directly judge right from wrong as well as referring meanings of one 
thing to another. They clearly and confirmedly what the truth really is. 
P6-2-AD 8.7  
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Does A Certain Way of Writing IAC Articles Exist? 
This thesis has proposed six SWPs which are based on three types of qualitative-oriented 
‘concepts’: the precise usage of terminologies (e.g., articulation), the related ideas (e.g., 
applying a concept analogous to the concept of articulation), and the ways of description 
(e.g., describing a phenomenon of articulation). Once a concept (based on the above three 
types) is repeatedly identified among diverse IAC articles, its accumulation being noticed to 
a certain degree, it will be pre-considered as part of the SWPs. 
 This thesis has established several ‘SWPs Codes’ (e.g., P2-M, referring to ‘Marx’s 
analytical pathway’) to indicate/mark the location in IAC articles where the words, sentences, 
or ways of description reveal, for example, how IAC analysts apply Marx’s ideas. The 
marked SWPs Codes alongside each IAC article have been categorised into several 
‘reference tables’ which has been attached to the discussion of each (sub-)SWP to support 
this thesis’ findings. 
 Figure 8-1 has been compiled according to the data for these ‘reference tables’ and 
related appendices. RA01 will be used as an example:  
• In RA01, a competing Class relationship indeed exists in the IAC article, but its IAC 
analyst did not clearly indicate the compared/opposite (Secondary) Class.  
• Hence, RA01 is linked to the label of ‘Sec. Class exists, but vague’. This is based on 
this thesis’s finding of Class relationship in 33 IAC articles (reference: Table 5-1).  
• Next, according to this thesis’s finding of power’s operation style and ways of 
presenting reality, the line is linked from the label of ‘Sec. Class exists, but vague’ to 
the label of ‘Style IV’ (reference: Appendix 5-1) and continue linking to the label of 
‘Way I’ (reference: Appendix 5-2).  
• From/across five analytical pathways, Gramscian theory was majorly applied in 
RA01, therefore, the line is linked to the label of ‘Gramscian analytical pathway’ 
(reference: Table 6-1 to 6-9).  
• The following linkages between each procedure all share the same categorisation 
method.  
• References for the categorisation method are listed below:  
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Procedure 1 Class: Table 5-1; Power: Appendix 5-1; Reality: Appendix 5-2 
Procedure 2 Table 6-1 to Table 6-9 
Procedure 3 Table 7-1 
Procedure 4 Table 7-2 to Table 7-7 
Procedure 5 Appendix 8  
Procedure 6 Table 8-2 to Table 8-7. 
 
Figure 8-1 shows the analytical trend of each IAC article, and most importantly, it enables 
the examination of whether certain common trends of writing articles related to ideological 
analysis/critique exist. 
 Although different analysts undertake their IAC works through (seemingly) diverse 
dimensions, according to this figure, it would appear that there indeed is a certain way/trend 
to undertake ideological analysis/critique. This trend is:  
 Procedure 1: Identifying Essential Elements. Classes When IAC analysts undertake 
an ideological analysis/critique, their research subject (i.e., Primary Class) and its 
compared/opposite subject (i.e., Secondary Class) are usually identifiable (70%). Power 
The relationship of these Classes is usually displayed as how one Class dominates (Style I, 
42%) the other Class. Reality As a result, the reality (representing certain ideology) is 
often constructed (Way I, 40%). 
 Procedure 2: Applying theoretical foundation Among diverse concepts of analysing 
ideological phenomena, Gramscian (45%) theories are frequently applied. 
 Procedure 3: Connoting certain meaningsWhile analysing ideology, IAC analysts 
often occasionally tell readers what connotation their researched subject(s) indicate (51%).  
 Procedure 4: IllustratingIn IAC analysts’ practical analysis, using references (70%) 
and applying specific writing skills (33%) are two common methods which will help them 
to (re/dis-) articulate certain ideas to strengthen their argumentations and to interpellate 
readers as the subject of their analysis. 
 Procedure 5: Selecting expression styleDuring the analysing process, IAC analysts 
usually/inevitably incorporate their opinions within their analysis when they attempt to 
defend their research subject and sometimes to correct the public’s misunderstanding (42%). 
Standard Writing Procedure 
257 
 Procedure 6: Revealing personal viewpoints Most IAC analysts did not expose their 
attitude during their analysis (54%). Yet, if they accidentally reveal their attitude regarding 
their research, a pessimistic attitude (27%) is what they frequently possess. They reveal 
their attitude usually because they assertively declare their opinion (63%). 
 To conclude, this section has combined each procedure’s findings, and presents Figure 
(8-1) to display their inter-relationship. In this figure, a certain way to write articles related to 
ideological analysis/critique is revealed which indicates the existence of SWPs. It also helps 
to testify that the ideological analysis/critique beyond (personal/social) ideology is arguable. 
 
Classes' Relationship is clear identified (23/33, 70%)
Title (5) 
Selection
Asking (2) 
Question
Personal (5) 
Background
Assertive declaration
(21/33, 63%)
Writing & (4) 
Explaining
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 
Sec. Class exists, but 
vague (9/33, 27%)
Relationship not 
revealed (1/33, 3%)
Style I (14/33, 42%)
X constructs Y
Style III (5/33, 15%) 
Y resists against X
Style II (8/33, 24%) 
X negotiates with Y
Style IV (6/33, 18) 
not explained
Way I (13/33, 40%)
Constructed reality
Way II (7/33, 21%) 
Objective reality
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Discussion  
Whether human beings are capable of escaping from the cage of ideology, or say, what limits 
humans’ capacity to undertake ideological critique, is the main question of this thesis. To 
deal with this question, this thesis provides answers through investigating academic scholars’ 
publications to determine if their articles are written according to their free will, or if they 
adhere to certain writing and thinking regularities. Regarding the genre of these publications, 
this thesis selected specific articles related to ideological analysis or critique (IAC). 
 Ideology is a subject about humans’ consciousness. Since critics claim to explore the 
phenomenon of their research fields through the dimension of ideology, it is reasonable to 
say that they think they have found some phenomenon which other people have not 
recognized which, for example, might be concealed by a certain way of thinking (that only 
benefits a certain group, sometimes). Accordingly, in Chapter 2, this thesis first explained the 
difference between general and ideological critics. Since ideological critics notice the power 
of ideology and strive to investigate how it influences/reflects humans’ consciousness and 
social practices, if there is any person who is capable of escaping from the power of ideology, 
this thesis argues, these ideological critics could be the most apt persons. Their academic 
publications related to ideological critique/analysis, likewise, might be the most suitable 
research data to ascertain whether they have eradicated of the influences of ideology while 
undertaking the works of ideological critique. 
 Yet, whilst ideological critics undertake their research through the so-called angle of 
ideology, do their findings, or the way they analyse or criticise, really break the invisible 
rules that guide them? For this question, in Chapter 3, this thesis reviewed the Frankfurt 
School’s study on the culture industry in which their argument of ‘standardisation’ could be 
the probe/measure to evaluate such a question.  
 The characteristic of standardisation, a concept of the culture industry, is to create a 
normal model, via reducing the diversities, to maximise efficiency and profits of production, 
and finally to establish identity-thinking. Similarly, if such a phenomenon of standardisation 
happens to academic publications, then it means that there is a rule leading the analysts to 
compose (i.e., analyse or criticise) their academic works. 
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 After analysis of 33 IAC articles, this thesis has found that there are some features 
frequently displayed in these articles. Six standard procedures for writing IAC articles were 
categorized and discussed in previous chapters as shown in Table 8-8. While discussing these 
writing procedures, this thesis also suggests ways of its application. It implies that there 
indeed exist rules leading IAC analysts to compose their academic works, even in articles 
about ideology. To a great degree, this rule is ideology—whether it is IAC analysts’ own 
ideologies or the social (total) ideology surrounding them—as many commonalities have 
been found among their analyses. The point is that if the phenomenon of standardisation 
occurs in academic publications, then it demonstrates humans’ limitation of undertaking 
ideological critiques.  
 That is to say, the IAC articles, which seemingly show the moment/possibility of 
escaping from the cage of ideology, in fact are still composed of certain guiding rules. The 
33 IAC analysts can only analyse or criticise their research according to their own ideology 
(even though they adopt the analytical angle of ideology). What they can argue depends on 
what they have already known; such statement applies to any humans’ conscious activity.  
 Doubtless, all arguments this thesis has made are unexceptional. The standard 
procedures for writing IAC articles suggested by this thesis, in fact, are the product of my 
ideology resulting from my background (life experiences, education, etc.). My own ideology 
determines how I compose this thesis. In short, ideology makes a work an ideological 
analysis/critique.  
 However, if every analysis or critique, even through an ideological perspective, is the 
product of (an individual’s or the social total) ideology, then what is the meaning of humans’ 
conscious activities? Is there any way out of ideology?  
 Therefore, in Chapter 9, this thesis will returns to review related literatures, specifically 
focusing on Adorno’s philosophy, to ascertain whether early scholars had provided escape 
routes from the dungeon of ideology. If Chapters 5-8 aim to answer this thesis’ research 
question—whether human beings are capable of escaping from the cage of (their own) 
ideology—through a practical empirical analysis, then the aim of Chapters 9 is to answer the 
same question via a philosophical perspective, which also endeavours to answer the meaning 
of humans’ conscious activities. 
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Chapter 9 
 
Adorno’s Way Out of Ideology 
 
 
9.1 Introduction: A Permanent Dialectic 
In the empirical analysis chapters (5-8), this thesis has delineated six standard procedures for 
writing IAC articles, based on the common features found in 33 IAC articles. If such 
standard writing procedures exist as this thesis argues, it not only means there is a rule 
guiding analysts to write their IAC articles. It further implies that despite every effort the 
IAC analysts have made to break through the cage of ideology, ultimately they are still 
prisoners of (their or the social total) ideology. 
 Accordingly, this chapter will re-investigate the literature to determine if early scholars 
had provided any means of escape from ideological restraints. Many suggestions are found113
 
, 
but this thesis will focus on Adorno’s ideas while similar notions offered by his colleagues in 
the Frankfurt School will be provided when relevant. While the capacity of ideology seems 
unassailable (even to the ideology-specialists), the purpose of this chapter is to offer 
perspectives proposed by Adorno to examine his fight against the power of ideology.  
9.2 Ways out of Ideology’s Cage: Diverse Perspectives 
The cage of ideology has had diverse interpretations in different epochs of thought. To Marx, 
the ideological cage meant the domination of the bourgeoisie over proletarians. After his 
political economy studies, Marx discovered the alienated world that results from capitalism. 
Correspondingly, to escape this cage, Marx asked workers to unite and fight against 
capitalists for their own interests. To Lukacs, Marx’s suggestion was possible only if the 
proletarians were to awake to their class consciousness and interests. He suggested striving 
for a ‘totality’ where the proletarians would begin to consider themselves as the subject of 
their consciousness and existence.  
                                                     
113 E.g., Zizek (1989, 1994, 2009), Marcuse (1991, 1978), etc. 
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 To explain the failure of revolution, Gramsci developed his theory of hegemony. He did 
not focus much on the question of finding ways out of the dominant ideology, which Marx 
and Lukacs had dealt with at length. Instead, he required proletarians to create their own new 
consciousness, one which could fight/compete for hegemony. For Althusser, it is not an 
exaggeration to say that he never thought about fighting ideology, as to him ideology seemed 
iron-clad, simply unchangeable. Instead, he analysed the nature of ideology, explaining how 
an ideology could be constructed. Therefore, if it is possible to understand how one ideology 
is constructed and what is required to build it, might there not be a way out of its walls? It is 
the same idea that this thesis has tried to develop in previous chapters: the standard writing 
procedures—people can analyse as well as create ideologies based on such SWPs. 
 According to their studies, in the cultural creation in modern capitalist society, the 
Frankfurt School thinkers, who, to a greater degree, accepted (inherited from) Marx’s 
thoughts, also explained how ideology intruded on humans’ life and suggested ways to break 
free from ideology’s restraints. A few Frankfurt School thinkers’ suggestions of breaking 
through ideology will be briefly introduced. The main discussion will focus on Adorno as his 
ideas regarding this question were more complete and systematic compared to his 
colleagues.  
 
One way of escaping the ideological cage, according to Horkheimer, is to help people 
remember (Held, 1980, p. 25). To him, the reason why the proletariat could not be awakened 
to possess their class consciousness is that they had forgotten their historical mission of 
struggling for emancipation. While the proletariat is forgetful, critical theorists’ mission is to 
remember for the public—not only for the proletarians, as with the Frankfurt School having 
moved their spotlight towards culture they no longer simply focused on class. Proletarians 
and critical theorists have to remember why they “struggle for emancipation, the reasons for 
this struggle, [and] the nature of critical thinking itself” (Held, 1980, p. 25). Here the concept 
of ‘remembering’ refers to a form of consciousness raising.  
 Marcuse (1991) in his book One-Dimensional Man explained how instrumental 
rationality causes the phenomenon of alienated human beings. Marcuse (1969a) also adopted 
Freud’s notion of repression to respond to the phenomenon of alienation in the age of 
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ideology. To Marcuse, alienation or repression did not develop from nothing so that, he 
suggested, the first step to escape from them is to recognize their “performance principle” (p. 
44)—that is, what factors made them, for example, to find reasons that cause the inequality 
in a capitalist society. The second step is to create what he called the ‘new sensibility’114
Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse strongly criticised the technological developments 
in artistic creations. Yet, to Benjamin (2003a), it is because of the development of 
technologies that artistic creations are able to be massively reproduced and widely available. 
Technological development facilitates and fertilizes humans’ capabilities of percipience as 
well as fostering their abilities to criticise the vested common knowledge. Although the 
original ‘aura’ of artistic masterpiece disappears, an intimacy is created between arts and 
audiences. Accordingly, the manipulation of artistic creations can help to eliminate the 
limitation of appreciating/accessing cultural masterpieces, which used to be occupied by 
certain social groups. Artistic creations with the assistance of technological manipulation not 
only shoulder the responsibility of social reformation but also light up the escape route from 
the dominant ideology.  
 
which can be found in artistic creations through an aesthetic dimension. Artistic creations 
can create a reality which is more real than reality itself; once the historical conditions reach 
a certain level, utopia will end. This is also the moment when humans escape from 
ideology’s cage. 
 Drawing on Habermas, humans’ communication reveals how they are influenced by 
ideology. To evade the power of ideology, humans have to communicate rationally. 
According to Habermas (1984), first, a rational communicative action should be based on at 
least two mutual admitted and recognized subjects. Any unbalanced power inclining to either 
subject is unacceptable. Second, the communicative action has to go through the 
intermediary of linguistic symbols; these applied linguistic symbols must be 
understandable115
                                                     
114 One way of creating the new sensibility is to liberate Eros. Eros, conceptualized by Freud, 
originally refers to the life instinct pursuing the physical happiness—in Freud’s study, the sexuality. 
Marcuse’s (1969a) new recognition of Eros contains Freud’s concept of physical happiness and his 
dimension of spiritual (mental) happiness. This is what he called the “rationality of gratification” (p. 
180). In Marcuse’s (1969b) later work, An Essay on Liberation, he termed the liberation of Eros as the 
“new sensibility” (p. 23), a convergence of rationality and sensibility. 
. Moreover, speakers must meet four requirements: the “corresponding 
115 Habermas (1979) suggested that speakers have to obey the following rules while applying 
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validity claims of comprehensibility, truth, truthfulness, and rightness” (Habermas, 1979, p. 
3). In so doing, rational communicative actions can help people to understand and recognize 
each other in order to create a harmonious world without the interruption of personal values, 
that is, their own ideologies. 
As introduced above, the Frankfurt School theorists have provided (what they thought 
to be) ways out of the ideological constraints. Yet, to most readers, their suggestions (ideas) 
are much like fantastic, unrealistic, abstract theories which reflect more a dimension of 
philosophical imagination instead of a practical method. However, to the Frankfurt School’s 
thinkers themselves, these seemingly impractical theories are indeed what they considered 
the real practice. To understand their philosophical position, their attitude regarding roles of 
‘theory and practice’ should be reviewed. In so doing, it will be easier to comprehend as well 
as to identify with Adorno’s escape plans from the dungeon of ideology. 
Theory and Practice 
Marx (1992) in his work On the Jewish Question disagreed with Bauer’s idea of ‘political 
emancipation’. To Marx, political emancipation only referred to a spiritual/mental freedom; 
yet, there are still many factors which limit humans’ real emancipation, such as economic 
practice. His argument questioned whether real emancipation could be achieved through a 
mode of thought or via daily practical activity. Marx’s famous quotation in Theses on 
Feuerbach seems to reveal his answer. He claimed that “The philosophers have only 
interpreted the world in various ways. The point, however, is to change it” (in Engels, 1976, 
p. 65). 
 Since what humans’ emancipation had led to, abruptly, was Nazism and Fascism 
instead of Marx’s prediction, the dictatorship of the proletariat, Horkheimer and Adorno 
started to review the tension between theory and practice (Held, 1980). The contradiction 
between theory and practice is that, according to Adorno (1973), “theory is legitimate and 
[…] is hated; without it, there would be no changing the practice that constantly calls for 
change” (p. 143). In other words, although humans despise dreary theories, their practices 
                                                                                                                                                      
linguistic symbols to communicate: “a. uttering something understandably; b. giving something to 
understand; c. making himself thereby understandable; and d. coming to an understanding with 
another person” (p. 2). 
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always require endorsement of theories in order to obtain legitimacy of their actions. 
 While Lenin arrived at Finland Station, he claimed,  
theoretical classification doesn't matter now [....] It would be indeed a grave error if 
we tried now to fit the complex, urgent, rapidly-unfolding practical tasks of the 
revolution into the Procrustean bed of a narrowly conceived ‘theory’, instead of 
regarding theory first of all and above all as a guide to action” (emphasis original; 
Wilson, 1972, pp. 546-7).  
Although Lenin did not degrade the importance of theories, to him, theories could only play 
a guiding role. The extent of humans’ emancipation still depended on their practical actions. 
 To some extent, Adorno (1973) agreed with Lenin that theories are a guide to action; 
yet, Adorno argued that any practices without theories were irrational and amounted to 
blindness, which would definitely meet with failure. Practices, which are executed 
mistakenly, cannot be counted as practices; instead, a misapplication of theory might cause 
serious tragedy. For example, the autocracy of Stalin, who claimed to follow the guidance of 
Marxism and Leninism, had indeed proved Adorno’s argument. 
 In fact, Adorno (1973) rejected putting theories into practice (e.g., revolution). If asked 
why humans in contemporary capitalist society recoil from theory and prefer practices, 
Adorno would reply that the contemporary ideology of pragmatism is guiding human 
behaviour (echoing the Frankfurt School’s critique on instrumental rationality). Besides, in 
contemporary capitalist society, the standard of establishing knowledge is usually based on a 
practical evaluation. To Adorno, once the standard (set up by practical evaluation) 
determines how humans recognize and apply knowledge, it eventually becomes a new myth 
(echoing the Frankfurt School’s critique on the idea of enlightenment). Again, Adorno 
rejected putting theories into practice. Theory must retain its individuality declining to be 
applied, just like artistic creations refuse to be appropriated/duplicated. 
While it might have been possible for Adorno to state that none of these practices 
should be engaged in, it could then be asked, what did he see as a way to practice? His 
answer would be that the process of developing theories per se is the real practice. The 
theory does not need material practice to prove its validity; as Adorno (1973) said, “the 
horizon of such happiness116
                                                     
116 “Such happiness” here refers to Adorno’s (1983) discussion of the birth of thought. It says that 
“when a man can do nothing that will not threaten to turn out for the worst even if meant for the best, 
he will be bound to start thinking—and that justifies him as well as the happy spirit” (p. 243). 
 need by no means be that of a transparent relation to a possible 
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practice to come” (p. 245). This statement shares the same idea with Žižek (2012) who 
points out: “Don’t act, just think”. ‘Thinking’ generates continuing dialectics and 
introspection; the purpose of which is to find a philosophical dimension to explain all 
phenomena117
Adorno’s objection against practice reflected on the 1968 student movement. Students 
adopted the spirit of critical theory to undertake their actions. To Adorno, professed critical 
theory is indeed born to criticise social problems; however, applying theories to practical 
actions dogmatically without thoughtful consideration will only help the ‘opponent’, who the 
critical theory originally tries to condemn. As Horkheimer (1972) put it, “opposition, 
however despairing, is itself co-opted into the very development it had hoped to counteract” 
(p. viii).  
. “Philosophy cannot in and of itself recommend immediate measures or 
changes. It effects change precisely by remaining theory” (Richter, & Adorno, 2002, p. 19).  
Drawing on Adorno and Horkheimer, practical actions are unnecessary because 
regardless of the critical theory itself, or of the criticised target, even to the critics, they are 
all part of the whole society. They are already in it. Only if social problems exist does the 
critique have its targets; the process of critique per se (via the process of developing theories) 
is the real practice. When will humans achieve a complete theory so that they obtain the 
guidance to proceed to the practical actions? Horkheimer (1972) would answer that there 
will be no such date because  
if our knowledge is in fact not yet final, if there is an irreducible tension between 
concept and being, then no proposition can claim the dignity of perfect knowledge 
(p. 27).  
In short, the process of developing theories is the process of practice. The practical action, 
such as a strike, which people used to consider as practice, is not the real practice. This 
epistemological foundation regarding the notions of ‘theory and practice’ is important to 
understanding Adorno’s escape routes from the ideological cage; otherwise, one would 
simply see his concepts as the fantastic, unrealistic, abstract theories, even considering his 
concepts as utopian fantasies. 
 
                                                     
117 This point echoes this thesis’s final argument that self-critique—or thinking— is the possible way 
to escape from the dungeon of ideology which will be discussed in final chapter. 
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9.3 Adorno’s Escape Routes 
Adorno (1973), in Negative Dialectics, said that “where an unleashed, self-escaping 
rationality goes wrong, where it becomes true mythology” (p. 148), meaning that if the 
rationality cannot recognise its foundational faculty, it becomes irrationality. When humans 
lose their capacity to recognize things, they will just follow a certain way of recognition, 
which results in their pursuing the identity(-thinking). Such a result is bad for humans’ 
development because, to Adorno, “identity is the primal form of ideology” (p. 146). Hence, 
he advocates ‘non-identity’ thinking, explained later. 
With the influence of this identity-principle comes the human pursuit of totality. One 
reason to aspire to totality, according to Lukacs (1971), is to expect the combination of 
subjects and objects; however, Adorno (1973) certainly disagreed with Lukacs. To Adorno, 
during the forming process of totality, a certain idea will emerge to play the role of subject 
(or claim itself as the only subject) in order to eliminate ‘others’, i.e., non-subjects, or say, 
the objects. This process will create an unbalanced power relationship between diverse ideas 
which also help the vested dominant/ruling ideas of subject to control over the 
dominated/ruled ideas of the objects/non-subjects. Eventually, the subjects will devour the 
objects despite any actions of the latter in trying to resist. The Holocaust is the testimony; the 
philosophy on which the totality particularly relies is also the philosophical example of the 
Holocaust.  
 To Adorno, failing to recognize the relationship between subject and object of things, 
will lead humans irrationally to identify certain guiding ideology which reflects in the 
common human activity—the pursuit of identity-thinking to reach totality.  
 Accordingly, drawing on Adorno’s ways out of the ideology restraints, he would 
suggest discarding the identity-principle and its predictable consequence: the pursuit of 
totality. Three dimensions—ontological, epistemological, and methodological— will be 
taken to examine Adorno’s philosophy to see how he fought against the ideology cage. By 
way of a brief introduction, in terms of the ontological dimension, Adorno insisted on ‘the 
preponderance of the object’ and the importance of ‘pursuing non-identity(-thinking)’. 
Regarding the epistemological dimension, Adorno offered concepts of ‘immanent critique’ 
and ‘constellation’. Finally, for the methodological dimension, he focused on the ‘writing 
style’. 
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Ontological Dimension 
This thesis in earlier discussions argued that ontology indeed is ideology. Adorno would 
suggest, one first has to discard what is currently believed in order to escape the ideology’s 
restraints. That is to say, from the ontology angle, humans’ existing ideology (i.e., ontology) 
must be overthrown first in order to escape the cage of ideology. Adorno argued that the 
existing ontology (in his time) was that people believe in the preponderance of ‘subject’ and 
for this reason people are desperately pursuing the identify-thinking to create totality. Adorno 
attempted to defeat such ontology. Thus, the ontology, or perhaps, new ideology, he tried to 
establish is the ‘preponderance of object’. In so doing, he wished that people would turn to 
pursue the non-identity(-thinking). 
Adorno (1978) claimed that one serious problem in the development of Western philosophy 
is the distinction between subjects and objects since Descartes. Although Descartes focused 
on the subject’s spiritual and philosophical development, the detachment of spirit from 
material simultaneously created the separation of subjects and objects (Held, 1980). Adorno 
(in Schweppenhäuser, 2009) argued that humans’ ability to categorize things is the reason 
why the concept of ‘subject’ is formed. If humans are incapable of undertaking 
categorization, the existence of the subject will never come about.  
Distinction of Subjects and Objects 
Yet, to Adorno (1978, 1973), the serious problem is that same human emphasis on the 
importance of the subjects, given the above distinction. People started to think that “the 
subject’s concepts produce the world” (Held, 1980, p. 202), considering that the subject itself 
possesses individual autonomy. What happens next is that the subject arbitrarily subsumes 
the object into its system; the rights of defining the object are occupied by the subject, which 
makes the latter forget that it, per se, is indeed an object (Adorno, 1978; 1973). As Adorno 
(1978) explained, “the subject swallows the object, forgetting how much it is an object itself” 
(p. 499); indeed, “objectivity can be conceived without a subject; not so subjectivity without 
an object”118
                                                     
118 Adorno (1983) interpreted this relationship by using an example. He wrote, “That the I is an entity 
is implicit even in the sense of the logical ‘I think, which should be able to accompany all my 
conceptions,’ because the sequence of time is a condition of its possibility and there is no sequence of 
time save in temporality. The pronoun ‘my’ points to a subject as an object among objects, and again, 
without this ‘my’ there would be no ‘I think.’ The being of a subject is taken from objectivity—a fact 
 (p. 502).  
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Adorno (1978) concluded that the separation of subject and object is “both real and 
illusory” (p. 498). The real part is seen in the fact that this separation reflects human 
development of consciousness; the illusory part is in the fact that this separation is seen as an 
absolute and unchangeable belief. 
Consequently, Adorno (1973) rejected such a simple mode of distinction between 
subject and object. He argued that they (subject and object) are not in an oppositional 
relationship; instead, it is the ‘difference’ between them.  
To Adorno (1973), if their relationship were to take the form of opposition, then such 
relationship would expunge what concerned him the most: the non-identity(-thinking). This 
is because the form of the oppositional relationship only exists in a structure which is 
controlled by the subject. In such a structure, the power between subject and object is 
unequally distributed. The former always possesses more. Thus, the final results will be 
either that the object is simplified as the single component of the subject’s identity, or that 
the object loses its appearance, just as if it had never existed at all (which, in fact, is also the 
reason/result of humans’ pursuing identity and totality).  
With respect to this phenomenon, Adorno suggested reconsidering the relationship 
between subject and object as a ‘difference’. Difference here implies that subject and object 
are in an inter-constructed relationship. Neither could claim significance or uniqueness of 
itself. In short, Adorno’s ideal relationship between subject and object would be that there 
should not be any dominant relation between them, but only interactive and independent 
differentiability.  
The ideal relationship between subject and object, to Adorno (1973), is difference rather than 
opposition; yet, such thought (i.e., ideology) ‘the preponderance of the subject’ has 
dominated humans’ consciousness for a long time, which results in an unequal power 
distribution. The subject possesses an authority to evaluate things such that even the weakest 
and most powerless non-identity-thinking will still be seen as a serious threat to the subject. 
The subject always declares itself as the whole, which cannot accept any non-itself/subject.  
The Preponderance of the Object 
                                                                                                                                                      
that lends a touch of objectivity to the subject itself” (pp. 183-184). 
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 For this reason, Adorno proclaimed “the preponderance of the object” (p. 183) to 
overthrow humans’ existing ontology (ideology). The object here is not the one which 
corresponds to the subject; because if so, then it would be the one which has already been 
defined by the subject. The object that Adorno claimed to be preponderant is not the one 
which needs the subject to intermediate or to interpret for it. On the contrary, it is the one 
which is even unable to conceptualize itself. In other words, to Adorno, the development of 
social knowledge has to be built on the indescribable phenomenon per se instead of being 
created/described by the researchers’ consciousness (i.e., their ideology). Researchers have to 
respect the individuality of their researched things/phenomena, that is, to see the object as 
one without any pre-existing understandings.  
 The reasons why Adorno strongly stressed ‘the preponderance of the object’ are not 
only that this is an interrelated concept with his concept of “constellation” (which will be 
introduced later), but also because only when the status of object is promoted preponderantly 
is it able to resist identity-thinking and the outcome, i.e., totality.  
 That Adorno fought against identity does not mean simply to say “No”, not to eliminate 
identity. It is similar to that suggesting the idea ‘the dialectics of enlightenment’ does not 
mean to abolish enlightenment per se. Instead, it means to combat the ideologies which 
worship absolute identity(-thinking) which has even been considered as the only way to 
reach the truth. It is acceptable to claim that Adorno disagreed with all 
identity-actions/thinking (although such a claim implies that even our learned knowledge 
indeed is the product of identity thinking119
                                                     
119 As Adorno (1973) said “We can see through the identity principle, but we cannot think without 
identifying. Any definition is identification.” (p. 149) 
, which should be criticised as well); yet, it would 
be much more accurate to state that what concerned Adorno the most was to find out critical 
factors which eliminate the ‘differences’ between subject and object or erase the 
non-identity-thinking during the process of pursuing the identity. For instance, what Adorno 
(Adorno & Horkheimer, 1997) did in the chapter “Elements of Anti-Semitism: Limits of 
Enlightenment”, in Dialectics of Enlightenment, was to investigate the eliminated elements 
which used to represent the Jews’ non-identity characteristics. Jews’ non-identity 
characteristics were eliminated which helped to build the Aryans’ identity-thinking of 
pursuing the pure-blood. 
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To Adorno (1973), “identity is the primal form of ideology” (p. 148). To escape from its 
dominance, the preponderance of the object has to be confirmed, as mentioned, which 
corresponds to his other notion: the pursuit of non-identity(-thinking). Non-identity is the 
diversities which reside in the identity(-thinking); it is what identity sees as the Others. These 
Others, or diversities, are the representatives of non-identity, which permanently struggle 
against identity. Although for humans it is usually inevitable to simply identify one subject’s 
authority (because it is the easiest way to recognise the world), what this concept—the 
pursuit of non-identity(-thinking)— mainly stresses is asking us to admit and be aware of the 
existence of others’ authority.  
The Pursuit of Non-Identify(-Thinking) (Via the Bestimmte Negation) 
According to Adorno (1973), non-identity(-thinking) per se cannot be arbitrarily 
described or categorized by concepts or any existing systematic knowledge, meaning that 
non-identity(-thinking) per se is not even a conceptualized idea. If it were considered as ‘a 
way of thinking’, then this professed non-identity(-thinking) would become 
identity(-thinking) immediately. In short, the ‘non’ of non-identity in Adorno’s idea refers to 
a continually acting and negotiating process. This echoes his attitude toward theory and 
practice: the process of developing theories is the process of real practice. This also echoes 
his disgust at standardisation in artistic creations, which reveal nothing but creating identity. 
As a result, this thesis attempts to discover whether SWPs exist in IAC publications; if so, 
IAC analysts generate nothing but an identity-thinking in ideological analysis/critique. 
As mentioned, the pursuit of non-identity is to prevent the objects from being 
conceptualized by the subjects or the identity(-thinking). In order to reach this goal, a 
continuous process of negation is required. Nevertheless, to Adorno (1973), the method of 
negation here does not refer to what Hegel suggested: the negation of a negation. Instead, a 
real process of negation, to Adorno (1973), is a negation without any positive purpose; it is 
an absolute negation. Adorno referred it to Hegel’s another less discussed notion: die 
bestimmte Negation (usually translated to English as the ‘definite negation,’ ‘concrete 
negation,’ or ‘determinate negation’; henceforth, the bestimmte negation.).  
Adorno (1973) argued that Hegel’s concept of ‘the negation of a negation’ reveals a 
misunderstanding of the dialectical principle. To Adorno, the real principle refers to “the 
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resistance which otherness offers to identity” (pp. 160-1) instead of “[reacting] negatively to 
the Other [… penetrating] the object and [… voiding] the negation which it is” (Hegel’s line 
in Adorno, 1973, p. 160). Adorno argued that once a thing (e.g., a concept) has been negated, 
it is impossible to restore it back to normal by way of negating this thing again.  
Adorno (1973) wrote that “the thesis that the negation of a negation is something 
positive can only be upheld by one who presupposes positivity—as all-conceptuality—from 
the beginning” (p. 160). To Adorno, Hegel is the person who pursued this positivity because 
“this positivity [the result of the negation of a negation] springs from the method—not from 
the thing, as in Hegel’s view it should” (p. 159). Adorno criticised this method as it follows a 
mathematic principle such that it “takes minus times minus for a plus”, which indeed is an 
“anti-dialectical principle” (p. 158). In other words, if people adopt Hegel’s negation of 
negation to negate a thing, their discussion will eventually and inevitably turn back to affirm 
what is supposed to be criticised and to reach the “self-sameness” (Hegel’s word in Adorno, 
1973, p. 160). 
 Although Adorno logically pointed out the shortcoming of Hegel’s negation of 
negation, what worried Adorno the most was that people innocently misconceive the concept, 
negation of negation, as the only one which could possess the power of negativity. Adorno 
(1973) was concerned that once people think this way,  
the negation of negation would be another identity, a new delusion, a projection of 
consequential logic—and ultimately of the principle of subjectivity—upon the 
absolute. (p. 160) 
On the other hand, to Adorno (1973), the notion that genuinely possesses the power of 
negativity should be Hegel’s other concept, the ‘bestimmte negation’, that is, to negate the 
thing (e.g., a concept) which has already been suggested to convey a certain meaning; in 
other words, to negate the concept which has been determined. 
This thesis will provide a way to understand these two terms, ‘the negation of a 
negation’ and ‘the bestimmte negation’, to delineate Adorno’s ideas. Whether it appears in 
the terminology of ‘the negation of a negation’ or ‘the bestimmte negation’, the word 
negation is presented as part of a noun phrase, which, to a certain extent, might cause 
confusion, especially for non-native-English readers. These terminologies would be much 
more understandable if read via the following method.  
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Clarification of terminologies: 
1. The bold-faced words in the terms ‘the negation of a negation’ and in “the bestimmte 
negation” should be read in a sense of verb or seen as an on-going action. It means ‘to 
negate/criticise a thing’. 
2. The bold-faced words in ‘the negation of a negation’ and in ‘the bestimmte negation’ 
could be seen as: how the analysts recognize the characteristic of their research subjects. 
This is also the critical point which distinguishes the difference between Hegel’s two 
terms. 
2-1. Explanation of Terminologies I: The Negation of a Negation:  
The bold-faced word of ‘the negation of a negation’ refers to things (e.g., concepts 
or social phenomena) which have already negated other things before. Accordingly, 
the method of the negation of a negation means: to negate a thing which has already 
negated other things before.  
Take scholars’ works of ideology critique as an example. Scholars who adopt the notion of 
‘the negation of negation’ will (unintentionally) possess the following attitude: ‘This 
ideology is bad (because it subverts other things already, such that it per se possesses a 
negation), so we criticise it (we have to turn it over again)’. 
 Adorno would disagree with the method of ‘the negation of a negation’ because these 
scholars have already defined their research subjects (e.g., one ideology) in terms of 
wrongness. It also tells why these scholars have decided to criticise or negate again. In other 
words, these scholars have already possessed an evaluation standard of what is right or better; 
they negate the ideology based on the rightness in which they believe. Yet, this is just what 
most troubled Adorno: the identity(-thinking). 
 
2-2. Explanation of Terminologies II: The Bestimmte Negation:  
The word bestimmte means: to negate a thing (i.e., a research phenomenon), which 
is conceptualized with a specific meaning. The point is that this research 
phenomenon did not negate others before; it simply represents/conveys a 
conceptualized meaning.  
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Similarly, scholars who possess this perspective will only stay in a neutral position, they will 
not presume whether this ideology is right or wrong. What they are going to find and then to 
negate is the ‘already-embedded meaning’ that the ideology represents. For instance, the 
Frankfurt School thinkers found that the already-embedded meanings in the aspect of 
enlightenment are rational, civil, and progressive cognitions. The point is that they did not 
directly claim the enlightenment as bad; instead, they evaluated the influences of these 
already-embedded meanings in the concept of enlightenment first, then negated them. To 
Adorno, only the bestimmte negation is the real negation. 
To conclude, in terms of ontology, escaping from the cage of ideology, to Adorno 
(1973), calls first for confirming the preponderance of the object. This is to avoid 
identity(-thinking), which results in subject’s invading the object. Since identity is the primal 
form of ideology, in order to escape from the cage, people have to agree with 
non-identity(-thinking). Non-identity is not a conceptualized aspect; instead, it is a 
permanent, continuous, and absolute negating process. This absolute negating process does 
not refer to the logic of the negation of a negation; rather, it refers to the bestimmte negation. 
Epistemological Angle 
Drawing on Adorno (1973), the permanent, continuous, and absolute negating process (i.e., 
the bestimmte negation) is the only way to escape from ideology restraints. This absolute 
negating process is based on the epistemological acknowledgement regarding the recognition 
of two important aspects—critique and concept. First, to reach the goal of absolute negation, 
the ‘critique’ that analysts apply does not refer to any type of critiques, but to what Adorno 
referred to as the ‘immanent critique’ (Held, 1980; Jay, 1984). Second, the way of 
understanding the composed concepts of one research phenomenon should go through the 
aspect of what he called the constellation instead of the traditional understanding of the 
general term concept. That is to say, only when analysts realize the epistemological 
differences of recognising the aspects of critique and concept does breaking through 
ideology become possible. 
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If the endless loop of critiques related to ideology is considered, it seems impossible to 
establish a neutral critique/analysis. Yet, the concept of immanent critique emphasizes that 
although critics inevitably situate in the same circumstance as the criticised 
subjects/phenomenon do and even though their own ideology unavoidably becomes involved 
with their research, it does not mean that they are incapable of producing critiques. The point 
is how analysts recognize the way they proceed their analysis.  
Immanent Critique 
 Immanent critique suggests that it is possible to depict, discuss, or criticise an ideology 
based on an objective perspective. Yet, to criticise one ideology does not mean simply to 
claim that ‘this ideology is untrue’ based on a viewpoint outside the researched subject; 
instead, critics can only analyse how this ideology is presented according to the inner 
constructing logic of the subject. (This also echoes the difference between the negation of a 
negation and the bestimmte negation.)  
To Adorno (1967/1981, p. 32, in Jay, 1984, p. 116), the spirit of immanent critique is to 
“grasp, through the analysis of their [the criticised subjects’] form and meaning, the 
contradiction between their objective idea and their pretension”. In other words, the method 
of immanent critique is to appropriate the same logics, concepts, and terminologies that the 
criticised subject adopts in order to obtain the authority (e.g., standpoint) to support their 
analysis/critiques instead of simply criticising the subject with an external logic and thinking 
(in other words, with a different epistemology). In short, immanent critique discovers the 
researched subjects’ inner contradiction first, then borrows weapons (i.e., the same 
argumentative logic or concepts) from the researched subjects, and finally fights/detects their 
inner concealed characteristic. (The fighting strategy—i.e., Adorno’s ‘writing style’ and 
principle—will be introduced later).  
From the perspective of immanent critique, the way out of the ideological cage is 
required to understand what concepts or logics are used to construct the researched subjects, 
and then to determine the contradiction of these concepts or logics which could be adopted 
as critical weapons to subvert these researched subjects per se. For example, the Frankfurt 
School’s critique on instrumental rationality did not directly claim that ‘new technologies are 
bad’; instead, they first found out the inner characteristics and the operating logics of these 
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technologies, then argued the possible influences of using these new technologies on humans’ 
consciousness.  
Similarly, although this thesis does not mean to undertake (immanent) critique on the 
33 IAC articles rather than ‘analysis’, the validity of the suggested SWPs can be 
acknowledged only based on the investigation of these IAC articles’ common inner 
constructing logics, such as argumentative logics or writing styles. If the ideological 
critique/analysis is regarded as a type of critique/analysis, then the findings of SWPs indicate 
that the inner constructing logic of the type of the ideological critique follows certain guiding 
principles, which influence how analysts conduct their works of ideological critique.  
Adorno (1973) rejected only appropriating a few or a set of certain concepts to describe the 
research phenomenon; this was to prevent the identity(-thinking). Instead, he suggested the 
notion of constellation. According to Adorno, the term constellation means that each concept 
adopted to describe a phenomenon should be equally important. There is no such 
dominant-subordinate relationship between all concepts—that is, no single concept has 
priority over others. This is because promoting a particular concept to a preponderant 
position is just what the identity-thinking does
Constellation 
120
 In all honesty, this thesis should not have used the word concept to describe the notion 
of constellation, considering that, to Adorno, the word concept has already referred to a 
certain scope of meaning. It is already defined, which is not what the notion of constellation 
attempts to suggest. In a constellation, the construction of an object does not occur as 
concrete concepts; it is more like concepts without boundaries, similar to clouds. One cloud 
itself is boundless within the sky and sometime mixes with other clouds; clouds integrate and 
separate all the time. In the notion of constellation, any concepts (just like clouds) do not 
refer to any certain or concrete meanings; rather, they are presented as a continually 
changing status, just like clouds.  
.  
                                                     
120 For example, both the terms capitalism and communism originally were created to signify 
particular social and political systems. There should be no such subordinate or superior relationship 
between the two concepts. Yet, in some countries with diverse backgrounds, either term is readily 
demonized or promoted for a country’s political purpose. Take my education experience for instance. 
During the 1990s in Taiwan, the historical education taught students that communism is a worse 
system and that people in mainland China suffered from starvation due to their political system. As a 
result, that communism is bad became the dominant ideology, or say, the identity-thinking, among 
Taiwanese people who were educated in the 1990s. 
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 To Adorno, if people could recognize concepts of one research phenomenon through 
the dimension of constellation, this would be able to prevent one concept breaking away 
from the object (where this concept inhabits). Otherwise, if such a concept were to 
successfully break away from the object, it might claim itself to be the subject. Eventually 
such concept will consider itself as the only subject and turn back to eliminate its 
matrix—the object—in order to reach identity(-thinking). To Adorno, the perspective of 
constellation is a way to prevent such a disaster. 
 Idea of constellation is explained above. To Adorno (1973), the real function of 
constellation is 
from without what the concept has cut away within: the “more” which the concept 
is equally desirous and incapable of being. By gathering around the object of 
cognition, the concepts potentially determine the object’s interior. They attain, in 
thinking, what was necessarily excised from thinking. (p. 162) 
Concepts that humans are able to perceive are those which are already limited to a certain 
dimension. These concepts have to eliminate other meanings in order to create its uniqueness 
(i.e., specific meaning). This is the outcome of a historical modification. Those deleted 
meanings which are banished from the concrete concept are precisely what the notion of 
constellation is eager to preserve—saving those meanings which could represent “the more” 
as well as meanings that the concrete concept tries to delete. In short, the notion of 
constellation is not only a way to recognize the constructed concepts of an object; it is also 
an angle for re-evaluating the concrete concept at present, or to see how much this concrete 
concept has lost. 
 To conclude, in terms of epistemology, for a great escape from the cage of ideology, 
one has to adopt the angle of immanent critique, that is, to discover researched subjects’ 
inner contradiction first, then to borrow weapons (i.e., the same argumentative logics or 
concepts) from them, and finally to fight/detect their inner concealed characteristic of 
negation. Moreover, the concept of constellation attempts to restore the relationship between 
one subject (identity-thinking, ideology) and its original figure—the object—in order to 
retrieve the deleted-meanings which are eliminated by this current subject for the sake of its 
dominance. In so doing, once no single concept is able to suppress others, humans will not 
be limited to certain concrete ideologies which could be seen as a way to break free from 
ideology restraints. 
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Methodological Angle 
Drawing on Adorno, his ‘writing style’ could be seen as the methodological angle to escape 
from ideology. Such an application also echoes his guiding principles of the immanent 
critique and constellation. Two common writing styles that Adorno frequently applied, as 
Rose (1978) investigated, are the “ironic inversion” (p. 16) and the “chiasmus” (p. 13). 
Rose (1978) interpreted Adorno’s idea that to “[pit] reality against reality is a way to 
criticise both the ideals and the reality” (p. 21). In so doing, the biggest benefit is that the 
critics do not have to declare another reality to carry their critiques, considering that any 
representation of a reality is the reflection of their own ideology (Rose, 1978). As the sayings 
go, ‘to fight fire with fire’ or ‘set a thief to catch a thief’—to fight against the researched 
subjects with their own concepts and inner logics—could prevent the critics from limiting 
themselves to their own opinions (i.e., ideology). This is the guiding principle of immanent 
critique.  
To follow the principle of immanent critique, Adorno adopted the writing style of 
‘ironic inversion’. For instance, Adorno (in Rose, 1978) wrote “The Health unto Death” to 
reply to “The Sickness unto Death” which was written by Kierkegaard. Adorno also penned 
“This Side of the Pleasure Principle” to contrast with Freud’s “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” 
(p. 17) and Minima Moralia is Adorno’s inversion of Nietzsche’s Magna Moralia (ibid., p. 
17). To write with this style, Adorno provided an explanation: it is to “[drive] thoughts with 
the utmost consequence to the point where they turn back on themselves, instead of 
qualifying them” (in Rose, 1978, p. 17). 
Another of Adorno’s writing styles, chiasmus, echoes his notion of constellation. For 
example, he displayed his discussion this way: “The subject is the object, the object is the 
subject” and “history is nature, nature is history” (Rose, 1978, p. 13). This is to avoid 
conceptualizing meanings during the process of discourse because of the great potential that 
the discourse will generate a concrete concept, such that eventually a subject will be created 
out of its matrix, the object. The principle of constellation states that all meanings in one 
object possess the same quality of importance; these meanings are unable to (should not) be 
conceptualized so that they are always in a continually changing process. In short, what 
needs to be done while recognizing an object is to focus on the whole constellation but not a 
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single star121
To conclude, in the style of ironic inversion, Adorno presented the same term with a 
diverse sense; with respect to chiasmus, he played with the relationship of the subject and 
object, to make them as the alter ego of each other. Such writing styles are for preventing 
concepts from being defined. They also help bringing all concepts to the same level of 
importance. In so doing, the writing is able to guard against identity(-thinking); at the same 
time, it is able to burst out of the ideology
. The writing style of ‘chiasmus’ could prevent critics from over-emphasising 
one concept which would unintentionally create a particular and one-dimensional thinking. 
122
 
. 
9.4 The Real Practice: Arts 
Adorno emphasized the importance of theory, claiming that none of any real practice (e.g., 
social movement) should have ever been proceeded; yet, there is still a place outside theory 
where, to him, the real practice could reach the truth and escape from the influence of 
ideology—that is, the artistic composition. (This is also the reason why he is so hostile to the 
invasion of technologies in artistic creations.) Jay (1984) said that “if Adorno allowed any 
glimmer of hope, it was only in his reference to art” (p. 53). Art, or artistic creations, which 
represent a way out of ideology’s cage, could be described based on three perspectives: its 
characteristic, its relation to the society, and its functions. 
First, in terms of its characteristics, art is considered to be able to surmount the conflict 
of interests, so that, as Schweppenhäuser (2009) interpreted, it “[serves] other goals than the 
making of commodities” (p. 91). As a result of this non-utilized character, artistic creations, 
                                                     
121  Adorno’s obedience to this constellation principle—or, put another way, to this writing 
style—corresponds to the logic of the hermeneutic circle, that is, the meaning of the whole text will 
not be created until the emergence of all individual parts, while the meaning of each individual part 
will not be understood until it is seen through the angle of the whole text. 
122 Here, this thesis only introduces Adorno’s writing styles; in fact, his colleagues Horkheimer also 
developed his specific writing style. Horkheimer (1972) tried to determine the conditions which make 
things (e.g., society, science, ideology) become such formation instead of other formations. However, 
he was unable to point to any condition which could be seen as a fundamental and basic element, even 
to the action of critique per se (1972). That is to say, if it is impossible to have a basic discipline for 
critique, then to criticize or to write discourses about critique itself is a challenge (Held, 1980). 
Horkheimer’s solution was to present his thought in the writing style of “essays and aphorisms” (Held, 
1980, p. 41) instead of the systematic and monumental literary works which people used to apply. 
According to Horkheimer, if one wants to create a system of thought, he or she has to externalize 
those abstract concepts (such as critique, nature, culture, spirit), which, to him, is definitely a mistake. 
This argument echoes Adorno’s (1983) rejection of the notion of identity-thinking. Hence, an 
aphoristic style or a form of short essay will prevent the externalization of abstract ideas into concrete 
concepts, which is the primal form of ideology, according to Adorno (1990). 
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arts per se, and the process of appreciating it are able to break through the limitations of 
ideology. Adorno (cite in Schweppenhäuser, 2009) claimed that “the purposelessness of the 
more modern great artwork lives off the anonymity of the market” (p. 150). The anonymity 
means that the creators of arts should completely avoid the market’s expectations123. Art is 
able to escape from ideology since it has nothing to do with contention of secular interests124
 Second, drawing on Adorno (1956), the notion that art is capable of escaping ideology 
is based on art’s relationship to society. To Adorno, art is the representation of the authors’ 
historically conscious accumulations; art represents society as a whole instead of displaying 
a few or particular ideas of certain interest groups (in Jay, 1984). In short, as Jay (1984) 
interpreted, “aesthetic merit and social content were inseparable” (p. 135). While what 
ideology represents is usually a certain concept (that is what Adorno argued, the totality), the 
role of art in society becomes the possibility to impede/prevent this certain totality. 
Furthermore, Adorno (ibid.) also stressed that art should free itself from representing the 
“idea of authenticity” (p. 157), meaning that art has to avoid defining one “concept of 
being-so-and-not-otherwise” (p. 157), at which point it is possible to reach the truth. 
Conversely, if art claims itself only to represent particular meanings, then its function of 
fighting ideology disappears.  
.  
 Third, the reason why art is able to become a weapon against ideology is that, to 
Adorno, it is the combination of mental and mimetic performances which both represent 
objectivity (Schweppenhäuser, 2009). In terms of mimesis, since humans are unable to retain 
every moment they have experienced, art (as the decoding tool of nature) preserves these 
moments for humans via its mimetic function (Jay, 1984). Yet, Adorno especially 
emphasized that although art possesses the mimetic function, it does not mean to directly 
                                                     
123 Adorno (cited in Schweppenhäuser, 2009) further explained that in the eighteenth century, 
although the patrons of artists provided them with protection so that they would not have to be 
involved in the market’s trends, they were still “subordinate to their clients and their clients’ purposes” 
(p. 150). Hence, anonymity means that the creator of art should completely avoid the market’s 
expectations. 
124 If Barthes’ concept of the death of the author is considered here as well, it could provide a better 
reason why arts could escape from the power of ideology. Drawing on Barthes, during the process of 
artistic appreciation the creator’s thoughts should be ignored. In so doing, it becomes possible to reach 
the ideal where the art fully possesses its independent character. Authors should be anonymous; the 
creations should also break the link with their authors once the work is done. Under this condition, it 
is possible to claim that arts (and arts appreciation) could be seen as representing a way out of 
ideology. 
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copy nature per se; instead, it refers to presenting the “natural beauty” (p. 157) of a thing. In 
the meantime, the mimesis of natural beauty, as Schweppenhäuser (2009) explained, is the 
“dialectic of mimesis and rationality [which] defines not only the reception and production 
of works, but also their truth content” (p. 99).  
 In terms of the mental function of art, it represents the philosophical characteristic of 
art (Schweppenhäuser, 2009). Art implies the philosophical recognition toward existence and 
toward phenomena (e.g., an expected happiness) which have not yet come into existence; 
philosophy is a subject for recognizing human existence (ibid.). Yet, since humans are only 
able to understand their existence through symbolic materials, as a result, art becomes the 
method for discovering the mental beauty behind material artistic creations. Because of arts, 
humans are capable of recognizing the concepts that philosophy tries to display. Adorno 
thought that “the self-manifesting of the artwork points toward a happiness that could not 
only appear in the world but also embody its existent truth” (ibid., p. 97-98). In short, art 
proclaims the possibility of utopia. 
 Except for the theoretical discussion of art’s characteristic, role, and function, Adorno 
also answered practically why art is capable of escaping ideology’s cage. As mentioned, 
Adorno rejected the pursuit of totality because it shows how one identity(-thinking) 
eliminates the Others. However, this does not mean that Adorno disagreed with all totality. 
Rather, it should be said that the pursuit of totality is important to the task of reaching the 
realm of objectification; the critical question is, what equipment and methods are adopted to 
pursue the real totality.  
To Adorno, music can be considered as a possibility to reach his ideal totality, 
especially Beethoven’s compositions in his middle period (Jay, 1984). These masterpieces, to 
Adorno, are a “prefiguration of a rationally totalized, yet non-dominating social whole” 
(ibid., p.143). In other words, the totality that Beethoven had reached in his middle period 
represents “strong subjects [which] realized their subjectivity in objective form” (p. 147). 
What Adorno tried to suggest here was still his suggestion of ‘the preponderance of the 
object’. To Adorno, the representation of a real totality should focus on the object instead of 
the subject. A practice such as musical composition, which sets up the object with a primary 
status, is the way to escape from the cage of ideology generated by identity-thinking. 
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Take the perspective of musical appreciation (instead of professional musical theory) to 
explain/conjecture why, to Adorno, Beethoven’s middle period composition reached the ideal 
of real totality.  Compared with other classical music composers in the eighteenth century 
especially Mozart, Beethoven’s works were barely impressive (Rosen, 1997). It is because 
Beethoven was the model who broke away from classical music and created a new era of 
romantic style leading into the nineteenth century that he became exceptional. Beethoven’s 
compositions in the romantic style only began during his middle period, especially his 
Heroic Symphony (Rosen, 1997). What makes Beethoven different from others is that his 
music expresses abundant creativity no longer attached to the Classical period.  
To a certain degree, the way Adorno praises the particularity of Beethoven’s middle 
period corresponds to Adorno’s pursuit of ‘difference’. This also links to Adorno’s applause 
to ‘atonal’ style and atonal music indeed is subversive compared to the established music 
style (2002). Drawing on Adorno’s philosophical perspective, what he hated most was the 
‘sameness’. Hence, the possibility of real practices is only expressed in the condition of 
difference. It can be said that the reason art can break through the constraint of sameness as 
well as ideology is that it can express the aesthetic aura, and because of this humans are 
capable of sensing ‘difference’, thus it becomes possible to be inspired, to create, or to 
question.  
Take public culture as example to echo Adorno’s ideas. In the movies Equilibrium 
(Wimmer, 2002) and The Lives of Others (Henckel von Donnersmarck, 2006), the secret 
agents are both touched by arts (books) and turn out to be the main force to hit back at the 
system. These books point out the existence of ‘differences’ distinguishing from what the 
system taught them to follow. This is just the same as the butterfly that flies into the base 
unintentionally in the movie The Island (Bay, 2005), or the 15 foot black pillar that appears 
in front of the apes in the film 2001: A Space Odyssey (Kubrick, 1968). They (the human 
clones and the apes) are all inspired by the difference. All these differences shown in the 
above examples testify Adorno’s disgust at identity(-thinking) and his dreaming for a 
non-identity world. 
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9.5 Conclusion 
The study in this chapter mainly introduces Adorno’s philosophy regarding the way out of 
ideology’s cage. Adorno suggested that, from an ontological perspective, one has to 
overthrow the cognition that humans used to possess: the priority of subject and the pursuit 
of identity(-thinking). Instead, he suggested promoting the object to the preponderant status 
and to agree with non-identity(-thinking).  In terms of the epistemological angle, he 
suggested following the principle of immanent critique which criticised the researched 
subject based on its concepts and inner logic. He also required readers to examine the 
researched phenomenon within the aspect of the constellation. This aspect suggests that 
critics have to restore concepts of object which are eliminated by the subject, and then create 
a new recognition towards an object where none of the concepts is prior to the others.  In 
terms of the methodological angle, Adorno applied it in his ‘writing style’, including the 
methods of the ironic inversion and the chiasmus. The former follows the logic of immanent 
critique while the latter refers to the application of constellation. Finally, Adorno considers 
art (artistic creation) as the possible practical action for escaping the ideological cage based 
on three dimensions, that is, art’s characteristic, its relation to society and its two functions 
(mental and mimetic). Adorno’s studies on music also help to explain how and why art is 
able to escape from ideology’s cage. 
 Adorno’s ideas are specifically introduced in this chapter to consider whether 
vanguards like him had found ways out of ideology’s dungeon. Many of his notions have 
provided the basic argumentative foundation for this thesis to validate the statement of SWPs. 
The suggestion of SWPs is based on the commonalities among 33 IAC articles. These 
commonalities represent the identity(-thinking) of undertaking ideological analysis/critique, 
which is revealed in the form of standardisation, contributing to what Adorno worried about 
the most, the totality; in this thesis’s case, the totality of writing IAC articles. In addition, 
Adorno’s concepts, the preponderance of the object, also influences this thesis’ suggestion of 
humbleness in the final chapter, which is the foundation of this thesis’ other suggestion, 
self-critique, whereby self-critique is seen as a possible way to escape from ideology’s 
constraints. 
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9.6 Discussion 
This chapter adopted three dimensions (ontological, epistemological, and methodological) to 
examine Adorno’s philosophy to see whether his ideas have led humans to break through the 
cage of ideology. Yet, the answer depends on whether we, the readers, agree with his aspect 
regarding the relationship between theory and practice. His aspect is: the process of 
developing theories per se is the process of real practice. To him, the practical action, such as 
strikes, which people used to consider as practice, is not the real practice. 
 Accordingly, if it is agreed that Adorno was theoretically chasing the brave new world 
out of ideology intervention, then his suggested notions—e.g., the preponderance of object, 
the pursuit of non-identity(thinking), immanent critique, and constellation—indeed have 
shown ways out of ideology’s cage which is what Adorno called the real practice. 
 Yet, not all humans, especially the public, live in a theoretical world, their daily 
practical activities should be brought into consideration as well (practical activities indeed is 
what people considered as real practice). The common phenomenon is that when these 
theories are applied practically to daily activities, it usually results in conflict and 
contradiction between theoretical imagination and practical reality. The application of the 
communist ideal in Russia and China are worth considering as cases.   
 Reasons causing these contradictions and conflict are because, first, humans can only 
recognise the world through using language, and, second, any argument and judgement, 
whether it is right or wrong, are all humans’ conscious products.  
 First, human beings are only able to display their ideas through language. The reason 
why languages are understandable is because they are the already conceptualized creations. 
Since languages convey certain concepts, they all possess the function of signification. 
Although Adorno offered the notion of constellation, expecting us not to apply the 
conceptualized aspects (i.e., concrete concepts) to express ideas, such an ideal is still 
impossible if languages are the only channel to express humans’ ideas. 
 Second, any discussion, judgement, and evaluation in the world would all be the 
production made by personal consciousness expressed by languages. Since all theories are 
the creation of consciousness, it is impossible to escape from ideology’s cage. Although 
Adorno (1990) has suggested many aspects (e.g., non-identity-thinking) striving to break this 
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constraint, he himself realized the impossibility. He described, “we can see through the 
identity principle”; yet, “we cannot think without identifying. Any definition is identification” 
(p. 149). 
 Held (1980) explained that, to Adorno, objective truths do exist, “but these truths were 
often inadequately interpreted by their creators and were not self-explanatory. To be grasped 
fully, the intervention of the theorist was necessary” (p. 208). This shows a contradiction for 
Adorno. While discussing the culture industry, he required anonymity be provided to authors 
so that they might not be influenced by the market; but, here, he claimed that not everyone 
has the ability to read artistic creations, so that the mission of interpretation should be left to 
theorists, who do possess the capacity. Adorno neglected the interpretation of a thing that 
theorists offer is the interpretation influenced by their “preferred reading125
Take Adorno and Horkheimer’s critique on the culture industry as another example. 
They argued that technological development enables business to massively produce artistic 
products. Such logic of capitalist production causes the culture creations to lose their 
autonomy and particular ‘aura’ (Benjamin’s term) becoming what they called the culture 
industry—identical products. Yet, such an argument also resulted from Adorno and 
Horkheimer’s opinions (i.e., their judgement, their own ideology) in their specific time. 
Similarly, if primitive men who lived in caves were able to travel through time to Adorno’s 
epoch, they would argue that what they had done by beating rocks or anything else with 
sticks or hands was the only thing which could be claimed as real music. The recording 
studio and concert hall which modern people built as well as the equipments like noise 
reduction or instruments like the piano which modern people invented are indeed all the 
results of technological development, which affects the factuality of music.  
”, i.e., their 
personal consciousness. While their interpretation becomes the only way of recognising a 
work (e.g., a theory), it gradually becomes an identity-thinking, which, ironically, is what 
Adorno fought against the most. 
                                                     
125 While the authors encode the message, they will inevitably provide a certain interpretation in order 
to influence readers. The interpretation that the authors wish their readers to accept is what Hall (2004) 
called the ‘preferred reading’ which no doubt reveals the authors’ own ideology. Depending on the 
degree that the readers accept, interrogate, or reject such preferred reading, Hall concluded three 
common readers’ decoding positions, including the dominant-hegemonic, negotiated, and oppositional 
position. 
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Thus, considering the primitive men’s argument, the only question is how could 
Adorno determine the level/extent of technological development that he considered to be 
acceptable? In what authority could he claim the harmfulness of technology acting on culture 
creations? The answer is found to be simple. All his arguments against the phenomenon of 
the culture industry are all his conscious products, his judgement, his own ideology. From a 
practical perspective, Adorno did not succeed in escaping from the cage of ideology. 
 It could be concluded that the aspects Adorno offered represent his democratic ideal. In 
the theoretical, philosophical, imaginational, and mental realm, his aspects have 
demonstrated one possible way out of ideology’s cage. Yet, since human beings cannot 
express their consciousness without applying language, every usage of language, which all 
convey particular significances, is the representation of a certain personal ideology. 
Criticising an ideology of a time via ideology of another time does not means that the critics 
succeed in escaping from the dungeon of ideology. One point which could be confirmed is 
that all aspects of conscious/ideological emancipation (e.g., Adorno’s aspects) are all the 
self-emancipation which does not change the conditions giving rise to it.  
 Although Adorno’s notions attempted to establish a world without the ideology 
intervention, he still cannot get rid of his own ideology. His dilemma reveals the limitation of 
undertaking (ideological) critique: criticising one subject, even through an ideological angle, 
involves an ideology itself. Faced with such a limitation, as a result, in Chapter 10, 
Conclusion and Suggestion, this thesis will explain why human beings have to realise the 
importance of humbleness, which is the foundation of self-critique. Self-critique, this thesis 
argues, is a possible way to escape from ideology’s constraints. 
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Chapter 10 
 
Conclusion and Suggestion 
—Humbleness and Self-Critique 
 
 
In the empirical analysis chapters (5-8), this thesis revealed the existence of standard 
procedures for writing articles of ideological critique. In the previous chapter (9), this thesis 
pointed out the limitation of (ideological) critique: criticising one subject, even through an 
ideological angle, involves an ideology itself. Such findings are displeasing since they not 
only imply the limitation of freely undertaking (ideological) critique but also seem to reveal 
a dead end with fatalism and determinism.  
 If all humans’ efforts were to follow an invisible guiding discipline to tell the same tale, 
which reflects (or is influenced by) these persons’ or social total ideologies, then what is the 
purpose of critique? What is the meaning of humans’ conscious activities? Before answering 
these questions, this section will briefly conclude each chapter’s arguments after which a 
suggested response to this question will be provided. This suggestion wishes to answer why 
we criticise, how to do it as well as indicating an escape route from the ideological matrix. 
 
10.1 Conclusion 
The research question of this thesis is: Are analysts or critics capable of extricating 
themselves from the influences of both their own and society’s ideology, even if they are 
experts in ideology studies? Or say, what factors that limit ideological critics’ capacity to 
undertake ideological critiques? 
 To answer the above question, three subjects are focused on, including humans, 
(ideological) critique/analysis, and ideology. To investigate these three subjects’ 
inter-relationships, this thesis focused on academic conscious activities, examining their 
publications which specifically refer to the type of ideological critique/analysis. This is to 
observe how they present their works to determine whether they are able to impart their 
critique/analysis neutrally and objectively, without referring to a personal ideology. 
Conclusion & Suggestion 
288 
 The human subject here specifically refers to ideology-specialists: This thesis, in 
Chapter 2, has promoted ideological-specialists to a higher position as the few people who 
are able to carry the role of real-intellectuals. Since they have noticed the power of ideology 
and systematically learned the related discussion of ideology (of course, they are also 
inevitably limited to their ideology), this thesis deems that, theoretically speaking, 
ideological-specialists are, or might be, the most capable people who can escape from the 
intervention of ideology. 
 Critique/analysis here refers to actions resulting from humans’ conscious activities. 
This thesis focuses on academics’ publications which claim to be written from the angle of 
ideological analysis or critique (IAC). The reason for selecting the ‘ideological’ angle is:  
what other angle of critique/analysis is capable of avoiding the interference of ideology if 
those which adopt the ‘ideological’ angle cannot. 
 Accordingly, this has been a thesis dealing with how humans (i.e., ideology-specialists) 
undertake critiques (with specific method/dimension, e.g., ideological angle) when another 
subject, ideology (i.e., their own or social total ideology), has played a powerful role or has 
been a powerful factor influencing humans’ critique work. 
 In Chapter 2, this thesis discussed the concepts and history of intellectuals and critique. 
It concluded that academic ideological analysts/critics are the few people able to shoulder the 
role of intellectuals to discover social problems (via their critique/analysis) especially in the 
epoch of ideology. According to ideological analysts’ characteristics, which are similar to 
intellectuals and their capacity to analyse ideology-related phenomenon, Chapter 2 
concluded that escaping from ideology’s dungeon is possible. 
 Yet, in Chapter 3, this thesis discussed the impacts on academic circles of capitalism. 
This thesis argues that, in the epoch of capitalism, academic publications become more of an 
‘academic industry’ where a phenomenon of standardisation might exist in scholars’ 
academic works. It would appear that there is a guiding principle for scholars to follow 
which in this thesis refers to standard procedures (SWPs) for writing IAC articles. If the 
above presumption of SWPs were true, then it is reasonable to claim that it is difficult for 
humans to escape from the dungeon of ideology, even the ideology-specialists. An 
ideological critique without referring to analysts’ common analyzing methods, which result 
from their society’s ideology, seems to be impossible.  
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 Accordingly, after explaining the methodology in Chapter 4, this thesis advanced to the 
empirical analysis (Chapters 5-8) to investigate whether the supposed standard writing 
procedures (SWPs) exist in IAC articles. Six SWPs have been found based on the 
commonalities between 33 IAC articles. These include procedures of: 1) identifying essential 
elements; 2) applying theoretical foundations; 3) connoting certain meanings; 4) illustrating; 
5) selecting expression styles; and 6) revealing personal viewpoints. While these six 
procedures are explained, the related ideology theories were reviewed. In so doing, in this 
thesis, I have sought to identify correspondence between theories and practices whereby the 
analytical angle of ideological critique/analysis as a ‘methodology’ might be established as 
well. The conclusion of these six procedures is found in Table 8-8, where this thesis has 
provided a systematic explanation.   
 Results from the empirical analysis show that the limitation of undertaking ideological 
critique, especially when certain guiding rules, like SWPs, were found to be embedded in 33 
IAC articles. Thus, in looking for ways out of ideology, in Chapter 9, this thesis returned to 
review related literature, specifically focusing on Adorno’s philosophy, to ascertain whether 
early scholars had provided escape routes from the dungeon of ideology, which is different 
from the contemporary advocates of ideological critique.  
 Selecting Adorno was not only done to draw a correspondence with the literature 
discussed in Chapter 3, from which this thesis’ argument (e.g., SWPs in IAC articles) was 
inspired. It was also because of Adorno’s concepts, such as the preponderance of the object, 
the pursuit of non-identify-thinking, immanent critique, and constellation seemed to guide a 
way out of the cage of ideology. No doubt the escape route from ideology’s cage exists in 
philosophical thinking like the way Adorno suggested. Yet, in humans’ practical action (e.g., 
undertaking ideological critique), it is still questionable since Adorno’s works were the 
conscious products reflected from his own or the society’s certain ideology.  
 Both the empirical analysis (Chapters 5-8) and the philosophical discussion (Chapter 9) 
all show that humans, to a great degree, are inevitably limited to their own or the social total 
ideology while undertaking the analysis or critique. Faced with such an inevitable limitation, 
in this final chapter (10), Conclusion and Suggestion, this thesis suggests that human beings 
have to humble themselves to minimize their self-considered-righteous as much as possible. 
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This is to prevent humans from adopting their own ideology to judge others’ ideology, which 
turns out to fall into the endless loop of ideology-critique of ideology-critique. Moreover, the 
only work of critique that humans are able to undertake is limited to the regime of 
self-critique. This argument is undoubtedly a moral perspective, yet, it is what this thesis 
considers the way out of ideology.  
 
10.2 Suggestion: Way Out of Ideology 
Humans understand each other in a range of communication methods. In daily activities, 
people often confidently claim that they are able to understand others’ position or argument. 
Usually, after such claims, they may continue to respond to others’ ideas by offering their 
own opinion. For example, ‘I understand what you are trying to say, but…, and I think…’. 
While arguments might be politely rejected, people may also retort, ‘I don’t think you 
understand my point…’. Meaningless conversation or failure in communication happens 
frequently and academic discourses are no exception. Humans always consider themselves 
capable of understanding others while rejecting the acknowledgment that others possess the 
same capacity. In other words, they are rationally and sincerely trying to comprehend others’ 
ideas, but, to them, other people are easily revealed to be irrational. 
 Communication failure results from humans’ communicating tools, symbolized 
languages. As mentioned in Chapter 6, due to the various applications of signs and the 
diverse background of signs’ users, all signs (are forced to) carry certain connotations 
(sometimes obviously and directly representing users’ ideology), even to the most basic signs. 
Humans often unwittingly use their own ideology, which is created according to their 
symbolic languages, to understand others as well as forcing others to accept their arguments. 
This is the main reason for communication failures. Thus, unless aliens teach us to 
communicate telepathically, it is impossible for humans to fully understand others if the only 
channel humans can use to communicate is the symbolized languages.  
 Any unintentionally, simple applications of symbolic language all already carry certain 
significances which reflect its performers’ life experiences; these symbolic languages are 
also comprehended differently based on the receivers’ life experiences. Namely, humans’ 
communication in fact is a process where diverse ideologies, which reflect the senders’ and 
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receivers’ application of symbolic languages, keep being exchanged. On the surface, 
symbolic languages are being exchanged to communicate with and understand each other; in 
fact, the process of communication is the exactly process of the competition of ideological 
hegemony, even though people always claim they communicate neutrally and objectively. 
 Academic discourse (or communication) indeed is a competition of ideological 
hegemony in which styles of communication are not special but merely named with a 
relatively notable terminology, i.e., critique or analysis. The term, critique/analysis, on the 
surface, reaches the purpose of understanding by revealing the problem of the researched 
phenomenon; in fact, the action that critique/analysis carries is to question or controvert 
other scholars’ ideas or problems based on its discussants’ own ideology. Sometimes, such 
action of critique/analysis is simply appropriated as a tool to present what its discussants 
want to say without any connection to the criticised topics.  
 The action of communication has no difference between the academic scholars and 
general publics. Both their communicative actions are built on their ideology fighting for 
conscious dominance. The only difference is that communication (or discourse) failure in 
academic circles will only lead scholars to insist their own position. There is no significance, 
even if other scholars cannot accept their argument even if other scholars illogically or 
irrationally criticise it. Conversely, they will continue to develop or revise their 
self-considered system of a great idea, waiting for the day when later scholars are finally 
wise enough to understand them. 
 Yet, in daily life, the humans’ communication (i.e., their conscious activities) refers to 
the continual actions of persuasion, rejection, dominating and resisting between persons, 
organisations, and nations. The problem is that human beings are unable to not to judge 
others’ opinions based on their own thoughts, nor are they unable to not to force others to 
accept their opinions. That is to say, while all communications that humans undertake carry 
nothing but their own ideology, humans’ rationality is simultaneously limited. 
 In short, while a certain ideology is displayed in the clothing of symbolic languages, 
humans forget that they are revealing their ideology instead of expressing their objective 
ideas via seemingly neutral application of language. They think they are able to present their 
ideas neutrally and objectively which is an ability others do not possess. As a result, 
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individuals’ egoistic attitude is created, based on their self-granted neutral and objective 
autonomous consciousness or free will. With the acknowledgement of self autonomous 
consciousness comes failure in communications. When humans’ communications fail, it 
results in disagreement and fighting among individuals or organisations as well as 
suppression, resistance or even wars among nations.  
Humbleness 
Although humans endeavour to understand each other via communication, many negative 
outcomes occur as a result of failing in linguistic expression. This is because humans can 
only define or judge others’ ideas based on their own thoughts. To overcome such a model of 
understandings or to escape from the ideology dungeon, this thesis argues that humans have 
to humble themselves, to consider themselves insignificant relative to their social existence. 
The concept of humbleness is: 
 1. People have to realise how ideology influences human conscious activities, to 
recognise the limitation of human communication.  
 There is no doubt that humans are willing to communicate neutrally and objectively to 
reach a full understanding with others. Yet, because of the embedded dominant thought of 
‘the preponderance of subject’ (Adorno’s term), humans are unknowingly taught to take an 
egotistic position whereby they unwittingly value themselves highly. Their arguments are 
inevitably based on their own perspectives (i.e., ideology) or ideologies surrounding them. 
According, the first concept of humbleness suggests: humans have to understand that their 
perspectives are all the reflection/representation of their own or the social total ideology, as 
well as to realise that their conscious activities (e.g., articles, speeches, arguments) will 
become the possible social factors that, somewhere in time, determine/influence the making 
of others’ perspectives. 
 Hence, realising that humans’ capacity to neutrally and objectively communicate with 
others is limited, what humans can do to create neutral communication (reducing those 
negative influences caused by humans’ failed communication) is: 
 2. Endeavouring to minimize their conscious participation in society as well as 
minimizing their interaction with others. The ways in which humans reveal their 
conscious activities are various. Take three common styles as explanations, namely general 
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conversation, suggestions, and critique. In short, the way to minimize participation in society 
is to diminish or to be mindful of these three styles of communication. 
 First, To Diminish Critique on Others
 The term critique in this thesis means to point out the problem of one research subject; 
yet, there is no doubt that such critique is also based on analysts’ own opinion (i.e., ideology). 
As previously mentioned, diverse types of conflicts between various levels of actors (i.e., 
individuals, organisations, nations) usually stem from their failed communications. For this 
reason, the reduction of critical judgements is a way to decrease unnecessary conflicts to 
reach the goal of humbleness.  
  
 Undoubtedly, direct judgement is an obvious style of communication which displays 
analysts’ own ideology in the neutral and objective state. Yet, most conflicts in fact result 
from the other two styles, general conversation and suggestions with/to others, which 
probably will not be considered by the public as harmful as this thesis suggests.  
 Second, To Be Mindful of the General Conversation
 Despite how general or casual conversations might be, the communication between 
individuals, to a great degree, always carries certain signification or connotation. A sentence 
that appears ordinary, without any implication to one person, might be decoded as a 
judgement or criticism by others. For example, phrases like ‘hang in there’, ‘take care’, 
‘happy birthday’ or ‘happy new year’. 
  
 (Warning: The following examples might cause readers’ difficult emotions.) 
 Consider a mother who has lost her child. Friends and relatives come to give their 
condolences and support by saying words like ‘hang in there’, ‘be strong’, or ‘take care’. 
This mother, for most of the time, will not feel better or comforted when hearing these 
phrases. Instead, these words do nothing but remind her of her loss. In fact, most people are 
“talking without speaking126
                                                     
126 Lyrics from Simon, P. & Garfunkel, A. (1964). 'The Sounds of Silence,' Wednesday Morning, 3 
AM. New York: Columbia Records.  
”. They think ‘they have to’ offer those words, to sign the 
‘I-care-about-you attendance book’, otherwise, they will be deemed as indifferent. They say 
these words for themselves more than caring about the mother; and this mother keeps being 
hurt again and again whenever people talk about her loss, even decades later. If the sadness 
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cannot be described by symbolic languages, why do people think they can use languages to 
comfort people? It is outsiders’ own ideology thinking that words like ‘take care’ might 
help127
 Take more general conversational phrases like ‘happy birthday’ or ‘happy new year’ as 
another example. To most people, these are just words they have to say at a specific time. Yet, 
what if a person’s mother died when giving birth to him/her? Maybe his/her siblings even 
hate him/her, thinking that s/he is the jinx causing the broken family? Is not the term, happy 
birthday, again words to remind this person of emotional pain? What if one gossips about a 
colleague’s cheating on her husband while the listener’s wife did the same many years ago? 
What if one says Merry Christmas to friends while the audiences do not follow the religion 
to which this festival belongs?  
. 
 People usually respond that they do not know others’ stories, and had not meant to hurt 
them with these general conversational phrases. Yet, this is indeed the reason why this thesis 
suggests being mindful of and reducing those general conversations which are taken for 
granted. We will never understand why one specific sentence might mean something to old 
friends, new friends, or even strangers—in short, we are unable to fully understand one’s 
past experience— that is why people cannot take daily general conversations, which ‘they 
think’ are nothing special, for granted. 
 
 Curtailing suggestions means to reduce applying ideas, which we consider as ‘good’, to 
interrupt others’ thoughts or to persuade others to accept our views. This thesis argues that 
the ‘good’ conscious activities, such as religious leaders asking people to help others, in 
some cases, still contain negative influences. One good conscious activity is defined by 
personal ideology; while if it is agreed by many people, it becomes a dominant ideology
Third, To Curtail Suggestions 
128
                                                     
127 I have been thinking if my given examples might unintentionally trigger very difficult emotions 
for readers as I completely have no way of knowing how many academics or students who read this 
example could have had similar experiences. If this example hurt you, I sincerely apologize. Yet, 
although I should not have said this, it proves this thesis’ argument again that general conversations, 
phrases, greeting, or innocent comforting words indeed hurt people. 
. 
Once the goodness of one conscious activity is defined by humans’ consciousness, it will 
never represent the characteristic of such conscious activity in nature. Instead, it only refers 
128 Definition and diverse characteristics of dominant ideology explained in Chapter 5. 
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to a dominant ideology agreed by most people. Yet, such conscious activity still might play a 
negative role for another group of people, even if the influences are difficult to detect. 
 For example, one person watches an inspirational film and presumes it is good for 
others, so that s/he strongly recommends friends to watch it. However, even though this film 
indeed contains some good influences, it still might have a negative influence on other 
people who have diverse life experience. For another example, people might suggest a 
younger person to (or not to) undertake a Ph.D (or any future career) based on their own 
opinions. Yet, they will not be responsible for their suggestion many years later if that 
younger fails or regrets the decision; they might not even remember that they ever gave such 
advice despite their suggestion indeed having been adopted by (or influenced) the younger 
person. Suggestion is an irresponsible human’s conscious activity which only attempts to 
persuade people to accept what they consider as ‘good’, even though the advisors always 
state that they have neutrally and objectively analysed the situation for others. In short, 
people are likely to give suggestions but they do not take responsibility for them, for the bad 
influences resulting from their suggestions. 
 
This thesis has explained three common styles of communication which illustrate how ones’ 
personal consciousness might hurt, influence, or unintentionally judge others, which might 
then lead to unnecessary misunderstandings between persons, simultaneously creating 
negative influences. It has to be admitted that, to the majority, the above discussions seem to 
find fault for a purpose. It will not be that serious for those ‘general conversations’ and 
‘suggestions’. Only a few people might believe that an inspirational film or a general daily 
greeting like ‘happy birthday’ might cause damage to others.  
 Yet, just because of the above dominant thought (i.e., general conversations and 
suggestions are not that serious), this thesis argues strongly that: humans’ conscious 
activities (whether to influence or in being influenced) are not a mathematical calculation, 
excusing that the world would be fine if the amount of good-influences were to surpass 
bad-influences. In fact, the bad-influences will not be neutralized by good-influences. Every 
negative factor indeed exists and takes action in humans’ society. If a negative seed exists, it 
should be taken seriously. 
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 People might never know when or how a bad seed is planted by their suggestion or 
general conversation. All they can do is to minimise their conscious participation in society 
or interaction with others. In so doing, the goal of humbleness might be achieved in which 
people: 
 3. Realize that their opinions (conscious activities) are not important because there 
is no difference if the world is without them; humans are no-body.  
 Once people realize their own unimportance, comparatively speaking, they will not 
insist their own opinions or force others to accept, ignoring that their opinions indeed result 
from their own ideology which might hurt, influence, and judge others. Once the 
participation of personal consciousness is reduced, the conflicts between humans could be 
expected to decrease. 
 
To conclude, symbolic languages can always be read differently. Although some conscious 
activities are considered to be ‘good’ and even though a greeting like ‘happy new year’ 
seems non harmful, they are all conscious products which are sensed differently from one 
person to another. Humans’ conscious activities are all the actions which always reveal 
certain judgements (i.e., an ideology against another), leading to humans’ conflicts (from 
individuals’ disagreement, organisations’ fights, to nations’ wars). Therefore, this thesis 
suggests humans should humble themselves to minimise their conscious participation in 
society or interaction with others, including not criticising others, not giving suggestions, and 
even being careful with their general conversations.  
Meaning of Critique and the Way to Escape Ideology: Self-Critique 
According to this thesis’s statement discussed above, it seems to suggest that there is no 
meaning for action of critique. Indeed, the action of critique is insignificant. This is because 
the critique that people usually acknowledge is always the judgements from one ideology 
against another. Such critique (between individuals’ ideologies) is unable to obtain authority 
to state the validation of its action. 
 However, there is still a Pure Land where the action of critique shows its possibility, 
that is, only when such critique is a self-critique. To prevent the negative-influences caused 
by humans’ conscious activities towards other people, what humans can undertake is a 
continual introspection of what they have innocently said, suggested, and judged in daily 
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conversation. The process of introspection, i.e., self-critique, is what this thesis deems as the 
action of real critique. Namely, criticizing others’ ideology via personal ideology will only 
fall into an endless loop—critique of critique of critique…. On the other hand, only when 
humans realise the limitation of human communication and endeavour to minimise their 
conscious participation in society to decrease their influence on others, might they discover 
the platform of real critique. Real critique should be one which is performed within 
individuals’ personal world where they only criticise their own old thoughts—that is, a 
critique based on a person’s new consciousness fighting against their old consciousness.  
 Hence, if there exists a moment in which humans overcome the strength of ideology, 
then it would be the moment when they start to think if they are limited to their own thoughts. 
If there indeed exists such a moment, it would be the time when humans humble themselves 
knowing they are insignificant nobodies in the world and start to criticise themselves. 
 
Either via the empirical (ch.5-8) or the philosophical (ch.9-10) perspectives, all arguments 
show humans’ limitation of undertaking ideological analysis/critique, even for 
ideology-specialists. This conclusion saves me from cognitive disorder, answering why I 
cannot resist Superman, even though I am familiar with those film elements and narrative 
tricks that make him a hero. This conclusion also answers why “people know very well what 
they are doing, but still, they are doing it”. Why? Humans might well know the 
‘analyzable’ or ‘visible’ part of ideology; but they will never ever detect any peace of 
the ‘invisible’ as well as the ‘ontological’ part of ideology. That is why we call it ideology.  
Although I know very well my conclusion, I still tried to find an escape route from 
ideology in this final chapter, thinking that it might work this time. Unfortunately, the 
arguments (which have led me thus far) and suggestions, I admit, are all the products of my 
ideology, representing my life experience. The suggestion in this section, which I consider as 
a successful way out of ideology, according to my own argument, also might cause 
negative-influences to others. Obviously, all my arguments fall into the trap of ideology once 
more, becoming my personal ideology rejecting/criticising others’ ideology. My conclusion 
testifies itself repeatedly. Humans’ capacity for undertaking ideological critique is limited. 
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At the beginning, I thought that Adorno’s concepts had unlocked the door of the 
ideology jail and was grateful for the escape map he had drawn and the weapons (e.g., ideas 
like non-identity-thinking) to fight the dragon of ideology he had provided. Right after I shed 
tears of joy, having seen the light penetrate through the crack of the final gate, the door I 
opened showed, to my surprise, the exact same cell that I had left. Unfortunately, whether 
Adorno had found the way out of ideology’s dungeon (theoretically yes and practically no), 
his concepts still stemmed from his personal ideology resulted from his life experience. 
As a result, I decide to lock myself back in the dungeon and strengthen the lock in 
order to shrug off any fantasy of escaping from ideology. It is difficult for humans to obtain 
authority to fairly, neutrally, and objectively criticise others’ ideology based on their own 
ideology. The only ideological critique that humans are able to undertake is to criticise their 
own ideology (but not that of others). In so doing, a way out of (our own) ideology could be 
possible, which might be able to be seen as real ideological critique. 
 The conclusion seems pessimistic and suggesting isolationism. Yet, since the topic of 
this thesis is ideology per se, what else can I say? It is all about ideology. 
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Appendix 1: Disk of 33 IAC Articles 
 
 
 
Click the following link to start. 
 
If the link fails, please contact Liao729@gmail.com for the research data. 
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Appendix 2: Scholars’ Preference Regarding the Roles of Intellectuals 
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Appendix 4-1: Basic Concepts of Textual Analysis 
 
1. Sentence Analysis: Subject + Verb + Object + Indefinite/Definite Article + Adjective + Noun + Adverb + Adverb of Time + Punctuation Marks 
 
Subject 
Notions Explanation 
With or Without a Definite Subject Shows to what extent the author is engaged in the context (Hodge & Fowler, 1979) 
Use of Subject, Pronoun, and  
Singular/Plural Nouns 
 
Indicates proximity/distance and directness/indirectness (Fowler & Kress, 1979) 
E.g., I: can be indicated as a witness to show authenticity. 
E.g., We: 1. The author indicates himself as well as others.  2. Refers to a broader range in order to persuade others. 
E.g., Usage of ‘You’ in academia is often deemed as meaning ‘we’; for example, Will you still believe this government? = 
Will we still…?. ‘You’ is adopted to create an ‘us’ asking readers to agree. 
No Subject, Virtual Subject, Noun Clause  Highlights what the author wants to emphasise (Fowler & Kress, 1979) 
Appellation 
 
Indicates the power relationship between the authors and their referred audiences (e.g., the differences between “Mrs. 
Thatcher”, “Baroness Thatcher” and “Prime Minister Thatcher”). 
 
Verb 
Notions Explanation 
Passive Voice Eliminates the agents and their responsibility in order to make the sentence appear neutral  
Decreases the imperative feeling(Fowler & Kress, 1979; Trew, 1979) 
Passivisation Conceals agents and their responsibility (Fowler & Kress, 1979) 
Auxiliary Verb Signals the power relationship between author and reader (e.g., usage of must/might) (Fowler & Kress, 1979) 
 
Object 
Notions Explanation 
With or Without a Definite Object Demonstrates the author’s attitude toward his/her research objects (Fowler & Kress, 1979) 
Pluralisation Prevents agents from feeling they are being offensive;  
Builds up the speaker’s power imperceptibly and eliminates distance and alienation (Fowler & Kress, 1979) 
 
Indefinite / Definite Articles 
Notions Explanation 
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The Refers to specific objects 
Adjectives  
To strengthen authors’ attitudes and to display authors’ positions 
 
Nouns 
Notions Explanation 
Nominalization Replaces adjectives and reduces the usage of describing words in order to decrease the embarrassment of described agents (Fowler & Kress, 1979) 
Diminishes the presence of actors and their responsibility (Fowler & Kress, 1979) 
 
Adverb  
Describe the adjective. E.g., stress the degree; for example, possibly, certainly, necessarily. (Fowler & Kress, 1979) 
 
Adverb of Time 
E.g., future tense can result in an effect of hinting at and predicting the future (Fowler & Kress, 1979) 
 
Punctuation Marks 
Marks Original meanings  Ideological function or Connotation 
Question  
？ 
to show that something is not certain 
(Oxford, online*) 
1. By pointing out a question (instead of directly claiming what is wrong), question sentence could create a 
neutral image. 2. Asking question is not to ask readers to suspect, but to already display a certain position. 
E.g., writing ‘The end of Ideology’ + ‘?’ to pretend neutrality; in fact, what the authors are trying to say is 
‘it is’ the end of ideology. 
Exclamation
！ 
to express surprise, anger, or 
excitement (Longman**, p. 541). 
1. to increase the readers’ sentimental resonance in order to interpellate them as the subject of such a 
sentence. 2. To create an imperative order, 3. To invisibly question/disagree with the previous. 
Colon 
： 
to introduce an explanation, example, 
quotation (Longman , p. 295). 1. to add extra information (on the surface); 2 to require readers to pay attention to the following sentence. 
Dash 
— 
to separate two closely related parts of 
a sentence (Longman, pp. 396-7). 1. to add extra information (on the surface); 2 to require readers to pay attention to the following sentence. 
Bracket 
(  ) 
placed around extra information in a 
piece of writing (Oxford, online). 
On the surface to add information or explanation, in fact, it is to lead readers to read, to comprehend such 
a sentence the way the writers wish. 
Quotation 
“ ” 
To show that you are recording what 
someone has said (Longman, p. 1347). 
1. Quotation is used to obtain credit and acknowledgement for writers themselves. 2. To guide readers to 
what should be focused on.  
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*The Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (online). http://oald8.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/  
**Longman dictionary of contemporary English (2003). Harlow: Pearson Education Ltd. 
2. Modal Form Analysis 
This refers to the interpersonal relationship between authors and readers, which also demonstrates the authors’ attitudes toward their imagined objectives (e.g., 
usage of the words obligation, ability, possibility, necessary and expectation; Fowler & Kress, 1979) 
 
Notions Explanation 
Modal Verbs To indicate authors’ modality, including permission, prediction, suggestion, etc. (e.g., can, should, will, must, may.) 
Modal Process Verbs To point out the start and the end of an action that creates a certain result (e.g., find, meet, graduate, etc.) 
Others: Modal Particles, Distancing Devices, Stalling and Hesitation, Hypothetical Forms (Hodge, Kress & Jones, 1979) 
 
 
3. Other Concepts related to Textual Analysis 
Notions Explanation 
Selection of Vocabulary To imply the standpoints of the author (e.g., when talking about the issue of races, the vocabulary the author selects to describe the white 
or the black is diverse from the usage of vocabulary) 
Classification Applies categorisation to determine the order and rules of the sentence   (e.g., relexicalisation: looking for the old vocabulary that the 
author replaces with a new meaning, and seeing how the neologism is being used) 
(e.g., overlexicalisation: discover the connotative ideology by using a sequence of synonyms (Trew, 1979) 
Neutralisation To provide a responsibility-free zone for the authors (e.g., unfairness is neutralized and cast as only a matter of “difference”) 
Articulation To investigate how a single word is linked to a certain concept to establish a specific meaning (e.g., the word democracy possesses 
diverse meanings within the diverse circumstances of capitalism and communism) 
Mood  Declarative sentences: refer to the meaning of a declaration, persuasion and propagation 
Imperative sentences: signify authors’ imperative voice, which also displays their views of power 
Negative-raising Using double-negatives to stress the authors’ viewpoint 
Jargon To raise the discussion barrier and to isolate outsiders, which can empower the authors (Fowler & Kress, 1979) 
Relexicalisation Relexicalisation is a way to produce jargon. It will create monopolized terminologies which are for internal use only. 
Viewpoint of Process To discover the developing process of happenings (e.g., begin continue, repeat, end) 
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Appendix 4-2: Basic Concepts of Iconographical, Colour, Typographical Analysis 
 
First of all, meanings conveyed by icons, colours, or types do not come from nothing; instead, they require historical accumulation, (Kress & Van Leeuwen, 2002; 
Van Leeuwen, 2005) which also varies from one culture to another and from time to time (Machin, 2007). For example, the gesture of people lifting their hats is 
a greeting originating in Medieval times when knights took off their helmets in order to prove their goodwill (Machin, 2007; Panofsky, 1955; Van Leeuwen, 
2001); yellow can mean sunny, but in some cultures, it refers to sickness, as when people have a liver disease (Kress & Van Leeuwen, 2002). Hence, what should 
be noticed is that the inductive concepts listed below only offer a general perspective, because the meaning that visual factors convey depends on the condition 
‘from text to context’.  
 1. Iconographical Analysis 
 “The study of iconographical symbolism means that we look for the way that certain objects, poses, gestures or other elements in a visual composition 
represent people, values or ideas.” (Machin, 2007, p. 39). 
Concepts Explanation / Function  Examples 
Poses To imply specific significance (Machin, 2010; 2007; 2004) Jumping with arms or legs out wide signifies youth and freedom. 
Standing straight with arms-across signifies confidence and professionalism. 
Gaze  A part of posing. 
To fulfill two opposite works: offer and demand (Kress & van 
Leeuwen, 1996)  
Advertising stars gaze at audiences to offer information, services, or goods. 
Kids in a war look at photographer to demand information, services, or 
goods. (Machin, 2010) 
Objects Objects means the visible things placed in images. Each object, e.g., 
horse, car, train, has their own significance. Even the same category 
of object with various forms signifies differently, e.g, truck and 
sport-car. Implication of objects relies on the setting. 
The thin lady, fluttering hairs, ‘round’ table, rotating pinwheel, 
waving skirt are all objects (compared to blue jeans and square 
tables) with specific setting to imply that the product is 
comfortable, relaxing, and a pleasure.   
 
Settings “To get general ideas across, to connote discourses and their values, 
identities and actions” (Machin, 2010, p. 45). The same background 
with diverse objects receives different significance. Setting results in 
idea of one image. 
E.g., A sandy beach 
1. + sunshine + palm tree + beers + surfers + bikini = leisurely and peaceful. 
2. + dark clouds + broken ship + floatees = worrisome and fearful. 
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2. Colour Analysis 
The study of colour is to investigate its language-like communicative functions including that of representation, interaction, and composition (Machin, 2007; 
Kress & Van Leeuwen, 2002; Jewitt & Oyama, 2001. Colours are able “to represent ideas…to convey moods and attitudes, and to create coherence within 
themselves” (Machin, 2010, p. 59).  
 
Concepts 
Explanation Reference 
Scale  Connotation / Explanation 
Brightness rests on fundamental experiences. Machin,2010, p. 
62  
 
Lightness   clarity happy curing life good secrecy truth reason 
Darkness obscurity  sadness killing death evil openness lie irrational 
Saturation rests on its ability to express emotional temperature. Machin,2010, pp. 
62-63 (same colour) 
 
Pure intensity of feeling exuberant playful showy garish adventurous 
Diluted (pale) toned down, subdued subtle, tender moody mild lacking in energy brooding 
Purity 
 
Purity and hybridity themselves suggest something of the meaning potential of this aspect of colour. E.g., green, brown, black 
(single name) versus cyan, blue-green, yellow green (names of colours). 
Kress & Van 
Leeuwen, 2002 
 Purity simplicity  certainty In art: modernity (single pure, bright colour, e.g., blues) Machin,2010, pp. 
64-65 Hybridity ambiguity  complexity postmodernism (colour scheme of pale, anaemic cyans and mauves) 
Modulation refers to how ‘real’ a colour is with regard to the object on which it is presented, e.g., comparing the shade of cars in an 
advertisement with those found in the natural world. 
Kress & Van 
Leeuwen, 2002 
 Modulated subtle fussy detailed complexity paintings by Cézanne perceptual truth  Machin,2010, pp. 
65-66 Flat simple basic simplified certain by Matisse abstract truth 
Differentiation refers to the quantity of colour used in images (compared to ‘Purity’ which means the quality of colour used) Machin,2010, pp. 
66-67  Monochrome  restraint, classiness, timelessness, timidity Conversely: old fashion, austerity, lacking energy 
Palette diversity, exuberance, energy, liveliness Conversely: garish, crude, Lacking restraint 
For other colour concepts, such as luminosity and hue, see Machin, 2007; 2010, pp. 58-69; Kress & Van Leeuwen, 1996; 2002  
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3. Typographical Analysis 
Van Leeuwen (2005) argued that printed words not only have word-meanings but also have typographic meanings. Basically, typography possesses the same 
function as colour does; but, Machin (2007) emphasized that typographic meanings can be recognized only when “the letterforms are (1) combined with other 
features…and (2) used in a specific context” (p. 93). Namely, only through a comparison can the special typographic meanings appear. 
 
Concepts 
Explication  Examples References 
Function / Connotation / Alternative perceived meaning 
Weight is about how bold or heavy a typeface appears. The function is to emphasize. Do not remove Machin, 
2010, p. 70  Daring, assertive, solid, substantial / alter. meaning: timid, domineering, overbearing 
Expansion is connected to human experience of space and how objects and people take up space. EXAMPLE Machin, 
2010, p. 71  Make words’ presence felt, be seen in a positive light, quick identification / free, confident, occupy. 
Connectivity means to use ‘letter forms’ to create a relationship and a consistency and individuality which also helps to emphasize the Machin, 
2010, pp. 
73-74 
 purpose of such phrases. For example: WORDS ARE ALL CAPITALISED, or written like handwriting, 
o r  p u t  f u r t h e r  a p a r t. 
Typeface provides readers with diverse perceptions based on experiential and cultural association. as below Machin, 
2007; 2010, 
pp. 72-73 
  shows romantic, elegant, natural, or emotional.  signifies smooth, soft, happiness, or youth. 
 refers to abrasive, harsh, technical, or masculinity. Slope or italic implies personal, informal, organic, old, or 
permanent. provides quality, professional, classic, or solid. 
For other typographical concepts, such as orientation, regularity, and flourishes, see Machin, 2007; 2010, pp. 69-76; Van Leeuwen (2005);  
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Appendix 5-1: Power 
 
Style I: The visible or invisible power possessed by a certain group which directly constructs 
a reality for the other groups (in order to serve the former group’s interests).  
Style II: The operation of power is displayed in the dominant and oppressed groups’ 
negotiating process.  
Style III: The oppressed group clarifies the misunderstanding, resists the installed viewpoints, 
or fights for their power of interpretation. 
Style IV: The operation of power does not obviously reveal or apply in IAC articles. 
 
Research Article Number  Category 
Explanation 
RA01 IV 
This article does not clearly explain how the New Labour government constructs a certain ideology 
(e.g., toward an information age) to the people. The operation of power in this article is not 
discussed; if any, it invisibly reflects how their policies lead people to accept such ideology (the 
importance of being independent in the information age). 
RA02 I 
This article clearly points out how U.K. media (falsely) presents the image of Islam which further 
constructs a (false) reality to its audiences. The operation of power in this article reflects, as the 
author suggests, the U.K. media’s news reports which were usually non-objective and taking certain 
sides. 
RA03 II 
This article does not clearly explain how power works. This is a paper whose author fights for the 
power of interpretation (of Fukuzawa Yukichi’s notions) against Maruyama Masao. The author of 
RA03 argued that because Maruyama Masao was “the most prominent and influential political 
theorist of postwar Japan”, his illustration toward Fukuzawa Yukichi has become the only way of 
thinking for Japanese to understand Fukuzawa Yukichi’s political thought. That is to say, from the 
study of dominant ideology, Masao’s way of understanding Yukichi is the dominant ideology for 
those who want to study Yukichi. Although the author of RA03 criticised that Masao misunderstood 
Yukichi’s thoughts, this does not affect the fact that Masao’s way of understanding Yukichi is the 
dominant ideology for Japanese which has nothing to do with true or false (It is a misunderstanding 
only to the author of RA03). 
RA04 I 
The operation of power in RA04 reflects how diet companies use media advertising (i.e., application 
of visible signs) to present/construct a certain image (i.e., ideology) for their product. Despite in 
different periods the purposes of advertisements are diverse (e.g., from fad dieting to healthy 
dieting), the diet companies constantly imbue the same ideology—dieting is important—which is 
indeed a dominant ideology to the customers. The diet companies apply visible signs or slogans to 
spread the invisible unidirectional power to the customers. To the author of RA04, the dominant 
ideology of “dieting is important” is negatively constructed by advertisements and never sincerely 
offers customers’ real need and benefits; instead, it only contributes to the diet companies’ interests.  
RA05 I 
This article explains how media utilizes news report to present/construct a certain ideology. The 
operation of power here reflects the discipline of media editorial room (that is what the journalism 
called the “gatekeeper theory”).  
RA06 I 
This article explains how news media (impeded by sport team’s invisible threat to their future news 
resources) constructs/presents an image of Joey Galloway as a wayward child, greedy, disloyal by 
their sport news (in which so-called power works). Such an image of demonizing Galloway is to 
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sustain the authority of the sport team, its coach, and their vested authority. 
RA07 I 
This article explains how the medical profession (the side who possesses power) continually 
constructs /presents a traditional image by their medical discourse that nursing is subject to the 
medical profession. 
RA08 II 
The author of this article suggests that the 1998 National Curriculum is a product of conscious 
competition and negotiation fought by diverse interest groups. The operation of power reflects in 
how individuals and interest groups, who all possess different historical, social, and cultural 
background, together participate in the discussion and finally construct the legitimate curriculum 
knowledge (i.e., 1998 National Curriculum).  
RA09 IV 
This article does not talk about how power operates or how power constructs reality. The author of 
this article adopts quantitative data (e.g., voting statistics) to show us where in the spectrum of 
political ideology (i.e., liberal, centrist, or conservative) these diverse factions of the Democrats 
party (i.e., Traditional Democrats, New Democrats, Blue Dogs) are located. 
RA10 I 
The description of power operation in this article focuses on how George Will’s editorials, which 
were published in the U.S. media, construct, praise, and strengthen a right-wing ideology. The 
author’s argument focuses on the results (or the constructed reality) influenced by Will’s power (i.e., 
his editorials).  
RA11 III 
This article discusses how Islamic intellectuals internally fight for the power of interpretation of the 
reform of Islamic Law. Nevertheless, due to involvement of religion, their arguments usually become 
a reform plan influenced by particular ideologies. This is an article explaining how reformers—the 
intellectuals (in this case, not the dominated group)—attempt to fight for the power of interpretation 
to rethink Islamic Law which is against the original vested ideas (even though they usually failed).  
RA12 I 
The first half of this article offers diverse interviewee’s opinions regarding law. Power is not 
described here. The second half of this article discusses why the “Haves” come out ahead in which 
possessing power (e.g., having legal knowledge such as lawyers) is described as holding invisible 
tools to influence the judicial results. Namely, the analyst of this article adopts an interview method 
to investigate people who have legal experience in order to answer why people agree with such a 
(dominant) ideology that ‘the Haves come out ahead’. The interviewees include the lawyers, the 
people who possess legal knowledge, the one who is capable of hiring lawyers, and the one who is 
not. Based on their experiences, the author of RA12 answered why ‘the Haves come out ahead’ is the 
dominant ideology when people think of legal activities.   
RA13 II 
This article does not clearly point out how power is manipulated. Nevertheless, the author of this 
article implies an invisible process of power application. In this article, the operation of power is 
reflected in the government’s promotion of certain policies (e.g., public assistance law & social 
insurance) which create an ideology to tame people (workers, farmers) in order to stabilize and 
maintain its social and political power.  
RA14 II 
If what Asante’s notion of Afrocentricity tried to do was to evoke black people to fight for power of 
interpretation for themselves, then what this article tries to argue is that such an action of competition 
for power of interpretation is unsuccessful. The operation of power in this article reflects how a 
reality is constructed after a power competition (negotiation and compromise) by diverse groups. 
RA15 I 
This article applies history and quantitative data to explain how the value of man (and middle class) 
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defines/constructs the social roles of female teachers (and working class).  
RA16 IV 
This article is an analysis which focuses on authors’ (who designed curriculum for Portuguese 
middle school) personal ideological and pedagogical principle of their works. This article does not 
clearly discuss how power operates.  
RA17 II 
This article discusses how a single word such as “just” could possess a function at an ideological 
level. This article does not focus on the description of power operation; instead, it simply points out 
what ideology effect might be conveyed in texts through a single word.  
RA18 I 
This article explains the “best practices movement” which is formulated by the American Counseling 
Association as the discipline of counselling; in fact, it is a dominant ideology which excludes other 
movements (ways of treatment) except “the best” one. Power is the key point which starts the 
ideology shift.  
RA19 IV 
This article belongs to analysis of cultural creation which analyses the narrative structure of 
Rowling’s Harry Potter. The author of this article mainly explains what ideology Rowling possesses 
and embeds in her novels. Basically, this article does not focus on how power is operated in order to 
create certain ideas.  
RA20 I 
This article explains how the academia dominated by males excludes females from power of 
interpretation via forms of thought, images, and symbols. Such power resulted from the dominant 
group constructs an academia where roles of females are not included. 
RA21 I 
This article, by reviewing history, explains how the definition of Dangdut music has been 
appropriated by diverse groups to pursue their group interests (e.g., political or economic interests) 
in which the spirit of Dangdut music—originally representing the people— is reinterpreted by 
invisible power to serve ideologies of certain groups. 
RA22 IV 
This article spends pages on theoretically discussing the relationship between power and reality, to 
explain how power constructs reality. Nevertheless, while the author of this article brings an example 
into her discussion, she does not clearly explain how her research objects—parents and 
daughters—apply their power or resistance respectively to construct or defend their own value (i.e., 
whether crop-tops are cute or dorky). Hence, this article only theoretically discusses the notion of 
power, while in the example discussion part how power works is not explained.  
RA23 I 
The author of this article argues that the definition of “caring” in the nursing profession has been 
reinterpreted. The new definition of caring refers to non-skilled treatment of spiritual concern which 
has replaced the original definition of skilled treatment of healthy concern. Operation of power is 
reflected in how a new definition of caring replaces the old one.  
RA24 I 
This article explains how the Chinese Communist Party applies visible political slogans to change 
people’s invisible consciousness. That is to say, the operation of power reflects in how CCP utilizes 
political slogans to construct and maintain their dominant ideology. This ideology shifts from time to 
time which generates diverse influences based on certain periods.  
RA25 I 
This article adopts signs and texts to analyse ideology. Diverse texts influence the birth of a certain 
ideology while journalists’ ideologies also determine what texts they might adopt in their report. 
Power operation reflects in how texts of news reports presents/construct a certain ideology for its 
readers.  
Appendices 
332 
RA26 II 
Operation of power in this article is reflected in how inner groups of Ireland Republican Movement 
negotiate and compromise between each other. Although the phenomenon of class distinction is 
clearly pointed out by this author, he did not specifically stress whether one group dominates the 
other. On the other hand, the author of this article focuses on how an ideology is developed based on 
power negotiation between diverse groups.  
RA27 I(III) 
This article explains how power owned by the dominant groups defines the meaning of a failed state. 
To the analyst of this article, the term failed state, which is adopted to describe countries such as 
Somalia, is defined by others (e.g., the western countries, academic). It is indeed a dominant 
ideology. This dominant ideology resulted from the academic demonstrations, news reports as well 
as imperial and post- colonialism. That is to say, the definition of a failed state is usually the 
imagination of the West which is often negatively presented; nevertheless, such an imagination is 
still the only angle—i.e., the dominant ideology— for the world to evaluate the status of a country. 
On the other hand, the author of this article also investigates how such a term is inappropriately 
applied based on Somalia’s history of being colonized. This analyst’s discussion of power could be 
seen as the discussion of resistant (Foucault’s term). 
RA28 IV 
This article mainly discusses the ideology shift in Die Grünen from 1980 to 2002 which is based on 
their official document. Whether power operation might influence the shift of party’s ideology was 
not discussed by the author. 
RA29 II 
The operation of power in this article includes two dimensions. The first dimension of (invisible) 
power operation is reflected in how Bolsheviks and Mensheviks fight for ideology dominance while 
presenting their arguments on issues. The second dimension of (visible) power operation is reflected 
in how the government tried to postpone the election in order to establish Kassa boards first (which 
benefits government) as well as the fact that factions such as Mensheviks directly “place their 
representatives on kassa boards” (p. 921) in order to obtain opinion leadership. 
RA30 I(III) 
This article claims that Oscar Lewis’ notion of “subculture of poverty”, in the past thirty years, has 
been misunderstood as a critique on victims of poverty. The author of this article attempts to clarify 
how such power operates in (or is dominated by) the mainstream academic discourses in the past 
thirty years. By distinguishing such a dominated phenomenon, this author also tries to defend and 
redress the misunderstanding of Lewis’ notion. 
RA31 I (III) 
This article explains how “digital reference service models” become the dominant ideology in 
contemporary library management. In this article, how power constructs the reality (dominant 
ideology) reflects in academic discourses as well as the practical application of “digital reference” in 
libraries. Such discourses in academic and application in libraries have generated phenomena such as 
de-professionalization and low wage-oriented. This article also reinterprets what value the reference 
work really is. 
RA32 II 
This article mainly investigates the “Schools Commission Reports” which is a competed, negotiated, 
and compromised outcome based on the discussion of diverse groups (e.g., government, 
commissions, theorists, school, teacher, and parents). 
RA33 II(III) 
The description of power in this article focuses on how the outside law and Vietnam elites compete, 
negotiate, and compromise with the inside culture and local executors in order to fight for power and 
cognition leadership. This author describes further how the local ideology resists against outside 
borrowed company law. 
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Appendix 5-2: Reality 
 
Way I: The IAC articles show what the constructed reality is. 
Way II: The IAC analysts simply illustrate the reality of their research; or objectively 
describe how a reality is presented. 
Way III: The IAC analysts arbitrarily or subjectively claim: the reality that their analyses 
have found is misrepresented; instead, the truth is… 
Way IV: That how reality is described is not clearly explained by the IAC analysts. 
(Discussion of reality is hardly found) 
 
Research Article Number  Category 
Explanation 
RA01 I 
The author of this article argues that, after 1997 election, the New Labour has established an ideology 
of “information age” which is based on the development of information and communication 
technology. In this ideology of “information age”, the ability of using the technology is emphasized; as 
a result, meaning of welfare is redefined. A new constructed reality is that the role of government is 
repositioned: as the assistant. On the contrary, citizens are (invisibly) required to learn new skills and 
knowledge. They are responsible to themselves. As a result, to the analysts of this article, the political 
ideology of the New Labour has changed as well. 
RA02 I 
The author of this article thinks that due to the U.K. media’s misrepresentation, Islam is stigmatized 
with an image which is violent, irrational, and radical (a constructed reality).  
RA03 III (I) 
The author of this article argues that Maruyama Masao misunderstood Fukuzawa Yukichi’s notions. 
And also that because Masao was quite an influential person after World War in Japan so, somehow, 
his understanding of Yukichi’s notions guided/constructed a particular (false) way to read Yukichi. (I) 
The author also provides his own understanding of Yukichi as well as criticises Masao’s 
misunderstanding of the former. (III) 
RA04 III (I) 
The author of RA04 argues that although diet companies continually revise the advertising of their 
products to create a fresh image of ‘we understand customers’ demands’, the purposes are all for their 
business. Namely, although advertising varies periodically, the goal of diet companies remains the 
same. Drawing on the view from RA04’s author, these various advertisings have created a false 
demand, i.e., the false consciousness, for the audiences. Thus, this author tries to explore the 
conversion of reality from a diachronic angle, and explains what reality (or false 
demand/consciousness) these advertisings really represent. 
RA05 I 
The author of this article explains that, by using words and specific description, the U.S. media 
constructs Muslim and Arab-Americans as the Other after 9/11 (i.e., a constructed reality).  
RA06 I 
This article explains how media news reports construct Joey Galloway as a wayward child, greedy, 
disloyal.  
RA07 I 
This article explains how medical discourse continually constructs a traditional image for the public. 
This constructed image (i.e., reality) is that nursing is subject to the medical profession.  
RA08 II 
The author of this article suggests that the 1998 National Curriculum is a product of ideological 
competition and negotiation fought by diverse interest groups.  
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RA09 II 
The author of this article adopts quantitative data (e.g., voting statistics) to show us where in the 
spectrum of political ideology (i.e., liberal, centrist, or conservative) these diverse factions (i.e., 
Traditional Democrats, New Democrats, Blue Dogs) of the Democrats party are located. The author 
simply presents what consciousness (i.e., reality) one faction holds without discussing the power 
operation or whether such a consciousness is true or false, right or wrong, and good or bad to the 
people.  Accordingly, the discussion of Class (faction) consciousness maintains a neutral dimension. 
RA10 I 
The author of this article tries to explain why the reality that Will constructs through his editorials is 
unreal. Will constructs a right-wing ideology for his readers. Hence, this article criticises the reality 
which is constructed by one side which also dominates the other.  
RA11 IV 
This article does not involve a discussion of reality except the explanation which shows the status of 
current legal reform in the Islam world (the reality of reform). 
RA12 I 
In the first half of the article, the author simply explains the different attitudes of law that diverse 
interviewees possess (i.e., their own reality). The second half explains why most interviewees consider 
that the haves (e.g., people who have legal knowledge such as lawyers) come out ahead. 
RA13 III 
RA13 argues that Egypt’s social welfare plans were originally designed to manage the poverty 
problem in order to reach modernity. However, social welfare plans, such as ‘public assistance law’ 
and ‘social insurance’, have provided Egyptians with nothing but the false consciousnesses which is 
always just an imagination of social welfare. This is because those diverse welfare plans are more like 
rhetoric tools which helped diverse political regimes to maintain social order and their authority. The 
purpose of social welfare plans is not to help people; instead, it is to create a (false) consciousness that 
the ‘government is helping people’. 
RA14 III 
The author of this article argues that Asante’s notion of Afrocentricity did not work out as Asante 
expected to lead black people or Africans to escape from the dominance of the west (i.e., a false 
reality). On the other hand, the reality (what this author thought) is that the notion of “Aftrocentricity 
erects a representation of self that is politically imaginary, that is, an image that hides the real alienated 
conditions of most of Afro-America’s material existence” (p. 100). This author presents what reality it 
is—i.e., the world is not changed due to such a notion; the black people are still alienated.  
RA15 I 
This article applies history and quantitative data to explain how the value of man (and middle class) 
constructs the image, or the social roles, of female teachers (and working class). Such an image 
influences the public expectation of female teachers’ roles, their teaching contents, their wages as well 
as their Class (status) location. Thus, the Class consciousness which these female teachers have 
perceived, to the analyst of RA15, is not their real Class consciousness. 
RA16 IV 
RA16 mainly explains the difference between the authors’ (i.e., people who designed curriculum for 
Portuguese middle school) personal ideological and the pedagogical principle of their works. This 
article does not clearly discuss what reality it is. 
RA17 II 
The author of this article adopts the word “just” to explore the ideology which the politician holds in 
order to explain their way of thinking about the society (i.e., the reality they possess).  
RA18 I(III) 
This article argues that the best practices movement formulated by the American Counseling 
Association indeed is a dominant ideology (a reality which shows what is right). By setting up the best 
practices movement, other types of treatment (e.g., disorder movement) have been excluded. As a 
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result, this author analyses the claim and application of “the best practice” to see whether such a claim 
of “the best practice” really proves its professional values in counselling.  
RA19 III 
This article belongs to an analysis of cultural creation which analyses the narrative structure of 
Rowling’s Harry Potter. By pointing out the contradictory narrative embedded in this novel, the 
analyst of this article argues that Rowling has mixed up the first (i.e., real) and the second (i.e., 
magical) worlds. Namely, the reality that this novel presents to us (i.e., mixed world) is not the same as 
what Rowling and her readers thought (i.e., magical world). This analyst tells us what reality it is 
instead of what we think it is (It is A not B).  
RA20 I 
By applying forms of thought, images, and symbols, men intentionally or unintentionally constructs an 
academia where females are excluded. This is the reality that the author of this article possesses. 
RA21 III (I) 
This article, by reviewing history, explains how the definition of Dangdut music has been appropriated 
by diverse groups to pursue their group interests (e.g., political or economic interests). In so doing, a 
reality—what meaning “the people” in Dangdut music refers to—is constructed. (I) The author of this 
article argues that such a reality does not represent the truth, the real meaning of Dangdut music. 
Consequently, he attempts to show the reality (what meaning the people in Dangdut music really refers 
to). (III) 
RA22 II 
This article spends pages on theoretically discussing the relationship between power and reality, or to 
explain how power constructs reality. Nevertheless, while the author of this article brings an example 
into her discussion, she does not clearly explain how her research objects—parents and 
daughters—apply their power or resistance respectively to construct or defend their own value (i.e., 
crop-tops are cute or dorky). Hence, this article only discusses how reality (e.g., daughters consider 
crop-tops as cute.) is constructed from a theoretical perspective.  
RA23 I 
The author of this article argues that the definition of “caring” in the nursing profession has been 
reinterpreted. Such a new definition of caring refers to non-skilled treatment of spiritual concern (i.e., 
the constructed reality) which has replaced the original definition of skilled treatment of healthy 
concern (i.e., the real reality, in the author’s position). The reality regarding significance of caring is 
constructed through the interpretation. 
RA24 I 
RA24 points out how the Chinese Communist Party applies diverse visible political slogans to change 
people’s invisible consciousness, which reflects people’s thinking (i.e., diverse realities) through times 
(e.g., in the early era: to be loyal to leaders; in later eras: to rationalize the policy of economic 
development). The reality which represents people’s value here is constructed by the dominant group. 
RA25 I 
The author of this article argues that a particular ideology is conveyed in news reports of the 
Columbine event which creates limited and non-objective discourses. Such discourses regarding the 
Columbine event is incapable of representing the truth (i.e., a false reality).  
RA26 II 
The author of this article does not judge whether the reality influenced by power is true or not. He 
simply explains the conversion of the Ireland Republican Movement. Such a conversion shifts “from a 
physical force organisation to a socialist party that emphasises economic rather than national issues.” 
He does not judge whether the reality, which represented the social condition of a time (e.g., in the 
‘force’ or ‘party’ style stage), is influenced by power or is presented truthfully or falsely. The analyst 
just (objectively) presents the reality of certain times diachronically. 
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RA27 III (I) 
This article tries to tell us that a false reality—the way people consider Somalia as a failed 
state—exists. The author of this article examines the colonised history of Somalia pointing out the 
reason (the real reality, i.e., his own perspective) that makes Somalia a failed state.  
RA28 III 
This article mainly discusses the ideology shift in Die Grünen from 1980 to 2002 which is based on an 
investigation of the official documents. The author of this article thinks that Die Grünen nowadays 
possesses the liberalism ideology (i.e., the reality that the author himself considers) instead of the 
ideology of ecologized socialism that most people suppose. Namely, the IAC analyst denies one 
current ideology and reasserts another. 
RA29 III 
The author of this article agrees with Haimson that it is workers themselves who triggered the October 
revolution instead of Lenin and his Bolshevik comrades. (Author tell us) The real reality is that 
workers were autonomous who expected social change which made the revolution possible.  
RA30 III (I) 
This article claims that Oscar Lewis’ notion of “subculture of poverty”, in the past thirty years, has 
been misunderstood as a critique on victims of poverty. That is, the whole academia’s 
misinterpretation of Oscar Lewis’ notion has constructed a false understanding. (I) The author of this 
article also attempts to redress that Lewis’ ideas maintain basic Marxism. (III) 
RA31 III (I) 
This article explains how “digital reference service models” have become the dominant ideology in 
contemporary library management which constructs a reality of library reference work. Such a reality 
concludes the phenomena of de-professionalization, female and call-centre orientation, and low 
wage-oriented. (I) In the second half of the article, its author also redresses what value reference work 
really is (i.e., her own reality). (III) 
RA32 II 
The author of this article analyses the “Schools Commission Reports” and tries to explain what 
ideology these reports contain and how the ideologies of these reports shift. The discourses of the 
reports present the reality.  
RA33 II 
This article explains that the Vietnam elites try to introduce company law from other countries to 
respond accordingly to the developing business activities in Vietnam. But the borrowed law does not 
match with the local Vietnam society as expected. Hence, the author of this article depicts the reality 
that these diverse groups together construct via the process of negotiation and compromise. 
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Appendix 81: Selecting Expression Styles 
 
1: The Purely Descriptive Style means that IAC analysts simply and purely describe or 
present the (new) ideology they have discovered without involving themselves with any 
personal subjectivity. 
2: The Interpretative Style means that IAC analysts start to argue or judge their research 
subjects. 
3: The Defensive and Corrective Style means that IAC analysts directly and obviously 
defend and correct the misunderstood parts as well as tell readers what is right. 
 
Research Article Number  Category 
Explanation 
RA01 2 
This article explains the ideological shift of New Labour (regarding their policy) after New Labour 
took power. Although the authors of this article just simply depict the party’s ideological shift 
without explaining how it shifts, their demonstration in fact concealed an invisible critique. The 
authors seem to suggest that New Labour’s spirit has changed (i.e., inclining to the right).  
RA02 3 
The Islamic background of the author of this article might be the reason that influenced the 
expressive style of this paper—inching to defensive or corrective style. In this article, the author did 
not focus on explaining what Islam really is; instead, he focused on how Islam is misrepresented 
through media news reports. 
RA03 3 
The author of this article thinks that Maruyama Masao misunderstood Fukuzawa Yukichi’s notions. 
As a result, he first explains what Masao’s understanding is, and then starts to defend and correct 
what Yukichi’s notions really are by offering his own understanding. 
RA04 3 
This article explains how diet companies use media advertisings to construct a certain image for their 
product through times (e.g., ideology shifts from fad diets to healthy diets) in order to continue to 
attract customers. The first person voice is adopted through the whole paper which creates a 
firsthand experience feeling for its readers. It seems like that we readers are all product consumers 
who are invited to fight against diet companies, who are usually described as “them”. As a result, the 
author’s purpose of defending a cognition regarding a diet company is revealed. 
RA05 2 
This article focuses on how media constructs certain ideology by their news reports. Although this is 
not a defensive or corrective style of ideological analysis, it is easy to detect their personal attitude 
through their demonstration. 
RA06 3 
This article explains how news media (impeded by a sport team for future news resources) constructs 
an image of Joey Galloway as a wayward child, greedy, disloyal by their news report. The author of 
this article argues that such an image of demonizing Galloway is for sustaining the authority of the 
sport team and its coach which did not represent the reality (truth) of that time. He tried to defend the 
reality. The Author concluded, even judged, that this results from modern racism. 
RA07 3 
This article explains how the medical profession who are superior in power continually adopt their 
medical discourses to construct a traditional value: nursing is subject to the medical profession. 
Because of such discourses, when nursing tries to fight for their independent character, 
simultaneously, nursing is articulated by the images of crisis, militancy, radicalism, and 
incompetency. The author of this article criticises such a false image of nursing and, by defending 
and redressing, he offers readers a real image of nursing. 
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RA08 2 
This article cites many quotations from interview draft (at least one quarter) which could create a 
neutral image for the author, that is, let quotations speak for themselves so that the track of the author 
vanishes. However, the author massively adopts the first person voice (e.g., I argue, p.2; I want to 
suggest, p.2; I do not want to claim, p.3; The position I adopt is, p.5; I want to illustrate, p.6; What I 
want to suggest, p. 12; I claimed) in most of his paper which also reveals his attitude and position. 
RA09 1 
This article does not talk about how power operates or how power constructs reality. The author of 
this article adopts quantitative data (e.g., voting statistics) to show us where in the spectrum of 
political ideology (i.e., liberal, centrist, or conservative) these diverse factions (i.e., Traditional 
Democrats, New Democrats, Blue Dogs) of the Democrats party are located. The author simply and 
purely describes what consciousness one faction holds without involving a discussion of power 
operation or whether such a faction-consciousness is true or false. The discussion maintains a neutral 
dimension. 
RA10 3 
This article explains how George Will’s editorials, which were published in the U.S. media, 
construct, praise, and strengthen a right-wing ideology. To the author of this article, Will’s arguments 
did not accurately present the reality. As a result, by uncovering what ideology Will’s writings 
convey, this author started to criticise and point out the wrongness of such a constructed ideology. 
RA11 1 
This article discusses how Islamic intellectuals internally fight for the interpretation right of the 
reform of Islamic Legal. The author of this article did not display too much personal subjectivity; 
instead, his discussion is mainly based on historical explanation and quotation. As a result, this 
article is categorized as purely descriptive ideological analysis. 
RA12 1&2 
The first half of the RA12(34) was written via a purely descriptive style in which the authors of this 
article simply presented stories of their interviewees as well as quoted these interviewees’ own words 
to show what they think about the law. Yet, in the second half of this article, the authors started to 
bring their opinions to demonstrate how and why the “Haves come out ahead.” For example, 
sentences such as “In answering these questions, we suggest precisely the opposite […]” (p. 1036) 
and “We reiterate, however, that law's power is only in part derived from its status as transcendent 
and ideal” (p. 1040). This thesis does not mean to find fault with the way they presented the articles. 
These sentences indeed exposed the authors’ position and attitude regarding their research topic. 
Other writings which also displayed their certain attitude include “In point of fact, Rita Michaels 
[…]”(p. 1030), “In fact, Alan Fox plays law as he plays poker” (p. 1033), etc. Because of these 
(unintentional) writings, this article turned the expression angle from a purely descriptive to an 
interpretative style. Thus, it could be said that both purely descriptive and interpretive styles exist in 
this article. 
RA13 1&2 
RA13 methods of historical narrative and offering quantitative data to explain Egypt’s social welfare 
plans (e.g., public assistance law and social insurance) indeed are the rhetoric tools which helped 
diverse political regimes to maintain social order and their authority. Regarding the analytical 
methods this article applied, it could be categorised as a pure descriptive style. Nevertheless, some of 
her writing such as “This sudden concern” (p. 280), “it is thus not surprising” (p. 281, 288, 290), “It 
no doubt seemed”, “would (of necessity?) be added” (p. 283), and “Ironically,…”(p. 290), to a great 
extent, has revealed her own subjectivity. Although these subjective descriptions might be innocent 
writings due to the analyst’s writing behaviour, from a holistic view, a fair categorizing is to admit 
the existence of both styles in this article. 
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RA14 2 
This is an article which obviously shows the author’s personal subjectivities. This article explains 
that Asante’s notion of Afrocentricity did not work out as Asante expected to lead black people or 
Africans to escape from the dominance of the west. To the author of RA14, Asante’s demonstration 
still relies on the vested western logic; the world is not changed due to Asante’s suggestion; black 
people are still alienated. The author’s subjectivity is found through his writing. He confirmedly 
argued that things are not going the way that Asante wished. This is an evaluation made from the 
author’s point of view. 
RA15 2 
In this article, historical literature and quantitative data were adopted to explain what roles the 
female teachers have played in the past as well as the present resulting from the education system. 
Basically, research topics which deal with gender or religion are usually presented with defensive or 
corrective style of ideological analysis (e.g.,RA02, 06, 20, 27 etc.). Nevertheless, maybe because the 
author of this article is male his writing did not try to defend or correct the so-called false ideology 
which shows how females are oppressed and unfairly treated. As a result, this article is categorized 
as an interpretative style of ideological analysis which focuses simply on the roles of females in the 
past and now.  
RA16 1&2 
This is an analysis of the authors’ (who designed the curriculum for Portuguese middle school) 
personal ideological and pedagogical principle of their works. The authors of this article compared 
interview opinions of authors of the curriculum with texts of “Flexible Management of curriculum”. 
Nevertheless, in some writings, the authors of this article inevitably display their subjective 
judgement. As a result, this article is categorized as a style between purely descriptive and 
interpretative ideological analysis. 
RA17 2 
This article explains how a word “just” could possess the ideological function. This article contains 
much discussion on theory and concepts related to the word “just” which explains why such a single 
word is able to possess the ideological function. Based on the above viewpoint, this article is purely 
descriptive in style. Nevertheless, the author of this article adopts the first person voice (i.e., we, our, 
us) to present his paper. Using the first person voice also reveals this author’s attempt to persuade 
readers. Because the author did not defend or try to correct any false ideas, this article is categorised 
as interpretative ideological analysis. 
RA18 3 
This article argues that the best practices movement formulated by the American Counseling 
Association indeed is a dominant ideology which has excluded other movements (i.e., way of 
treatment) except “the best” movement. In this article, the author corrects and argues against such a 
dominant ideology (i.e., the pursuit of “the best”) and defends and suggests what real understanding 
and value should be when people think of the counselling field. 
RA19 3 
By pointing out the narrative contradiction within this novel, this author argues that Rowling has 
mixed up the first (i.e., real) and the second (i.e., magical) world. Namely, the reality that this novel 
presents to us (i.e., mixed world) is not the same as what Rowling and her readers thought (i.e., 
magical world). This author corrects the readers’ misunderstanding and tells us what the truth 
(reality) is. 
RA20 3 
This article explains how the academia dominated by males excludes females in the right of 
interpretation via forms of thought, images, and symbols. The author of this article, by adopting the 
first person voice, invites readers to dig out the unbalanced power relationship. Moreover, this article 
employed the percentage of female educators at different levels (e.g., from high schools to 
universities) and the percentage of women in different positions (e.g., principals, lecturers, 
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professors), to respond to its argument: women (their roles and opinions) are excluded from 
academia, which is dominated by men. Thus, the author provides suggestions to break through such 
a condition. 
RA21 3 
The author of this article historically explains how Dangdut music is appropriated by diverse interest 
groups to reach their benefits through time. As a result, he tries to defend and correct such false 
understanding by offering his opinion: what real Dangdut music should be, what it represents, and 
how it functions.  
RA22 2 
This article theoretically discusses how reality is constructed, e.g., by different social structures, such 
as school v.s. real society. The author designed an example (not real life example) to discuss how 
parents and daughters react to this question: whether a crop-top is cute or dorky. Although this author 
tries to examine what reasons (e.g. relative truth, social truth relativism,) influence parents’ and 
daughters’ thoughts, the way he describes it is obviously close to parents’ position (even though he 
tries to present arguments equally). Since this author involves his position in his discussion, this 
article is categorised as interpretative ideological analysis in which the author tried to suggest what is 
right (e.g., parents’ opinion is right while daughter’s is wrong). 
RA23 3 
The way of presentation in this article is to cite many quotations accompanying the authors’ own 
words. After displaying one quotation, the authors of this article start to demonstrate why the 
concepts of these quoted words are wrong as well as why those words are harmful to the meaning of 
caring. In so doing, the authors offer ideas on what should be the right meaning of caring (i.e., their 
own ideology). In a word, they correct and redress the wrong concept and offer another. 
RA24 2 
This article explains how the Chinese Communist Party applies visible political slogans to change 
people’s invisible consciousness. That is to say, the operation of power reflects in how CCP utilizes 
political slogans to construct and maintain their dominant ideology. Although the author’s 
subjectivity is found through his writing, he did not claim CCP’s slogans were wrong or not (so a 
correction or criticism is need). Hence, this article is categorized as interpretative ideological 
analysis. 
RA25 1&2 
This article focused more on quoting sentences or paragraphs to explain what ideology the research 
object conveys instead of judging whether such an ideology is right or wrong. Nevertheless, some 
selected words also reveal its author’s ideological position and preference. As a result, this article is 
categorized as a style between purely descriptive and interpretative ideological analysis. 
 
RA26 1&2 
This article does not tell what ideology is hidden, nor argue how one group dominates the other. 
Instead, it only explains the process of the Ireland Republican Movement which is “from a physical 
force organisation to a socialist party that emphasises economic rather than national issues” (p. 79). 
Nevertheless, the author of this article inevitably exposed his subjectivity through words. As a result, 
this article is categorized as having a style between purely descriptive and interpretative ideological 
analysis. 
 
RA27 3 
This article argues that some countries (e.g., Somalia) which are named as “failed states” in fact are 
defined by others (e.g., the western countries, academics). The author investigates how such a term is 
inappropriately applied based on Somalia’s history of being imperial or economically colonized. He 
tries to correct what is wrong as well as defends what reality it is. 
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RA28 2 
This article compared policies of Die Grünen in two periods (1980 and 2002) in order to explain the 
ideological shift in the political spectrum. For most of the time, the author of this article is neutral 
and objective; however, on some occasions, the writing unintentionally reveals their personal 
opinion.  
RA29 1 
This article adopts historical explanation to illustrate how one ideology is presented. The author of 
this article did not claim whether one group is dominated by the other or not, nor claim such an 
ideology is right or wrong. 
RA30 3 
This article cites much literature to explain how and why most scholars misunderstood Oscar 
Lewis’s notion of subculture of poverty. By using quotations, the authors could build a neutral and 
objective image for themselves. However, those selected quotations, in fact, usually invisibly display 
the authors’ preference and attitude (so that these quotations are selected). In the abstract, the authors 
write “An attempt is made to remedy this situation […]” which obviously shows that the authors’ 
personal opinions have already claimed “someone is wrong”. Hence, this article is categorized as 
defensive and corrective ideological analysis. 
RA31 3 
The author of this article first explains what reality is constructed by digital reference service models 
which contain bad influences. Such bad influences have generated phenomena such as 
de-professionalization, call-centre settings, and low wage-oriented. That is why this author tries to 
correct bad values and defends the real value of reference work. 
RA32 2 
The author of this article analyses the “Schools Commission Reports” and tries to explain what 
ideology these reports contain and how the ideologies of these reports shift. He used many 
quotations to support his demonstration. Although he tries to stay in a neutral and objective position, 
he massively adopts the first person voice (e.g., if we wish to; Let us now; we witnessed; we can 
now see; As we shall see; Perhaps we can, etc.) in most of his demonstration which also reveals his 
attitude and position. 
RA33 1 
This article adopts angles of history and environment to explain why Vietnam cannot fully accept the 
borrowed company law. The author compares the borrowed company law with Vietnam’s local 
condition in order to point to the differences between two ideologies. Except for a few subjective 
descriptions, this article can be seen as a neutral and purely descriptive ideological analysis. 
 
